

**REGIONAL THREATS AND DEFENSE  
OPTIONS FOR THE 1990s**

---

**HEARINGS**

**BEFORE THE**

**DEFENSE POLICY PANEL**

**AND THE**

**DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY DEFENSE NUCLEAR  
FACILITIES PANEL**

**OF THE**

**COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES  
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES**

**ONE HUNDRED SECOND CONGRESS**

**SECOND SESSION**

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**HEARINGS HELD**

**PART I—MARCH 10, 11, 17, 19, 24, APRIL 2, 8, AND 9, 1992**

**PART II—MARCH 18, 26, 27, 31, APRIL 8, AND MAY 5, 1992**



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(II)



# CONTENTS

## LIST OF HEARINGS

1992

	Page
Part I. Regional Threats and Defense Options for the 1990s:	
A. Testimony of Unified and Specified Commanders in Chief and Regional Commanders in Chief:	
1. March 10, 1992: CINC Transportation Command .....	1
2. March 11, 1992: CINC Central Command .....	61
3. March 17, 1992: CINC Atlantic Command and CINC Southern Command .....	119
4. March 19, 1992: CINC Special Operations Command .....	167
5. March 24, 1992: CINC U.S. European Command .....	197
6. April 2, 1992: CINC U.S. Forces, Korea .....	233
7. April 8, 1992: CINC Strategic Air Command .....	249
8. April 9, 1992: CINC Pacific Command .....	279
Part II.	
B. March 18, 1992: The Bush Administration's Seven Scenarios for American Military Involvement (CLASSIFIED)—Held in committee files.	
C. March 27, 1992: Worldwide Threats to United States Security, Director of Central Intelligence Agency .....	311
D. March 26, 1992: Anti-Chaos Aid to the Former Soviet Union and Nuclear Proliferation Issues .....	323
E. March 31, 1992: U.S. Post-Cold War Security in the Pacific .....	355
F. April 8, 1992: Future Nuclear Weapons Requirements .....	395
G. May 5, 1992: The Army National Guard Combat Role and Capabilities	423

## STATEMENTS PRESENTED BY MEMBERS OF CONGRESS

Aspin, Hon. Les, a Representative from Wisconsin, Chairman, Defense Policy Panel .....	1, 61, 167, 233, 249, 279, 311, 323, 355, 423
Davis, Hon. Robert W., a Representative from Michigan .....	250
Dickinson, Hon. William L., a Representative from Alabama, Ranking Minority Member, Defense Policy Panel:	
Statement .....	120, 168, 198, 234, 280, 312, 424
Prepared statement .....	356
Kyl, Hon. Jon, a Representative from Arizona, Ranking Minority Member, Department of Energy Defense Nuclear Facilities Panel .....	396
Martin, Hon. David O'B., a Representative from New York .....	324
Sisisky, Hon. Norman, a Representative from Virginia .....	197
Skelton, Hon. Ike, a Representative from Missouri .....	119
Spence, Hon. Floyd, a Representative from South Carolina:	
Statement .....	2, 62
Prepared statement .....	62
Spratt, Hon. John M., Jr., a Representative from South Carolina, Chairman, Department of Energy Defense Nuclear Facilities Panel .....	395

## PRINCIPAL WITNESSES WHO APPEARED IN PERSON OR SUBMITTED WRITTEN STATEMENTS

Armitage, Ambassador Richard, Coordinator for Assistance to the New Independent States, Department of State .....	324
---	-----

## IV

	Page
Burns, Maj. Gen. William F., USA Ret., Coordinator for Nuclear Dismantlement, Department of State:	
Statement .....	328
Prepared statement .....	332
Butler, Gen. Lee, Commander In Chief, Strategic Air Command:	
Statement .....	251
Prepared statement .....	252
Davis, Richard A., Director, Army Issues, National Security and International Affairs Division, General Accounting Office .....	436
Edney, Adm. Leon A., USN:	
Statement .....	130
Prepared statement .....	133
Edwards, Maj. Gen. Donald F., President, Adjutants General Association .....	433
Ensslin, Maj. Gen. Robert F., Jr., Ret., President, National Guard Association .....	431
Gallucci, Robert L., Senior Coordinator in the Office of the Deputy Secretary, Department of State .....	326
Galvin, Gen. John R., USA, Commander In Chief, U.S. European Command:	
Statement .....	199
Prepared statement .....	202
Gates, Robert M., Director of the Central Intelligence Agency .....	313
Griffith, Lt. Gen. Ronald H., Inspector General, Department of the Army .....	425
Hoar, Gen. Joseph P., USMC, Commander In Chief, U.S. Central Command	
Statement .....	63
Prepared statement .....	66
Johnson, Gen. Hansford T., USAF, Commander In Chief, U.S. Transportation Command:	
Statement .....	2
Prepared statement .....	5
Joulwan, Gen. George A., USA, Commander In Chief, U.S. Southern Command:	
Statement .....	121
Prepared statement .....	124
Kreisberg, Paul, Senior Research Associate, East-West Center:	
Statement .....	373
Prepared statement .....	377
Larson, Adm. Charles R., USN, Commander In Chief, U.S. Pacific Command:	
Statement .....	280
Prepared statement .....	284
May, Michael, Former Director, Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory .....	402
Peay, Lt. Gen. J.H. Binford, III, Deputy Chief of Staff, Operations and Plans, United States Army .....	429
Pollack, Jonathan, Corporate Research Manager, International Policy Department, Rand Corporation .....	
Reed, Thomas, Former Secretary, U.S. Air Force .....	396
RisCassi, Gen. Robert W., USA, Commander In Chief, U.S. Forces, Korea:	
Statement .....	235
Prepared statement .....	238
Romberg, Alan, C.V. Starr Fellow for Asia Studies, Council on Foreign Relations .....	362
Stiner, Gen. Carl W., USA, Commander In Chief, U.S. Special Operations Command:	
Statement .....	168
Prepared statement .....	184
Yost, Casimir, Director, Center for Asian and Pacific Affairs, Asian Foundation .....	356

## CINC TRANSPORTATION COMMAND

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HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,  
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES,  
DEFENSE POLICY PANEL,  
*Washington, DC, Tuesday, March 10, 1992.*

The panel met, pursuant to call, at 9:40 a.m., in room 2118, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Les Aspin (chairman of the panel) presiding.

### OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. LES ASPIN, A REPRESENTATIVE FROM WISCONSIN, CHAIRMAN, DEFENSE POLICY PANEL

The CHAIRMAN The meeting will come to order this morning.

Today the Armed Services Committee begins a series of hearings on the regional threats we are likely to face in the post-cold war era and the right defense to meet them.

The two modern revolutions, in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union, have fundamentally changed the basis of our defense planning. For more than 40 years, the danger posed by the Soviet Union drove the size and shape of our military and the amount we spent on it. The former Soviet Union no longer poses so great a threat, but it still makes sense to size and shape our forces to meet real threats; otherwise, you don't know how much defense is enough, nor will we be able to expect the support of Americans who see many competing needs for their tax dollars.

Other hearings in this series will examine the threats of the new era region by region. Today, we will look at an element of our force structure that is vital to us whatever the threat we face, and that is the strategic lift. We learned the primacy of lift in Operation Desert Shield and Desert Storm. We successfully moved an enormous amount of equipment halfway across the world. Yet, in the process some inadequacies became clear.

The committee is pleased to have the opportunity to discuss this very important issue with Gen. Hansford T. Johnson, Commander in Chief of the U.S. Transportation Command. General Johnson deserves our thanks for his fine work on Operation Provide Hope, the relief effort which transported humanitarian aid to the former Soviet Union last month.

We would like to explore the capabilities and limitations of our current lift and the changes we might make in future force structures. In particular, sir, we would like to address the recent Mobility Requirement Study (MRS) which concluded that we do not now have the lift to support two contingencies simultaneously. The study recommended adding enough lift for one contingency and rejected, because of cost, other options that would have provided



more capability. We would like to get into that and other issues with you, sir.

Before we begin, let me see if Congressman Spence would like to say anything before we begin.

**STATEMENT OF HON. FLOYD SPENCE, A REPRESENTATIVE  
FROM SOUTH CAROLINA**

Mr. SPENCE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Just briefly, I would like to welcome General Johnson for a number of reasons, one of which is that he is a native of my home State.

I am real proud of you and the job you have done, General. It is good to see you again. We recall with much pride the success your command had in getting our warriors and their weapons and supplies to the Persian Gulf. Moving over 500,000 troops and 10 million tons in less than 6 months was a tremendous feat.

But, even before the Desert Shield buildup peaked, we knew there were not enough planes and ships to move our Army faster. As it turns out, we were fortunate. Iraq gave us time to deploy ground, air and naval units, and even rehearse the war. Future opponents won't give us that much time. We learned that and much more in Desert Storm.

That is why we are starting today to work at closing the gap that has existed for too long in both air and sealift. Getting more combat forces into a theater in weeks, not months, is key to winning in a decisive way. The Defense Department's Mobility Requirements Study is a start. With its candid view of our air and sealift vulnerabilities, it does offer improvements in strategic mobility.

But the right mix of support, ships, aircraft and money is something this committee is going to decide.

Mr. Chairman, for our side, I commend you for starting the panel's review of reasonable threats, with a look at boosting our Armed Forces lift capabilities. Not shortchanging strategic lift is likely one of those crucial defense areas where the panel will reach the most consensus.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN Thank you, Floyd Spence.

General Johnson, sir, the floor is yours.

**STATEMENT OF GEN. HANSFORD T. JOHNSON, USAF,  
COMMANDER IN CHIEF, U.S. TRANSPORTATION COMMAND**

General JOHNSON. Mr. Chairman, I am very pleased to be here representing the men and women of the defense transportation system. This system includes not only my command and our three components, but also the Active, Reserve and Guard forces that support them, and most importantly, the commercial sector that we depend upon so greatly in providing the transportation for the Armed Forces.

**MEETING THE TRANSPORTATION CHALLENGE**

This year's hearings will focus on the enormous changes that have occurred in our country and around the world in the last several years. Nowhere are these changes better demonstrated than, as you mentioned, by our activity last month during Operation Provide Hope. Our airlift, sealift, and ground transportation team posi-

tioned and delivered over 2,200 tons of food and medicine to the states of the former Soviet Union. It was an historic and turbulent end to five decades of confrontation.

As an American, I am heartened by the end of the cold war and the greatly reduced threat of nuclear confrontation. As a military officer, I am proud of the role America's Armed Forces played in this victory. As the commander of U.S. Transportation Command, I am committed to maintaining a defense transportation system that can meet the future needs of our country. Ironically, the end of the cold war has made this challenge—the transportation challenge—more difficult.

Throughout the past five decades, we have had a clearly defined threat and well-identified areas of potential conflict or confrontation. This allowed us to develop a defense transportation system that was spring-loaded for clearly identified scenarios. Significant amounts of forward-deployed troops, prepositioned assets, and well-developed transportation infrastructures were of great assistance in meeting our requirements.

From a transportation perspective, however, the future provides a different picture. First, the rapid proliferation of high technology weaponry combined with the age-old causes of conflict, unfortunately, means the end of the cold war will not necessarily bring about the end of all threats to our country nor our security interests around the world. Second, the transition from a bipolar world to a multipolar world will require a defense transportation system that is prepared to respond to a crisis at any point on the globe, from Northeast Asia to the Middle East and many other locations around the world. We no longer will have the luxury of focusing our efforts on one or two scenarios.

In my prepared statement, I provide a detailed description of the defense transportation system that America needs to meet these new challenges. This system will require the speed and agility of airlift, the enormous capacity of sealift, and the benefits of prepositioning. It will best use our continental United States port, road, and rail systems to provide the American people with a cost-effective transportation system that maintains the vast majority of its capability in the commercial sector. It is a system that will increase its efficiency, flexibility, and responsiveness with a combination of improved computer technology and an uncompromising commitment to quality management principles.

The foundation of our defense transportation system is solid. As you mentioned, this was well demonstrated during our Desert Shield deployment. To prepare for future challenges, it will be necessary to expand our surge and prepositioned sealift capability; to modernize our aging airlift fleet with the addition of the C-17; to maintain and improve the U.S. ground transportation system; and to maintain a sufficient degree of support infrastructure both within our country and outside the continental United States, such as our bases at Torrejon in Spain and Rhein Main in Germany.

If we fulfill these requirements, our defense transportation system will continue to meet America's mobility requirements throughout the remainder of this decade and into the 21st century.

As you mentioned, the Defense Department has provided a good study on transportation needs: the Mobility Requirements Study. It

is a definitive analysis. It addresses all of the defense transportation issues, contains extensive analysis, and recommends sound and executable solutions. USTRANSCOM fully participated in all parts of the Mobility Requirements Study, and I enthusiastically endorse the findings of the study.

As Congress, the administration, and the uniformed services work together to restructure and reshape America's Armed Forces, we must ensure that America builds a force that maintains both capability and credibility. This is the type of force that President Bush discussed in his speech at the Aspen Institute back on August 2, 1990. The capability will come from the technological superiority and excellent levels of readiness that were demonstrated in Desert Shield and Desert Storm. The credibility will come from America's ability to move these well-equipped and well-trained forces where and when they are needed. That is our mission at the U.S. Transportation Command, to provide America's base force credibility through global transportation capability.

I look forward to this meeting with you and your committee, sir.



**Presentation to the  
Committee on Armed Services  
United States House of Representatives**

**March 10, 1992**

**Statement of  
General Hansford T. Johnson  
Commander in Chief  
United States Transportation Command**



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**United States  
Transportation Command**

*Not for publication Until Released  
By The Committee on Armed Services  
United States House of Representatives*

## TABLE OF CONTENTS

<b>Introduction.....</b>	<b>1</b>
<b>Transportation in the National Military Strategy.....</b>	<b>2</b>
Foundations and Principles.....	2
Planning and Employment.....	3
Transportation in the Base Force Concept.....	3
<b>Defining the Transportation Force Structure.....</b>	<b>4</b>
Emerging Realities for Strategic Lift.....	4
Results of the Mobility Requirements Study.....	6
Mobility Assets.....	6
Airlift.....	7
C-17 .....	8
Intratheater.....	10
CRAF.....	10
Sealift.....	11
Surge Sealift .....	12
Sealift Acquisition.....	14
CONUS Transportation.....	15
<b>The Future Defense Transportation System.....</b>	<b>15</b>
An Integrated System.....	16
USTRANSCOM's Role.....	17
New Directions .....	17
Aerial Refueling.....	18
Global Transportation Network.....	18
Containerization and Intermodalism.....	19
Active and Reserve Forces.....	20
Merchant Marine Reserve .....	21
Total Quality .....	21
<b>Conclusion.....</b>	<b>22</b>
Strategic Mobility Assets.....	Attachment 1
Explanation of Sealift Abbreviations.....	Attachment 2

## **Introduction**

The call for deployment came on 7 August 1990. That same day, the first combat troops of the lead echelon of the 82nd Airborne were on the ground in Saudi Arabia. Within 10 days, this nation's defense mobility resources had been energized, many for their first true test: the Maritime Prepositioning Ships, the Fast Sealift Ships, the Civil Reserve Air Fleet, the Ready Reserve Force ships, the Afloat Prepositioning Ships, and the Defense Freight Rail Interchange Fleet. The total deployment effort for DESERT SHIELD/DESERT STORM amounted to over four million short tons (over eight billion pounds) of dry cargo and over six million tons of petroleum products. We moved over nine divisions worth of troops and equipment to the Persian Gulf. And then we had to move them home again. The shooting war was over at the end of February 1991, but the redeployment, called DESERT SORTIE, is still not totally complete. The combat troops and equipment have all returned, but the last retrograde supply shipments are due in next month.

Mr. Chairman, members of the committee, I appreciate the opportunity today to discuss with you the role strategic mobility plays as a cornerstone of our national defense capability, as well as the assets needed for a transportation system that will ensure the success of future deployments. The historic changes the world has seen in the last year have understandably resulted in a drawdown in our overall defense force structure. As we guard against a return to a "hollow" force, we must also ensure we do not limit that force due to lack of sufficient transportation. As President Bush stated in his first address on the new direction in national security on 2 August 1990:

"And in many of the conflicts we could face, we may not have the luxury of matching manpower with prepositioned materiel. We'll have to have air and sealift capacities to get our forces where they are needed when they are needed. A new emphasis on flexibility and versatility must guide our efforts."

His words, spoken in Aspen, Colorado, could not have been truer as halfway around the world on that day, Saddam Hussein's tanks were rolling into Kuwait. Our strategic airlift, sealift, and overland transportation resources must be ready to respond to the next call.

## ***Transportation in the National Military Strategy***

Transportation is a vital part of our National Military Strategy, as an implicit part of its Foundations, Principles, Planning and Employment, and an explicit supporting capability to the Base Force.

### ***Foundations and Principles***

Often, the first action the military undertakes when called upon to respond to a potential threat is moving troops and their equipment. As the Army transporters say, "Nothing happens until something moves." Transportation is a vital underpinning to the foundations of military strategy: Strategic Deterrence, Forward Presence, Crisis Response, and Reconstitution. The effects of transportation are most clearly seen in Crisis Response — getting the fighting force where it needs to be by the time it needs to be there. A flexible, balanced transportation system is required to respond across a full spectrum of deployments, from lesser regional contingencies like JUST CAUSE to major regional conflicts like DESERT SHIELD/DESERT STORM. Mobility also draws upon the foundation of Forward Presence by utilizing prepositioned materiel.

Transportation is the means to achieve the principle of strategic agility. One of eight principles in the National Military Strategy, strategic agility calls for U.S. forces to be fully capable of worldwide employment on short notice. The capability for worldwide *employment* of forces is dependent upon sufficient lift assets to provide for their worldwide *deployment*. While naval, marine, and air forces are dependent in varying degrees upon strategic lift assets in their initial deployment, Army forces are wholly reliant upon mobility assets to accomplish another strategic principle: power projection. Furthermore, as demonstrated in DESERT SHIELD/DESERT STORM, the projection of power for all of the armed forces will last only through the efforts of sustainment and resupply. Transportation makes power projection credible. The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, General Colin Powell, made this his key point about transportation in his testimony this year when he stated simply and precisely, "Transportation: we have to be able to project power."

## ***Planning and Employment***

With the exception of strategic nuclear forces, the combatant Commanders in Chief (CINCs) must take transportation into account in all categories of their operational plans: deployment of forces, peacetime engagement, and deployment of reconstituted forces. The time-phased requirements for the deployment of forces must be accounted for realistically to provide viable military options. Transportation feasibility is an integral part of the planning process, and one that will become even more important with a shift in focus to regional contingencies.

Transportation assets are not limited, however, to contingency planning and operations, nor do they remain idle during peacetime. They actively contribute to the prevention of war through joint exercises and nationally directed relief efforts. Since the end of DESERT SHIELD/DESERT STORM, airlift aircraft, sealift ships, and military port operators have been involved in moving cargo to support exercises such as DISPLAY DETERMINATION, REFORGER, FOAL EAGLE, and currently, AHUAS TARA. Strategic lift also facilitates humanitarian assistance operations, the largest of which was a direct result of the Persian Gulf war. Operation PROVIDE COMFORT brought needed assistance to the Kurdish population in northern Iraq and eastern Turkey through both airlift and sealift assets, military and commercial. Military aircraft delivered almost 40,000 tons of cargo while military and civilian airlift carried over 14,000 passengers as of the end of last year. Commercial and government-controlled ships delivered thousands of containers full of supplies. The airplanes, ships and containers of the defense transportation system often appear throughout the world as a symbol of American policy.

## ***Transportation in the Base Force Concept***

In the new National Military Strategy, released in January 1992, four conceptual force packages and four supporting capabilities make up the Base Force. One of these force packages, the strategic forces, is a nuclear deterrent which relies upon the strategic nuclear triad if called to carry out its mission. The other three force packages, the Atlantic, Pacific, and Contingency Forces, are composed of conventional arms. These conventional force packages, the bulk of the Base Force, rely upon strategic mobility resources when called to respond.



The National Military Strategy recognizes the key role of transportation, establishing it as one of the Base Force's supporting capabilities. Specifically, it states "The United States requires sufficient strategic mobility to rapidly deploy and sustain overwhelming combat power in any region where U.S. national interests are threatened." Moreover, these combat forces must be capable of deploying on short notice and arriving ready to fight. That requires a mobility structure up to the challenge. The initial response capability of joint forces in a contingency where we have no forward presence is proportional to the amount of lift we have available plus the airfields and seaports in the reception area. A strategic lift transportation system with the proper mix of air, sea, and overland assets is essential to the future base force structure.

## ***Defining the Transportation Force Structure***

The question then becomes: How much lift do we need? With DESERT SHIELD/DESERT STORM as the first operational test of the strategic lift programs created since World War II, we understand more fully the many variables effecting a strategic deployment. These include the size and nature of the threat itself; the concept of operations employed by the enemy; the response force package to be employed, both active and reserve; the combat-to-support-force ratio; the delivery schedule needed by the warfighting CINC; the distance to deploy; any prepositioned assets in or near the theater of operations; the amount of host nation support that can be expected or provided; the host nation's infrastructure, especially its air and sea port facilities; the terrain, climate, and time of year; the availability of en route bases; the degree of international cooperation; and most importantly, the amount of warning time. For any given regional scenario, some of these variables will be in our favor, some will not. Our transportation system and its assets must be diverse and flexible enough to permit a successful deployment, even in the worst of conditions.

## ***Emerging Realities for Strategic Lift***

Amidst this uncertain background, there are some emerging realities important to the sizing of the mobility force. First, even with the demise of the Soviet Union in the post Cold War era, the United States will continue to have vital interests in locations throughout the world. These locations are, in large part, thousands of miles away from our shores, with most of that distance over water. Nothing will change the geographic



fact that we are separated from most of our allies and foreign interests and will require a viable means of long-range strategic lift.

Second, the U.S. will continue to support and defend our vital interests, and must be able to send U.S. troops to show that resolve when necessary. Political "hot spots" can develop overnight. Responding to these various threats means that the size of a deployment force, and the corresponding requirement for mobility assets, could vary widely. We will never have enough strategic lift to satisfy every possible scenario. What we must have is the capability to deploy a decisive force for a given scenario, and have it on the ground at the definitive moment. The sizing of strategic lift assets, then, is dependent upon moving that decisive force in time to ensure success.

Third, we are decreasing our forces in current overseas locations, and have no forces stationed in many other vital areas. There is a direct relationship between the distance forces must travel and the amount of strategic lift needed. Increasing the distance increases the need for lift. In a contingency, soldiers already in the theater of operations require no strategic lift to deploy. Soldiers in the continental U.S. and areas other than the theater of operations need airlift, sealift, and ground transportation assets to join the battle. As we decrease the forces based overseas, we increase the likelihood that forces will have to be moved from the U.S. via strategic lift to respond to a particular crisis.

Finally, there are transportation requirements unique to the military that must be met with military, or organic, assets. It is uneconomical for U.S. rail, air, and sea shipping industries to maintain a capability for moving massive amounts of heavy combat equipment when the transportation assets that provide that capability do not have a commercial application. Still, we need a certain amount of railcars and trucks that can get heavy or outsized combat equipment from the unit's installation to the ports, and ships and aircraft that are capable of moving it to the theater of operations in quantity. Moreover, future regional contingencies may not involve full mobilizations of our armed forces. As in DESERT SHIELD/DESERT STORM, we would not expect to requisition transportation assets from U.S. commercial carriers to support a deployment. We will therefore need a significant amount of organic lift, more than we have now.

## ***Results of the Mobility Requirements Study***

The task of quantifying our lift requirement has been a challenging yet enlightening process, and one in which the U.S. Transportation Command (USTRANSCOM) has played a major role. The scope of the analysis, combined with an ever-changing world security situation throughout its undertaking, required time to develop but has yielded a product well founded in the new National Military Strategy and our historical experience. The Mobility Requirements Study (MRS) reflects the regional threats of the post Cold War/post DESERT STORM environment. It provides the basis for developing a balanced mix of strategic lift assets needed for tomorrow's defense transportation system.

The executive summary to MRS Volume I, Conclusions and Recommendations, released on 23 January 1992, contains an integrated mobility plan that addresses each mode of transportation: air, sea, and land. As with any analysis, though, the MRS had to make some important projections, and it is necessary to emphasize that some of the projections guiding its recommendations are not yet a reality. The MRS establishes a baseline for mobility assets in Fiscal Year 1999 (FY99). That baseline is above the level of assets we currently possess. It is critical, then, that we achieve both the FY99 baseline and the MRS's recommendations for further improvements. The specific recommendations for each mode of strategic lift are discussed in the sections that follow.

## ***Mobility Assets***

Our strategic mobility assets for air, sea, and overland transportation are listed in Attachment 1. One of the assets we currently possess, the C-141, is planned to begin retirement in this decade, a fact which is accounted for in the MRS FY99 baseline. With the operational experience of DESERT SHIELD/DESERT STORM and the recommendations of the MRS as a foundation, it is time for action to strengthen and improve the level of these strategic mobility resources.

## *Airlift*

Airlift provides the means for immediate response in any contingency. The inherent speed and flexibility of airlift is ideally suited to the shape of modern warfare -- high intensity and short duration. Victory or defeat of a U.S. response may, in fact, hinge upon that speed and flexibility. For small regional contingency operations involving lighter combat forces, airlift may be all that is needed. Operation JUST CAUSE in Panama relied almost exclusively on airlift to deliver nearly 40,000 troops and over 20,000 tons of combat and support cargo. Larger and longer regional contingencies, while requiring more capability than airlift can provide in the long run, will be totally dependent upon airlift in the crucial first days of the deployment. Airlift is both the means of delivery and the sustainment lifeline for the first combat troops until the sea lines of communication can be established. It continues to serve an irreplaceable role throughout deployment and sustainment, moving virtually all the troops and delivering urgently needed supplies and equipment within 24 hours of the request. The combat capability airlift can carry is impressive. In the DESERT SHIELD/DESERT STORM deployment, airlift carried over 500,000 passengers and almost 545,000 tons of cargo.

Our experience in DESERT SHIELD/DESERT STORM highlighted the importance of suitable en route and arrival bases overseas to support a U.S. deployment. The movement of troops and equipment to the Persian Gulf depended heavily on the airfield at Rhein Main, Germany. Rhein Main is the only major structural repair facility for C-5s and C-141s, and the only engine repair facility for C-130s in the region. It is also an established industrial base and the largest European supply center for airlift aircraft. Access to Rhein Main and other bases, such as Torrejon in Spain and Lajes in the Azores, are critical to supporting the strategic transportation and reinforcement efforts to NATO and the Middle East. We should use caution when withdrawing from foreign bases to consider the long-term impact on response capability. Maintaining a peacetime presence grants maximum flexibility to meet a potential crisis situation. Relying only upon wartime agreements for access adds significant uncertainty to a deployment and could limit response options for the warfighting CINCs.

The main role of our airlift fleet's organic and commercial assets is to provide capability for wartime deployment. However, airlift is particularly well suited to serve as a valued, and frequently used, asset for displaying national will at any time. During Operation SEA ANGEL in May and June 1991, 23 airlift missions transported nearly 400

passengers and 575 tons of cargo to assist the government of Bangladesh in recovering after the worst cyclone to hit that country in 20 years. Airlift was also the most expedient way to evacuate U.S. citizens fleeing the Philippines after the devastation caused by the eruption of Mount Pinatubo. Operation FIERY VIGIL returned 18,400 passengers and 1,600 pets to U.S. soil in a ten day period. Most recently, many of the newly independent nations of the former Soviet Union were visited by a total of 65 C-5 and C-141 missions during Operation PROVIDE HOPE. When it ended on 26 February 1992, airlift had successfully delivered over 1,600 tons of excess food and over 440 tons of medical supplies. All of our cargo relief efforts were carried out by military airlift aircraft.


## C-17

As capable as our current organic airlift force is, their design as well as the airframes themselves are aging. The C-141 and C-5 were built upon technology from the 1950s and 1960s, designed to operate between major airports in support of the Cold War strategy of reinforcing Europe. They have also logged considerable flying hours in the last three decades, especially the C-141. Congress has supported the solution to our need for strategic airlift modernization: the C-17. Its capacity for carrying twice the payload of a C-141 with only half the crew at about the same cost per flying hour make it the ideal system for tomorrow's defense environment. The C-17 is the only aircraft capable of direct delivery from major air facilities in the U.S. to thousands of small airfields around the world. The access of a large capacity airlifter carrying outsized cargo to fields currently open only to the C-130 will be especially important to our regional defense strategy. These same characteristics also add a new dimension to our long-range, low visibility projection of special operations forces. As the Commander in Chief of the US Central Command (USCINCCENT), General Schwarzkopf underscored the C-17's usefulness in a conflict like DESERT STORM. Testifying after the war, he said, "...I am a very strong supporter of the C-17 for the type of operations I expect to see conducted in my area of responsibility."

Indeed, as seen in the following figure, actual DESERT SHIELD operational factors (ground times, ramp space, loads, routes, use rates) showed that by replacing C-141s with C-17s one for one, we could have delivered 45% more cargo by air in the first 45 days. Conversely, we could have delivered the same amount of cargo 15 days earlier than with the C-141. While we are not planning on acquiring as many C-17s as we have C-141s, this comparison is indicative of the increased capability of the C-17 in an actual deployment scenario.



Potential Impact of C-17 in Desert Shield  
(Thousands of Short Tons Delivered)



The C-17 will live up to design expectations. Over 120 hours of flight testing has been done on the first aircraft, at a pace faster than any other large military aircraft has been tested in the last 20 years. The C-17 is receiving excellent marks for overall flying quality during this first phase of its test program. So far it has flown as slow as 83 knots and as high as .8 Mach, and up to an altitude of 35,000 feet. The C-17 proved its ability to land on short runways by stopping in approximately 2,000 feet at 350,000 pounds gross weight and has also backed up under its own power. Its basic airworthiness and ground handling characteristics are sound. The aircraft began a second phase of flight test at the beginning of this year to verify its structural stability. Further qualification testing will be followed by cargo loading and unloading, troop transport, and cargo and personnel airdrops. Moreover, these tests will not be done in isolation of the end user. Army and Marine Corps personnel are part of a combined test team, along with the Air Force and McDonnell Douglas.

We need to keep the C-17 program on its present procurement schedule and complete the 120 aircraft we are currently planning to buy. Recommendations of the Mobility Requirements Study assume that the FY99 baseline is achieved, and C-17 deliveries are part of that baseline. The C-17 was used as one of the organic lift assets according to the

procurement profile determined after the FY92 defense appropriation. The budget request for FY93 is \$2.514 billion in procurement funding for eight airplanes, advanced procurement of \$205.6 million for 12 airplanes in FY94, and \$211.1 million for research and development. As Secretary Cheney said in his briefing on the Defense Budget on 29 January, "...the C-17 aircraft is a vital program for us to replace the C-141. We flew the wings off those in the Gulf last year and we badly need to bring on-line this new strategic lift capability." As commander of USTRANSCOM, I could not agree more. I urge your full support for the C-17.

### ***Intratheater***

While the C-17 will play a significant role in our future theater airlift capability, we will continue to rely heavily on the C-130 for intratheater airlift operations. Its role in a regional conventional conflict was clearly demonstrated in DESERT SHIELD/DESERT STORM. Through airland, airdrop, and Low Altitude Parachute Extraction System deliveries, C-130s repositioned over 500,000 passengers and 245,000 tons of cargo in over 52,000 sorties. The need to deliver troops, equipment, and supplies rapidly and directly into forward areas validates the importance of theater airlift. It is a force multiplier, increasing the warfighting CINC's force employment options. While specific requirements for theater airlift are still under study, the importance of this mission will grow in our regional defense strategy. With continued acquisition of new C-130H aircraft to modernize the fleet, we will continue using the C-130 as the primary theater airlifter in our future mobility force structure.

### ***CRAF***

The Civil Reserve Air Fleet (CRAF) was a good idea when it first originated in 1952. It is now a proven concept and an essential part of our airlift capability. Commercial airliners flew 3,600 missions in support of our forces in the Persian Gulf. Those missions were responsible for carrying 64% of the passenger and 27% of the cargo airlifted during the deployment. Commercial aircraft actually played an even bigger role in the redeployment, accounting for 84% of the passengers and 40% of the cargo airlifted in DESERT SORTIE. Building upon this operational experience and guided by the new regional defense strategy, we will modify the CRAF organization to increase our CRAF capabilities early in a deployment. We are working closely with the carriers to add assets to the initial stages of activation and improve our ability to tailor activations depending on the airlift requirements. These changes will make a solid program even better.



## Sealift

Contingencies requiring heavy combat forces will depend upon the enormous capacity and economy of sealift. The deployment for DESERT SHIELD/DESERT STORM illustrates that capacity. Over 85% of the dry cargo and virtually all of the petroleum products shipped to the Persian Gulf went by sea. When time was not as critical, as in the DESERT SORTIE redeployment, sealift carried an even greater share: 92% of the dry cargo returned. The overall experience revealed the militarily useful sealift capacity we currently have as a nation, and the type of capacity we are going to need to deploy forces in the future. Of the non-containerized dry cargo deployed by sea in DESERT SHIELD/DESERT STORM, the majority of it (61%) was carried by government-owned or controlled ships. Foreign shipping carried approximately 26% and just under 13% went by U.S. flag commercial ships offered for charter. The prospect of relying on voluntary surplus shipping from the U.S. flag fleet to respond to future regional contingencies continues to decline in real numbers throughout this decade. Table 1 provides USTRANSCOM's outlook for militarily useful U.S. flag commercial shipping.

**US Flag Fleet**

	RO/RO	BB	LASH	CONT	TKR
<b>Current (FY92)</b>	23	31	12	92	146
<b>Losses thru FY99</b>	-7	-26	-10	-54	-79
<b>Projected Total</b>	16	5	2	38	67

**Table 1**

*Note: Explanation of sealift abbreviations found at Attachment 2.*

Considering these numbers include the 26 dry cargo ships and 20 tankers already under government charter for sealift, but not counted as organic assets, we could not expect to get sufficient ships from the U.S. flag fleet to meet all sealift requirements. This is especially true considering the potential availability of these ships during the initial surge, the critical early days of a deployment. Furthermore, this decline is a continuation of a trend in U.S. shipping since World War II. DoD's response in the 1980s was to create the government-owned reserve fleet that was relied upon so heavily and served us so well in DESERT SHIELD/DESERT STORM. Improvements to that organic fleet are a necessity.

The single biggest need in sealift is for additional capacity to move heavy combat equipment at the beginning of a deployment. Tanks, artillery, and tracked vehicles are best moved in Roll-On/Roll-Off (RO/RO) type ships. The question was exactly how many

additional RO/ROs do we need to meet surge requirements and how best to utilize them? The answer hinged on the force package to be moved in light of the new regional defense strategy. That answer is provided in the MRS, the results of which are at Table 2.

Organic Fleet <sup>1</sup>	APF					RRF				
	FSS	SSS	APS	MPS	CONT	RO/RO	BB	SB	T-ACS	TKR
Current	8		8 <sup>4</sup>	13		17	49	7	8	13
FY99 <sup>2</sup>						19			4	23
MRS <sup>3</sup>		11	9		2				-2 <sup>5</sup>	
Total	8	11	17	13	2	36	49	7	10	36

**Table 2**

- Notes: 1. Explanation of sealift abbreviations found at Attachment 2.  
 2. Projected additions to the current fleet represent the MRS baseline.  
 3. This is the MRS recommended mobility option to augment the organic fleet.  
 4. Reflects the number of APS cargo ships at the time of DESERT SHIELD.  
 5. MRS recommends 10 T-ACS ships instead of the 12 projected for FY99.

The MRS recommends acquisition of 20 large, medium speed RO/ROs (LMSRs), nine configured for afloat prepositioning and 11 to be used as surge ships in a manner similar to the current Fast Sealift Ships. It also recommends leasing two containerships for immediate prepositioning needs. I strongly support these recommendations. Furthermore, the MRS revalidated that the programmed growth of the Ready Reserve Force as shown must be achieved. Achieving this growth, actually programmed to be complete in FY97, is critical to the other recommendations. Acquisition of the RO/ROs, tankers, and crane ships for the Ready Reserve Force must continue on track. Simultaneous construction/conversion of the additionally recommended sealift will ensure we have the surge capability needed in the 21st Century before that century begins.

## Surge Sealift

Our new military strategy requires us to project a force, unilaterally if necessary, that can meet any potential regional threat. This first two weeks of a deployment, called the early risk period by the MRS, can make the difference between a quick victory or a long and bloody battle. The ability to rapidly place a decisive force on any potential fighting field in the world calls for surge sealift capable of deploying a large amount of heavy combat equipment. This sealift must be ready to respond within days of a deployment order to be credible.

In DESERT SHIELD/DESERT STORM, the very first ships to arrive were ships from the Maritime Prepositioning Ships (MPS) stationed in the Indian Ocean. Prepositioning afloat is the fastest way to respond with a heavy combat force. It combines the advantage of forward presence with the high capacity of sealift. The nine additional Afloat Prepositioning Ships (APS) recommended by the MRS will enable the Army to preposition the combat and combat support equipment for the minimum of a heavy brigade equivalent. It will also mean that we can deploy this brigade much faster than we were able to in DESERT SHIELD. APS ships can be easily maneuvered close to potential hot spots as a response option or even as a show of force. Prepositioning ships also offer a double bonus. Once their equipment is discharged in theater, they are turned over as additional common user sealift.

Response from ships not already loaded and operating depends upon their level of readiness. The Fast Sealift Ships (FSS), ready to sail within 96 hours due to their cadre manning and four day Reduced Operating Status (ROS 4), carried most of the 24th Mechanized Infantry Division to Saudi Arabia at the beginning of DESERT SHIELD. While activation of the FSS ships went smoothly, their age became a factor, and one of them broke down while crossing the Atlantic. New ships are needed to augment this capability and prevent deployment delays. The additional surge sealift LMSRs recommended by the MRS will more than triple the square foot capacity we currently have with our FSS ships and enable us to carry up to two divisions, plus initial support, using all 19 ships. The required surge capability of what we call the Strategic Sealift Ships (SSS), though, is incumbent upon them also being placed in ROS 4 status.

Activation problems were encountered getting ships in the Ready Reserve Force (RRF) prepared to sail. We have worked the readiness issue hard together with the Maritime Administration (MARAD), who oversees these vessels. As these ships are being laid up again after their use in DESERT SHIELD/DESERT STORM, they are in excellent operating condition. We want to maintain the readiness of this fleet. In our plans for the eventual 102 dry cargo ships in the RRF, all of the current and future RO/ROs will be in an ROS 4 status like the FSS ships. Twenty-seven of the other ships most able to support a surge requirement will be in five day readiness. The remaining 41 RRF ships will be placed in either ten or twenty day categories. These latter ships are mainly needed for follow-on support. To increase efficiency and decrease response time, the RRF, FSS, and SSS ships will be berthed, as much as possible, close to the debarkation ports for the units that will actually deploy on them.

## ***Sealift Acquisition***

The need for additional sealift ships has long been recognized by Congress. The \$1.875 billion now in the sealift account after three years of defense appropriations has been the impetus for the program. I ask your continued support this year by authorizing the \$1.201 billion request for sealift in the FY93 Defense Budget. This would make a total of over \$3 billion available for sealift and go a long way toward implementing the recommendations of the MRS. As you know, the acquisition process is underway. Within the last year, we have seen positive action on acquiring these additional ships. The release of the Navy Strategic Sealift Program implementation plan and award of preliminary design contracts to nine shipyards were completed prior to the final MRS results. Now the MRS recommendations can be incorporated into the plan and the acquisition process can soon continue to the engineering design phase. The construction of these new sealift vessels will ensure needed sealift capability well into the next century, although they will not be ready soon enough to address our near-term needs.

Of special significance in the appropriation last year was a provision permitting a percentage of the sealift funds to be used for the purchase of foreign built ships for conversion in U.S. shipyards. This allows for rapidly adding capacity without the long lead time needed for new construction. Since our shortfall in surge sealift demands that we act now, I am urging that the maximum amount permitted for procurement of foreign built ships be obligated for that purpose to acquire foreign RO/RO vessels. This will yield the greatest increase in surge sealift in the minimum amount of time, while invigorating U.S. shipyards with the conversion work. At the same time, MARAD will continue to purchase and convert used ships to bolster the RRF. Both of these acquisition programs should remain focused on the priority of surge capability. Once that capability is achieved and dedicated ships are standing by in a ready status, other expansion and modernization plans like charter, build and charter, and national defense features on commercial ships, should be explored. These concepts should, however, only be used for sealift ships planned for reinforcement or sustainment, not those critical for immediate response.



## ***CONUS Transportation***

Timely strategic lift from airports and seaports in the Continental United States (CONUS) to theater operating locations is only possible if the cargo and passengers are ready at the port. CONUS overland transportation makes that possible. America's troops deploy on U.S. railroads, over U.S. highways and bridges, along U.S. inland waterways, and through U.S. airports and seaports. The state of those facilities is a legitimate concern in meeting our national security requirements. While CONUS transportation is almost entirely reliant upon the U.S. commercial truck, rail, bus, airline, and port industries, there are some unique military concerns which have been addressed by the Mobility Requirements Study.

The MRS analyses determined the Defense Freight Rail Interchange Fleet (DFRIF) requires an additional 233 heavy lift flatcars to move tracked vehicles and other heavy combat equipment. The FY93 budget requests \$13 million to begin procuring these railcars. Additionally, the daily railcar loading capacity of key installations, depots, plants, and other support locations has to be increased. As for ports, additional berthing will be necessary to accommodate an increase in surge sealift assets and ensure a smooth flow for rapidly deploying heavy units. Of particular concern is the lack of a modern ammunition loading facility on the west coast of the United States. The MRS recommended a facility of at least the same capacity as the one we have on the east coast. I am working with the Services to seek funding for the construction of this west coast ammunition port. The MRS recommendations for improving the use of rail and port facilities are enhancements that must be done in conjunction with many different agencies. Such efforts are greatly facilitated by a unified command that can view all the pieces of the transportation picture within a system framework.

## ***The Future Defense Transportation System***

Defense transportation is multi-faceted. It involves not only organic air, sea, and ground assets from four military services, but heavy reliance upon the U.S. commercial airline, maritime, trucking, bus, pipeline, barge, and rail industries. It is also dependent upon airports, seaports, and roads both in this country and around the world. With such a complex structure, it is increasingly important that it be able to function as an integrated system.

## *An Integrated System*

The bedrock of our defense transportation system is our own national transportation infrastructure. While we endeavor to increase our organic lift capabilities in air, sea, and land, this will still be but one portion of a much larger transportation capacity. We remain highly dependent upon U.S. civil sector carriers and their industrial base. Deploying forces from our shores is truly a national effort, involving hundreds of commercial transportation companies. Each of these becomes a critical link in the chain of movements required to get a unit where it needs to be, when it needs to be there. Defense and commercial systems must be capable of working together, closely and efficiently. Defense transportation must, therefore, be as compatible as possible with commercial assets and procedures and, to the extent practicable, maximize their use. Our defense transportation *system* needs to integrate our military defense requirements with our national infrastructure and the commercial sector.

Our defense transportation system must also take advantage of the unique characteristics and interrelationships of each mode of strategic lift. Airlift and sealift have distinct roles in a deployment and one makes a poor substitute for the other. They are complementary. Both are essential. Working together, airlift and sealift transport everything that is not prepositioned. Prepositioning, though, is also not a self-deploying effort. It places a surprisingly large demand on airlift, and the additional afloat prepositioning recommended by the MRS will only increase that need.

For example, it requires approximately 250 airlift sorties to "marry up" a Marine Expeditionary Brigade with its prepositioned equipment. Only a small portion of these airlift sorties are needed for carrying the troops themselves, a mission which can be done by civilian passenger planes. The majority of the missions require military aircraft to take additional equipment and armament which, because of cost or sensitivity, are not prepositioned. These items can include helicopters, aircraft engines, test equipment, and communications vans, among other things. Balanced mobility assets are necessary. So is a system that understands this and uses the proper balance. Without the correct integration of these resources, a deployment certainly would not run smoothly and could possibly come to a halt. Integrating transportation resources into a system also leads to efficiencies in operation, important in our strong desires to minimize costs while increasing effectiveness. The bottom line is we simply must do defense transportation smartly.



## **USTRANSCOM's Role**

An integrated system requires an integrator, in this case, a single manager for transportation. Since October 1987, the U.S. Transportation Command (USTRANSCOM) has been that single manager in time of war. In fact, we are primarily organized to support a warfighting CINC in time of conflict. The DESERT SHIELD/DESERT STORM deployment experience proved that centralized transportation management is the most effective and flexible way to manage and coordinate air, sea, and land movements, while retaining the ability to react quickly to changing priorities and efficiently schedule and employ transportation resources.

The efficiencies of the central management concept apply equally well during peacetime. Moving things in peacetime the same way we do during a contingency simplifies the process. It requires no change in procedures to "gear up" for a deployment, just an increase in the level of operations. We are now moving toward making this seamless transition a reality. Under current direction from the Secretary of Defense, USTRANSCOM's mission shall be to provide the air, land, and sea transportation for the Department of Defense both *in time of peace* and in time of war. This strengthening of the DoD transportation function, which takes effect after the President signs the next revision to the Unified Command Plan, will consolidate current transportation management. The single manager assignments for airlift, ocean transportation, and land transportation/ocean terminals now performed by the Military Airlift Command, Military Sealift Command, and Military Traffic Management Command, respectively, will be integrated into USTRANSCOM. The U.S. Transportation Command will be the single manager for *all* common user transportation. This streamlining will foster greater peacetime efficiencies, while enabling us to increase the effectiveness of our primary wartime role. With added peacetime control, USTRANSCOM can provide the global projection management our nation needs.

## **New Directions**

USTRANSCOM is looking ahead to the issues and events which will shape our future transportation system. Achieving a more capable, flexible, and responsive mobility force will require some improvements and modifications to our current transportation system.

## ***Aerial Refueling***

The air component of USTRANSCOM, the Military Airlift Command (MAC) will become the Air Mobility Command (AMC) on 1 June 1992. The new name reflects an increased capability as well, as this Air Force restructuring effort will transfer most of the aerial refueling assets to AMC. The command will receive about two-thirds of the KC-10 Extenders and the majority of the KC-135 Stratotankers. Airlifters and tankers have long had a symbiotic relationship, most recently seen in DESERT SHIELD/DESERT STORM. As the Department of the Air Force stated in their September 1991 report on the U.S. Air Force in the Gulf War:

"The tremendous productivity of the airlifters would not have been as impressive were it not for the synergy of Strategic Air Command's tankers with MAC's transports. The advent of large-scale air refueling transformed the United States Air Force in the 1950s into a true global striking force. The expansion of air refueling capability to transport aircraft in the 1970s had an equally significant impact on readiness and rapid deployment."

We welcome the marriage of these capabilities into one command, and plan to make that synergistic effect permanent. Airlift and aerial refueling will be integrated into our mobility planning and our command and control structure. The new AMC will include a central tanker and airlift control center.

## ***Global Transportation Network***

Command, Control, Communications, and Computer Systems (C4S) are a necessity for directing an integrated system. USTRANSCOM is making extensive use of C4S to provide that information management capability. This is no easy task, as hundreds of different systems are already being used by military and commercial air, sea, and freight operators. We want these systems to be able to communicate with each other. The CINCs need a real time transportation command and control network during a contingency; USTRANSCOM needs it for more productive peacetime operations. DESERT SHIELD/DESERT STORM taught us that without common C4S, transportation planning effectiveness is diluted, carrier flexibility is reduced, and short notice

requirements increase. All of these result in inefficient use of strategic mobility assets and point to the tremendous need for integration.

Allowing these myriad command and control systems to interact in a single functional arrangement is the goal of our Global Transportation Network (GTN). GTN automates command and control and provides a means of standardizing tracking to improve intransit visibility -- knowing exactly where any piece of cargo is at any stage of movement. Intransit visibility is a key toward finding transportation solutions that will be more efficient during peacetime and still effective for meeting wartime needs. GTN will undertake this highly complex task with an implementation strategy that will streamline existing DoD transportation procedures, connect military and commercial transportation tracking systems, and establish a centralized database to share transportation data among all users. The USTRANSCOM budget request for FY93 includes \$10.4 million for this important capability. With GTN, USTRANSCOM will have timely, comprehensive information to make optimum use of transportation resources.

### ***Containerization and Intermodalism***

Our command, control, and communications network is not the only link we are forging with the transportation industry. We are also striving for more commonality with commercial shippers in the way they transport cargo. The industry is moving more and more toward an intermodal system -- shipping cargo through different modes of transportation, but in the same container. USTRANSCOM is working toward the increased use of containerization for military cargo.

DESERT SHIELD/DESERT STORM was the first military deployment that used a significant amount of containers, around 37,000 forty-foot equivalent units, primarily for resupply. If containers were used for ammunition, they would substantially increase throughput, decrease cost, and reach the theater faster. Six containerships can carry the same amount of ammunition as 18 of the breakbulk ships currently used. More importantly, the containerships could have delivered all that ammunition up to four weeks faster!

The effective use of containerization, though, will depend upon continued efforts to enhance intransit visibility. We must also work to improve theater reception capability. In spite of these challenges, the overall improvements gained from the increased use of containerization are so striking that I have declared 1992 as "The Year of the Container" throughout USTRANSCOM. We are strongly committed to increasing our compatibility with worldwide intermodal systems and resources.

### ***Active and Reserve Forces***

Defense transportation resources must be capable of both immediate movements and sustained heavy lift. They are designed to permit a graduated response, to allow options for the National Command Authorities. USTRANSCOM's current ratio of active to reserve military personnel supports that graduated response capability. Active duty forces provide rapid response, augmented by guard and reserve forces to meet sustained or escalating requirements. While we wish to maintain that balance, our DESERT SHIELD/DESERT STORM experience showed that early availability of transportation units could have increased the output of the transportation system. Early activation of transportation units could enhance embarkation operations to allow for smoother flow at the ports than can be expected by merely relying upon early individual volunteers.

USTRANSCOM Headquarters is fortunate, however, to have its own reserve augmentation. The Joint Transportation Reserve Unit (JTRU) was established on 1 October 1991, and is the joint reserve unit prototype for DoD. Comprised of 100 Army, Navy, Air Force, and Marine Corps reservists under the command of a reserve two star flag officer, the JTRU trains together as a unit at our facilities at Scott Air Force Base, Illinois. Upon mobilization, it will reinforce and sustain the headquarters. This concept is an extension of the Goldwater-Nichols Act of 1986 and anticipates the drawdown of active forces and increased reliance on the reserves. Other unified commanders are seriously considering establishing such units.



## ***Merchant Marine Reserve***

There is one area of strategic mobility where we are critically short on manpower and have no established reserve. This is not military manpower, though, but commercial merchant mariners. We use U.S. merchant marine crews to man all of our reserve fleet vessels. As indicated earlier, the number of U.S. flag commercial vessels is decreasing, and along with it the number of crews. In 1950, there were over 50,000 jobs for U.S. merchant seamen. In 1970, the number was still between 35,000 and 40,000. As of 1990, however, there were less than 10,000 positions for active seamen. Concerned over this ever shrinking pool of qualified mariners, we strongly encourage the establishment of a Merchant Marine Reserve Program. A prime concern for the success of this program, however, is a guarantee of reemployment rights for mariners who would respond to an actual call for deployment. Unlike our military reservists, these merchant mariners have no job protection after serving our national security needs. I urge your support for their inclusion in the Uniformed Services Employment and Reemployment Rights Act. It calls for no additional funding and will greatly benefit our sealift capability.

## ***Total Quality***

Transportation is a service, and its customers are the commanders of combat forces. We want to provide them the best possible service. American businesses are increasingly turning to the works of such noted Quality experts as W. Edwards Deming and Joseph Juran to improve the processes by which they deliver their products and services. Within the U.S. Transportation Command and its components, we are actively using these methodologies to revolutionize the way we conduct global mobility operations. Our new vision statement guides our efforts: U.S. Transportation Command -- A partnership of people building on proven performance and providing leadership to achieve higher levels of excellence within the Defense Transportation System. At USTRANSCOM, we are committed to a path toward Total Quality Transportation.

## **Conclusion**

We have come a long way in defense transportation. The strategic mobility programs put into place in previous decades provided valuable transportation resources. The Goldwater-Nichols Act paved the way for uniting all common user resources under the U.S. Transportation Command. Through this combination of resources and leadership, plus the remarkable execution by our components, we met the deployment challenge of DESERT SHIELD/DESERT STORM. We have a long way to go, though. In order to meet the strategic lift requirements for our future defense, we should settle for nothing short of a flexible, balanced transportation system sized to the future force structure.

The DESERT SHIELD/DESERT STORM experience, our new National Military Strategy, and the analysis provided by the Mobility Requirements Study shape our direction for the rest of this decade and beyond. I urge your support for the programs we will need to follow this direction. You know the need for the C-17. What we must do now is stay on a production schedule to hold unit costs under control. The eight aircraft in the FY93 budget allows for an increase to 12 aircraft in FY94 and reaches the full production rate of 18 aircraft per year in FY95. We will also make significant progress in our procurement of additional sealift and prepositioning ships if the \$1.201 billion sealift request for FY93 is authorized. The requirement for more sealift is almost universally acknowledged, and surge sealift assets must be its foundation. Your support of transportation programs has a major impact on strategic mobility. As we shift to a regional defense strategy, and as the overall level of defense spending declines, mobility becomes even more important. In view of the future defense structure, strategic mobility is a "must pay" bill.

The call came in August 1990. What if the call comes again in August 1992? Or in August 1999? Will our mobility forces actually be what we envision? Will we be able to move a force capable of victory in time to achieve victory? The recommendations of the Mobility Requirements Study can only benefit us if we begin now to construct the defense transportation system of the future. USTRANSCOM stands ready to complete that system -- to provide the strategic agility and power projection our Base Force will need. We will work closely with the Services, other defense and transportation agencies, and you, the members of Congress, to build the strategic mobility forces our nation needs for a vital military in the years ahead.

**Strategic Mobility Assets***Considered Organic Asset***Military Aircraft (Primary Aircraft Available)\***

C-5	109
C-141	234
C-130	463
KC-10	38
KC-135	512

*\* Does not include Backups and Trainer Aircraft***Civil Reserve Air Fleet (Aircraft Available at Each Stage)**

	Stage I	Stage II	Stage III
Passenger	18	76	249
Aeromedical	0	6	34
Cargo	23	40	134
Total	41	122	417

**Militarily Useful Sealift (Number of Ships)**

Vessels	Dry Cargo	Tanker	Passenger	Total
FSS	8	0	0	8
RRE	81	13	2	96
Other NDRF	99	13	3	115
MPS	13	0	0	13
APS	3	3	0	6
MSC Charter	26	20	0	46
US Flag Fleet*	158	146	2	306
EUSC	36	81	7	124

*\* Includes MSC Charter Ships***Defense Freight Rail Interchange Fleet (Flatcars)**

140 Ton (Chain Tie-down)	566
100 Ton*	523
80 Ton*	74

*\* These flatcars are all scheduled to retire by the end of FY93*

Attachment 1



## Explanation of Sealift Abbreviations

<b>APF</b>	<b>Afloat Prepositioning Force</b> Encompasses all prepositioning at sea. Comprised of APS and MPS.
<b>APS</b>	<b>Afloat Prepositioning Ships</b> Vessels used for prepositioning of Army, Air Force, and Navy equipment. Some of these ships are tankers.
<b>BB</b>	<b>Breakbulk Ships</b> Vessels designed to carry miscellaneous, non-uniform general cargo, including pallet-sized lots and ammunition.
<b>CONT</b>	<b>Containerships</b> Vessels designed to carry standard modular cargo containers. Increasingly preferred by commercial shippers for general cargo, as they accommodate intermodalism.
<b>EUSC</b>	<b>Effective U.S. Controlled Ships</b> Merchant vessels owned by U.S. citizens or corporations but registered under certain foreign flags. Could be requisitioned in time of war or national emergency.
<b>FSS</b>	<b>Fast Sealift Ships</b> Eight large, high speed containerships converted to partial roll-on/roll-off use. Capable of speeds up to 33 knots. High military utility.
<b>LASH</b>	<b>Lighter Aboard Ship</b> Vessels which transport barges loaded with cargo. Most can also handle containers.
<b>MPS</b>	<b>Maritime Prepositioning Ships</b> Thirteen prepositioning vessels organized into three squadrons. Each squadron carries 30 days worth of stores and equipment for a Marine Expeditionary Brigade.
<b>MSC Charter</b>	<b>Military Sealift Command Charter Ships</b> US flagged, commercially owned, militarily useful vessels currently on long term contract to meet routine sealift requirements.
<b>NDRF</b>	<b>National Defense Reserve Fleet</b> All inactive merchant vessels maintained by the Maritime Administration for DoD. RRF is part of NDRF. NDRF also includes 71 World War II Victory Class ships.
<b>RRF</b>	<b>Ready Reserve Force</b> Most capable portion of NDRF. Maintained by Maritime Administration when inactive. Operated by Military Sealift Command when activated.
<b>RO/RO</b>	<b>Roll-On/Roll-Off Ships</b> Vessels designed to allow trucks and heavy vehicles to drive on and off via ramp systems. High military utility. Limited commercial applications have made them scarce on the open market.
<b>SSS</b>	<b>Strategic Sealift Ships</b> Term for the ships to be constructed under new sealift appropriations that would be used similarly to FSS, but would be larger and more capable.
<b>SB</b>	<b>Seabee Ships</b> Cargo barge carriers similar to LASH but with capacity to carry barges five times bigger than LASH ships can carry.
<b>T-ACS</b>	<b>Crane Ships</b> Vessels equipped with two or three twin, heavy lift cranes. Can unload its own cargo and that of other ships.
<b>TKR</b>	<b>Tankers</b> Crude oil tankers carry petroleum, oil, lubricants (POL).
<b>US Flag</b>	<b>U.S. Flagged Ships</b> Merchant vessels owned by U.S. citizens/corporations and registered under U.S. flag.



## RESULTS OF THE MOBILITY REQUIREMENTS STUDY

The CHAIRMAN General, thank you very much.

Let me begin the questions and then turn it over to my colleagues here. Let's talk a little bit about the Mobility Requirement Study. Could you briefly tell us a little bit about the history of that study and the conclusions? I mean, just briefly summarize the whole issue for us, if you would.

General JOHNSON. Several years ago, in the early 1980s, Congress directed a study of lift. One of the outcomes of what was called the congressional mandated mobility study was the fiscally constrained goal of 66 million ton-miles for airlift. Last year you asked for a second mobility study, and that resulted in the Mobility Requirements Study. This one is more comprehensive than the last one. It has a more in-depth analysis. It meets our needs for the 1990s and beyond, yet it is still prudent from a financial standpoint.

The Mobility Requirements Study does several things. It addresses, in essence, every part of our defense transportation system. First of all, surge sealift. As you well know, we have 8 fast sealift ships now. They can do 33 knots. They only operated at around 27 knots, on average, in the Desert Shield deployment. The MRS we would add 11 large, medium-speed, roll-on/roll-off ships for additional surge sealift capacity. Each of these 11 ships would have a deck space of 380,000 square feet. We in the military use the roll-on/roll-off ships most effectively for transporting heavy combat gear. So we would procure 11 of those.

We also found that prepositioning and prepositioning afloat is a very effective way to close combat power. The Maritime Prepositioning Ships, 13 of those, served us very well. We also had 12 Afloat Prepositioning Ships. The Maritime Prepositioning Ships were configured by brigade sets. There were 3 squadrons for 3 brigades to equip 16,000 marines. The Afloat Prepositioning Ships were more commodity based—bombs, supplies, and so forth. The Mobility Requirement Study would add 9 roll-on/roll-off ships of the same size that I described a moment ago—380,000 square feet.

In the prepositioning mode, though we only count them at 300,000 square feet because we don't use the deck space. With the corrosive environment encountered by sitting out in the ocean, it would not be proper to use the topside deck space. So 300,000 square feet is usable.

We would also lease 2 more ships, container ships. These container ships would preposition sustainment-type supplies.

The third area in sealift that we looked at was the Ready Reserve Force. It currently has 96 ships. We activated 73 of those ships for use in Desert Shield. We had some trouble activating them, but once we got them activated they operated at a very respectable 95–96 percent readiness. So they worked very well. We only had 17 roll-on/roll-off ships in that fleet, however. The MRS includes the additional 19 roll-on/roll-off ships, according to Ready Reserve force plans for fiscal year 1999 and adds a total of 44 ships to that Reserve fleet.

The study addresses some other things, for sealift, including the manning of the Ready Reserve fleet. We would also have a little

higher readiness state for those ships. The MRS also addresses what is called "logistics over the shore," the ability to offload ships at anchor, so to speak, without a port.

Turning to the other parts, on the airlift side it endorses continuation of the 120 aircraft buy for the C-17. It says that in the future we will have to evaluate the need for some more of those as the C-141s phase out or go some other way. But right now it stays with the 120 C-17s.

The study addresses a lot of other things, and I won't go into all the details, but it looks at the total infrastructure. For instance, the need for a west coast containerized ammunition port. We have one on the east coast at Sunny Point in North Carolina, near Wilmington. It says we need one on the west coast. We have been working that with the Congress. The study expresses concern over the infrastructure of our country's roads and rails. It recommends buying some more special-purpose rail cars. So it really goes end to end in transportation. It is a definitive study and I believe it is a very good study for you and the Congress to consider.

#### LIFT CAPABILITY FROM THE MRS RECOMMENDATIONS

The CHAIRMAN Thank you. General Johnson, in terms of capability, what are we buying here? From what I know about the study and from reading some of the summaries which were provided, the study authors recommended the middle option, which was middle in terms of risk and middle in terms of cost. There were more expensive with less risk and less expensive with more risk, and they picked kind of a middle option.

What I would like is, can you tell me what capabilities we have to move divisions when this force is bought, and compare it with Desert Storm. For example, right now or in Desert Storm/Desert Shield we could move so many divisions in so many days. If we have this, how is that increased? What capabilities do we have after we buy this?

General JOHNSON. The study was based on moving  $4\frac{2}{3}$  Army divisions in about 6 weeks.

The CHAIRMAN After we buy this?

General JOHNSON. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN What could we do right now, before we make these purchases?

General JOHNSON. Well, we did about that for the combat forces in about 3 months before, albeit without the immediate use of all our mobility assets. So we have greatly reduced the time it takes to close that force.

When you look at moving a force over a very short period of time, then a ship can only make one journey—one voyage. In this case we are able to make more than one voyage in sufficient time to close a force.

You mentioned that we picked the mid-range. I think that was the prudent choice. Certainly, if you wanted to move in a week, it would be impossible. We believe we picked the prudent one, the medium-confidence/medium-cost option.

The CHAIRMAN Again, never mind how we characterize it, tell me what we are buying if we buy the recommendations of the MRS?

General JOHNSON. Yes, sir. We procure 22 ships.



The CHAIRMAN No, not the ships. The ability to move divisions. OK? What are we buying in capability?

General JOHNSON. The requirement called for  $4\frac{2}{3}$  divisions, Army divisions, which is really the pacing factor, in about 6 weeks.

The CHAIRMAN Basically, that is—let's see. Six weeks is about—

Mr. SISISKY. Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN Yes?

Mr. SISISKY. I thought General Sullivan said here that he needs to move 2 heavy divisions in 30 days and 3 backup divisions in 75 days. Can you meet that criteria? I think that is the statement that he made when he was here.

General JOHNSON. Yes, sir. In fact, we close  $4\frac{2}{3}$  divisions in 52 days; 1 brigade in 10 days; 1 airborne division in 26 days; and 2 heavy divisions in 30 days.

The CHAIRMAN What he was talking about, Norm, I think, was 2 heavy divisions and one light division in 30 days. The light division goes mainly by air.

Mr. SISISKY. Two heavy divisions in 30 days and 3 more divisions in 75 days is what I have here that he said.

General JOHNSON. In 30 days, it is very hard to move two fully supported heavy divisions, sir.

The CHAIRMAN In the transcript we have it is 3 in 30.

Mr. SISISKY. Not in my transcript.

The CHAIRMAN Go ahead, sir. What have you got?

General JOHNSON. Sir, the basic requirement was to move  $4\frac{2}{3}$  heavy divisions in a little over 6 weeks, and that certainly would meet the requirements that were outlined. I couldn't remember if it was 2 heavy in 30 days and 2 more later.

The CHAIRMAN Thirty days what?

General JOHNSON. We cannot realistically move fully supported heavy divisions in less than 30 days, sir.

The CHAIRMAN But, in 45 days, you say you can move  $4\frac{2}{3}$ ?

General JOHNSON. I said the study was based on that requirement. For the medium-confidence option it is about 6 weeks.

The CHAIRMAN OK. So, when we buy the forces that the MRS is recommending, you are saying that in how many days we can move the  $4\frac{2}{3}$  divisions?

General JOHNSON. The study was based on closing the combat divisions in about 6 weeks. We close a total force in about 2 months, little less than 3 months. That includes all of the support.

Since World War II we have had a support-to-combat ratio of 2-to-1. In this study we accepted no less than a  $1\frac{1}{2}$ -to-1 ratio. In Desert Shield we had a 1.4-to-1 ratio. That means for every ton of combat gear we took to Desert Shield, we took 1.4 tons of support. In this study we said we will take a minimum of  $1\frac{1}{2}$  tons of support per ton of combat gear, and to move the whole thing, we can do it in less than 90 days. The underlying requirements to move the combat divisions was about 6 weeks.

The CHAIRMAN So the combat, the  $4\frac{2}{3}$  divisions, the combat part of that in 45 days. The whole support is more like 80-90 days?

General JOHNSON. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN How capable—I mean, what have you got at the end of 45 days and before 80 and 90 days? I mean what kind of capabilities have you got without the full support arriving?

General JOHNSON. We have the bulk of the combat forces. We have the bulk of combat forces. However, at 52 days, we have the entire combat force and sufficient combat support and combat service support and resupply for a successful counterattack.

The CHAIRMAN What are you missing in terms of capability at that point?

General JOHNSON. Well, the 30–60 days' resupply; the support structure; the combat service support, which would be some additional support for our people. In other words, they are out fighting initially and they need this backup support. There are two types: one, combat support is additional artillery and engineers; combat service support is the total gamut.

The CHAIRMAN But combat support is in 45. The combat service support isn't there until 80 or 90. Is that right?

General JOHNSON. That is right, sir.

The CHAIRMAN OK.

General JOHNSON. Combat was required to be there in the 6 weeks.

The CHAIRMAN Right. What happens if you want to move more than  $4\frac{2}{3}$  divisions into a contingency?

General JOHNSON. Well, first of all, the MRS requirement, to be precise, was based on 8,700 miles,  $4\frac{2}{3}$  divisions, and about 6 weeks to close combat forces. If we have a contingency that is closer, we can move a larger force. If we have one that is that distance, and that is really about halfway around the world——

The CHAIRMAN That would be a Desert Storm——

General JOHNSON. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN Distance; is that right?

General JOHNSON. About. Yes, sir.

If we wanted a bigger force, it would just take longer.

The CHAIRMAN How much longer? What if we wanted 8 divisions in there?

General JOHNSON. I am not prepared to answer that. I can provide that for the record, sir.

The CHAIRMAN It would be helpful to us.

General JOHNSON. Yes, sir.

[The following information was received for the record:]

To provide a reliable answer to the question posed and consider all the factors which contribute to and constrain our deployment capability would require a full-scale study, similar to that conducted for the MRS. The MRS took more than a year to adequately address the many interrelated facets of the transportation network that impact our force deployment capability. A lesser effort would oversimplify the complexity of the transportation network and potentially lead to misconceptions about what can and cannot be done. A review of the most significant factors that must be considered when evaluating deployment capabilities illustrates this complexity.

First, the time factor. The amount of time required for deployment to meet operational needs will be a major determinant for the number and type of lift assets needed to deploy the desired force. Given enough time, we could deploy eight divisions and an abundant amount of support and sustainment using the ships and aircraft we have today. As the timeline decreases, however, several factors become prevalent: the capability of surge lift assets, including their speed, load times, and availability; readiness of the units to deploy from their home station to the port of embarkation; port constraints, both air and sea, at embarkation, en route, and de-



barkation; availability of waterways and threats to the lines of communication; and, movement priorities for the deploying forces. For whatever scenario, the deployment timeline should be consistent with the threat and our operational objectives.

Second, force structure. Army combat units make up only a portion of the deployment requirement. In Desert Shield/Storm, Army unit equipment comprised less than half of the total cargo moved by sea and air. The support, sustainment (resupply and ammunition), and other service equipment that must accompany the combat forces account for the majority of the common user strategic lift needed to deploy the total force package. In order to adequately define the total force package, there are considerations in addition to the combat to support force ratio that must be taken into account. The requirement for sustainment materiel (resupply and ammunition) depends itself upon a number of factors such as host nation support, the environment, stockage levels, and the level of intensity of the conflict. Sustainment cargo made up roughly one-third of the total shipments in Desert Shield/Storm. Other forces from the Air Force, Navy, and Marine Corps must also be deployed. The fighter squadrons, bomber squadrons, carrier battle groups, special operations forces, Marine forces, and associated support being provided by the other services must correspond to the Army force package deployed.

Third, the level of mobilization. There are significant differences in the mobility assets available under partial and full mobilization conditions. The MRS solution for the regional contingencies in the Persian Gulf and Korea assume only partial mobilization. Under coercive requisitioning, as in a full mobilization situation, the U.S.-owned lift contribution can be expected to nearly double. In the case of a much larger force package, and assuming a much larger threat to go with it, use of full mobilization would likely be considered.

Additional factors include distance to the theater and the amount, if any, of allied support. The distance from where the deployment forces currently are to the theater of operations must be coupled with the theater reception capability, both air and sea, the host nation support offered, and the anticipated threat to determine the size of the force package needed and our ability to deliver and employ those forces. Allied support must not be discounted, either. For sealift, depending on the allies involved and the theater of operations, foreign flag shipping could more than triple the number of ships available for deployment.

Undoubtedly, a force of 8 or even 12 divisions could eventually be moved, if desired, to almost any location. The closure estimates, however, would not be instructive unless the scenario is fully developed, accounting for all of these factors.

#### HANDLING MORE THAN ONE CONTINGENCY

The CHAIRMAN What would happen if you had to do two contingencies at once?

General JOHNSON. In the study, they looked at many different scenarios. One of them was two regional contingencies sequentially. For small contingencies, we can handle 2. You can say in Desert Shield we kind of had 2: we had one in Turkey and one on the other side against a common enemy, but they certainly were well coordinated and not 2 separate contingencies. Depending upon the size of the forces required, we can provide the lift. If you put a smaller force in one place, we can handle another one at the same time.

The CHAIRMAN I think the base force concept, if I remember, has a 12-division force of which they figure 8 would be available for a Desert Storm kind of contingency and another 4 would be for, say, a Korean contingency. Suppose you had to move 12 divisions, how long would it take you?

General JOHNSON. I would have to provide that for the record, sir. I don't know, and it wouldn't be useful for me to come up with one off the top of my head, sir. Volume I of MRS provided only a preliminary view of multiple scenarios. Analysis is ongoing and will be provided in Volume II.

The CHAIRMAN But, basically, it would be a stretch to try and do 2 contingencies, where you were trying to move multi-divisions in both contingencies at the same time? That is essential.

General JOHNSON. Certainly.

The CHAIRMAN That is what I figured.  
Ike Skelton.

#### THE READY RESERVE FORCE

Mr. SKELTON. Mr. Chairman, you asked my questions concerning the two contingencies. I specifically would like to have the answer to the one that you will provide for the record, General.

Would you define for us the Ready Reserve Fleet?

General JOHNSON. Yes, sir. We have a rather large fleet of ships that is called the National Defense Reserve Fleet (NDRF) and that really includes 2 fleets of ships. We normally just talk about the older ships as the National Defense Reserve Fleet. In reality, the Ready Reserve Force is a segment of the NDRF. Many years ago we separated some of those ships and now hold them in a higher state of readiness: in 5- 10- and 20-day breakout status. We have 96 ships in RRF. They are basically located in three major areas.

Mr. SKELTON. Didn't you say 75 of those perform right quickly? Was that your testimony?

General JOHNSON. Yes, sir. I said we used 73. During Desert Shield, we broke out a total of 79. Some of those were broken out for other reasons. We only used 73 of those.

The ships are located in the James River; in Beaumont, TX; and in Suisun Bay, which is near Oakland. Out of the 96 ships, we used all of the ones that we needed. The primary need was for roll-on/roll-off ships. Then we used a lot of break-bulk ships, and we have some crane ships that have the capability, not only to offload their own cargo, but to offload other ships as well. In essence, we used all of those ships. Not only the break-bulk, but the roll-on/roll-off and crane ships.

We have a fair number of petroleum ships—13 tankers. We did not break out very many of those because it was much easier to get them off the market. It costs a lot of money to break a ship out of laidup status: \$1.5 million to break it out, and about \$2.3 to \$2.5 to lay it up again, because you have to make sure that the machinery and so forth does not corrode.

So that is the Ready Reserve Fleet—96 ships. We intend to grow that to 140. I mentioned that we wanted to buy 19 more roll-on/roll-off ships. We want to buy 2 more of the crane ships, and 23 more tankers. MRS Volume II will provide the analysis and requirements for tanker ships. So 140 is the size we are looking for.

Mr. SKELTON. Thank you.

The CHAIRMAN Floyd Spence.

#### EFFECT OF REDUCING FORWARD PRESENCE

Mr. SPENCE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

General, in your statement you make clear the direct relationship between our forward presence and our strategic lift requirements. As you know, there is strong sentiment in Congress to reduce our forward presence in Europe and Korea, for instance, and I was just wondering what effect you think it would have if we re-



duced, as some people would like to do, our forward presence in Europe from, say, a corps down to a division or less, and in Korea from a division to maybe a brigade.

General JOHNSON. Sir, I am not qualified nor prepared to discuss the level of forces in Europe. General Galvin certainly is more qualified. I can tell you what happens to lift. It is an equation. Forward presence reduces the need for lift in that theater. Prepositioning reduces sealift in a given theater. But, as you bring things home, then you increase requirement for lift. The Mobility Requirements Study recognizes that equation and says, as we are bringing things home, we will need more lift to take them back.

Mr. SPENCE. As you suggested, the prepositioning, we would have to have more of that too, wouldn't we?

General JOHNSON. Yes, sir.

Mr. SPENCE. Well, simply put, if you have people there and you are supplying those people, you already have part of the job done and haven't got to take it over for them.

General JOHNSON. Yes, sir. Now, we learned in prepositioning that if it is on land it is rather confined; prepositioning afloat, at sea, has much more flexibility. That is why the Mobility Requirements Study is recommending adding 9 more of these very large ships for prepositioning afloat.

Mr. SPENCE. Thank you.

The CHAIRMAN Norm Sisisky. No?

All right. Charles Bennett.

#### USING THE C-17 IN A THREAT ENVIRONMENT

Mr. BENNETT. I would like to ask about the C-17. Is it your intention to use the C-17 in a medium threat environment such as the AGS delivery—the delivery of the Armored Gun System—in a battle zone?

General JOHNSON. Sir, our intent is to use the C-17 as far forward as we need to to deliver equipment. Now, when I say that, we have to recognize that any big airplane has to be protected when it goes into those areas. Over time we have developed ways of escorting them in, ways of determining the threat, but we intend to take the C-17 forward as we do the C-130s today, recognizing they would be in a threat area and would no doubt in many cases have to have escorts from fighters and so forth.

We don't expect the C-17 to be able to survive, or any other cargo aircraft for that matter, under intense hostile fire. But we intend to take them in by suppressing the fire, if necessary, and going around the hostile areas when that is appropriate, sir.

Mr. BENNETT. As you know, this is an ongoing discussion between the Pentagon and Congress with regard to the C-17 and the testing of it with regard to battle conditions. It is similar to what we had with regard to the Bradley. When you started with the Bradley, the attitude of the Defense Department was that it was going to be put in harm's way in a lot of cases, and when that surfaced, then they started protecting the Bradley more fully, and also adjusting their tactics with regard to it.

A similar situation has arisen with regard to the C-17 in that there seems to be a desire to use it in places where it would be pretty dangerous to use it. Are you on top of that particular discus-

sion now? It hasn't been finalized, I know. But do you have a word of caution with regard to how the C-17 is going to be used?

General JOHNSON. Sir, I don't caution the use. I caution that when you use it, you have to provide the proper protection, defense suppression packages and so forth. I am aware of the testing programs, and I support the Project Office on the support in testing sections, vulnerable sections, as opposed to flying the aircraft and shooting at it in flight.

A large aircraft can be shot down by ground-type activity. We have to make sure that we avoid that. In the testing, we need to test the vulnerable components, and I support that testing.

Mr. BENNETT. I agree with you. You shouldn't have to shoot down a C-17 to tell it can be shot down.

General JOHNSON. Yes, sir.

Mr. BENNETT. That would be a terrible waste. I would like for you, however, to give me a letter or a memo about what tactics are expected to be used with regard to the C-17 and whether or not there is a disparity or disconnect between what you desire to have it do and what in all probability it can safely do. I won't pursue it further here, but I would like to have a memo or something from you on that subject matter when you have the time.

General JOHNSON. Yes, sir. I support that testing also.

#### ACQUISITION OF ADDITIONAL SEALIFT

Mr. BENNETT. With regard to the benefits or problems of purchasing existing roll-on/roll-off ships versus building new ones, how do you lean on that?

General JOHNSON. Sir, I think in the MRS study talks about taking both actions concurrently. I believe that we ought to get some ships off the market and convert a few early on for prepositioning. The Congress has counseled us on buying American and foreign and so forth, and we are working within those guidelines.

We need 9 additional Afloat Prepositioning Ships. I would expect some of those early on to be ships we buy and convert. I have made my desires known. I would spend the first dollar on laying a keel for a new ship, one of the large roll-on/roll-off ships I talked about. The second dollar I would spend to purchase a ship and convert for prepositioning. The third dollar I would spend on buying some additional roll-on/roll-off ships for the Ready Reserve Force.

Now, if you tracked me through there, the first dollar to come to fruition, obviously, would be the one that increased the Ready Reserve Force. The second one would be from buying a ship and converting it in a U.S. shipyard. The last to come in, third one, because it takes so long to build ships, would be the first I recommend spending; i.e., building a new ship.

#### ANY SHORTAGE OF TRUCKS IN KOREA

Mr. BENNETT. If we should have the unfortunate situation of having to do something about North Korea and South Korea, would you expect that we would have a shortage in trucks to do that, as we did in Desert Storm?

General JOHNSON. I am not sure—again, this is outside my area of expertise, but I am not sure we would have that same problem in Korea.



Mr. BENNETT. Why?

General JOHNSON. Because of the infrastructure that is there: the road structure, the rails, the trucks, and so forth. The problem in Desert Storm was we didn't want to move the ground combat forces until we began the air war and that required a tremendous number of trucks. But trucks are a concern, and I am sure General Sullivan has that same concern. We need to make sure we have enough ground transportation; i.e., trucks.

Mr. BENNETT. Well, since you are talking about ground transportation, I note you are looking into the question of utilization of, perhaps, new types of rail in the United States, and I am apprehensive. That could be pretty expensive and, maybe, unnecessary. Wouldn't it be better for us to adjust to the existing rail structure rather than creating something new that would be terribly expensive?

General JOHNSON. We have advocated buying some rail cars that will move heavy tanks. These cars are not readily available in the commercial sector. We fully use the commercial sector in everything we do. In essence, everything in the Continental U.S. was moved on commercial rails or roads during Desert Shield. We had one example that is worthy of mentioning. The 101st Airborne Division was moved from Fort Campbell, KY, to the port at Jacksonville, FL, using 1,174 trucks from 27 different companies over a 5-day period. Not a single one was late. That is what our transportation system can do for us—and does.

#### POTENTIAL THREATS TO SHIPPING

Mr. BENNETT. Well, if you had the same situation in Desert Storm again in which you are faced with submarine fleets like that of the Soviets, to what degree would there be losses that we did not have in the Desert Storm operation?

General JOHNSON. I am not sure anyone can tell you the exact answer. I would provide one for the record, if you wanted one.

But certainly, if we had a threat, the U.S. Navy would have been much busier protecting the sea lines of communications. There are several ways you can do this. One, you can convoy, or you can sanitize a lane. I believe the U.S. Navy would rather sanitize the lane than convoy, and I think that is what our Navy should do.

But certainly a lesson to be taken from Desert Shield was that we didn't have a hostile situation enroute or on arrival. That made the job much easier.

Mr. BENNETT. What non-Soviet threats could our shipping face that have surfaced in your studies of the various scenarios?

General JOHNSON. We are concerned mostly with terrorist-type threats. I am not prepared to go into great detail, but there is a lot of piracy around the world even today that we are concerned about day to day. Small threats like that is the only type we would expect other than from a Libya. It would certainly be greater from a Soviet Union or some other large navy.

But the terrorist threat is of concern when we go through confined waterways.

Mr. BENNETT. I have no further questions. Thank you.

The CHAIRMAN Norm Sisisky.

## ROLE OF USTRANSCOM

Mr. SISISKY. Thank you.

It is interesting that you said the first priority, and, obviously, it is not your priority, it is the Navy now—that will be buying the sealift ships. The first 8 ships will probably be bought, and, of course, they are done in U.S. yards. That is a given. Upstairs in 2216, right above us, we are having a hearing, which I have to go to, Mr. Chairman, on how to save our industrial base. Sometimes we have cross purposes. We may be able to buy them cheap. We may be able to buy them faster. But by doing that we may lose part of our industrial base, which is very hard to convert. Of course, that industrial base is shipbuilding.

Now, I know that is not your call, I don't think, General Johnson, and that is really my question. You are the CINC in charge of transportation. I assume the Navy makes the call on the ships. The Air Force, of course, has set up a new Air Mobility Command. What effect does this really have on TRANSCOM? I know you are the user. But where do you fit into the development of a transportation system like the C-17, like the ships that we need?

General JOHNSON. Yes, sir. As the Commander in Chief of the Transportation Command, I have an input to the Services, to the Joint Staff, or JCS, and also to the Secretary of Defense, and I make our requirements known, and, as with the Mobility Requirements Study, our requirements are respected and become a part of the ongoing activity.

I don't directly build ships or build airplanes, but we develop the requirement, and I think our voice is listened to. I fully respect what you are saying about building in U.S. yards. I am confident that will be done.

As far as the Air Mobility Command is concerned, the Military Airlift Command will stand down and the Air Mobility Command will stand up. The command will integrate airlift with aerial refueling. It will be under the Transportation Command, as a component of our unified command, and continue to serve our customers around the world. The Air Force did that to bring together all the mobility forces to give one command the responsibility for lifting our forces. Unified control over lift makes sense, whether it be refueling or airlift in the case of the Air Force; or, in the case of DOD, ships, airplanes, trucks and rails.

Mr. SISISKY. So you see no problem with these other commands?

General JOHNSON. No, sir.

## NEED FOR ENROUTE SUPPORT BASES

Mr. SISISKY. I notice you used Torrejon in Spain. How would you characterize the use of enroute support bases to the success of an operation such as Desert Storm and how will the acquisition of the C-17 impact the use of these bases? If indeed we are leaving Torrejon, do we have contractual agreements with Spain on that base?

General JOHNSON. Yes, sir. With airlift, the better enroute structure you have, the larger payload you can carry. In the Desert Shield environment, Torrejon in Spain and Rhein Main in Germany were exactly halfway, so they were ideal. You could carry the

maximum payload, make one stop, and keep going. With all of our airlift fleet, the C-5s, C-141s, and soon the C-17s we can do in-flight refueling, but that becomes very, very expensive. If we need to go a long way and carry a heavy load, though we can.

Torrejon—the forces will be leaving Torrejon. We will leave a small detachment there, and we intend to keep them as a base we can use in case of a conflict. We are working with the Spanish Government for the continued access to Torrejon. Our normal peacetime activity will move to Rota, Spain. It is on the southern coast. It is a base that the Navy uses a great deal, and they will be our primary customer, so it makes sense to use that in peacetime. In wartime we would be hard pressed not to have a Rhein Main, or a Torrejon, and in many cases a Lajes out in the Azores.

Mr. SISISKY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN General, so you are saying that at the current situation, even though we are leaving Torrejon, we anticipate and look forward to the ability to use them in another kind of contingency in this part of the world?

General JOHNSON. Yes, sir. We intend to have almost the same arrangement we had with Spain using the base at Moron. That is down near Seville and we used that during the war. A stand-by-base-type operation.

The CHAIRMAN What is it about Torrejon that makes it so valuable?

General JOHNSON. The tremendous ramp space and the capability to onload fuel. The Spanish Government allowed us to ship a tremendous amount of fuel through the pipeline to Torrejon. I don't know the number of aircraft that went through or the pounds of fuel, but it is enormous.

The same thing applies for Frankfurt, Germany. If you draw an arc between here and the Persian Gulf, the two of those are in the middle.

#### OBLIGATING PRIOR FUNDING FOR SEALIFT

The CHAIRMAN Let me just follow up on something that Charley Bennett was asking. Why is it that the Pentagon has never spent all the money that we keep appropriating and authorizing for sealift? I mean, we have now done it how many years? Three years or 4 years. I mean, you have a request in here now for this year, so I mean it wasn't that you didn't request it. We put money in in the past and it has never been spent. What is the problem?

It was quite clear in Desert Storm it would have been used. It should have been spent.

General JOHNSON. The actual spending was delayed for the Mobility Requirement Study. The Navy, back in October, forwarded their acquisition program to look at two classes of ships and we are in the process of going out to find the proper design to build these ships. So I think the Pentagon is moving.

As you mentioned, this year \$1.0 billion was added to the program by the Department of Defense for sealift.

The CHAIRMAN You have, what, \$1.8 million that we have already given in the past years. It is still sitting there from how many years ago? Three years ago.



General JOHNSON. Well, it has accumulated from different years. The MRS shows how to spend that, sir.

The CHAIRMAN What other delays are we going to have?

General JOHNSON. I don't know of any, other than the normal acquisition processes, sir, that we have to follow. Those processes are underway, and I don't know of any built-in delays other than the normal acquisition processes that we must and should follow.

The CHAIRMAN Are you going to submit legislation to create a national defense sealift fund, and is that going to be the reason why we are not spending the money when you come here next year?

General JOHNSON. I hope not, sir. I think there will be a national sealift fund proposed, but I don't think that will delay spending money.

The CHAIRMAN Earl Hutto.

#### MEDIUM CONFIDENCE OPTIONS IN THE MRS

Mr. HUTTO. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. General Johnson, I want to commend you and your people for the tremendous job you did in Desert Shield and Desert Storm.

I was wondering about the options. As I understood it, you said that the recommended option was the medium option. On the Mobility Requirements, I understand there were 3: the low confidence, the medium confidence, and the high confidence. It seems the medium confidence would lead one to believe there is a little bit of a lack of confidence. What is the difference between the medium and the high?

General JOHNSON. The difference, sir, has to do with how quick you would close the force. If you wanted to have high confidence, obviously, you would like to close the 4 $\frac{2}{3}$  divisions, as I think the chairman mentioned, in 42 days. But when you do that it becomes an expensive operation and not one that is prudent. I believe that the MRS took a prudent approach in being able to close that force in about 52 days. It is one that, No. 1, does the job. No. 2, it doesn't depend on outside help from international areas as much as we have in the past. No. 3, it is executable. It is doable. We can afford it and it will allow us to move our forces when we need them, where we need them.

#### TRANSPORTATION PLANNING

Mr. HUTTO. As I understood your testimony there, in some ways your job is more complex than it was before, because you knew the likely enemy or the likely scenario and now that has changed considerably. Is that correct? You can't focus on any particular thing, but you have to be ready for any number of contingencies.

General JOHNSON. Yes, sir. From a transportation standpoint, we can provide a lift capability of so many tons for so many miles. The people who do the strategy and the CINCs that we support decide the force deployment scenarios we will follow, and how it is much more difficult. Before you could focus on Europe. You could focus on the Middle East. Now we have regional scenarios that look at various places around the world. So not having a clearly defined and identifiable enemy makes military planning more difficult, but perhaps more importantly, we have to build in that flexibility we have talked about.



## AIRLIFT AND SEALIFT IN DESERT SHIELD/STORM

Mr. HUTTO. In Desert Shield and Desert Storm, what percentage of our lift was by air, what by sea?

General JOHNSON. That becomes kind of complicated. But if you look at dry cargo, it was 15 percent by air, 85 percent by sea. That is combat equipment support equipment and supports—everything except petroleum. There were 545,000 tons by air. There were 3.5 million tons by sea.

When you look at petroleum, and these numbers are not directly comparable, there were 6.1 million tons of petroleum moved, and most of that was moved within the area of conflict: from one country to another, out to ships—it certainly did not come from this country. So that is not comparable to taking the 3.5 million tons of dry cargo by sea from this country and Europe. So, looking at apples and apples, 85 percent by sea, and 15 percent by air.

## C-17 ACQUISITION

Mr. HUTTO. Would that percentage change very much with the acquisition of the C-17s?

General JOHNSON. The situation would change some in that some of the equipment would close more quickly by air and that an alternative would be used. We figure we could close forces much quicker. We could have closed 12 additional TAC fighter squadron plus 2 more light infantry brigades in the first 12 days with the C-17, just because of the larger capability and the ability to go directly to more airfields and so forth. So it would change a little bit.

Now, we had historically thought that the ratio of airlift to sealift would be 5 percent to 95 percent, but I think we wisely did not take a lot of supplies and build a supply depot, rather we had a "supply pull" system. When people needed supplies we took them.

Mr. HUTTO. What is the timeframe for the acquisition of the 120 C-17s?

General JOHNSON. The first one is flying now. The second one starts to fly this year too. The last one is bought and I think it is delivered around the turn of the century.

Mr. HUTTO. OK. Well, that is close enough for Government work, as they say.

[Laughter.]

## TRANSPORTATION PROGRAMS IN THE DEFENSE BUDGET

Mr. HUTTO. General Johnson, we are in a big drawdown now and, as far as your budget is concerned, it is in several different areas, I guess, with the different Services and the different programs and so on. But have you isolated all that or do you have a grip on your part as far as transportation is concerned? How much of the budget in 1993 is for transportation?

General JOHNSON. Not as much as many would think. I cannot give you a total number.

Mr. HUTTO. Well, my purpose in asking that is are we putting more emphasis now on lift? Are you drawing down at the same percentage as the rest of the defense budget?

General JOHNSON. Sir, lift is, in essence, not decreasing at all, not the airlift end of it. Ground transportation is, in fact, increas-

ing a little bit, and the sealift is increasing tremendously. The reason why lift is such a small percentage of the budget is that we depend on the commercial sector for so much of it. Even when we buy these new ships, the U.S. Navy will not man them. They will be manned by merchant mariners and we will go to the commercial sector to operate those ships. The Merchant Marine serves very, very well in that role.

#### CRAF IN DESERT SHIELD/STORM

Mr. HUTTO. OK. One final question. How did the CRAF program work out in Desert Shield/Desert Storm?

General JOHNSON. It worked extremely well. They met every need. As I am sure you know, we activated two stages of CRAF. There are three stages of CRAF. The first stage was activated on August 17, 1990. The 17-passenger airplanes in stage I at the time is what we were going after. We activated the second stage on January 17, 1991. This time we had a great need for long-range international cargo aircraft. Stage 2 made a total of 40 of these aircraft available. But, within a matter of a week or so, we had 77 such aircraft, including 37 volunteers above the 40 already committed. The commercial sector stepped forward and worked very well.

For sealift we had to go to the international market to get ships. On the airlift we did not go to the international market, other than the lift that was donated by several countries.

Mr. HUTTO. Thank you, sir.

#### LINKING GUARD AND RESERVE FORCES TO LIFT CAPACITY

The CHAIRMAN General Johnson, let me follow up Earl Hutto's questions just a second to get back to the question of the timing of this thing.

In terms of getting help from the civilian sector which you were talking to Earl about and the dollar cost here, and back to the question that you and I were discussing at the first, what we have is a base force concept which has 12 Active divisions in it, and you press them on what is the kind of scenario that they are looking at to use—why 12? Eight of them are for a Desert Storm rerun and 4 are for a contingency, perhaps like Korea.

We on the committee and the staff and other people have been playing with some options and looking at an Option C, which has 9 in it, which would be 8 for a Desert Storm kind of contingency, and then another—dealing with a Korea-type thing with air forces primarily, and mostly with allied ground forces. So it comes down to the question about whether you need ground forces for a Korea kind of contingency.

My question to you is what do we do if we can't move them there? I mean, basically, why buy forces if you don't have the lift to get them there?

General JOHNSON. Sir, I respect your question. We always have the lift to get them there. The question is how quickly you want to get them there.

The CHAIRMAN Right. Simultaneously.

General JOHNSON. I am not sure—we would have a very difficult time moving all those divisions simultaneously. But I am not sure the Nation would want to move all those divisions simultaneously.

Of course, I am not in the strategy business. I am in the business of providing transportation capability. We can move any force, the question is how quickly.

The CHAIRMAN Well, then that gets into the argument that we have with the Guard and Reserve community, which says that if you can't get them there quickly, and they admit that you need time to train up the Guard and Reserve—I mean, if Sonny Montgomery were here. I will ask his question for him. Why not rely on the Guard and Reserve for that contingency, the fact of the matter is that you have Active Duty forces which are ready to fight right away but you can't get them there anyway, so you have to sequence the deployment. Why not then put the forces for that second contingency in the Guard and Reserve?

General JOHNSON. We depend on the Guard and Reserve for almost any contingency. Certainly, in my business I can do nothing without calling on them for help.

The CHAIRMAN I am talking about combat.

General JOHNSON. I understand, sir. I understand the difficulty of training large ground units for combat. It is very difficult to keep that training up, and they would not be ready as quickly as the Nation would need them.

Again, we are aligning transportation with the base force. Some of the base force you don't want to move. Some is now forward deployed and I assume that we will continue to have a forward presence. Others we can move to where they are needed and, I believe, in the time that they are needed.

The CHAIRMAN But, if it is going to take you 6 weeks, a month and a half, to move the combat elements of  $4\frac{2}{3}$  divisions and 3 months totally to move all combat and combat support and combat service support elements of  $4\frac{2}{3}$  divisions, I don't know what—you say you are going to provide for the record how that plays out in terms of moving a full Desert Storm, 8-division force, over there how long that would take.

But then if you want to do 4 more divisions on top of that to Korea, I mean what are we talking about? We are talking about a long time there. As Sonny Montgomery would say, you have got enough time to train the Guard and Reserve before you have the lift available to move them.

General JOHNSON. I cannot argue that question on either side, sir. I am not enlightened on how long it takes to train them, so any answer I would give would not be very useful.

The CHAIRMAN Richard Ray.

#### FUTURE OF CRAF

Mr. RAY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. General Johnson, thank you for coming this morning.

I want to follow up just a little bit on Congressman Hutto's question about the CRAF program. I know it worked very well during the Middle East, but there have been a lot of casualties in the airline industry since the Middle East and more looming on the horizon. How does the CRAF program look to you in the next few years? What are your projections in that respect?

General JOHNSON. We are quite concerned. In fact, we are out for a new contract. Once you use something like CRAF, companies look



more carefully at how participation in CRAF would affect their other business.

CRAF has been and continues to be a tremendous partnership between the Government and the commercial sector. There is an Act that Congress passes and renews continuously called the Defense Production Act, which says that when our country needs U.S.-owned assets we can have them. So, if we didn't have a CRAF, the President would have to declare a national emergency and then we could use those assets anyway. But CRAF works so much better because it is a partnership in peacetime and in wartime.

I believe that we will be able to continue on track, though. The difficulties in the airline industry are of concern to us. We had a large number of aircraft from Pan American in the CRAF program. Some of those we are able to keep because Delta picked up the requirements on the passenger aircraft. Some of the cargo aircraft were sold to other U.S. carriers. There are about 13 that we don't yet have back in the fold, so to speak.

We are concerned, just like the whole country is.

Mr. RAY. So you are going to be working on trying to shore that up in the future in some sort of a way?

General JOHNSON. Shore up the industry, sir?

Mr. RAY. Shore up that program.

General JOHNSON. Yes, sir.

Mr. RAY. Obviously, it is going to be a tight situation the way the forecast is looking now for the next decade. So that is going to leave a big hole in the plan, isn't it?

General JOHNSON. Yes, sir. We are trying to take a new approach with the industry. First of all, we want to extend for another year what we are doing now. But then we want to look at leveling the playing field, looking at all the Government business as opposed to just what we look at today, and, in essence, offering the carriers a partnership in peace. We believe they will volunteer for CRAF based on these concepts, and we never have to resort to the authorities of the Defense Production Act.

#### AIRLIFT IN THE PACIFIC THEATER

Mr. RAY. I see. General, a couple of visits through the Pacific in the last 2 years and talking to other people who are in the Pacific, it appears that the transportation program has been neglected in the Pacific. I know it is very difficult to get our command people around. As near as I can tell, 2 Learjets, several C-12s—if it wasn't for the commercial flights that people can fly to Japan and then catch a flight down to Okinawa and around, we would have a problem.

Is that a misconception on my part? Or has the Pacific been neglected on transportation?

General JOHNSON. I don't think it has been neglected. I was the Vice Commander of the Pacific Air Forces a few years ago. Anyplace you go in the Pacific, especially from Hawaii, is a long way. We have good commercial and other connections, but once you get into the Far East, then we have as good a system as we have in the continental United States on going around. But it is a long way from Japan to Hawaii.



Mr. RAY. As near as I can tell, you have one old, 35- or 40-year-old C-135 or C-136 there that is now in the shop for a couple of years. You have the Marine general at Okinawa taking care of more than 25,000 marines having to rely on a Learjet that won't even make it to the Philippines.

Now, this committee has placed in the budget, and the Senate has to, on a number of occasions airplanes designated for the Pacific that somehow or another wound up at Andrews Air Force Base. Now, the Congress of the United States has more ways to get around than the Pacific does. Right now we have 3 C-20s that will get—were designated one for Japan, one for Honolulu, one for the theater after a long hard congressional battle, and they stuck in the Mobility Requirement Study, the black hole of studies out there.

At a time when you have aircraft companies as well as other manufacturing concerns getting ready to lay people off, shut down and reduce their production, with the money authorized, the need is there, it just appears to me that we need to loosen this up a little bit.

General JOHNSON. Yes, sir. It is a matter of priorities that are set at the higher departments and the Defense Department. Certainly the Pacific has not been neglected of late. Realizing we have had the same situation for a long time, we have tried to improve it. We have a couple of aircraft, long range aircraft out there. We have daily service the aircraft that I operate to the Western Pacific through Hawaii. Of course, we have the commercial alternatives that are much, much less expensive than some of the military alternatives.

Mr. RAY. Well, I don't want to be disrespectful, but you are singing an entirely different tune from all the commanders that have been out there, needing aircraft and complaining about it. It just appears to me that because the Department of Defense didn't request these airplanes, even when they were needed, and they were actually put in in the best interest and good judgment of the House and the Senate, that now somebody's nose is out of joint and they are stuck in this study, Mobility Study.

I just want to get that into the record, and I really would like for you to concentrate on the need out there. I think the need is much greater than you are saying it is, and I don't dispute you in any kind of way. But I see it, I hear it, and I hear it from the horse's mouth out there, and I know there is a problem. The Pacific is a big area. Bigger than any other area we are trying to serve, with less ability to serve it.

Thank you, sir.

General JOHNSON. Thank you, sir.

The CHAIRMAN Buddy Darden.

#### NEAR-TERM AIRLIFT CAPABILITY AND THE C-17

Mr. DARDEN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. General, thank you for being here this morning.

I want to start off with the good news. I was in Berlin on behalf of the chairman a couple of weeks ago, and they are still talking about what a wonderful thing the Berlin Airlift was. But certainly it pales in comparison to the magnificent performance of the Mili-

tary Airlift Command in Operation Desert Storm and Operation Desert Shield. What we were able to accomplish I think is a wonderful story in and of itself. So first I want to commend you for it, and everyone involved.

Having done that, I still think that if you and I debated the C-17 for the next 5 hours I wouldn't change your mind and you wouldn't change my mind. But I do want to remind you that we have been talking about the C-17 since before I came to Congress around 1982, and even by your testimony it will be some 20 years from that date before it ever comes into service. I want to remind you that the C-17 continues to set new records for program delays and cost overruns.

While we talk about what we did in Operation Desert Storm, certainly there was no C-17 there. I think to talk about how great it would have been with a C-17 is really of little value, considering the fact that it has not now or ever been there, and we will probably have 5 or 6 more conflicts of that type before it becomes available, which brings me to my point.

Doesn't it make sense to continue to upgrade our inventory equipment; that is, do things with our C-141s through a SLEP program; to continue to buy at least to hedge our bets in the short term, so we can have mobility for those situations which are going to occur before the C-17 ever comes?

I think if we had continued, of course, to rely on the C-17, you know it would have been rather embarrassing, if not shameful. So what are we doing to upgrade our assets in the inventory right now? As a result of Operations Desert Storm and Desert Shield, didn't we lose a lot of hours in the life of these aircraft?

General JOHNSON. We certainly flew the aircraft a great deal. We have looked at them very carefully after the war, and we haven't found the increases in fatigue that the extra hours would have indicated. Recognizing that the flying in Desert Shield was very long legs, very few landings, and so forth, the fatigue hours were not as high as the flying hours.

We are doing a lot to keep all of our military equipment, but certainly our airlift fleet, working. The C-5 is in pretty good shape, but we continue to do things to it. The 141 has had some cracks in the wings. We are fixing those. We have adjudged it prudent to continue to fly them. They are totally safe. The C-130s, we continue to buy some new ones. The C-17 is coming along well. I don't, certainly, want to debate you, but the pace of testing for that aircraft has exceeded all previous heavy aircraft tests. For instance, the first 10 flights in the B-1 took 135 days; in the C-5A, 95 days; and in the C-17, 25 days. It has flown 45 flights. I flew on flight number 43. It operates very, very well, and I am sure you would be proud of it.

I once went down to Lockheed Georgia and was asked to address the workers, and the first question, of course, was, Why don't we buy some more C-5s? I said, "Our Nation has made the decision that we will buy the C-17," and then I went through the normal defense.

Mr. DARDEN. Let me say I concur with you that the Nation has made the decision. That decision is made and that decision is irreversible, and I am not going to debate the wisdom of that decision,



because as you quite properly indicate it has been made. But my real concern is, having made the decision, I just want to be sure—and I know that you are taking steps, so I want to be sure the record is clear that the Transportation Command is doing everything in its power to look out for our present, short-term capability, rather than the day, long-heralded day whenever the C-17 comes into the inventory.

General JOHNSON. I would like to compliment you and your constituents on the tremendous performance of the Lockheed fleet, the 130s, the C-5, and the 141. Magnificent performance. I gave fairly specific guidance during Operation Provide Hope that we wouldn't spend the night in the former Soviet Union if we could help it; and if the airplane would fly that we were under combat conditions, and we would bring it out. Of the 65 missions, we only had to go in to make a repair on one airplane. In that instance, the wheel disintegrated and even I wouldn't have flown that one. So the performance continues to be quite good.

#### AIRLIFT CAPABILITY

Mr. DARDEN. What is our present capability in ton-miles per day of airlift? I know we have had various congressionally mandated studies, and I know that the number has changed from time to time, and certainly our requirements have changed in light of the collapse of the Soviet Union. But what is our realistic amount of ton-miles per day of airlift right now?

General JOHNSON. We calculate it at 48 million ton-miles. Now, sometimes you will see the number of 52 million ton-miles. Above the 48 is a 4 million, Joint Chiefs of Staff withhold, so 52 is really what we have.

Now, some would argue you don't have that because of your loss of Pan Am airplanes and so forth. But that is——

Mr. DARDEN. That is a combination of the CRAF as well.

General JOHNSON. Everything.

Mr. DARDEN. What percentage of that is CRAF?

General JOHNSON. About one-third.

Mr. DARDEN. So of that amount, then, about two-thirds is U.S. military assets and the other third is in the CRAF.

Thank you very much. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN John Spratt.

Mr. SPRATT. Thank you, General Johnson, for your testimony. Let me just follow up on what Mr. Darden was asking about the capacity of our airlift today.

Is 48 million to 52 million ton-miles the existing capacity? Sir, in the cold war period we had a goal laid down of 66 million ton-miles per day, have we abandoned that goal?

General JOHNSON. Sir, when we looked at the major aircraft review in 1990, it was decided that it was prudent to stop at the current level, at 48. In the MRS it grows a little bit. In 1999, it has grown up to about 57 million ton-miles, as I recall. But we have thought that, with moderate risk, that was the right level to keep it at. As we go forward, the Secretary of Defense has left open the possibility of adding more as we have to phase out some of the C-141s later. But right now we are sticking at that level.

Mr. SPRATT. Are we retiring C-141s any earlier because we have moderated this goal?

General JOHNSON. No, sir.

Mr. SPRATT. Same retirement schedule?

General JOHNSON. Yes, sir.

Mr. SPRATT. When the C-17, all 120, have been purchased at the end of this decade, what will be the ton-miles per day capacity of the C-17s, C-5s and the——

General JOHNSON. With the combination of all airlift assets it grows to about 57 million. I don't have the exact number, but it stays near the 1991 baseline.

Mr. SPRATT. How do we derive that particular requirement?

General JOHNSON. We derive it by such things as the Mobility Requirements Studies and others. It takes the force and says, Do you need to add more or not add more? In the study itself it talks a little bit about as the fleet grows older we need to acquire about 34 more aircraft equivalents, whether we get them from the CRAF, C-17s or elsewhere. It doesn't designate where.

Mr. SPRATT. We are getting along right now with 48 to 52, but we are going to 57 by the end of the decade. I mean, is the number really that determinative? Is it something we plan for or is it just the result of how many airplanes we decide to buy? That is a pretty wide spread from 48 to 57.

General JOHNSON. Yes, sir. But the 48 is really 52.

Mr. SPRATT. OK.

General JOHNSON. The 57 includes that 4 I was talking about, the withhold. In the height of Desert Shield, we still flew missions around the world that were not participating in Desert Shield, so that is what the 4 go for.

I think that certainly if we had an open-ended study we might add some more airlift. Airlift is much more expensive than sealift, and when you look at the moderate risk and try to maintain prudence, it made sense to do what we are doing here. This is a gigantic step for the Mobility Requirements Study.

Mr. SPRATT. It would seem to me that if 66 million was sufficient for the cold war period when we were contemplating moving massive forces in a hurry to Central Europe, then 57 million in a period when we are not worried about moving massive forces to Central Europe would come a lot closer to meeting our probable requirements than the 66 million would have during the cold war period.

General JOHNSON. But, as we were talking earlier, in the new world, as we bring troops home, those requirements don't go down. In fact, sometimes they go up, as we have talked about on sealift——

Mr. SPRATT. The idea of a remote presence and needing to get back out there.

General JOHNSON. Yes, sir. Forward presence versus deployment.

#### USE OF 747 CARGO PLANES IN CRAF

Mr. SPRATT. Just one sidelight. You mention in one of your graphs here that CRAF cargo, there were 134 CRAF cargo planes used. Did you use any 747 cargo planes?



General JOHNSON. Yes, sir. In fact, the largest amount of CRAF cargo was carried on 747s.

Mr. SPRATT. Back in the days when the C-5A was in trouble and the Air Force was deciding whether or not to carry the program forward there was a study made to see whether or not the 747 was an adequate substitute for it. One of the problems was that you had side-door loading and the platform for cargo storage wasn't suitable to it, and you were going to have to restructure the whole plane.

How suitable is a regular CRAF 747 to carrying most of your equipment?

General JOHNSON. The 747 carries sustainment equipment. It carries pallets. It doesn't carry—

Mr. SPRATT. Big, out-sized equipment.

General JOHNSON. Patriot missiles. We could not have done Patriot missiles except with two airplanes in the whole wide world: the C-5, (the C-17 would in the future) and the AN-124. In other words, the 747 just flat cannot do that.

Of all the commercial aircraft, the 747 carried the largest amount of cargo by far. The aircraft that carried the most passengers was the DC-10, which surprised me. I thought the 747 would carry more passengers too, but of the total number, the DC-10s carried the most.

Mr. SPRATT. So you can get more weight and bulk into the 747, but you can't get the out-sized equipment in the 747?

General JOHNSON. That is right, sir. It is just a matter of loading, as you have pointed out, sir.

The 747 worked well from Dover, DE, to Southwest Asia.

#### WINGS ON THE C-17

Mr. SPRATT. You mentioned that the flight tests were going well for the C-17. As I recall, the C-17 did have a problem initially with the construction of the wing, or at least McDonnell Douglas had a problem with their subcontractor on that. The C-5, obviously, had big wing problems. It showed up early in the dynamic testing and later came back to plague the airplane.

Are you comfortable with the dynamic testing thus far of the wings on the C-17?

General JOHNSON. Yes, sir. On the C-5, our technology was different back in those days and we didn't make the wing quite as strong, because we thought it would handle the load. Since then, we have changed out those wings.

On the C-17 I think it took a little different approach. It is made differently. Conventionally, a large airplane has 5 sections of the wing; this has 2. It is put together by the machine, Drivematic, which is working well, and probably produces a higher quality than if you were doing it by hand, which was the alternative. I have looked at the equipment. I have looked at the test results. Outside experts have looked and found that the wings that were built early on with the Drivematic are in good shape. Any problems with the Drivematic were corrected; it had to do with the expansion of the rivets. It was designed not to expand the rivets. But, if you expand the rivets, it gives them even more strength.

I have looked at it and, again, experts have looked at it outside Douglas and outside the Program Office and found it in good shape.

Mr. SPRATT. Who is building the wing?

General JOHNSON. That was a surprise. It is put together in a Douglas plant. That is where the Drivematic is.

Mr. SPRATT. I thought Lockheed was originally the subcontractor for the wing.

General JOHNSON. Parts come in from—and they did come in from Lockheed at Burbank early on. I think someone else is doing it now. But that was the parts. The Drivematic is right there at Douglas. I have looked at it.

#### C-17 COST AND OPERATIONAL ENVIRONMENT

Mr. SPRATT. One final question. What is the program unit cost currently for the C-17?

General JOHNSON. I don't have that number. If you look at 1992 on, in 1992 dollars it is about \$180 million.

Mr. SPRATT. About \$180 million in 1992 dollars?

General JOHNSON. Flyaway cost. Ninety-two on, not going back and recapturing—

Mr. SPRATT. The C-5 was originally conceived as an airplane that would be able to land on small, unimproved strips. That's one reason you put all the wheels on it. But I don't think that anybody would be too bold about taking such an expensive airplane in and letting a peasant in the hills take it out with a mortar.

Do you really think the C-17 is going to be able to deploy at small forward strips in a time of crisis?

General JOHNSON. Yes, sir. I have landed the C-17. I didn't do an assault landing.

Mr. SPRATT. Not operationally. But do you think that we are going to take a \$200–\$250 million airplane into those?

General JOHNSON. Yes, sir. If it is needed, it will be taken wherever.

I have also landed a C-5 on 5 feet of ice in Antarctica. So we use airplanes where we have to.

#### RESERVE PARTICIPATION IN AIRLIFT IN DESERT SHIELD/STORM

Mr. SPRATT. What was the Reserve percentage? I commend the Airlift for the way you have incorporated and integrated the Reserves. To what extent were Reserve pilots and Reserve crews flying these sorties that were making the airlift movements to the Persian Gulf?

General JOHNSON. It is impossible to tell the difference once they start flying. We had called up 21,000 reservists. We mobilized all the C-5 wings, and in the end we mobilized all the 141s, but only in the last few days. Normally, we had 11 of 15 of those squadrons. We also had a number of C-130 units that were mobilized. The Reserves do their job as well as the Active units.

They are part of the total force. When we did Project Hope, the Reserve and Guard participated in those missions.

Mr. SPRATT. As a percentage of your total crews deployed, what was the Reserve percentage, just roughly speaking?

General JOHNSON. I can't tell you that. I guess I can, too.



If we had all of them, and we did in the C-5s, 62 percent of the crews are in the Guard and Reserve. In the C-141s, 52 percent, and, again, we only had 11 of 15 squadrons, so the percentage would be a little lower.

Mr. SPRATT. Thank you very much for your testimony.

General JOHNSON. I am totally committed to the Reserve forces and disappointed that we don't get an opportunity to talk more about them. But it is a good program.

The CHAIRMAN Martin Lancaster.

#### MERCHANT MARINER REEMPLOYMENT RIGHTS

Mr. LANCASTER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you, General. Speaking of Reserves, in your testimony you mention the problem of merchant seamen who were called to man the Reserve ships not having re-employment rights. Can you tell us a little bit more about that problem, the extent of the problem? More importantly for me, why these folks were not protected by the Soldiers and Sailors Civil Relief Act provisions?

General JOHNSON. I must admit that I was naive about that also. I had always thought and I had heard the stories that during World War II, the second highest percent of casualties was in the Merchant Marine. But they have never been under the Soldiers and Sailors Acts. They need re-employment rights very desperately, because we could call up the Coast Guard and everyone else under the Soldiers and Sailors Act, but we could not call the Merchant Marine because they don't have re-employment rights. They are civilians in every meaning of the word, and they work through the unions, and the unions find the people to bring on to man the ships.

We need to look at a Merchant Marine Reserve, and the Maritime Administration is looking at that. But the key will be to have re-employment rights. There are people who wanted to go to sea who could not go to sea because they, in essence, have to leave their jobs.

#### LOCAL GROUND TRANSPORTATION PROBLEMS

Mr. LANCASTER. You also mention in your testimony the importance of our CONUS transportation network: rails, highways, bridges. I am glad to hear that commitment on your part. Several years ago I had a real problem with the Pentagon in this regard. First of all, aviation fuel is delivered to Seymour Johnson and to Cherry Point from an aviation fuel terminal at the Port of Morehead City by rail. The Marine Corps got a chance to buy some cheap fuel that would be brought in by barge, and signed a long time contract, which then made it no longer economically feasible to maintain the aviation fuel terminal and the rail lines between Morehead City, Cherry Point and Seymour Johnson, which would have resulted in, actually, the abandonment of that rail line because it was the fuel that made the rail line economically feasible for other hauling.

It took some real doing to convince the Marine Corps that they were being very shortsighted in saving just a pittance in getting this barged in fuel and lose a railroad that was providing not only fuel, but also significant capability for deployment. They did finally

back down, and that rail turned out to be a significant factor in Desert Shield/Desert Storm to the Port of Morehead City, which was a major port for deployment of forces and materiel from North Carolina.

Similarly, North Carolina was going to build a 4-lane road between Camp Lejeune and the port at Morehead City, the port of embarkation for the forces at Lejeune. But they were going to build the bridges only for highway traffic, were not going to build it to military specifications. So the Marine Corps was going to continue to have to go around through New Bern, a 20-mile-longer route. I tried my best to get the Pentagon to cooperate in using defense access funds to build those bridges to military specs. They fought me all the way. I finally got a special appropriation approved to help with some of the costs so that those bridges could be built to military specs, but over the objection of the Pentagon.

Can you tell me is this behind us? Do we have a new attitude with regard to both of these instances or are we likely to face continued opposition if those situations arise in the future?

General JOHNSON. I would like to say yes. I certainly will say yes that we watch that very carefully, but we depend on those commanders out there being enlightened in recommending such things as you have discussed.

Mr. LANCASTER. In both cases the commanders were pushing as hard as I was. It was in the Puzzle Palace that we ran into the problems.

General JOHNSON. We would be on their side in that discussion, and we work very hard to support them. In the past, railroads and others have wanted to remove spurs that go to forts and bases, and we have been successful in every case with the commercial industry at keeping those spurs when we address the subject, and we will continue to work those.

To say there won't be some isolated cases that I don't know about and others don't know, I couldn't be confident of that.

Mr. LANCASTER. Well, with regard to the fuel purchase, they were looking at one line and that was the bottom line, and they were not looking at any collateral issues. They kept saying, "But we're going to save \$300,000," or whatever the figure was over a 5-year period by this long-term contract. I think there are lines to look at sometimes other than the bottom line in these instances.

#### ACQUIRING FOREIGN SEALIFT SHIPS

Now, I have heard and have read a little bit about the possibility of acquiring some of our sealift capability from ships already built in Eastern Europe. Can you tell us a little bit about what the study is showing and whether or not it is likely that we will be buying such ships, or will we be buying ships built only in American shipyards?

General JOHNSON. I know of no such ideas. The Congress has said that we can spend up to 15 percent for non-U.S. ships, but I know of no plans such as you suggest. Is that being considered? It may be so, that we have no plans for that.

I would be remiss if I didn't tell you something else, answering your earlier question. We in the Defense Department are often accused of making bad deals at the lowest price. My command is



committed to quality, and one of the guiding principles we have is to assure quality transportation at the best value and reasonable price. I think that might be a new way of doing business, but I believe it's a smart way, and in the end a lower cost to the Government.

#### PROGRAM CUTS FOR THE GLOBAL TRANSPORTATION NETWORK

Mr. LANCASTER. In your testimony you note that the budget request for the Global Transportation Network is \$10.4 million for fiscal year 1993. Can you tell us what the total estimate is for this program, not just for 1993?

General JOHNSON. I am sorry, sir. I didn't catch exactly what—the 10 point?

Mr. LANCASTER. OK. You say that the Global Transportation Network's cost for 1993 is going to be \$10.4 million. Can you tell us what the total cost of this program is going to be over the life of the program?

General JOHNSON. No, sir, I cannot. We are still trying to define the endpoint for the Global Transportation Network. Development costs are on the order of \$70 million total. But our challenge in the Global Transportation Network is trying to pull together all the Services' inputs to transportation and provide in-transit visibility on everything that is in the defense transportation system.

The Army has a program called TDS (Total Distribution System) that they are trying to work, and we are looking at using GTN to assist them in knowing where all their cargo is throughout the transportation system. So, again, the cost to develop GTN is on the order of \$70 million, but we haven't fully defined the endpoint. We are working very hard to serve our customers and the Army certainly is a big customer, and this Total Distribution System will have a big impact on how far we go with the Global Transportation Network.

Mr. LANCASTER. So we don't even know what the outlines of the system will be much less its cost, because it is evolving?

General JOHNSON. Yes, sir. We know where we want to go, we don't quite know how to get there. We know each step, and each step is a stand-alone. The first step is to provide the in-transit visibility, and then you go on to the Total Distribution System and so forth. But we are taking a step at a time and each one is a stand-alone. It is not a turn-key operation.

#### WORLDWIDE TRANSPORTATION FACILITIES

Mr. LANCASTER. Mr. Sisisky asked you about enroute infrastructure, and you talked a little bit about what you had at Seville that was made available from a standby status and that Torrejon will have a similar status for the future. But I think one of the real successes of Desert Shield/Desert Storm was the infrastructure that had been put in place by the Saudi Government in advance: El Kharg, some of the King Khalil, the various things that were in place.

Are we seeing other countries, either with our cooperation or otherwise, putting in stand-by endpoint facilities in hotspots or potential hotspots, or are we going to be faced in future contingencies

with having to get in the best way we can to places that we already know may be potential hotspots for the future?

General JOHNSON. I suspect no place in the world had as good a set of facilities as Saudi Arabia had built many years before, and some projects were ongoing. I must tell you that when we did the end run, if you will, we had airplanes landing on a roadway to deliver logistics supplies to the Army.

Can we land? Yes, we can land a lot of places. Finding the support at those places is the key. In Project Hope, we went to 24 different airfields. I was quite concerned about what kind of support we would get. We received very good fuel. We tested it before we put it in the airplanes, brought samples back. We found that the infrastructure was much, much better than we would have thought.

Around the world it would be the same way. Will we have to lay some runways? Yes. Will we have to convert some roadways? Yes. Will we have to do end-stream offload from ships? Yes, and we have the logistics over the shore capability to do that.

The situation we had in Saudi has to be the best, with the port of Ad Dammam with its 31 berths and all the runways that we had available, as you mentioned.

Mr. LANCASTER. But is there any program, either in concept or farther along, to maybe look to the future at some other places in the world to put in place similar—well, nothing can compare to that, but to put in some infrastructure for a future contingency?

General JOHNSON. No, sir. We will have to depend on the commercial economies doing that. There are a lot of fields around the world because of commercial aviation, and a lot of ports because of commercial activity, and we must depend on those. We have no programs to go out and encourage or give money ourselves to build new facilities.

Mr. LANCASTER. How about inventorying or otherwise having the data on hand for the use of those civilian facilities?

General JOHNSON. Yes, sir. We are charged in the Transportation Command to be the gatherers of transportation intelligence, and our big areas are ports and airports and terrorism, for obvious reasons.

Mr. LANCASTER. Thank you very much.

The CHAIRMAN Mrs. Byron.

#### ISSUES EFFECTING TRANSPORTATION

Mrs. BYRON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

General, let me, first of all, commend you for a job extremely well done. The question is where do we go from here?

Mr. Lancaster has been talking about a lot of the things that I had on my list. I came back from Saudi in 1983 with the feeling that this is probably the best kept secret that we have, because there is an infrastructure there that is probably superior to any that we have in this country, because anything they purchased was the top of the line and there was no question that was going to be maintained to our standards, which was a key component there.

I am very concerned as we look at Torrejon closing down and we look at our flight ops from Rhein Main closing down somewhat. We looked in the 1980s at Egypt and development of a base at Ras



Banas, one that was not developed but I guess could be used in an emergency.

We are talking about a new structure in our military. What are we going to be looking at? What is the threat going to be? We have a reduced threat. We have a new threat. Just in the last several years, we talk about the Philippines with Fiery Vigil and we talk about Bangladesh with Sea Angel. We talk about the Russian Commonwealth with Provide Hope. We talk about the Kurdish rescue mission. We talk about, in December 1989 or 1990, the earthquake in Armenia. There were no questions asked. We were airborne within 12 hours with supplies and the critical help that was needed.

As we restructure, are we going to be able to continue to meet these world crises, which are not really military crises? Are we going to be able to have the capability to meet these?

There is one aircraft that you failed to mention, and that is a dual-role aircraft which I think was at a prime area in Operation Desert Storm/Desert Shield, and that is the KC-10. It has dual capability. It not only is a refueler, but it has enormous capability of moving pallets and equipment. At the same time, it can do the refueling mission.

Where are we going as we downsize? When I was on the Seapower Subcommittee back in 1978—1979 and 1980, the question there, Mr. Bennett, we talked about roll-on/roll-off ships and we talked about the fact that we didn't have sealift, but we were going to do something about it. We haven't done anything yet.

We had prepositioned equipment. We had POMCUS units. What percentage of the POMCUS units were used? What percentage of the prepositioned did we go into? These are questions that are of great concern.

How much can we move through Sigonella? How much can we move through Turkey in a worldwide situation? That is just looking toward the Gulf.

Mr. Ray is concerned about looking toward the Far East, and I couldn't agree with him more. Are we developing that kind of lift capability?

A bunch of questions, but I hope you can give us some of the answers.

General JOHNSON. Well, first of all, I would be remiss if I didn't tell you on behalf of all the men and women of the Armed Forces how much we have appreciated your visits. In my various positions over the last few years, I have watched you as you went to Saudi—I remember that visit very well—and visited our troops, and we greatly appreciate that. You have had a very strong personal interest, and certainly our troops have benefited.

As far as the humanitarian support, I appreciate the various missions that you talked about, because in each one of those we provided the Nation the capability to do what we did as a nation, and we will continue to have that capability to do those jobs wherever they occur.

In the Commonwealth of Independent States, as I mentioned, we expected great difficulty. I am not sure any of us understood the reception that we would get at the various locations. We were treated with great respect and great appreciation. I don't have the



capability of showing slides here, but the medical part of Provide Hope was probably more meaningful than the food part. Some parts of the world that we went to didn't have syringes. They were reusing plastic syringes. They didn't have I.V. capability. So I think we provided that.

You mentioned Fiery Vigil. It was very, very difficult. We had no place to land. So the Navy moved the people to another island and we landed at Mactan. Our country will always rise to these occasions.

We look around the world in the intelligence role I mentioned a moment ago to assess the capability. I went to a port in southern Turkey near the Syrian border, an antiquity port, very, very difficult to operate there. But yet, there is another port nearby and all we have to do is to gain access, and we certainly can do that.

You asked about POMCUS. We did use some of that equipment. I cannot tell you exactly how much. But the prepositioning that you and others had supported over time has paid off, and I believe that the Department of Defense and our Nation are listening to you and Mr. Bennett and others about sealift. I think we have responded in a manner that you would be pleased with.

I am pleased that the KC-10 will join the Air Mobility Command, and we will fully use its capability, both in hauling cargo, people and, of course, transferring fuel.

Mrs. BYRON. Let me talk about one of the rescue missions that is very seldom discussed, and that was several years ago with the earthquake in Armenia, where we had no understanding of what we were going to find when we went in, and yet our crews, on 12 hours notice with pallets loaded with emergency supplies, took off, landed in hazardous conditions at that time, and no questions asked; we were there.

When we went in on Provide Hope we were expected and so it doesn't surprise me that we were well received. But, on the other one with the earthquake, where you had an enormous damage and concern, our crews never questioned; all they did was fly.

Mr. Lancaster talked a little bit about the Soldiers and Sailors Act and the effect on the merchant areas. There have been Reserve and Guard individuals that were called up that came under the Soldiers and Sailors Act that are still not back in the employment that they left, because of layoffs. So, as it works it also has a down side. If industry is closing down and laying off, those individuals that are called up are caught in that catch-22.

So, for us to talk about the Soldiers and Sailors Act protecting everyone, there are some holes in it and there are some that fall through the cracks on that. But that is another day for another issue.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

General JOHNSON. If I may respond to two comments, if you don't mind? First of all, in my command I released all the people in MAC on the 15th of June, and my staff said, "You cannot"—this is Guard and Reserve. They said, "You cannot do that. We are still very busy." I said, "We must do that."

In a message to General Powell I said: No. 1, we can do it. No. 2, it is a prudent thing to do. No. 3, if we don't do it, we can't expect them to come back next time we need them. We owe it to their

families and their employers to release them when the perceived threat is gone.

I recognize that sometimes people will use that as an excuse from their downsizing, and we can't defend against it. But we have to make sure we keep the faith with them.

One side story. We sent an airplane into Armenia, Yerevan, in December, and they knew they shouldn't expect fuel. They weren't prepared for what they saw. There are still 55,000 people displaced from the earthquake 2 years ago. There are another 35,000 displaced for political reasons. So there is a lot of turmoil in Armenia—Yerevan, to be specific—from the cases you cited.

Mr. BENNETT. Thank you very much.

Mr. Browder.

Mr. BROWDER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I have no questions, other than to thank General Johnson for his appearance here today. Thank you.

Mr. BENNETT. Well, I will conclude then by repeating that. We appreciate your down to earth, specific information you have given us, and it will be very helpful to our country. Thank you for your career.

With that we will adjourn and come back tomorrow at 9:30, same place.

[Whereupon, at 11:28 a.m., the panel was recessed, to reconvene at 9:30 a.m., Wednesday, March 11, 1992.].





## CINC CENTRAL COMMAND

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HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,  
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES,  
DEFENSE POLICY PANEL,  
*Washington, DC, Wednesday, March 11, 1992.*

The panel met, pursuant to call, at 9:37 a.m., in room 2118, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Les Aspin (chairman of the panel) presiding.

### STATEMENT OF HON. LES ASPIN, A REPRESENTATIVE FROM WISCONSIN, CHAIRMAN, DEFENSE POLICY PANEL

The CHAIRMAN The meeting will come to order this morning.

Today, the Defense Policy Panel welcomes Gen. Joseph Hoar, the Commander in Chief of Central Command. The panel is pleased to have General Hoar's help as we begin to develop threat-based defenses for fiscal year 1993.

This year our work takes place in a different world than we have seen for more than 40 years. The national security concerns that drove our defenses for two generations have changed fundamentally as a result of two modern revolutions in the former Soviet Union. The first revolution ended with the collapse of the Warsaw Pact, and occurred mainly in 1989. The second, which occurred in the last 6 months of 1991, led to the dissolution of the Soviet Union itself.

This reduction in the threat facing us allows a reduction in our defense effort. But the right defense for the new post-Soviet era cannot be the result of subtracting from the forces that we have now. That would only leave us with a smaller version of a force designed to meet a very different threat.

The first step must be a bottom-up review of our military, starting with a re-examination of the basis for our defense. This means determining what is likely to threaten us. Defenses based on vague notions of maintaining superpower status don't justify the expenditure of taxpayer dollars. Only forces that can defend against real threats guarantee superpower status and constitute a worthwhile use of scarce financial resources.

This morning the panel will hear from General Hoar about the real threats he foresees in Southwest Asia. Clearly, of all the areas in the world, the area that comes under the purview of our witness this morning is at the center of any future defense planning because that is where a good bulk of the threats that we can see on the horizon are located. A resurgent Iraq, a revitalized Iran, the presence of weapons of mass destruction—all fall into the category, and that is why we are so very pleased to hear from you this morning, General Hoar.

We would also like to discuss the size and shape of forces required to meet those threats and whether any situation might exist which would require a force greater than that deployed in Desert Storm.

Developing the right forces for the new era requires all our best work.

We look forward to General Hoar's testimony. Before I turn the mike over to you, sir, let me see if Floyd Spence has any comments.

#### STATEMENT OF HON. FLOYD SPENCE, A REPRESENTATIVE FROM SOUTH CAROLINA

Mr. SPENCE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Just briefly—I have a statement I would like to submit for the record.

General Hoar, we welcome you before us today. You occupy a very responsible position and we appreciate ahead of time your counsel in this matter. Of course, we are concerned, as you are, about the security assistance in your part of the world and how we can work with our friends and allies to keep stability in that particular area.

We are also concerned about people drawing the wrong lessons from the Persian Gulf conflict we just went through.

For instance, I wonder what would have happened if Saddam Hussein had attacked Saudi Arabia in the first month before we had a chance to do all the things and build up as we did.

What if he had a navy and submarines to interdict our supply lines and make things more difficult for us? I am just afraid we are going to draw some wrong lessons from this conflict—the way it was played out—and that it might be the wrong kind of guide for us in the future. So, I would like your comments on that.

Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

#### PREPARED STATEMENT OF HON. FLOYD SPENCE

General Hoar, we welcome you.

Few doubt the inherent instability and danger in the Central Command area. Therefore, I believe the issues now facing this panel are how to best promote stability, and if that fails, to understand what military forces are needed to end the instability.

There are two major policy questions you can help us with. The first issue relates to security assistance, but addresses the larger question of how the United States encourages other nations to undertake a larger share of their own defense.

You place great importance on security assistance. Unfortunately, in a current Washington spinoff of catch-22, many say we cannot be “the policeman of the world.” Yet, when friendly nations like the Gulf States seek to assume the leadership and financial burden of their collective defense, such “policeman-no-longer” advocates refuse to allow our allies to buy the aircraft, ships, and tanks they need. In the case of the Gulf, U.S. sales would provide a deterrent to future aggression and allow us to share in shaping the regional security strategy, and, by the way, keep thousands of U.S. workers employed in the process.

Another issue I hope you will address is the danger of learning the wrong lessons from the last war. In trying to determine the size of U.S. forces for 1997, some seek to make the U.S. 1991 Desert Storm force the base line for all future potential conflicts. It seems to me there are many dangers in this approach. For example:

- What if Saddam had attacked Saudi Arabia in the first month of our deployment, or had used nuclear or chemical weapons to achieve a crucial tactical advantage?
- What if the Iraqis had fought skillfully and tenaciously?

In both these cases, the 1991 Desert Storm force would have looked far different than what we did employ. As a result, the size, shape and cost of the 1997 force

based on these "threat-based" scenarios would have been far different than the Desert Storm equivalent force now being touted as a baseline.

General Hoar, this committee faces some difficult choices over the next few weeks. Your testimony is crucial to our achieving a better understanding of the requirements and roles of U.S. forces in the Gulf region.

I look forward to your remarks.

The CHAIRMAN General, the floor is yours, sir.

## STATEMENT OF GEN. JOSEPH P. HOAR, USMC, COMMANDER IN CHIEF, U.S. CENTRAL COMMAND

General HOAR. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, members of the panel. It is a distinct honor to be with you today in my first appearance as Commander in Chief of the U.S. Central Command. I have been granted a unique privilege to be trusted with the military planning and operations for this dynamic and vital area of responsibility.

There are a number of important issues that I would like to discuss with you today, and, with your approval, I will submit a detailed statement for the record.

The CHAIRMAN Without objection.

General HOAR. Before answering your questions, I would like to make a brief opening statement, if I may?

The CHAIRMAN Please.

General HOAR. I am sure we can all recall the triumphant moment only a year ago when my distinguished predecessor and good friend, Gen. Norm Schwarzkopf, led the U.S. Central Command force of over half a million Americans to a stunning victory in the Gulf. The liberation of Kuwait, undertaken by an extraordinary coalition of nations, demonstrated the unique resolve and capability of the United States to take the lead in reversing aggression and restoring the rule of international law in this vital area of the world. Today, as we reflect with gratitude and pride on that national achievement, we also do well to remember the ongoing challenges to our mission in the greater Middle East/Southwest Asia area of responsibility.

As much as the Gulf War was a defining moment in the history of this region, it is also true that many other complex, powerful dynamics are shaping an unpredictable future there. Ancient cultures and religions co-exist with, and are increasingly challenged by rapid social change, nationalism, exploding populations, economic disparities, and new ideologies. The urgent matter of proliferation of weapons of mass destruction adds an ominous aspect to this course of events. In short, the region remains unsettled and potentially dangerous.

Yet, from our perspective as keepers of the watch in this part of the world, we at CENTCOM can point to a number of emerging opportunities to reduce the dangers and help create a more secure, stable future.

There can be no question of the importance of the Central Region to U.S. vital interests. In an increasingly interdependent global economy, our well-being depends on the free flow to market of the region's principal resource, oil, and on the use of regional waterways for world commerce. We have stood with our friends both within and outside the area, for the principle that such critical economic activity benefits all and must not be jeopardized by aggres-



sion. Unfortunately, we are not yet free of the threats to our interests which come from a number of sources.

Iraq and Iran are the two states in the region which pose the greatest risk of aggressive action. Iraq, as you know, remains hostile, intransigent, and uncooperative with the U.N. Security Council sanctions. Despite its enormous wartime losses, Iraq preserved and salvaged a significant military capability and shows every intent of reconstituting its earlier strength at some point in the future. Iran has accelerated its military modernization and force expansion, with the apparent aim of re-establishing itself as a dominant regional power. Its political and strategic objectives are not always apparent, but Iran's potential is clearly growing.

The steady spread of weapons of mass destruction causes an exponential increase in the danger associated with regional conflict. Many states are turning to such weapons in the mistaken belief that they represent a shortcut to security and regional prominence. We seek to discourage this route by helping to strengthen conventional deterrence and stability. Yet the momentum toward weapons of mass destruction increases.

Against this mosaic of potential threats, our principal focus is to orchestrate the military component of U.S. policy and strategy for the region. USCENTCOM is committed to creating the conditions for battlefield success should we be so challenged. Operations Desert Storm and Desert Shield showed clearly the critical relationship between peacetime preparation and victory. Not only were we able to capitalize on a long-term investment in first-class, technologically superior, superbly trained forces, we also needed and were able to call on a climate of trust and interoperability brought about by a similar investment in coalition building with our friends in the region. Now, perhaps more than ever, we must redouble our efforts to show that climate remains favorable.

For a number of reasons we know it will be very unlikely that we could replicate Operations Desert Storm and Desert Shield in the future. In such a major regional contingency of tomorrow, we doubt our adversary would grant us the reaction time and the initiative that Saddam Hussein provided in 1990 and 1991.

Further, as the U.S. military reduces its size and withdraws from traditional forward-deployed locations, our ability to respond quickly with decisive force is reduced. Therefore, it is critical that all practical steps be taken to improve the capabilities of our potential coalition partners and lay the groundwork for credible initial defense.

We have developed a peacetime strategy to accomplish these objectives over time through three key instruments or pillars: forward presence, combined exercises, and security assistance. The synergism that grows from these elements will provide the interoperability and coalition war-fighting capability that we need.

Forward presence is demonstrated first and most visibly in our region through the continued deployment of U.S. Navy Middle East Force, our CENTCOM Navy component. Presence, however, also includes intelligence sharing, combined planning, prepositioning, senior military contacts and visits, and humanitarian assistance efforts. These all serve to make our influence felt on the scene and reinforce the credibility of our commitment to the region.

Combined exercises also contribute greatly to interoperability and war-fighting effectiveness. By working directly with friendly forces in the region, each side grows in confidence and skill in the conduct of coalition operations. Every advantage gained by such familiarity and confidence is a potential war-winning force multiplier during combat. Our exercise program in the region has grown five-fold since 1989.

Security assistance, the third peacetime pillar, is vital in strengthening legitimate defensive capabilities of our friends and partners. Security assistance programs also serve the objective of interoperability by expanding the network of U.S.-origin weapons systems and support equipment in the region. As with combined exercises, hardware compatibility among coalition partners can provide a critical edge on the battlefield, particularly during the early stages of a conflict when we are vulnerable and building up our forces.

I have stressed the coalition aspects of our involvement in the region because we have neither the ability nor the desire to provide for the security alone. We see ourselves fitted into a regional security structure which consists of three levels or lines of defense. First, individual countries will seek to improve necessary self-defense capabilities with our cooperation and assistance. Next, regional partners will develop a better basis for collective action to deter and defend against local threats, a process which we are actively encouraging. Finally, the United States and other countries will contribute their capabilities to deterrence and defense of the common regional interests. At each level, coalition building and interoperability give coherence and integrity to the structure.

If deterrence fails, and we are again called on to fight, we must be able to count on certain essential elements to ensure our success. Superior readiness, highly trained and motivated people, timely intelligence, modern equipment, prepositioned assets both ashore and afloat, and strategic mobility provide the means to shape the battlefield, minimize casualties and achieve decisive victory. In particular, we need to sustain programs such as the C-7, enhanced sealift, amphibious launching, improved communications and intelligence architectures, advanced munitions, and ballistic missile defenses. We look to you for support in building flexible, hard-hitting U.S. forces for the future.

Mr. Chairman, I am encouraged both by our accomplishments and the opportunities now appearing before us. We can point to solid progress in strengthening our security relations through cooperative agreements with Bahrain, Kuwait, and Oman. We continue to seek mutually beneficial arrangements with the United Arab Emirates and Qatar. In Egypt and Saudi Arabia we can count on long-lasting and stalwart friendships. We have reason to look forward to a new, more constructive future with Jordan, and we are working patiently to resolve our disagreement with Pakistan over nuclear issues and to find a way to remove the threats of weapons of mass destruction to the subcontinent.

In a new spirit of international cooperation and commitment to collective security free from the constraints of the cold war, we now have an opportunity, greater than at any moment since World War II, to shape a regional environment of peace and stability. By pru-



dent attention to our peacetime strategy and investment in the programs I have described, we can truly seize this moment and help to create a more promising future for the benefit of all.

Again, I thank the panel for this opportunity, and I look forward to your questions.

#### PREPARED STATEMENT OF GEN. JOSEPH P. HOAR

Mr. Chairman, members of the panel, I welcome this opportunity to appear before you today to testify as the Commander in Chief, U.S. Central Command.

#### EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Today, I am sure we're all struck by the fact that it was only a year ago that U.S. Central Command forces, in concert with our allies, had just executed one of the most successful military operations in our history. Over 500,000 Americans participated in reversing aggression and restoring the rule of international law in a distant and, to some, unfamiliar region of the world. This massive national effort had taken place in a climate of shared resolve and cooperation with a diverse coalition of nations that would have surprised many. The redeployment of most of those troops to their homes and other duty stations, a tremendous accomplishment in its own right, has been completed. All should remain proud of what the United States brought about through its leadership.

It is clear that the Gulf War had a profound effect on the broad Middle East and Southwest Asia region, the area of responsibility (AOR) assigned to U.S. Central Command. However, it is also true that in this part of the world, many complex, powerful factors combine to shape a future that defies prediction. Here are ancient, durable cultures; a rich religious heritage for hundreds of millions of people across the globe; rapid social change marked by exploding population growth and intractable conflicts. A relatively new element, the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, adds a potentially grave backdrop to the course of events here. So, while this region enters the new, hopefully brighter, post-Gulf War phase of its long history, tomorrow is far from certain.

Just as during the years leading up to the Gulf War, we at CENTCOM are again charged with maintaining watch in this turbulent area, projecting American presence and influence where possible, and planning for the use of U.S. forces as required to protect U.S. vital interests. Operations Desert Shield and Desert Storm reflected continuity with earlier CENTCOM efforts such as the Earnest Will escort operations during the Iran-Iraq war. Our experiences and perspectives suggest that the United States is at this moment faced with important challenges and opportunities in this AOR. I appreciate the opportunity to describe and discuss them with you today.

Operations Earnest Will, Desert Shield, and Desert Storm demonstrated our unshakable commitment to protect U.S. interests in this vital part of the world. We will continue to promote regional stability, assist friendly states to defend themselves, maintain access to oil, and work to limit the spread of weapons of mass destruction. We are cooperating with countries in the region to stem the flow of illegal drugs and to counter terrorism. We want to take advantage of this new era of international cooperation to encourage security and stability for the benefit of all.

Strategic oil reserves and waterways make the region vitally important to the United States. The health of an increasingly interdependent global economy, including the economic strength of the United States and the well-being of our friends and allies, depends on uninterrupted access to Arabian Gulf oil. Additionally, security of the sea lines of communication is essential to the unimpeded flow of world trade through USCENCOM's area of responsibility.

We view our AOR as consisting of three distinct and interdependent sub-regions: South Asia, the Arabian Gulf/Arabian peninsula, and the Red Sea/Horn of Africa. Each sub-region is unique, presenting its own set of challenges. Long-standing conflicts between nations, internal ethnic violence and civil war, religious differences, and large armed forces all contribute to unstable conditions in the area.

The South Asia Sub-region, made up of India, Pakistan, and Afghanistan, has great potential for increased conflict. The Kashmir dispute between India and Pakistan and the civil war in Afghanistan are a major cause for concern. Drug traffic originating from the "Golden Crescent" portions of Pakistan and Afghanistan is also troubling. Additionally, the unravelling of the former Soviet Union and creation of the Commonwealth of Independent States add uncertainty along with new opportunities and challenges.



The Arabian Gulf/Arabian Peninsula Sub-region has a central place in our area of responsibility. There can be no question of U.S. commitment to the stability of this area and the security of the strategic oil resources and waterways, now more openly evident in the new bilateral security agreements we have recently signed with Oman, Kuwait, and Bahrain. We are also negotiating security arrangements with Saudi Arabia, Qatar, and the United Arab Emirates.

The countries of the Red Sea/Horn of Africa Sub-region border the critical sea lines of communication running from the Western Indian Ocean through the Bab el Mandeb to the Suez Canal. Political upheavals in Djibouti, Ethiopia, and Somalia and the destabilizing activities of Iran, Libya, and Sudan have reduced our influence in this volatile region. Egypt, however, remains a key ally, promoting regional stability. We seek to reestablish relations with Ethiopia and revitalize our relations with other countries in the region to encourage reform, enhance access, and promote regional stability.

Significant challenges to peace in this entire region remain. Iraq and Iran are the two countries which pose the greatest threat of aggressive action. Iraq remains intransigent and, despite enormous losses in the Gulf War, retains a significant military capability which can threaten its neighbors. Iran is moving quickly to restructure and rearm its military and remains a threat to U.S. interests. The proliferation of ballistic missiles and weapons of mass destruction among many countries in the region is also cause for great concern. Other regional challenges include: ethnic and tribal rivalries, border disputes, religious differences, poverty, overpopulation, famine, economic disparity, and water shortages.

Recognizing the importance and unique challenges of our area, we have developed a long-term and flexible regional strategy. The peacetime portion of our strategy is based on three pillars: forward presence, combined exercises, and security assistance.

Forward presence cements our credibility, strengthens deterrence, and facilitates transition from peace to war. Because naval forces provide the bulk of our long-term forward presence, access to ports and airfields is essential. Presence is enhanced through ongoing military-to-military interaction, cooperative defense measures, and pre-positioning of equipment and supplies critical to our responsiveness and war-fighting flexibility.

Combined exercises, the second pillar of our strategy, are designed to provide the primary foundation for developing strong military-to-military relations and increased coalition training opportunities. Because we fight as we train, the experience gained in the pre-war combined exercise program contributed significantly to the Coalition's success in the Gulf War. Support for combined exercises is essential to solidify our military relationships, demonstrate our commitment and capability to defend our interests, and supplement our standing naval presence with short-term, air and ground force deployments to the region.

Security assistance, the final pillar, develops strong relationships with friendly nations and promotes increased U.S. influence in the region. Meeting the legitimate self-defense needs of our friends reinforces regional deterrence and stability, while increasing the time for the United States to react should a crisis require coalition military action. Sales of U.S. weapon systems bolster our credibility as a security partner and significantly improve interoperability between our forces and those of our friends. We must support the legitimate security assistance needs of our friends to sustain their confidence in us, solidify our bilateral relationships, facilitate interoperability and access, and reduce the probability that U.S. forces will have to fight.

Other aspects of our peacetime strategy provide opportunities for the United States to remain engaged in the region. Through the close coordination of U.S. military and other governmental agencies with our friends, we are working hard to combat terrorism and stem the flow of illegal drugs. Additionally, our Humanitarian/Civic Assistance Programs have helped to improve the health care and physical infrastructure of recipient countries. These activities greatly enhance U.S. prestige and good will. Meanwhile, our forces remain trained and ready to protect U.S. citizens and conduct noncombatant evacuation if necessary, as demonstrated during the Operation Eastern Exit evacuation from Mogadishu, Somalia last year.

If deterrence fails, we are prepared to transition to our wartime strategy. This strategy is designed to provide an extensive range of options which permit flexible, measured responses to regional aggression.

With the breakup of the former Soviet Union, our planning effort focuses on a number of potential regional contingencies. Wartime operations could range from short-duration crises to major conflicts like the Gulf War. We must be able to defend critical sea lines of communication while ensuring continual access to Arabian Peninsula oil supplies. Our strategy takes into account that our friends and allies have

an important share of the responsibility and burden for maintaining the region's stability and security.

A number of essential elements contribute to our ability to build upon our regional strategy in time of war. Superior military readiness, highly trained and quality personnel, combined exercises, timely intelligence, modern equipment, pre-positioned equipment and supplies, and strategic mobility provide the ability to shape the battlefield, minimize casualties, and achieve decisive victory. Continued support for quality personnel, sufficient force structure, aggressive training, strategic sea and air lift, and state-of-the-art command, control, communications, and intelligence systems will be critical to maintaining that advantage.

In summary, the United States has vital interests in the USCENTCOM region and a solid record of engagement and commitment there. We remain prepared to again assist our friends and allies in conducting a collective defense of the region and ensuring unhindered access to oil. By maintaining presence and building on our relationships with them through combined exercises and security assistance, we demonstrate our resolve and willingness to respond to their legitimate defense needs. As a result of Operations Earnest Will, Desert Shield, and Desert Storm, we have significantly improved our credibility and influence in the area. It is important that we capitalize on these gains to help provide a more stable and secure future.

#### STRATEGIC IMPORTANCE OF THE AREA

The 18 diverse countries in the U.S. Central Command's area of responsibility form a unique and complex region at the intersection of Europe, Asia, and Africa. As an intercontinental crossroads, this area has long been the scene of military conflict. Access to the region's strategic oil reserves and waterways in this area is vitally important to U.S. national interests. Yet the area is replete with tribal, religious, national, and regional conflicts which constantly threaten to influence the area.

#### *Emerging realities from Operations Desert Shield and Desert Storm*


Operations Desert Shield and Desert Storm clearly demonstrated the value the U.S. places on the overall stability of this region. They tested our ability and confirmed our commitment to protect vital national interests there. More importantly, our actions made a powerful, enduring statement that naked aggression will not be tolerated by the world community.

The success of our wartime operations provided an opportunity to take significant steps toward advancing our interests in the region. U.S. credibility is now at an all-time high and our relations are improved with our friends of the Gulf Cooperation Council states. We have worked with them to pursue regional defense cooperation arrangements. In each case, we respect the unique requirements and circumstances of our partners. We can point to solid progress. Consolidating and building now on our recent gains will pay big dividends in the future.

#### *Strategic oil reserves*

The Middle East provides 70 percent of the world's supply of economy. Eleven percent of U.S. total oil requirement comes from the area. Many of our European and Pacific allies and trading partners have an even greater reliance on Gulf oil. This region supplies 27 percent of West European and 63 percent of Japanese national requirements.

## 1991 OIL IMPORTS AS A PERCENTAGE OF NATIONAL REQUIREMENTS



The Middle East will be the key to oil production in the future. This region contains 66 percent of the world's known oil reserves, with many promising areas yet to be explored. Five nations, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, United Arab Emirates, Iran, and Iraq, control 90 percent of those reserves. Reserves of easily recoverable oil in the United States and the Commonwealth of Independent States will be depleted in the 21st century. When this occurs, the Gulf region will still have over 100 years of proven reserves. Thus, any attempt to control access to Arabian Gulf oil is a threat to regional and global security, and to U.S. vital interests.

### *Strategic waterways*

The region's strategic importance extends far beyond oil. Strategic waterways contain three critical chokepoints: the Suez Canal, the Bab el Mandeb, and the Strait of Hormuz. In peacetime, these sea lines of communication are essential to the smooth flow of world commerce. During conflict, they are critical to our ability to deploy and sustain forces abroad.



# CHOKEPOINTS



We moved 95 percent of our lift requirements by sea during Operations Desert Shield and Desert Storm. Had the use of these sea lines of communication been denied, our only alternative would have been to move supplies and equipment around the Cape of Good Hope with a 40-percent increase in transit times and a commensurate increase in cost. The denial of free movement through these chokepoints could have disastrous consequences during any regional contingency.

The region's strategic location, vast oil reserves, and critical waterways make stability of USCENTCOM's area of responsibility absolutely vital to the security of the United States and its allies. Regional conflicts have the potential to threaten our interests and again result in the commitment of U.S. military forces.

## REGIONAL ANALYSIS

The USCENTCOM area of responsibility contains three distinct, yet interdependent, sub-regions: South Asia, the Arabian Gulf/Arabian Peninsula, and the Red Sea/Horn of Africa. Each sub-region remains dynamic and unpredictable each state pursues its own domestic, regional, and international interests. During the Gulf War, several states were able to overcome traditional differences and work collectively to defeat Iraq. However, many difficult issues remain unresolved. Ethnic diversity, religious differences, limited water resources, economic disparity, territorial or border claims, and weapons proliferation command the attention of leaders within the region.



#### *South Asia sub-region: India-Pakistan-Afghanistan*

The South Asia sub-region, made up of India, Pakistan, and Afghanistan, has a high potential for continued, and perhaps escalated conflict. Long-standing issues such as the Kashmir dispute between India and Pakistan and the civil war in Afghanistan remain unresolved. Religious and ethnic violence occur both within and across national borders. Although India is outside USCENTCOM's area of responsibility, its relationship with Pakistan significantly influences regional stability. The pursuit of ballistic missile and nuclear weapons technology by India and Pakistan is a major factor in this sub-region.

The Governments of India and Pakistan seem interested in avoiding conflict and appear willing to move toward compromise. At the ministerial level, these countries have addressed a number of major concerns, including the ongoing Siachen Glacier confrontation. Pakistan's recent call for a South Asia nuclear-free zone is encouraging, but there is no agreement among the South Asian nations on how this can be accomplished. India and Pakistan have also adopted confidence-building measures such as increased use of hotlines, notification of exercises, and establishment of common radio frequencies for naval vessels.

The Golden Crescent, which extends into Pakistan and Afghanistan, remains one of the world's major sources of heroin. The drug problem is more than a concern to Western nations. There is also a large and growing local market for narcotics that is becoming an increasing problem for the countries of the region.

As the Soviet Union unraveled, its loss of influence was felt throughout South Asia. The newly independent republics, beset with their own internal problems, are unable to assume the U.S.S.R.'s role of political, military, and economic patron. This situation provides the United States with new opportunities to foster regional stability through constructive engagement.

#### *Pakistan*

Pakistan is strategically located between the Commonwealth of Independent States, Iran, China, and India. It has provided crucial support to U.S. regional initiatives. The cooperative support of Pakistan and the United States to the Mujahedin was central to the withdrawal of Soviet forces from Afghanistan. Pakistan has influence with the Mujahedin, and its access to key Iranian leaders makes it an important player in determining the ultimate course of events in both Afghanistan and Iran.

The country is not without problems, however. The war in Afghanistan led to numerous economic and social difficulties that the Government of Pakistan must resolve. The large population of Afghan refugees in Pakistan has contributed to increased drug trafficking and other crime. Along the border with Afghanistan, the mining of roads hampers travel, commerce, and the ability of the refugees to return home.

The most volatile issue involving India and Pakistan remains the status of Kashmir. Pakistani support to insurgents crossing into Indian-occupied Kashmir and India's human rights violations within that state contribute to this ongoing dispute. Although both nations have initiated confidence-building measures which have helped reduce escalation of tensions, a solution to the Kashmir problem is not imminent. The best hope lies in multinational support for bilateral negotiations such as those called for by the Simla agreement signed by both nations in 1972.

U.S. security assistance to Pakistan was designed to enhance Pakistan's conventional forces and provide an alternative to nuclear weapons as a means of security. Pakistan's desire for nuclear weapons stems, at least in part, from the 1974 explosion of a nuclear device by India and the overwhelming conventional inferiority Pakistan perceives.

Due to Pakistan's commitment to obtaining a nuclear weapons capability, the United States cut off its security assistance in September 1977. In May 1979, the United States again suspended aid under the Symington and Glenn Amendments to the Foreign Assistance Act. Responding to the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, the United States resumed aid in 1981 under a 6-year exemption to the Symington Amendment. The Pressler Amendment later required the President to certify annually that Pakistan did not have a nuclear explosive device as a condition of continued U.S. assistance. From 1985 to 1989, the President provided this certification annually to Congress. In 1990, he did not and the United States once again suspended its security assistance program to Pakistan.

There is no doubt that Pakistan must satisfy the requirements of the Pressler Amendment for a full restoration of security cooperation. However, we should seek ways to maintain our relationship with Pakistan to the maximum extent possible within the law. We should continue a number of ongoing activities such as port visits and combined naval exercises. Opportunities for small exercises should be explored and personnel exchanges continued. The United States should emphasize cooperation with Pakistan in counter-drug efforts. These activities will produce even greater interaction and the dialog necessary to keep open channels to Pakistan's senior military leaders.

Pakistan's armed forces relied heavily, until recently, on U.S. assistance for force modernization. The loss of U.S. security assistance is forcing them to consider alternative sources of equipment, such as France, Poland, Czechoslovakia, the Commonwealth of Independent States, and China. Pakistan will acquire arms—if not from the United States, then from others. Such an outcome will dilute U.S. influence with this long-term friend in the South Asian area and erode our ability to work for stability in the region.

### *Afghanistan*

The conflict in Afghanistan remains stalemated. The Najibullah Government controls the major urban centers and the Mujahedin control much of the countryside. Tribal leaders, whose allegiances change frequently, control other areas. The Mujahedin remain hindered, both politically and militarily, by continued in-fighting.

The U.N. Secretary General's peace plan offers some hope for a political solution. All major resistance factions, the Najibullah Government, Pakistan, Iran, the United States, and the Russian Republic have endorsed the plan. The United States and the former Soviet Union agreed to stop arms supplies on 1 January 1992. In addition to the moratorium on arms, the plan calls for preserving the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Afghanistan, recognizing the right of the Afghan people to self-determination, establishing a transition government, and providing assistance to refugees. The U.N. Secretary General's personal representative for Afghanistan continues to work with all parties to reach a consensus on specific transition arrangements.

The United States, U.N. and national and international relief agencies continue to help Afghans with humanitarian needs. There has already been considerable progress in the areas of health and education. However, extensive support will be required to rebuild electrical power networks, clear and rebuild heavily mined roads, and refurbish other essential national support infrastructures. The United States should continue its support for relief programs, encourage continued support by other countries and international organizations, and work with the Afghans to build a solid foundation for future social and economic recovery.



ARABIAN GULF/ARABIAN PENINSULA SUB-REGION: IRAN-IRAQ-KUWAIT-BAHRAIN-OATAR-UNITED ARAB EMIRATES-OMAN-SAUDI ARABIA-JORDAN-REPUBLIC OF YEMEN

Operations Earnest Will, Desert Shield, and Desert Storm marked a turning point for this sub-region. The United States demonstrated its commitment to regional peace and stability and its resolve to maintain the free flow of oil. Success in these operations opened the door to increased politico-military cooperation throughout the region. To date, the United States has signed new security agreements with the Governments of Kuwait and Bahrain, and renewed its long-standing arrangements with Oman. Discussions continue with Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates. Bilateral security arrangements are only part of the evolving regional security strategy as these states take steps to improve their military capabilities and make an effort to cooperate with each other in new ways. However, the security sought by our friends in the Gulf is not yet assured.

### *Iran*

Since the end of the Iran-Iraq War, Iran has been rebuilding its military at an increasing pace in an effort to reestablish itself as a prominent regional military power. Iran has demonstrated its capability to threaten neutral shipping and the Gulf Cooperation Council states by conducting offensive naval and amphibious exercises in the Arabian Gulf. It is modernizing its air and ground forces with windfall oil profits gained during the recent war by purchasing arms from the Commonwealth of Independent States, China, North Korea, and East European countries. Iran has also sought to purchase military and industrial items from Germany, Italy, France, and Japan to facilitate its modernization efforts.

While rebuilding its conventional forces, Iran is concentrating on improving its missile and chemical weapons capabilities. It currently possesses missiles provided by Korea and is attempting to acquire missiles with a greater payload from China. Iran developed offensive chemical weapons and employed them in response to Iraqi chemical use during the Iran-Iraq War. Tehran is pursuing improved chemical agents and delivery means and is bolstering its chemical stockpiles.

We are concerned that Iran may have embarked on a nuclear weapons program. There has been civilian nuclear cooperation between Iran and a number of other countries. Iran could develop a viable nuclear weapons capability within the next decade.

Iran will play an increasingly important role in the Gulf as its infrastructure modernizes and oil exports increase. It is attempting to establish itself as a major regional power by expanding relations with post-war Afghanistan and the Commonwealth of Independent States. Tehran continues to speak out against U.S. renewed prestige and ties in the region, claiming these will result in a permanent U.S. presence on the Arabian Peninsula. It also remains opposed to the Arab-Israeli peace talks. We would welcome a more constructive posture on the part of Iran, but at this time it is not clear what future course it will choose.

### *Iraq*

Iraq lost much of its military power in the Gulf War, but still retains significant capability. Its nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons production and research capabilities were found to be far greater than originally estimated. Iraq may also retain hundreds of ballistic missiles and some production capability. Although internal unrest and U.N. sanctions hinder its reconstitution efforts, Iraq continues to reorganize and reconstitute its military.

Continued international sanctions are the most effective means of preventing the rebuilding of Iraq's military forces. If these sanctions are not maintained, it is possible for Iraq's military to return to pre-August 1990 levels within 8 to 9 years. Although the United States has no quarrel with the Iraqi people, we must continue to support the U.N. sanctions as long as the current regime maintains its hold on the country.

Saddam Hussein remains in power and his intransigence continues. He delays locating missing prisoners of war and repatriating interned Kuwaiti, Saudi, and other foreign nationals. He also continues to oppose U.N. sanctions, repeatedly manipulating and hindering U.N. officials in their inspection efforts. Saddam is attempting to circumvent U.N. resolutions while redirecting popular discontent away from his regime. Meanwhile, Kurdish and Shiite minorities struggle for their political rights.

Saddam Hussein remains a long-term threat to regional countries and, if given the opportunity, will foment instability and discontent. The President has made clear our view that the nation of Iraq and the region would be better off if Saddam were removed from power. Despite the U.N. inspections, there is no guarantee that Iraq will not resume its surreptitious development of nuclear, biological, and chemi-

cal weapons. The United States remains the focus of Saddam's resentment and is a likely target for Iraqi-sponsored terrorism.

### *Kuwait*

Kuwait remains vulnerable because of its geography and limited military capabilities. Iraqi claims to Kuwait predate Saddam and are likely to survive into a successor regime. As a result, Kuwait is working to guarantee its security through a series of bilateral defense relationships with the United States, the United Kingdom, and France. Kuwait also seeks to strengthen its alliance with other Gulf Cooperation Council states, as well as with Egypt and others. Additionally, it is cautiously seeking improved relations with Iran.

Kuwait is making rapid progress toward the reconstruction of its country. The U.S. Army Corps of Engineers is actively assisting in these efforts. Politically, Kuwait continues to make progress toward democratic reform as evidenced by the National Assembly elections planned for October 1992.

Kuwait's No. 1 international priority today is the return of more than 1,000 POWs and MIAs from Iraq. Other issues of major importance, such as war reparations, border demarcation, and the return of captured equipment, also remain unresolved.

Kuwait is pressing hard for increased U.S. presence and military assistance. The Government of Kuwait has paid over \$16 billion to the United States to reimburse it for expenses incurred during Operation Desert Storm, and recently signed a Defense Cooperation Agreement to facilitate U.S. access to ports and airfields and promote common security interests. The current, vigorous exercise program with Kuwait also serves to allay immediate security concerns. Our improved relations provide opportunities for stronger cooperation in the future.

### *Bahrain*

The State of Bahrain is a stable emirate which has provided invaluable support to the United States. Bahrain has been the host to the Commander, Middle East Force since 1949, and has consistently supported U.S. actions in the Gulf. Although our relationship with Bahrain has been traditionally close and mutually beneficial, the United States and Bahrain signed a Defense Cooperation Agreement on 27 October 1991 which expands on earlier bilateral agreements and marks a new era of greater cooperation.

A long-term friend, Bahrain desires stronger military-to-military relations with the United States, while it seeks to acquire our state-of-the-art military equipment to improve its defensive posture. It purchased the Multiple Launch Rocket System and inquired about the Patriot Air Defense System. If the administration request for new grant assistance through the U.S. Foreign Military Financing Program is approved, Bahrain will be eligible to receive excess defense articles, a move we support. France and Great Britain also seek to strengthen military-to-military ties with the Bahrainis and maintain a presence in the Arabian Gulf.

Prior to the spring of 1988, our relationship with Qatar was cordial. However, military cooperation was interrupted then through the fall of 1990 because of the contentious Stinger missile issue. During Operations Desert Shield and Desert Storm, Qatar proved to be a key supporter of U.N. actions in the Arabian Gulf. Since then, our bilateral relations have improved significantly and military-to-military cooperation is expanding.

Qatar is politically and economically active on several fronts. It is cautiously seeking to normalize diplomatic and economic ties with Iran, as both countries share the huge gas reserves off Qatar's northern coast. Qatar maintains strong economic and military ties with both Britain and France, with the bulk of its military equipment coming from French sources. It has also shown an interest in procuring small quantities of advanced American weapon systems.

### *United Arab Emirates*

The United Arab Emirates (UAE) proved to be a key supporter of the United States and the Coalition during the Arabian Gulf War. The Emirates contributed over \$4 billion to defray the costs of coalition forces and provided logistical support and basing. Its ports are valuable sites for U.S. Navy port visits and provide support for our crucial naval presence.

The United States has an important role in improving the United Arab Emirates' military capabilities. The UAE has indicated a need for air defense and early warning capabilities, and has expressed an interest in an advanced fighter aircraft and the M1A1 tank. It also asked to buy the AH-64 Apache attack helicopter. In order to help strengthen our important friendship, as well as to remain a reliable defense partner, we must contribute to filling its legitimate defense requirements.



## *Oman*

A strong and independent Oman is important to regional stability and the flow of commerce through the Strait of Hormuz. Oman has been a staunch friend and supporter of U.S. regional goals. Oman was the first Gulf country to sign an access agreement with the United States and renewed it in 1990. The Omanis also played an important role in multinational maritime interception and diversion operations during the Gulf War.

Oman remains a stabilizing influence in the region and is working to enhance Gulf security. Under Sultan Qaboos' leadership, Oman has led the drive to improve the collective defense of the Gulf Cooperation Council states. Oman's steadfast cooperation with the United States improves our ability to respond to threats throughout the region and is key to the success of our strategic planning.

## *Saudi Arabia*

Saudi Arabia is the largest and most influential nation on the Arabian Peninsula, containing two of Islam's holiest sites as well as the world's largest petroleum producing infrastructure. Its strategic location between the Arabian Gulf and the Red Sea makes it pivotal to the security of the region. During Operations Desert Shield and Desert Storm, the United States expanded the close military-to-military relationship which it has maintained with Saudi Arabia since World War II. Saudi Arabia provided almost \$17 billion to the United States in support of the war effort. Saudi Arabia is expected to take an expanded role in world affairs during the post-Operation Desert Storm era.

Saudi Arabia's moderate political orientation, generous foreign aid program, and ongoing efforts to mediate regional disagreements contribute substantially to maintaining peace and stability in the Middle East. The Saudis continue to support the U.N.-sponsored sanctions against Iraq. Negotiation of the Kingdom's border differences with Oman, United Arab Emirates, and Qatar are progressing, but the boundary dispute with Yemen is unlikely to be resolved in the near future. Saudi Arabia is establishing diplomatic relations with the Central Asian Republics of the former Soviet Union, and is also cautiously exploring diplomatic relations with the newly democratic East European states.

The U.S. enjoys close military-to-military relations with Saudi Arabia. These ties reflect the largest Foreign Military Sales Program in the world, financed entirely by Saudi Arabia. After the Gulf War, the Kingdom announced plans to expand its armed forces and demonstrated a willingness to take a more active military role in the region through multilateral security arrangements.

Saudi Arabia would like to modernize its forces by expanding its existing military assistance program with the United States. As a result of restrictive U.S. military sales policies, the Saudis may turn to other sources.

## *Jordan*

A stable, moderate Jordan is essential to achieving U.S. policy objective in the Middle East. It enjoyed a long and cooperative relationship with the United States prior to the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait. However, Jordan's support for Iraq during Operations Desert Shield and Desert Storm forced the United States to cut off all foreign assistance programs. Although aid was terminated, U.S. contact with key Jordanian officials continued. This access proved valuable in monitoring the plight of hundreds of thousands of refugees fleeing through Jordan, enforcing sanctions imposed by U.N. Security Council Resolutions, and coordinating the return of coalition POWs.

Jordan faces many domestic and regional challenges as a result of the Gulf War. Its weakened economy, hard hit by foreign debt, is further burdened by the influx of nearly a quarter-million citizens forced to return to Jordan from Kuwait and Iraq. Relations with Gulf Cooperation Council states are still poor, and only slow improvement is anticipated in the near term. Jordan is addressing internal problems, continuing the process of democratization, rebuilding relations with its neighbors, and searching for resolution of the Arab-Israeli confrontation and Palestinian issues. Jordan leads a joint Jordanian-Palestinian delegation to the Middle East Peace Talks. The Jordanians went to the Moscow Multilateral Talks despite Syrian and Palestinian opposition.

Jordan wants to rebuild military-to-military relations with the United States. It is looking to the United States for help in reorganizing and improving its defenses. Increased U.S. security assistance support will foster closer relations and help Jordan in maintaining its defensive military readiness. In turn, this makes it easier for Jordan to accept the security risks of supporting the peace process and enforcement of sanctions against Iraq. Supporting Jordan in this way will reinforce its ability to remain a moderating influence in the region.



### *Republic of Yemen*

The Yemen Arab Republic and People's Democratic Republic of Yemen united to form the Republic of Yemen on 22 May 1990. Yemen is in a 30-month transition period while it drafts new laws for the unified country. New elections are scheduled for November 1992.

In the wake of the Gulf War, Yemen is surviving despite being isolated by its Gulf neighbors for supporting Saddam Hussein. Although Yemen and Oman seem to be reaching an amicable border settlement, the Saudi-Yemeni boundary remains undemarcated and a source of tension. Yemeni expatriate workers, expelled during the Gulf War, are not expected to regain their privileged residency status in the Gulf states. Additionally, the Yemeni Government is not likely to expand its commerce in the region until it can normalize relations with its immediate neighbors on the Arabian Peninsula.

With an economy unable to support a military infrastructure capable of meeting its defense needs, Yemen has relied on foreign financial aid, equipment, and advisory assistance to develop its armed forces. Most of the country's military equipment came from the Soviet Union. Termination of U.S. and Saudi security assistance programs during Operations Desert Shield and Desert Storm ended military-to-military relationships. We should watch Yemen closely and consider reestablishing a military relationship if the Government of Yemen adopts more moderate regional policies, continues to make progress on human rights, and increases popular participation in government.

### RED SEA/HORN OF AFRICA SUB-REGION: SOMALIA-ETHIOPIA-DJIBOUTI-KENYA-SUDAN-EGYPT

Egypt and the Horn of Africa lie on the western coast of the Red Sea which is the critical avenue between the Atlantic/Mediterranean and Indian/Pacific Oceans. Ten percent of the world's seaborne commerce transits this route.

At the north end of the Red Sea is Egypt and its Suez Canal. Egypt's guarantee of the continued use of the canal was critical to the logistics flow of equipment and supplies to Operations Desert Shield and Desert Storm. Today, Egypt supports U.S. naval ships as they conduct maritime intercept operations of shipping en route the Gulf of Aqaba.

Egypt is a strong friend of the United States and a key link between the Arab and African world. The country has also led the Arab world in supporting the Middle East peace talks. Continued U.S. support to Egypt is a major national priority—Central Command remains dedicated to maintaining a strong military-to-military relationship with this key ally.

At the southern end of the Red Sea is the Bab el Mandeb Strait, dominated by the Horn of Africa countries: Ethiopia, Djibouti, and Somalia. The termination of our military-to-military relations with the Republic of Yemen, on the opposite side of this important waterway, leads us to an increased focus on the Horn of Africa countries in order to maintain the free flow of shipping. Adding to the importance of the Horn, U.S. access to ports and airfields in these countries provides the strategic depth needed to respond to contingencies throughout the region.

U.S. access to the Horn of Africa Sub-region was considerably reduced in 1991 by political upheaval in Djibouti, Ethiopia, and Somalia. Reestablishing U.S. access to, and presence in, this volatile region is not only in our national interest, but may also serve to counter the destabilizing forces at work there. Internal stability in the Horn can be fostered by U.S. assistance in nation-building and humanitarian relief efforts. As the nations of the Horn of Africa work on their own development, we should endeavor to reestablish our relationships with them.

### *Somalia*

The continuing 10-year insurgency has left Somalia in a state of political and economic chaos. Although the United Somali Congress is the controlling faction in southern Somalia an internal power struggle continues in the country. The Somali National Movement that controls Somaliland in the north, including the port of Berbera, has declared independence and refuses to engage in reconciliation talks. As a result, no stable government exists in Somalia, and the intense fighting in Mogadishu has forced the United States and other nations to close their embassies.

Somalia is currently struggling with persistent violence, political instability, and a destroyed national infrastructure. These conditions prevent adequate assistance from reaching the growing number of refugees. Humanitarian assistance is essential to curb mass starvation, yet international relief organizations can do little because the safety of their personnel cannot be guaranteed. The political turmoil, lack of a

viable government, and widespread ethnic fighting will preclude any military relationship or access in the foreseeable future.

### *Ethiopia*

Ethiopia occupies a strategic location on the western coast of the Red Sea. Because of its location, large population, and economic potential, a stable and friendly Ethiopia would significantly enhance U.S. interests in the region.

After more than 30 years of civil war, a coalition of ethnic groups toppled the Mengistu Government in 1991 and installed the Transitional Government of Ethiopia. The new government, headed by President Meles Zenawi, is striving for democratic reform and has already expressed interest in expanding relations with the United States and other western countries. The Zenawi Government has called for free elections and a referendum on Eritrean independence within the next 2 years.

Ethiopia faces a shattered economy and ethnic conflict throughout the country. Despite numerous difficulties, the government is concentrating on improving the general welfare of the populace. To support Ethiopian political stability, we should provide humanitarian assistance and nation-building initiatives. The prevailing outlook for Ethiopia is more positive than it has been for many years.

### *Djibouti*

Djibouti is important to U.S. interests because of its strategic location on the Bab el Mandeb and its pro-Western orientation. Djibouti's port and airfield facilities directly supported coalition maritime operations during Operations Desert Shield and Desert Storm and continue to support U.S. naval operations in the region.

Djibouti is currently facing domestic strife which threatens its security. Rivalry between the Issa and Afar tribes has led to fighting across northern Djibouti and has extended into Ethiopia and Somalia. This causes tense relations with Djibouti's larger neighbors.

Djibouti is heavily dependent on foreign assistance because of a service-oriented economy and a lack of natural resources. Foreign assistance has been largely provided by the French. U.S. support will contribute to internal stability and help ensure continued access required for the protection of the Bab el Mandeb.

### *Kenya*

Kenya provides USCENTCOM access to air and sea ports and storage facilities on the East African coast. The access agreement was developed at no cost to the U.S. Government and supports our strategy by providing alternative deployment routes to respond to contingencies.

The Government of Kenya is interested in continuing good relations with the United States. In 1991, when the United States decided to remove its embassy personnel from Somalia, the Government of Kenya offered transit rights and safe haven areas. While the United States did not use Government of Kenya assistance, Kenya did aid the Italians in evacuation of their personnel. President Moi recently responded to our concerns about political repression and has taken steps to change Kenya's constitution to allow a multi-party political system. Although the outcome of this reform is unknown, democratic reforms should enhance Kenya's stability.

Citing concerns about human rights abuses, Congress froze Foreign Military Financing to Kenya with the exception of International Military Education and Training Program funds. The frozen funds will not be released until the President certifies that human rights abuses in Kenya have ended.

The United States and Kenya have enjoyed an excellent military-to-military relationship. The Kenyan military is an influential institution and its participation in the International Military Education and Training Program strengthens our relationship with senior Kenyan defense officials. The military also shows strong interest in a combined exercise program. Exercise related construction projects and U.S. ship visits to Mombasa assist Kenya in upgrading its facilities and provide needed access and presence.

### *Sudan*

Sudan is located on the western shore of the Red Sea and is the largest country in Africa. Politically and economically isolated from the international community, Sudan is burdened by a devastated economy, and besieged by separatist insurgent groups. It also has the potential to control the flow of the Nile, Egypt's only source of fresh water.

Sudan's political and economic isolation stems from the increasingly radical nature of its government and the relationships it has established with states such as Iraq and Iran. Sudan supported Iraq during the Gulf War and continues this political support. In the past, Iranian support to Sudan was largely economic and cul-



tural. In 1991, the relationship expanded when Iran began providing military hardware and advisers to Sudan.

A civil war in Sudan continues with little likelihood of resolution in the near term. Tensions are fueled both by Sudan's economic nonviability and the efforts of its fundamentalist government to impose Sharia law on a non-Muslim population. The current Sudanese Government has been unable to end the civil war because it is unwilling to compromise on religious issues. The non-Muslim population in southern Sudan may eventually see succession as their only option.

United States assistance has been limited by congressional sanctions to humanitarian relief. These sanctions, coupled with Sudan's support of Iraq, led to the closing of the U.S. Office of Military Cooperation in December 1990. At present, there is no U.S. military relationship with Sudan, nor will there be unless there are major political changes within the country.

### *Egypt*

Egypt plays a key role in the politics of the Arab world as well as an important role in African affairs. Cairo is host to the headquarters of the Arab League, now chaired by the former Egyptian Foreign Minister Esmat Abdel Meguid. An Egyptian chaired the Organization of African Unity and another now holds the Secretary General position in the U.N. Egypt's active participation, leadership, and diplomacy were key to the success of the coalition effort during the Gulf War. President Mubarak's diplomatic skills and relationships in the Arab world lend tremendous support to U.S. initiatives in the Middle East peace process. Egypt is a strong proponent of regional stability and continues to press for nuclear non-proliferation.

While Egypt is a stable and powerful state in the region, rapid population growth and economic problems are causing its government to focus primarily on domestic issues. Egypt's population growth of 1.7 million people annually places an enormous burden on its limited resources. Compounding this problem, the Egyptian economy has experienced a downward trend since the late 1980s. To reverse this trend, Egypt has developed a plan for economic reform. But until reforms are successful, Egypt's domestic problems create an environment conducive to the growth of radical and anti-democratic opposition groups which are attempting to discredit the government both domestically and internationally.

Another significant concern for Egypt is the continued free flow of the Nile River, the principal source of Egypt's fresh water and livelihood. Since instability in countries to the south could threaten the security of the Nile headwaters, Egypt actively promotes initiatives to reduce tensions among her southern neighbors. However, the water problem could make the Egyptian-Sudanese border a potential flash point in the region.

Moreover, Egypt is committed to maintaining peace with Israel and is uniquely positioned to serve as a bridge between Israel and its Arab adversaries. President Mubarak has been a key player in the Arab-Israeli peace talks that began in October 1991 and can be expected to continue to influence and play a vital role in the peace process.

Egypt's professional military forces were the second largest Arab force in the war against Iraq. Our combined exercise program with Egypt, the largest in the region, prepared us to fight together from the time of our arrival and is an excellent illustration of why the exercise program is so important. The Egyptians continue to cooperate with us in the post-operation Desert Storm era by supporting U.S. naval vessels conducting U.N. maritime intercept operations of shipping en route the Gulf of Aqaba.

U.S. Foreign Military Financing to Egypt is committed through 1995 based on current annual funding levels. Projects using these funds allow Egypt to replace its aging Soviet equipment and support U.S. strategy through force modernization and interoperability. It is crucial that we continue this support to Egypt, along with our other economic and military programs, in order to further U.S. interests and enhance regional stability and security.

### THREATS

There are many serious and diverse threats to U.S. interests in the region. Iran and Iraq are two countries with the military potential and political ambitions and present the greatest direct threats to their neighbors. Weapons proliferation, particularly ballistic missiles and weapons of mass destruction, add to the volatility. The potential is high for the use of these weapons in future conflicts. Regional conflicts over oil, water, borders, and religious issues can threaten U.S. interests. Emergence of essentially new nations in the southern republics of the former Soviet Union offers further challenges for the United States. Finally, the Horn of Africa



has undergone many changes over the past year, creating unstable governments and intermittent local conflict.

### *Iraq*

Despite the losses suffered during Operation Desert Storm, Iraq still retains one of the largest military forces in the region. Immediately following the war, Iraq began to reconstitute its forces, repairing and replacing damaged and destroyed equipment and weapon systems. Iraq's forces retain a strong defensive capability, but the rebuilding of a major offensive capability will take some time. The U.N. arms embargo remains Iraq's most significant obstacle to procuring and upgrading military equipment. If the U.N. sanctions are removed, Iraq will rebuild its military capabilities and once again threaten peace in the region.

### *Iran*

Iran may become the greatest threat to peace and stability in the region. Since the end of the Iran-Iraq War in August 1988, Iran has been steadily rebuilding its forces. Initially, Tehran relied on equipment captured from the Iraqis or repaired through cannibalization. In 1990, Iran began to purchase high-tech weapons using hard currency from oil profits. Iraq's invasion of Kuwait and the resultant oil price increase provided Iran with unexpected revenues to accelerate an already ambitious rearmament program. Iranian armed forces are modernizing with newer and more capable equipment from other nations, including those Iraqi aircraft flown to Iran during Operation Desert Storm. As a result of this ongoing buildup, Iran will soon pose an even greater threat to U.S. interests in the region. Finally, we continue to regard Iran as a principal supporter of terrorism in the region.

### *Weapons proliferation*

Weapons proliferation, including weapons of mass destruction and uncontrolled growth of conventional weapons, undermines regional military balances. The region is now experiencing an expansion of nuclear, biological, chemical, and ballistic missile capabilities. As more countries feel the need to arm themselves against a perceived threat from their neighbors, the opportunity for regional conflict grows.

Iraq has aggressively pursued nuclear capabilities since the mid-1970s when it first contracted to construct small research reactors at Tuwaitha. Since then, it has explored methods for enriching uranium and has spent over \$20 billion constructing modern facilities and importing high technology equipment. Little was known about the extent of Iraq's nuclear program prior to Operation Desert Storm, but the nuclear-related facilities that survived the war give us an indication of how far Iraq had progressed with this technology. U.N. inspections and confiscations should limit the Iraqi nuclear threat until the mid-1990s. However, the Iraqi scientific infrastructure is still in place and could be employed in the future to revive their program.

Prior to Operation Desert Storm, Iraq had the most extensive biological and chemical warfare program in the Middle East and aggressively pursued research and production. It used several thousand tons of chemical agents in the war against Iran. Coalition air strikes during Operation Desert Storm severely damaged numerous facilities associated with biological and chemical weapons research and production. The remainder of these facilities should be destroyed under U.N. cease-fire guidelines over the next 3 years. Dual-use technology, much in evidence in Iraq, is a major challenge to the U.N. inspection process. Legitimate pharmaceutical and fertilizer industries could quickly and easily transition to producing biological and chemical weapons, as the manufacturing facilities and many of the chemical ingredients are common to civilian and military use. The United Nations has not denied Iraq the use of these facilities which support the production of food and medicine.

It is likely that other regional states are working to develop biological and chemical weapons, and we know that Pakistan possesses, and Iran is pursuing, a nuclear capability. The presence of any nuclear, biological, or chemical weapons in the region is destabilizing.

Iraq's technique of conducting mobile missile launches during the Gulf War demonstrated what could be achieved with 1950s' vintage technology. This strategy enabled Iraqi missile crews to conduct launches in the face of intense pressure from coalition reconnaissance and strike aircraft. The development of larger payload missile systems with greater precision could provide Iraq with an improved deep strike capability and means for delivering weapons of mass destruction. Baghdad probably views such capability as essential to its military planning. U.N. resolutions ordering the destruction of Iraq's ballistic missile program will impede near-term missile production, but we believe Saddam Hussein will pursue a renewed missile development program at the first opportunity.

We recognize that friendly nations have legitimate defense requirements. We are concerned, however, that unrestricted and unbalanced increase in the number of modern conventional weapons is dangerous and economically draining. The United States seeks to provide friendly countries with modern defense systems appropriate to the threat those countries face, while pursuing international cooperative measures to restrain the traffic in arms.

In recent years, the majority of the conventional arms entering the region went to Iran and Iraq. This created a genuine threat to friendly countries, who have responded by purchasing their own modern weapons to provide a defense against this growing threat.

## **REGIONAL CONFLICTS**



Other regional conflicts can spill over and threaten U.S. interests and citizens. Oil will remain the dominant energy source in the world for the foreseeable future, and competition over existing, new, or anticipated oil resources could heighten tensions. This problem may be further aggravated by low revenues in some oil exporting countries, such as Iran, due to declining reserves. Any conflict which threatens to close regional chokepoints such as the Strait of Hormuz, the Bab el Mandeb, and the Suez Canal, or to otherwise disrupt oil supplies would have a dramatic impact on the world's economy.

Over the past decade, radical Islamic fundamentalism has become an influential and dynamic force in the political, ideological, cultural, and social mosaic of the region. Economic hardships, wide social gaps, and the failure of various Western-oriented ideologies have created conditions which enable radicalism to thrive. Iran advocates revolution as a means to establish additional Islamic republics and has inspired large segments of the region's population toward that end. In Jordan and Egypt, organized elements such as the Muslim Brotherhood are a potent religious and political force working to reverse the secularization of their societies. The result of Iranian influence on the southern republics of the Commonwealth of Independent States remains to be seen. Radical Islamic fundamentalism poses a serious challenge to some regimes and could spark dramatic political changes in the region.

After 43 years of conflict and 5 wars, the Israelis and Arabs finally sat down together in October to begin the arduous process of bringing stability to this volatile region of the world. The enhanced prestige of the United States in the Arab world



after the Gulf War enabled us to function as a bridge between the two sides. Both sides have accepted the U.S. framework for negotiation and are likely to continue discussions. The hard-line positions taken so far should not be discouraging, but we should not expect quick results. Until the Arab-Israeli problem is solved, it will continue to have a profound influence on the social, political, and military situation in our area.

Despite current efforts to resolve their disputes, the potential for conflict between India and Pakistan will remain high. Since partition in 1947, India and Pakistan have fought three major wars centering on disputes over the status of Kashmir, and traded accusations of meddling in each other's internal affairs. These conflicts are likely to continue since the problems are deeply rooted and will not be easily solved. The possibility of another conflict between India and Pakistan is especially disturbing because both countries possess the capability to assemble and employ nuclear weapons. So far, neither government has been able to overcome the political influence of domestic radical elements, thus allowing serious talks which could lead to a lasting peace.

In an effort to help Afghanistan deal with its problems and shape its own future, the United States and former Soviet Union agreed to cease military assistance to the Najibullah Government and the Mujahedin on 1 January 1992. Fighting during the winter months is traditionally light, and all sides have supplies of arms and ammunition that will last for several months. The immediate effect of the cutoff of supplies will be negligible. Multiple factions with varying agendas are involved; and the road to a solution will be difficult.

### *Horn of Africa*

The removal of Soviet military assets, advisers, and aid from the region has effectively ended the superpower competition over the Horn of Africa. The former Soviet Union's naval and air forces have ceased regular deployments to this area and many of its military relationships were superseded by changes in local governments. Although the United States currently faces no serious military threat in this area, the rapid changes over the past year have created an unstable atmosphere marked by intermittent local conflict. While the safety and well-being of American citizens remain primary concerns in this volatile part of the world, the hundreds of thousands of refugees and displaced persons residing in the Horn of Africa are also a concern. The U.S. Government, in concert with other donor nations and the United Nations, continues to support emergency relief efforts for those affected by the years of war, drought, and famine.

### *The Commonwealth of Independent States*

Based on recent events in the former Soviet Union, the threat of these states intervening in the region is unlikely. Their current focus on internal political, military, and economic reform has greatly diminished the potential for aggression outside the former Soviet border. Former Soviet forces in the Southern Theater of Military Operations, oriented toward USCENTCOM's region, have been significantly reduced in the past year and are currently maintained at low levels of readiness.

The new republics in the Central Asian and Transcaucasus areas which border our region could experience a significant degree of instability as they resolve economic and political problems. Some of the republics could find themselves driven to large-scale weapons trade to finance needed imports and investments. Many groups in these particular republics desire independence or increased degrees of autonomy. The potential for open warfare between the republics and between internal factions exists and this conflict could easily spread to other nations. Today, Turkey, Iran, Pakistan, and to a degree Saudi Arabia have taken steps to increase political and economic ties with these states. New alignments, some of which could be anti-Western, will begin to emerge.

## NATIONAL AND REGIONAL OBJECTIVES

The U.S. national security strategy provides a broad plan for satisfying our national security objectives. It was developed with the following basic security goals in mind:

- Survival of the United States as a free and independent nation, with its fundamental values intact and its institutions and people secure.
- A healthy and growing U.S. economy to ensure opportunity for individual prosperity and resources for national endeavors at home and abroad.
- Healthy, cooperative, and politically vigorous relations with allies and friendly nations.
- A stable and secure world, where political and economic freedom, human rights, and democratic institutions flourish.



Fulfilling this strategy requires achievement of both global and regional objectives. Our national military objectives to support these security goals are well defined:

- To safeguard the United States, its allies, other friendly nations, and interests by deterring aggression and coercion; and, should deterrence fail, by defeating armed aggression and ending hostilities on favorable terms.
- To increase U.S. influence around the world; to further an atmosphere conducive to the democratic process; and to protect free commerce and ensure U.S. access to world markets, critical resources, the oceans, and space.
- To promote regional stability and cooperation by assisting our allies and friends in defending themselves against aggression, coercion, subversion, insurgency, terrorism, and drug trafficking.
- To stem the flow of illegal drugs and to combat terrorism.

Our recent actions in the Gulf demonstrated the depth of U.S. commitment to protecting our vital interests throughout Southwest Asia. It showed we had the military capability necessary to achieve these national security objectives and fulfill the requirements of our commitment to regional security. USCENTCOM's regional objectives are:

- To strengthen regional stability by encouraging defense cooperation and addressing the root causes of instability, be they military, political, economic, or social.
- To prevent the spread of weapons of mass destruction.
- To ensure free world access to Southwest Asian oil resources.
- To maintain stable regional military balances to deter those powers that might seek regional dominance.
- To assist friendly states to improve their defensive capabilities.
- To deter, and defeat if necessary, operations hostile to U.S. vital interests.
- To stem the flow of illegal drugs.
- To reduce the threat of terrorism.

These national and regional security objectives are the basis for developing USCENTCOM's theater strategy, a strategy validated by Operations Desert Shield and Desert Storm. Recognizing the importance and unique problems of the region, the theater strategy remains focused on achieving long-range security goals while retaining the flexibility necessary to respond to fast-breaking threats.

#### THEATER STRATEGY

The unprecedented changes in the former Soviet Union have virtually eliminated the potential for global war and signal a new era of international cooperation. However, many of the changes required to fulfill the promise of a brighter future have yet to be implemented. Once achieved, the results may not be uniformly positive in all regions of the world.

In fact, the potential for regional conflict may be increased. As the threat of global war has decreased, previously subdued tensions and national ambitions have emerged to threaten stability. The common need for access to critical resources, the proliferation of modern weapons, and a growing resurgence of nationalism and religious fervor have created conditions marked by rapid change, friction, and conflict.

USCENTCOM's theater strategy consists of two mutually supporting strategies—one for peacetime, the other for war. These strategies have one central purpose, to protect our vital interests and friends in the region. We accomplish this by demonstrating our steadfast commitment to the region's security and our ability to fulfill the requirements of that commitment.

#### *Peacetime*

The goal of the peacetime strategy is deterrence and has three basic elements:

- To retain our ability to forge coalitions to confront possible threats to our interests or friends.
- To promote regional defense cooperation both with and among our friends in the area.
- To maintain our political and military access to the key nations of the region.

These elements proved indispensable to the rapid, effective response to aggression and ultimate triumph in the Gulf War last year. They will remain important in the future. Forward presence, combined exercises, and security assistance are the basic pillars of the peacetime strategy in our region.

Forward presence, a visible symbol of our commitment to the region, is reflected primarily by the naval forces assigned to and supporting the Middle East Force. Presence, however, involves more than just military forces. Intelligence sharing, pre-positioning, port visits, conferences, training programs and exchanges, and humanitarian assistance efforts all constitute presence and bolster mutual confidence in our ability to execute a coalition defense of the region.

Combined exercises, the second pillar, are a key factor in maintaining close relations with our friends in the region. Exercises demonstrate our resolve and help increase our presence and access to regional facilities. More importantly, while helping to bolster host-nation confidence in America's commitment to support regional stability, combined exercises provide an opportunity to increase the ability of all forces to work together in a coalition environment. They demonstrate the importance of coalition warfare and are aimed at illustrating to individual nations the force multipliers brought to bear by combined arms warfare. Pre-positioning of equipment and supplies in the region decreases the overall cost of deploying our units for exercises, signifies our continuing commitment to the host nation, and allows for rapid introduction of combat forces should they be needed.

Security assistance is the final pillar of our peacetime strategy. When properly applied, it can make the biggest contribution to the peacetime goal of deterrence. Providing the equipment and training necessary for our friends to meet their legitimate defense requirements reduces the potential need for U.S. forces to intervene directly in regional crises. It gives these countries the resources to provide their own deterrence and incidentally supports America's economy. Security assistance creates a visible and lasting impression of U.S. commitment to the area and opens avenues for increased access to regional facilities and resources. It provides the means for nations to improve both their own defense capabilities and their ability to operate as part of a coalition effort against common threats. Security assistance also increases the interoperability of our equipment and forces and improves our ability to deploy to this region and carry out combined operations. Our friends in the region see security assistance as a key element in measuring the depth of our commitment to their security.

The peacetime strategy supports a three-level approach to achieve our objectives or set the stage for the transition to a coalition defense should deterrence fail. The first level involves actions by each nation to provide the initial line of deterrence and, if required, defense. The second level involves actions by friendly regional nations to support a threatened state in attempts to restore stability and preclude hostilities, or provide for the defense of common interests if deterrence fails. The final level involves direct actions by the United States and other friendly nations to support the threatened state and regional alliances when their capabilities alone are insufficient to restore stability or defend our common interests. The primary focus of this three-level approach is coalition burdensharing—sharing both the benefits and costs associated with regional security.

#### *Wartime*

Our wartime strategy builds on the framework implemented by the peacetime strategy of deterrence. Should deterrence fail, we would transition to a wartime strategy of deterring/defeating aggression. This strategy encompasses the full operational continuum from regional to global operations and capitalizes on U.S. technological superiority. It is based on coalition warfare and is designed to achieve the following wartime objectives:

- To deter or defeat further aggression.
- To control escalation of hostilities.
- To terminate hostilities early, on terms favorable to the United States.

The wartime strategy envisions three phases of operations which are embodied in all of our operational and contingency planning. These phases are:

- Early flexible response/deterrent options. These are preplanned, initial response options to any crisis, encompassing all of the instruments of national power (diplomatic, political, economic, and military). They are designed as a series of flexible actions to be employed sequentially or simultaneously, as needed, to meet the threat. These options demonstrate U.S. resolve and bolster the confidence and self-defense capabilities of friendly nations. The goal of these options is to forestall conflict by demonstrating to potential aggressors the price to be paid for their actions.
- Defensive operations. If deterrence should fail, our initial focus will be on operations designed to defend critical facilities, lines of communication, and rear areas. These operations could also be used to create the conditions necessary for the next stage, offensive operations.



- Offensive operations. The actions in this stage would be focused on the enemy's centers of gravity. These operations would be designed to break his will to continue fighting and to achieve an early termination of the conflict on terms favorable to the United States and its allies.

Our strategy emphasizes that our friends and allies assume their fair share of the responsibility and burden for maintaining the region's stability and security. This approach allows the United States to concentrate on those actions necessary to achieve a speedy, favorable end to any crisis while reducing risks to national interests.

#### *Force levels*

The forces apportioned to USCENTCOM are drawn from the national inventory of available assets. They incorporate the total force comprised of Active, Reserve, and civilian elements in air, land, and sea components. Each is flexible and expandable, allowing the proper response to the scope, duration, or intensity of any crisis or conflict. To ensure that we retain our ability to respond effectively, we need to improve our chemical and biological defense capabilities; ballistic missile early warning and identification friend or foe systems; intelligence capability including imagery, reconnaissance, and battle damage assessment; strategic air and sealift; mine countermeasure capability; and regional infrastructure to include pre-positioning and command, control, and communications.

Our theater strategy is realistic and effective in pursuing U.S. objectives; however, cuts below the projected base force could jeopardize USCENTCOM's ability to execute that strategy. The base force identifies the minimum level of forces required to apply the decisive power necessary to overwhelm our adversaries and terminate conflicts swiftly. Measures taken by regional countries to increase their defensive capabilities will take time. The United States must maintain the currently projected force levels to provide stability in the interim.

#### FORWARD PRESENCE OPERATIONS

Forward presence operations are an element of our national security policy and are based on the concept that the United States will continue to play a leading role in shaping world democratization and change. To do this, we must remain engaged throughout the world and influence, where appropriate, the course of change. The goals of these operations are to protect U.S. interests, to maintain a stable security environment, and to improve the human condition through self-determination, economic opportunity, and human rights.

The naval forces assigned to Middle East Force are the major element involved in conducting forward presence operations. They are the visible symbol of our continuing commitment to regional stability and also provide the initial line of defense for vital U.S. regional interests. These afloat forces possess great combat capability, provide a high degree of flexibility, and are able to respond rapidly to threats throughout the region.

Forward presence operations, however, require more than just military forces. They also require the coordinated application of four principal instruments of national power—diplomatic, political, economic, and military. These instruments integrate the efforts of many agencies to achieve a common goal. A prime example of this is the use of our flexible deterrent options. By synchronizing all four instruments, we can accomplish national objectives that might not be attainable through the use of any single one. Our deterrent options range from indicating U.S. concern through diplomatic communiques to deploying a credible military force to protect our vital national interests.

Forward presence operations encompass a broad range of efforts. USCENTCOM's efforts include: counter-drug operations, noncombatant evacuation operations, humanitarian/civic assistance activities, and combating terrorism. These activities are best accomplished through selective, low-visibility use of military training operations, including the use of U.S. Special Operations Forces.

#### *Counter-drug efforts*

USCENTCOM is charged with the responsibility for countering drug traffic in the region. Our role is to support efforts by the Drug Enforcement Administration and other U.S. law enforcement operations who are supporting host-nation programs and providing assistance.

The "Golden Crescent" is an opium and heroin production area which includes portions of Pakistan, Afghanistan, and Iran. Current estimates indicate that about 25 percent of the heroin consumed in the United States comes from this region. To date, the problem of heroin use in the United States has been secondary to that of



cocaine, but experts point to an increasing popularity of heroin. Therefore, we must redouble our efforts to stem the "Golden Crescent" heroin industry.

USCENTCOM is working with the U.S. country team in Pakistan in their counter-drug efforts. Our activities are restricted by host-nation limitations and the lack of U.S. military counter-drug operators in the region. We have enjoyed some degree of success in the intelligence arena and will continue our efforts to counter this menacing threat.

#### *Noncombatant evacuation operations*

When requested by the Department of State through the Department of Defense, USCENTCOM will conduct noncombatant evacuation operations in the region. These operations provide protection and evacuation for our citizens when they are threatened by natural disasters, civil strife, or international conflict. For example, in January 1991 during operation Eastern Exit, we successfully evacuated the American Embassy in Mogadishu, Somalia when it came under siege by rebel forces.

Contingency planning for noncombatant operations is based on the most likely regional scenarios. We use the worst case situation as the basis for potential evacuation planning. These plans are updated periodically as the embassies and consulates submit their emergency action plans. This enhances USCENTCOM's ability to evacuate personnel within the region.

#### *Humanitarian/civic assistance*

The Humanitarian/Civic Assistance Program, conducted under title 10 U.S.C., provides a means for the United States to gain access and demonstrate presence throughout the region. This program also provides a vehicle for our Government to respond to either man-made or natural disasters. Projects conducted under this program have focused on improving medical treatment, preventive health care, and the country's infrastructure, including water production/distribution systems. Overpopulation, poverty, and disease in underdeveloped regions provide challenging, realistic training opportunities for the medical and support personnel of participating U.S. military units. This medical and engineering assistance is a cost-effective means for our Government to promote favorable relationships with host nations.

#### *Combating terrorism*

Preventing, combating, and recovering from terrorist acts require an integrated effort. This effort includes defensive measures used to reduce the vulnerability of individuals and property, and offensive measures used to prevent, deter, and respond to terrorism.

Our antiterrorism program covers our headquarters in the United States and our security assistance organizations in the region. The program includes antiterrorism training at service schools for personnel being permanently assigned to threat areas, and a local antiterrorism brief given to all personnel within 48 hours of their arrival in the area. Organizational security managers throughout the region have antiterrorism plans detailing security procedures for their unique situations. USCENTCOM personnel conduct annual inspections to review antiterrorism plans and conduct counterterrorism exercises to ensure procedures are current and complete.

### ESSENTIAL ELEMENTS OF EXECUTION

We employ 10 essential elements of execution to accomplish our theater strategy. These elements fall into two categories: those that directly support our peacetime strategy and those that support our wartime strategy. Both categories are important for an effective theater effort to ultimately achieve our long-term security goals in the region.

#### *Peacetime elements*

The five elements which directly support our peacetime strategy of deterrence are combined exercises, security assistance, military construction, pre-positioning, and personnel.

#### *Combined exercises*

Combined exercises demonstrate U.S. commitment and provide for increased access in the region. The planned exercise program has increased fivefold compared to pre-Operations Desert Shield and Desert Storm levels. In fiscal year 1990, 14 JCS and non-JCS exercises were conducted. In fiscal year 1991, all JCS exercises were canceled, but 20 small maritime exercises were conducted, more than twice the number planned in previous years. In fiscal year 1992, we have 56 JCS and non-JCS exercises scheduled with 9 of the 18 countries in our area of responsibility; and in fiscal year 1993, we have 71 exercises planned with 12 of the countries. We are

expanding the Kuwaiti program to provide exercises on a virtually continuous basis. The majority of exercises in the region are conducted by Navy and Marine Corps units, and include passing, amphibious, and tactical air exercises. These combined exercises are essential to maintaining and improving our military-to-military relationships.


Exercise Related Construction is an important element of the exercise program. Construction projects such as airfield improvements, roads, beddown facilities, training ranges, and temporary warehouses support and enhance the program. In addition, these projects strengthen relationships between the United States and the host nation.

Funding for transportation as well as operations and maintenance remains our biggest concern for the exercise program. For fiscal year 1992, we have \$39 million in transportation funds and all scheduled exercises are fully funded. Projected out-year funding reductions will require us to downsize or cancel scheduled exercises beginning in fiscal year 1993. If this downward trend continues, it will be increasingly difficult to maintain theater access and presence at current levels.

#### *Security Assistance*

Security Assistance programs include Foreign Military Sales, Direct Commercial Sales, and International Military Education and Training. These programs enhance stability by enabling countries within the region to improve their defensive capabilities in a balanced, controlled manner. At the same time, security assistance improves interoperability with United States and other coalition partners.

### SECURITY ASSISTANCE FUNDING USCENTCOM AOR



NOTE: "AOR TOTAL" LINE INCREASED DUE TO ADDITIONAL EARMARKED FUNDS FOR JORDAN IN 1990


The U.S. equipment and associated infrastructure that each country obtains through the security assistance program (e.g., facilities, support equipment, spare parts, munitions, and trained personnel) enhance interoperability between host-nation military and our forces. This interoperability assists us in rapidly deploying into this region, achieving operational status, and carrying out combined operations. Improved military relationships developed during implementation of security assistance programs also contribute to goodwill and cooperation.

The sale of U.S. equipment to friendly countries in our theater is in keeping with the administration's efforts to control the spread of arms throughout this volatile region. Imbalances in military capability, perceived or real, between potential adversaries only perpetuate the unconstrained buildup of forces and more destructive weapons. Controlled arms transfers on our part will assist in the balancing efforts by satisfying only legitimate defense requirements. This will increase our credibility

as a reliable defense partner and decrease the perceived need for weapons of mass destruction by regional countries.

## FMS AND SECURITY ASSISTANCE DELIVERIES IN USCENTCOM AOR

BILLIONS



During the Gulf War, coalition partners saw the quality and reliability of U.S. equipment demonstrated under combat conditions in the desert. Our Total Package approach to equipment sales—providing the buyer with quality end-items, appropriate levels of spare parts, supporting technical data, and appropriate operations and maintenance training—is key to why nations throughout the region want to deal with the United States to meet their legitimate defense requirements.

However, if nations within the region are unable to procure U.S. equipment and training, they will not hesitate to buy equipment from other countries. Many have long-standing ties with other Western nations which have already supplied them with a wide range of equipment. The United Kingdom and France, are especially active in marketing equipment. The Commonwealth of Independent States, China, North Korea, Argentina, and Brazil also are actively pursuing opportunities to supply military equipment to the region.

Nations within the region face threats from other countries, such as Iraq and Iran, who have or are obtaining sophisticated military equipment. Our friends and allies are going to procure military hardware from some source to counter these external threats. To the extent we sell them U.S. equipment, training and maintenance capabilities, we can assist them in enhancing their defensive capabilities, as individual nations or as a coalition. Should they require U.S. assistance in some future conflict, our forces would have interoperability with their forces. The alternative of allowing others to sell their most lethal weapons systems throughout the region, may preclude U.S. influence in to the area.

In conjunction with equipment sales, technical training provided by Mobile Training Teams and Technical Assistance Field Teams in the countries helped create a visible U.S. presence in the region throughout the 1980s. This professional and personal contact between U.S. and host-country military personnel has long been a vital part of our security relationship. It contributed significantly to successful military-to-military coordination among coalition forces during Operations Desert Shield and Desert Storm.

Although much of the security assistance training in our region is directly connected to Foreign Military Sales, one grant program, the International Military Education and Training Program, is extremely important. This program emphasizes education of mid-level through senior officers, giving these military professionals firsthand knowledge of U.S. values and culture, as well as military doctrine. We



cannot overemphasize the contribution this program makes to our ability to work with current and future military leaders throughout the region. During the last 5 years, we trained more than 4,400 students in U.S. schools from across the region at a cost of less than \$7.4 million per year. The program is a long-term success story which contributes substantially to U.S. interests, at a relatively low cost.

Security assistance improves the defensive capabilities of friendly nations and may be one of the most cost-effective programs in the U.S. budget. It reduces U.S. defense requirements, improves military interoperability, and increases regional stability, while benefiting the recipient countries.

### *Military construction*

Congressional support of our past military construction programs was a key to our success during the Gulf crisis. Without forward-deployed forces, we relied on pre-positioning and infrastructure support in order to rapidly deploy forces into the region. We significantly shortened our response time and reduced our lift requirements by using facilities authorized under the military construction program. Continued support of this program is important to ensure we can rapidly respond to contingencies.

### *Pre-positioning*

The materiel pre-positioning program directly and positively affected USCENTCOM's response during Operations Desert Shield and Desert Storm. This program includes both ashore and afloat war reserve materiel and the Marine Corps Maritime Pre-positioning Force Squadrons. These assets consist of: fuel, rations, medical equipment and supplies, ammunition, water production and distribution equipment, fuel distribution equipment, tents, generators, support vehicles, as well as combat equipment. These stocks reduce our initial dependence on both strategic airlift and sealift and shorten the time required to deploy forces to the region. During operation Desert Shield, the Maritime Pre-positioning Force proved the value of afloat pre-positioning by enabling the projection into the theater of the first significant, fully equipped ground forces capable of blocking the enemy's advance. If we can achieve our pre-positioning goals (i.e., 200,000 short tons afloat and 350,000 short tons ashore), we can save, in a future contingency, approximately 28 shiploads or an equivalent of 24,500 C-141 aircraft loads.

### *Personnel*

Quality soldiers, sailors, airmen, marines, and coast guardsmen are the most important part of our Nation's military might. In the face of force reductions and declining defense budgets, we must maintain the ability to rapidly deploy sufficient forces to the USCENTCOM region. It took years to forge a quality force capable of deploying over 540,000 professionals halfway around the world to fight and win a war against Iraq. We cannot allow our Desert Storm victory, the end of the cold war, and the disintegration of the Soviet Union to blind us to the dangers which we still face. Reducing forces beneath a level required to respond to the regional conflicts would unnecessarily place those forces and U.S. interests at risk.

As the forces are reduced, we should assist those returning to civilian life. We applaud the concerted efforts by Congress to vest service members prior to 20 years of service. This acknowledges the contributions and sacrifices they made to our Nation's defense. These military members can now depart with their heads high, knowing the Nation has kept faith with them.

Personnel permanently assigned to the region daily meet the difficult challenges of living in Southwest Asia. To attract quality people for these important missions, we need to support initiatives such as funded Environmental Morale Leave to the United States.

Lessons learned from Operations Desert Shield and Desert Storm will have a tremendous impact on combined arms planning and execution in the future. We must evaluate and revise our training and education programs in light of this experience. An important aspect of this effort should be the integration of Operations Desert Shield and Desert Storm lessons learned into Joint Professional Military Education.

### *Wartime elements*

The five elements which directly support our wartime strategy are: readiness, intelligence, mobility, sustainability, and command and control.

### *Readiness*

Maintaining a high degree of readiness for our forces requires programs that provide quality personnel, modern equipment, and essential training. Exercise programs are critical to this effort. Continued modernization of equipment is essential to preserving our technological edge. Finally, operations and maintenance funding

is key to supporting essential training and maintaining the readiness of our equipment and facilities.

Operations Desert Shield and Desert Storm vividly demonstrated the need for a proper balance of combat, combat support, and combat service support units in our Active and Reserve forces. Components in the CONUS must be capable of rapidly deploying to a crisis in the region and both Active and Reserve forces must be structured to provide the right number and type of units required during combat operations. As we execute the force drawdown contained in the President's Budget, it is critical that commensurate Reserve Force reductions accompany our Active Force drawdowns. Maintaining unneeded Reserve units would require additional Active Force cuts and may jeopardize the men and women deployed in the future in response to a crisis.

### *Intelligence*

The region continues to present a significant challenge to our intelligence gathering efforts. The diversity of people, terrain, cultures, conditions, the distance to the United States, and a limited, in-theater intelligence infrastructure compound the problem.

We have made significant strides during the past year in improving our intelligence capabilities. National and theater intelligence assets are becoming more responsive to tactical and theater commanders. Our progress comes from developing more responsive procedures to support the theater commander, and from acquiring adequate communications and dissemination systems. Our intelligence activities have increased through formal intelligence exchanges and cooperative intelligence initiatives. We have also developed expanded intelligence data bases, and trained additional Arabic and Farsi linguists.

Operations Desert Shield and Desert Storm led to the Command's development of a deployable, Joint Intelligence Center. Deployable intelligence systems are now commercially available to respond to varying levels of operations. We are developing and refining our Joint Intelligence Center capabilities through exercise participation.

We are also working hard to ensure the interoperability of service and other agency systems, including secondary imagery dissemination systems, local and wide area networks, and deployable intelligence support systems. We support common Department of Defense Intelligence Information System standards as the basic reference for all systems.

### *Mobility*

USCENTCOM relies heavily on strategic lift to meet its commitments. As witnessed in Operations Desert Shield and Desert Storm, the extraordinary distances from the continental United States to the region magnify the immense difficulties encountered with deploying any size force in response to a crisis or contingency. Strategic lift should remain a high priority on our future agenda, and support for procurement of strategic lift assets must continue.

Operation Desert Shield stressed our strategic sealift resources to their limits. America's declining national sealift capability could jeopardize our future ability to deploy, employ, and sustain any sizable force responding to a regional contingency. We need more roll-on/roll-off ships and additional strategic sealift ships to improve our force closure profiles. We should support the National Sealift Policy of 1989 to alleviate two systemic problems: the deteriorating capability of U.S. shipyards and the aging, Merchant Marine Force. These problems contribute to the overall decline of the Merchant Marine and could jeopardize future deployment efforts.

Existing strategic airlift and amphibious lift adequately support our current regional contingency plans. However, the heavy use of C-141 and C-5 aircraft during Operations Desert Shield and Desert Storm reduced their remaining service life, and replacement of the C-141 is now critical. We must ensure that C-17 production continues on track to replace the aging C-141 fleet. We also need to acquire sufficient amphibious ships to maintain a viable, amphibious, force projection capability into the 21st century.

### *Sustainability*

The remoteness and austere environment of our area require a number of unique programs to support deploying forces. This is especially true in the case of water production, storage and distribution systems, tactical fuel distribution systems, and bare-base life support systems. These programs are necessary during peacetime training as well as during regional contingency and wartime situations. Congressional support for sustainability programs is essential in order to maintain combat capability.



Host-nation support was a combat multiplier during Operation Desert Storm even though few written agreements existed. Host-nation support augmented our capabilities for fuel, food, water, facilities, and transportation. We were fortunate to have fought Operations Desert Shield and Desert Storm in developed countries with excellent infrastructures, but this was a "best case" scenario. Future conflicts may not afford us this same luxury. It is imperative we continue our pursuit of written host-nation agreements to ensure the necessary support will be available when needed.

Assistance-in-kind also contributed significantly to the support of our deployed forces. The coalition governments provided items such as transportation, communications, and automated data processing equipment. However, we cannot count on this support always being available.

Contracting in-country proved to be another means of flexible and prompt support. Operation Desert Shield identified the need to increase the dollar threshold for small purchases during contingencies. Congress acknowledged this need and increased the ceiling from \$25,000 to \$100,000 for overseas procurement in support of operational contingencies.

#### *Command and control*

USCENTCOM relies heavily on satellites for its command and control communications due to the distances involved and a limited communications infrastructure in the region. Although commercial satellites can supplement our single and multi-channel military satellite systems, they cannot meet all of our requirements for communications capacity, mobility, and security. Therefore, military satellites carry the bulk of our long-haul communications.

The multi-channel, Defense Satellite Communications System is the backbone of our network and will remain so for the foreseeable future. This system carries the majority of our communications traffic during large-scale operations. However, the satellite constellation is aging and should be replaced to retain the ability to meet the increasing demands of future crises. Also, the aging, fixed, ground station terminals need refurbishment and upgrades to ensure their continued availability.

USCENTCOM also relies on single-channel satellite systems which provide the most portable and reliable, long-range communications available. Maneuver brigades, special operations forces, and carrier battle groups moving rapidly over large distances require these systems. We fully support efforts to expand our satellite capacity.

#### SUMMATION

The USCENTCOM area of responsibility, with its strategic location, critical sea lines of communication, and essential oil reserves, is vital to the security of the United States and its allies in a rapidly changing world order. Operations Desert Shield and Desert Storm demonstrated U.S. commitment to the region. They also confirmed that aggression against neighbors will no longer be tolerated by the world community.

Since the breakup of the former Soviet Union, theater and regional conflicts are the area's most destabilizing influences. Many of these conflicts have the potential to threaten our interests and could result in the commitment of U.S. military forces. The trust and goodwill developed during Operations Desert Shield and Desert Storm should be cultivated to build our friends' confidence in our commitment to their security.

To ensure the continued access and cooperation necessary to counter regional threats, the United States must maintain a military presence in the region. We must also support the legitimate defense needs of our friends through security assistance and a comprehensive exercise program.

USCENTCOM has accomplished much during the past year in demonstrating our steadfast and long-term commitment to the security of the region. Sustained congressional support will enable us to build on these accomplishments and prepare to meet the demands of the coming decade.

#### HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE OF U.S. MILITARY PRESENCE IN THE PERSIAN GULF

On 2 August 1990, Iraqi President Saddam Hussein launched a predawn invasion of his southern neighbor, Kuwait. The invasion precipitated one of the most extraordinary international coalitions in modern history which, in the end, pitted forces of 38 nations against Iraq's battle-tested army. On 28 February 1991, following a theater campaign of coordinated air, ground, and naval operations, coalition forces destroyed Saddam's army and restored the sovereignty of Kuwait to its former government.



### *The beginning*

Significant U.S. involvement in the Middle East is as old as the American Republic itself. By 1800, as a consequence of searching out foreign markets not yet dominated by the major European powers, both American merchant and naval shipping entered the Indian Ocean and Arabian Gulf. By the mid-19th century, American merchant ships were sailing inside the Arabian Gulf where they succeeded in concluding a commercial treaty in 1856 with Persia, whose government viewed the United States as a counterweight to Russian and British influence in the region. In 1879, Commodore Robert Wilson Shufeldt reached Muscat on the Gulf of Oman, sailed into the Arabian Gulf, and proceeded to travel 70 miles up the Shatt-al-Arab. In reporting his trip, Shufeldt noted that over half the goods in the warehouses of Muscat were American, thus recognizing that American interests were rapidly transcending British and Russian commercial interests in the region.

### *Post-World War I developments*

European industrialization and World War I increased the significance of petroleum to the world economy. The collapse of the Ottoman Empire strengthened British influence in the Arabian Gulf area, leading the British to pursue proprietary policies with regard to the region's oil development. The British Government and industry lacked adequate resources to support these policies. The insistence of local rulers to share the fruits of oil development, combined with competition from American oil companies, compelled the British to allow foreign oil exploration and development throughout the Arabian Gulf.

During the 1930s, American oilmen gained concessions in Bahrain, Kuwait, and Saudi Arabia. The oil concession in Bahrain established an American-Bahraini relationship that continues to this day. With the outbreak of World War II, the joint Anglo-Soviet invasion of Iran led to the presence of American servicemen in the region whose principal mission was to speed delivery of Lend-Lease equipment by rail from Arabian Gulf ports across Iran to the beleaguered Soviet Union. By the Teheran Conference of 1943, Iran, once dominated by England, began to look to the United States for political, military, and economic support.

### *Post-World War II developments*

During the years immediately following World War II, the Truman administration not only made permanent the American naval presence in the Arabian Gulf, but also established the framework under which those forces continue to operate. Three interrelated factors drove American policy in the early post-war period: geopolitical considerations, the emerging bipolar cold war which dominated American thinking, and oil. Growing confrontation with the Soviet Union in Europe spilled over into the Gulf region. In 1949, the United States established a permanent naval task group consisting of a flagship and two destroyers to counter Soviet influence. Additionally, there were continual efforts to involve Middle Eastern states such as Egypt, Israel, Syria, and Iraq in regional defense pacts, however, the Truman administration rejected proposals to build up the armed forces of the Gulf states.

### *Cold war command arrangements*

Lacking any sizeable land-based military forces or a headquarters in the Middle East, the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the military services devised various command structures and arrangements over the years. In 1947, joint planning responsibility for the Middle East fell under the Commander in Chief of U.S. Naval Forces, Eastern Atlantic and Mediterranean, who reported directly to the Joint Chiefs of Staff. The Kennedy administration, which emphasized readiness to conduct conventional military operations anywhere in the world, created the U.S. Strike Command in January 1962. In November 1963, Strike Command assumed responsibility for joint planning of operations in the Middle East as well as South Asia and sub-Saharan Africa.

In 1967, the United Kingdom began its withdrawal from bastions east of Suez, including those on the Arabian peninsula. The United States, in view of domestic opposition to the Southeast Asia War and other overseas commitments, was unable to fill the void left by the departing British. Instead, almost by default, the Nixon Doctrine evolved to deal with the apparent power vacuums being created.

The Joint Chiefs of Staff, in realigning Third World responsibilities, implemented a new Unified Command Plan in 1971. Strike Command was replaced by U.S. Readiness Command and its operational responsibilities in Southwest Asia were divided between the Pacific and European Commands. The European Command assumed responsibility for Southwest Asia eastward through Iran. The Pacific Command's area began with Pakistan and included the northern Indian Ocean minus the Red

Sea and Arabian Gulf. In 1976, this area was expanded to encompass the entire Indian Ocean.

The end of the 1970s brought disaster for American policy in southwest Asia. The Carter administration responded to the situation with several steps to improve American military capabilities in the area. Its most visible action was the Navy's deployment of a carrier task force to the Indian Ocean consisting of two carrier battle groups. Meanwhile, the Department of Defense accelerated plans for the creation of a Rapid Deployment Joint Task Force.

The Rapid Deployment Joint Task Force was established on 1 March 1980 at MacDill Air Force Base, FL. During 1981 and 1982, it evolved from a force originally designed to be deployed virtually anywhere in the world into a regional unified command representing American interests in the Middle East and the Horn of Africa. This evolution culminated in inactivating the Rapid Deployment Joint Task Force on 31 December 1982 and in establishing the U.S. Central Command on 1 January 1983.

President Reagan's reaffirmation of the Carter Doctrine reassured the Arabian Gulf states and Saudi Arabia of protection not only from the Soviet threat, but also from regional threats. The Iran-Iraq War, which broke out in September of 1980, threatened the economies and stability of the neighboring states. Iran was openly and defiantly exporting militant fundamentalism and terrorism. In addition, the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan was a year old with no withdrawal in sight. All of this combined to spur the Reagan administration to more vigorous and concerted action.

### *The Iran-Iraq War*

USCENTCOM first tested its mettle during the latter phase of the 8-year Iran-Iraq War. During 1986, Iranian battlefield success on the southern front facing Basra was accompanied by Pan-Islamic agitation directed at substantial Shiite minorities inhabiting the states bordering the Arabian Gulf. These actions threatened the very foundations of the oil-rich Sunni states which supported the Iraqi War effort. Of these supporters, Saudi Arabia and Kuwait donated as much as \$1 billion per month by the end of 1987.

The combination of the construction of Iraqi oil pipelines across Saudi Arabia and improvements in the capacity of existing pipelines across Turkey, significantly improved Iraq's ability to finance resistance to Iran. This improved financial status served to bankroll development and execution of a blockade against Iranian oil and transportation facilities. The very success of Iraq's economic war against Iran's oil and transportation facilities compelled Iranian retaliation, particularly against Kuwait and Saudi Arabia.

As opposed to the Iraqi blockade, Iranian retribution took on a different and distinctive form. Iranian small boats and aircraft attacked not only the vessels of Iraq's Gulf allies, principally Saudi Arabia and Kuwait, but also neutral merchant shipping. Iran laid minefields in international waterways and erected Chinese-made, Silkworm missile-launching sites on the Faw Peninsula and the Strait of Hormuz. Kuwait suffered damages and losses so severe that its government began negotiations in December 1986 seeking Soviet protection for its tanker fleet.

These events conflicted with U.S. policy objectives in the region and Kuwait's request for Soviet assistance brought a counteroffer from the United States. On 29 January 1987, the Reagan administration proposed registering half of Kuwait's fleet under the U.S. flag. On 2 April, the Kuwaiti Government agreed to the offer and 11 Kuwaiti tankers were placed under the U.S. flag and given U.S. naval escort through the Arabian Gulf. The Kuwaitis also chartered three Soviet tankers, successfully balancing the two superpowers and aligning both against Iran.

The Iranians responded with further attacks on Gulf shipping. To counter these attacks, the U.S. National Command Authority directed that all U.S.-flagged ships transitting the Arabian Gulf, Strait of Hormuz, and Gulf of Oman, be provided U.S. Navy protection. The Arabian Gulf escort operation, Earnest Will, proved extremely successful. By the end of the Iran-Iraq War, U.S. forces conducted 380 escort missions protecting as many as 540 ships.

### *The crisis of 2 August 1990*

The cost of Iraq's victory over Iran was staggering. Estimates place Iraqi casualties in excess of 375,000, and debts owed to neighboring states and to various corporate creditors for arms sales exceed \$80 billion.

To remedy this problem, Saddam asked Kuwait and Saudi Arabia to forgive his debts, accusing them of manipulating oil prices downward on the international market to deprive Iraq of sufficient revenue to recover from its 8-year conflict. Also, various Iraqi officials attempted to revive historical claims of Iraqi sovereignty over Kuwait. Saddam repeated this claim and on 19 July began massing troops along the



border, eventually deploying 100,000 troops, 300 tanks, and 300 pieces of artillery. On 2 August 1990, the Iraqi army invaded and occupied Kuwait.

#### *Operation Desert Shield and strategic mobility*

The United States responded by executing the most massive movement of American forces to a remote theater since World War II. Within 2 days of the invasion, the first naval combatants began to deploy to waters adjacent to the Gulf, deterring Saddam from invading Saudi Arabia during the early phases. On 7 August, the President issued the initial combat forces deployment order and the first Military Airlift Command aircraft landed in Saudi Arabia. The first combat aircraft and ground forces arrived in theater on 8 August. On 10 August, Maritime Pre-positioning Force ships were ordered to sail; Fast Sealift Ships were activated; 17 ships of the Ready Reserve Fleet were activated; the first agreement to charter a U.S. ship was signed; and over 100 aircraft deployed to the theater. Two days later, elements of the 1st Marine Expeditionary Force and the 101st Airborne Division (Air Assault) began deploying by air. Additional naval combatant forces also deployed to underscore U.S. resolve and to enforce economic sanctions ordered by the President on 12 August. The first squadron of C-130 transports arrived in Saudi Arabia on 17 August.

The first pre-positioning ships arrived at ports of debarkation by 16 August and were quickly linked with Marine Corps units. This Marine Air-Ground Task Force with 30 days of supplies gave USCENTCOM its first mechanized force with supporting air at an early point in the operation. In order to improve the speed of deployment of forces to Saudi Arabia, stage I of the Civil Reserve Air Fleet was activated on 17 August.

In November, the President authorized the deployment of follow-on forces which included: a heavy division from the United States and the European-based VII Corps, as well as associated combat and support elements, three additional carrier battle groups, one battleship, Amphibious Ready Group 3 with the 5th Marine Expeditionary Brigade, the II Marine Expeditionary Force, and 410 additional Air Force aircraft.

The overall strategy controlling deployment of forces to Southwest Asia was to deter further Iraqi aggression and to support the Saudis in defending key facilities. This phase of military operations gradually shifted as Coalition forces grew to levels adequate for offensive operations, endorsed by the international community in U.N. Security Council (UNSC) Resolution 678. This decree authorized Coalition forces to use all means necessary to enforce previous resolutions warranting removal of Iraqi forces from Kuwait. The U.S. Congress also passed a joint resolution on 12 January 1991 authorizing President Bush to use U.S. Armed Forces pursuant to UNSC Resolution 678.

As Operation Desert Shield deployments brought forces to the theater, USCENTCOM staff began to plan for an offensive campaign to eject Iraq from Kuwait. Known to the world as Operation Desert Storm, the objectives of that campaign were succinctly stated: attack Iraqi political-military leadership and command and control; gain and maintain air superiority; sever Iraqi supply lines; destroy known chemical, biological, and nuclear production, storage, and delivery capabilities; destroy Republican Guard forces in the Kuwait Theater of Operations; and liberate Kuwait.

#### *Operation Desert Storm*

The Operation Desert Storm theater campaign plan called for four phases: phase I, a strategic air operation; phase II, a short but intense effort to establish air superiority in the Kuwait Theater of Operations; phase III, air attacks on the Republican Guard and other Iraqi army forces in the Kuwait Theater of Operations; and phase IV, a ground offensive supported by air and naval forces. By January 1991, there were enough air forces available that Coalition leaders decided to execute the three phases of the air operation almost simultaneously. The air war began on 17 January 1991. The resulting attack on critical targets throughout Iraq and the Kuwait Theater of Operations deprived Saddam of the initiative, and provided the basis for the ground assault to complete the destruction of Iraqi forces in Kuwait with minimal losses.

As the relentless air war achieved its goals, the President approved execution of the ground operations. The coalition attack, which began on 24 February, included a flanking attack by U.S. Army, French, and British forces. It was aided by a U.S. Marine Corps amphibious feint along the coast of Kuwait which fixed Iraqi forces to the east and south, and by secondary attacks to fix their forces along the Kuwait-Saudi border. These secondary operations prevented Saddam's forces from responding to the main attack and were conducted primarily by Egyptian, Kuwaiti, Saudi,



Bahraini, Qatari, Omani, Syrian, United Arab Emirates and U.S. Marine Corps forces. On February 28, 1991, following 4 days of ground combat operations, the Coalition forces had defeated the Iraqi army and Republican Guard Corps. A cease-fire conference was held at Safwan and all Allied demands were agreed to, thereby allowing Iraq to disengage near Basra. The Coalition forces inflicted the following equipment losses upon the Iraqi forces: 3,847 tanks, 1,450 fighting vehicles, and 2,917 artillery pieces.

The CHAIRMAN General, I thank you very much for that very important and helpful statement. We would like to ask you some questions. Particularly, I want to get into the issue of how many forces you need and what kind of capabilities we need to have.

But let me begin—and then I will turn it over to my colleagues here—with two peripheral issues, issues that are in the news. We should try and find out what your thinking is.

First of all, I would like to ask you a little about this shootout that is going on at the U.N. with Tariq Aziz. Are you part of the planning process of the U.S. policy in terms of what we put together, what our policy is toward Iraq now?

General HOAR. I think, without talking about contingency planning or future operations—which clearly we wouldn't want to do in open session—I think it is fair to say that our position right from the beginning has been that we must have compliance with the U.N. Security Council Resolution 687, which requires the destruction of the weapons—chemical, biological, nuclear weapons, and the missiles. Mr. Ekeus, the gentleman that works for the U.N. who has supervised the inspections, has recently been in Iraq. I had the good fortune to meet him while I was in Bahrain recently, and, without attempting to put words in his mouth, he is clearly disappointed with the progress that Iraq has made.

Mr. Tariq Aziz, as you know, will speak to the Security Council today, and we will see what the next step is. I can assure you, though, the bottom line from our point of view is compliance with that U.N. Security Council resolution. At the end of the day we will get compliance.

The CHAIRMAN Let me then ask, are you part of the consideration of how we might proceed? Do you or the Pentagon have a view on whether we ought to borrow against the frozen Iraqi assets or seize the Iraqi assets in order to fund the UNSCOM effort here? UNSCOM is running out of funds, and the original proposal was that they would be paid out of the oil program under Resolution—I think it is 706, is it?—706. Basically, then the question before the U.S. Government, and the international community, is how do we continue to fund UNSCOM's efforts in the light of Iraq's intransigence on this issue? Are you involved in that debate?

General HOAR. Not specifically in that part of it, Mr. Chairman. The ability to fund clearly is not a CENTCOM issue, and I am not familiar with the details of it other than what you have described.

The CHAIRMAN I think the concern of a number of Members of Congress is that we have made what sounds like threats in the past and then have never followed through on them. We are very much concerned that we are sending—I am speaking now for myself—the wrong signal to somebody like Saddam Hussein who seems to have a high degree of sensitivity at detecting soft spots in the opposition. I just have a bad feeling that what we have been doing since the war ended was walking up to the brink and issuing

a lot of statements, but then ultimately never carrying through on them. I am very much afraid that we may be doing the same thing now, this week, but we will see.

General HOAR. Yes, sir. I would rather not predict what the outcome of this will be. But I can say that the Security Council's recent votes—with respect to demanding compliance with these resolutions—have been unanimous. Even Cuba voted with the remainder of the Security Council members in encouraging Iraq to comply.

The issues are quite serious for everybody involved. The continued use of an embargo of material into Iraq has been very successful to the degree that \$1.5 billion a month in oil revenues are lost by Iraq. The oil exports are down to an absolute trickle, a very small amount of oil that is allowed to go into Jordan because Jordan has no other means of providing for its petroleum needs. There is no shipping going into Iraq through the Arabian Gulf. To date, we have stopped, or I should say intercepted, 13,000 ships in the Red Sea, have stopped and inspected over 3,000 and have turned away some 230 ships, and that program goes on unabated under the auspices of the U.N. So there are a lot of things that have been done.

In my judgment, what has happened inside Iraq is that Saddam Hussein has in many ways abandoned people in the north—the Kurds—and the Shi'a in the south. What little assets are available have been made available to his own party members, to those people that support him, and those military units that are close in to Baghdad that support him. While there is great suffering in Iraq on the part of common people, as you know we bear no grudge against the people of Iraq, Saddam Hussein has managed to take care of his own people.

With respect to reading what is going on in the Security Council, my concern has always been that Saddam Hussein has not been able to read the perseverance or the strength of decisions that have been made in the West and has frequently guessed wrong when it comes to those things.

The CHAIRMAN What does your intelligence tell you about the shape that Saddam Hussein is in in Iraq? I know that the Secretary of Defense, when asked very often, says that he can't predict when Saddam Hussein will go. But he believes that he will go, and that he basically is pretty much on the defense in the country. What shape is he in in terms of control over the country? How is he doing in control over the Kurdish area and the Shi'a area? What is your assessment of the status of the embargo, the sanctions, and the general status of the morale of the Republican Guard units, and, generally, internal security in Iraq?

General HOAR. Let me say first of all that I think that the embargo, as I alluded to a moment ago, has worked quite well. But because of the limited group of people that are being supported, that the effect has been mainly on Iraqi citizens who have no ability to call on Saddam Hussein for help. The Kurds are a perfect example of this and most of the assistance going to the Kurds has come in through Turkey through our Provide Comfort Operation. As you know, this is a joint task force run out of EUCOM with the help of our Turkish friends, and European friends as well.



In the south, the armed forces of Iraq have continued to conduct counterinsurgency operations against the Shi'a, with limited success. It appears that while there have been multi-level division operations conducted in the south, it is difficult to say that the regular army in Iraq is very competent at this point. The Republic Guard forces—which have always been the mainstay, both in the Iran-Iraq War and in Desert Storm—are for the most part circled around Baghdad and provide a degree of political protection to Saddam Hussein.

I clearly agree with the Secretary of Defense in the sense that Saddam Hussein has been weakened. He is surrounded by political allies or people that have been paid off. The question is how long will he last and under what circumstances will he depart? That is the sort of predictive thing that I am afraid I can't help you with, nor can I give you the timetable for it.

The CHAIRMAN Without revealing any contingency plans, I take it that if the end result of the showdown up in New York is that we need to use military force, are you prepared and able to do that?

General HOAR. I think it is fair to say that throughout the region we are planning for a wide range of contingencies. We have a large number of forces that remain in the region, and I think it is fair to say that we are doing the kind of planning that is prudent at this point.

The CHAIRMAN Thank you, gentleman. Let me just cover one more area and then let me turn it over to my colleagues. This is kind of a peripheral area. You talked in your opening statement about building relationships in the region. Tell us a little bit about three things, if you can.

One, the plans and the progress, if any, of moving your headquarters to the region. Have you got anything to report in terms of whether there is any change on that issue?

Second is the issue of ongoing negotiations in the region about our ability to preposition some equipment and have some kind of an agreement, particularly with the Saudis. What is the status of others.

Third, tell us your view of the F-15 sales to Saudi Arabia.

General HOAR. Yes, sir. With respect to the headquarters, a CENTCOM headquarters in the region has been a long-held goal of all of my predecessors. Having said that, the success of Desert Storm/Desert Shield without a full-time headquarters permanently located in the region is unassailable. I think as we look to save money in the years to come and to find ways to cut costs, the idea of taking 700 people of all services, their families, and automobiles, moving them to the region, and building the infrastructure that would support them—schools, hospitals—just doesn't make economic sense. The argument would be, "you fought with over a half million Americans, coordinated an enormous coalition of 28 countries without a forward headquarters. Why now do you want to charge the American taxpayers for all of this?"

However, there would be value to having a small forward headquarters. As you know, we are 8 time zones different from the Gulf. The countries in that region work a different workweek than we do. We find there is a continuing requirement to coordinate exer-



cises, to talk about joint planning, to work through some of the security assistance, and some of the other points that you know are important to us. So, our plan is, at some time in the future, to place a small headquarters in the region that would be able to assist those of us that remain in a permanent station in Florida on day-to-day business. Clearly it would assist us in transitioning in times of crisis, to bringing larger forces to the region.

There are a couple of countries that are under consideration, and because there are a couple, I would be happy to provide that for you later in classified form.

With respect to prepositioning, we learned during the last conflict it is key to our ability to respond. The one thing that we can be sure of in the future is that warning will always be ambiguous. We talk in military planning about unambiguous warning, but it is very doubtful that we are ever going to find that. So in the early stages of any sort of a crisis we need to have the ability to respond quickly. The forces that are probably most useful in those conditions are maritime forces that would probably already be in the regions—carrier battle groups, amphibious ships with embarked marines—and then the tactical squadrons which could move very quickly.

When we were doing the planning in 1988 for OPLAN 1002 which became the basis for Desert Storm and Desert Shield, we always worried about the possibility of whether or not our friends in the region would respond positively on short notice to a crisis situation. In fact, they did. We all know the story about Saudi Arabia. I should also point out that in the United Arab Emirates even before the attack by Saddam Hussein into Kuwait that Sheik Said invited the United States to come in and bring some forces, and we prepositioned some F-16s and some tankers down in the UAE.

But now we are quite certain, in the wake of Desert Storm and Desert Shield, that we are going to get that kind of support early on, that we would be able to move forces and equipment, particularly with respect to air forces, and that we would be able to fall in on prepositioned material. Without providing classified information, it is fair to say there are a reasonably large number of tactical fighter squadron bare base sets in the region. Bare base sets are those heavy pieces of gear—tentage, ground support equipment, trucks, vans—all the sort of things that you need. These are not necessarily high value items that we would want to have spread all over the world at large expense to the taxpayer to maintain, but these are, relatively speaking, lower cost items. We anticipate that throughout the Central Region that we would be able to preposition significant amounts of equipment for our aviation units, and that becomes very key and I will address it in a moment in conjunction with the F-15.

The one thing that we have been unable to do, which has been a disappointment to me, has been to preposition sufficient heavy assets—armor assets—in the region. We have been unable to find, in the few countries where they would be most accessible to respond to a crisis from the north, the right kind of agreement or the right formula working with our coalition friends in the region for placing that sizable kind of a force. We continue to work on it, and without naming specific countries because of the sensitivity of the

ongoing negotiations, I think that it is a goal that is achievable in the long haul, but not in the short haul.

I would characterize the Air Force prepositioning as very achievable in the short haul, and we are very positive about the Navy prepositioning, which is relatively minor; it is a fleet hospital and some logistics equipment that we could use in shore base activities to support ships in the region.

Finally, let me speak to the F-15. In my opening statement I alluded to the problems of having interoperability with the forces in the region, particularly in the early stage of a crisis. You will recall in August or September of 1990 when the threat was very great that Iraq might continue to attack south through Kuwait into the Eastern Province of Saudi Arabia. General Schwarzkopf's principal concern during that time was to get a larger number of aircraft that could kill tanks into the region. So, at the expense of a logistics infrastructure of all kinds of things, dual-purpose aircraft—attack aircraft and attack helicopters—were the highest priorities during that period.

We assess right now, based on the willingness of our partners in that region, that in times of crisis that we would be able to move large numbers of aircraft to the region, if the National Command Authority decided that was the right thing to do.

Now, what is important from my point of view for a war-fighting capability is that if we move large numbers of forces to that region, the countries in the region should have compatible equipment with us. We should expect in those countries that are going to bear the burden for defense of the Arabian Peninsula and the surrounding areas that they buy U.S. equipment so they are wholly interoperable with us. So if we fly airplanes out of the United States with just a basic load of ammunition across the Atlantic, and arrive in the region, they should land on host country airbases that have similar training, similar experience, the same spare parts, the same ordnance requirements, and the ability to refuel their planes as well as ours. Those countries need to work closely with us to bear their share of the burden in the early stages of a conflict, to either stop it at that level or to limit it until larger forces from our European allies and from other Arab states, such as Egypt and Syria in the past, coming into the region can array their forces and prevent further aggression.

What is key about the F-15E sale that is proposed by Saudi Arabia is that we believe if the United States chooses not to sell F-15s to Saudi Arabia. I should say an air-to-ground variant of the F-15E because the export model would be slightly different in some ways than the current F-15E then we clearly see that the Saudis will go to another country and buy a comparable, as good but comparable, type of aircraft.

Beyond that, it is our belief—those of us who have spent some time in Saudi Arabia and talked with the leadership out there—that when it comes time to replace Saudi Arabia's aging F-5 fleet they will opt to buy an aircraft from the same country that provides the advanced air-to-ground aircraft. So if, for example, we were to sell F-15s to the Saudis, we would anticipate that the Saudis would then buy either F-16s or F-18s on their next buy. Conversely, for example, should they buy the Tornado aircraft,



which is a very capable air-to-ground aircraft sold by the United Kingdom, chances are the second buy would be the Hawk aircraft.

From a war-fighting point of view, there would be nothing wrong with that, in my estimation, if they bought the British aircraft, if the United Kingdom were going to bring forces of similar size as the United States to the region for a conflict. But we know that is not going to be true. We know that the United States in a conflict similar to Desert Storm/Desert Shield will bring the bulk of the equipment. I want to see interoperable American equipment on the ground that will allow us to move quickly to contain a crisis and save lives. That doesn't include just F-15s; it includes M-1 tanks, Bradley Fighting Vehicles, and Apache helicopters. We need to have that kind of force to complement what we have, because we all know in the years to come the U.S. forces will be reduced in size and numbers. Our ability to respond rapidly to that region will clearly be reduced because of those imperatives.

The CHAIRMAN Thank you, General Hoar.

Floyd Spence.

Mr. SPENCE. General, I have been listening to what you have said so far. I think the region you command is still the most unstable in the world. Not only because of the problem with Iraq, the ongoing problem, but beyond that I am convinced that the religious differences of the people in that area will continue to fan the fires of war for a long, long time. I think that the next major war will be in that area because of that.

I look at Desert Storm and I think we are basing too much on the results of that conflict and we are drawing the wrong conclusions, as I alluded to in my opening statement. Never before in our history, I think, and never again will we have a situation like we had in that particular conflict. It was very unique. Everything fell our way, so to speak.

I don't think Iraq took advantage of the situation as they could have in the very beginning. It would have made it a lot more difficult, obviously, if they had proceeded into Saudi Arabia before we were able to handle the situation as we did ultimately. As I indicated earlier, we didn't have the naval threat to be concerned about. Everything went our way.

Getting back to my basic problem. What do you think would have been the result if these things hadn't fallen our way, if Iraq had acted differently and if we had had more of a threat to contend with. Could we have handled that situation as we did? Beyond that, can we base our future planning requirements on what we had during the conflict because of those unique things that we had to deal with?

General HOAR. Yes, sir. I think, first of all, that your assessment about basing all of our plans on Desert Storm/Desert Shield, of course, is absolutely correct. Had Saddam Hussein's forces not paused at the southern border of Kuwait, and continued south, it would have been an entirely different operation.

But let me preface my remarks by saying that Saddam Hussein had at the time the war began, the 2d of August in 1990, the fourth largest armed force in the world—a minimal navy, but a very capable army, hardened by 8 years of combat with Iran, and a credible air force. I think it is a great tribute to the commanders



that were on the scene during that time and the leadership that was exhibited here in Washington that the outcome was as it was.

I think it doesn't adequately characterize what happened to say that everything went our way. I would characterize it this way; that we took advantage of the weaknesses of a man who understood very little about Western institutions and turned those weaknesses into great successes for us. So, while many people would indicate that that was not a very capable force, it was an extraordinarily capable force defeated by a combination of leadership in Washington and by Gen. Norm Schwarzkopf, who is, in my judgment, the pre-eminent military man of our generation.

Beyond that, let me describe for you how I think the war would have unfolded had the Iraqis continued south. We would have ultimately defeated them. We would have defeated them in a line someplace in the Eastern Province of Saudi Arabia. There would have been great destruction to the infrastructure in the Eastern Province, and most of all, there would have been considerably larger loss of life on the part of American forces. Because the very things that I have described to you earlier, the Air Force, Navy, and Marine attack pilots, and Army and Marine helicopter pilots would have borne the brunt of that fighting. They would have done just as we expected them to do; they would have destroyed Iraqi tanks wherever they found them, but at great cost.

We would have been allowed, through their efforts, to bring Army and Marine ground forces on the ground to bear. Again we would have suffered heavier casualties. But again, we would have defeated Saddam Hussein.

The lesson is, of course, that we need to act on ambiguous warning. We need to move forces to the region before a crisis. We need to encourage our coalition partners to work toward deterrence through greater cooperative effort on their part. We need to work closely with them in peacetime to show the determination that we are not going to allow Saddam Hussein, or anybody else in that region, to overrun countries or to disrupt the economic balance of the world.

Mr. SPENCE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN Ike Skelton.

Mr. SKELTON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. General, it is certainly good to see you again and have you testify.

I would like to follow through on the Chairman's questions concerning the F-15 sale to Saudi Arabia. Are you aware of any ongoing preliminary negotiations between Saudi Arabia and the United Kingdom concerning the alternate choices?

General HOAR. I hear a great deal of speculation. I know that senior members of the Saudi Government have traveled to the United Kingdom. I have seen no hard evidence of that, sir.

Mr. SKELTON. We need to, as you know, look at future force structure in the light of threats, but historically, the crystal ball has been very cloudy. But today, in your position I know that you can give us some sort of an assessment as to potential threats such as a resurgent Iraq, regional terrorist actors and Iran.

There is an interesting article in *Defense News* dealing with the fact that Iran is in the market for 5 mini-submarines. It already

has 2 Soviet-made Kilo Class submarines. They are awaiting delivery of that.

Should that come to pass and will that become a threat that would alter our efforts in that region. Could you address Iraq, Iran and regional terroristic threats, General?

General HOAR. Yes, sir. I think that there is, of course, always a threat from terrorist activity from both of those countries. We know the association with the Hezbollah in Iran. We know that Iraq is very capable of taking those kinds of actions.

However, it is interesting that within the Central Region there is very little terrorist activity against either the members of those countries or against U.S. nationals. Most of the terrorist activities take place in countries of Europe and Asia Minor, I think, for a couple of reasons: there are bigger population centers, and a more porous ability to move freely into those countries and out of them.

So I don't want to minimize the terrorist threat at all. But in my region, while much of that terrorist threat emanates from that region, it normally isn't played out in terms of execution in the region. It is more likely to take place in Europe, for example.

With respect to Iran and Iraq, if I may, I will sketch some of that capability in general terms again, since this is an open hearing. As you know, Iraq's navy was completely destroyed. Their air force had large numbers of aircraft fly to Iran; we expect those airplanes will never go back to Iraq. Because of the terms of the ceasefire, there have been, to our knowledge, no high-performance aircraft flown since February of last year, and so there is essentially no aviation capability today.

I mentioned earlier the Iraqi forces' ability to conduct multi-division operations in a counterinsurgency environment. This is the extent of their demonstrated offensive capability at this point. We believe that through continued rearmament, through rebuilding their lines of communications and through rebuilding ordnance factories and munition factories they will, at some time in the next 5 years, perhaps, have an offensive capability once again.

That does not minimize their capability to conduct operations that could cause great damage to our facilities or to the facilities of our friends on a one-time basis in extremis. But to conduct a sustained offensive operation, we don't see that in the short-term.

With respect to Iran, we believe that Iran, as a conscious effort in 1989, began to rearm by buying Soviet equipment in exchange for hard currency. We saw this played out in MiG-29s, SU-24s, and SA-5s. We saw it in a lot of expensive Western high-tech weapons, artillery pieces, and things like that. What is most concerning to me about Iran, and I must say among the nations of the Gulf as well, is the acquisition shortly of missile patrol boats from China. You mentioned the submarines, the 3 Kilo submarines to be bought from Russia. Those weapons add an entirely new dimension to the threat in the Gulf should Russia sell those weapons to Iran. It is my understanding that this issue has been brought to the leadership of Russia, and recently we saw something in the newspaper that Russia had demurred with respect to selling the submarines because of the some \$400 million of back bills Iran owed Russia.



In my judgment, we should make every effort politically to make sure that Russia does not sell those submarines to Iran. I have mentioned that to the leadership in the Gulf. On at least one occasion I know that the leader of one Gulf country spoke to a member of his Foreign Ministry and said, "Bring that to the attention of the Russian Republic" as well. So there is some international concern, serious concern on the part of the countries in the Gulf about the submarines in particular.

Mr. SKELTON. Thank you.

The CHAIRMAN Earl Hutto.

Mr. HUTTO. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. General Hoar, welcome.

Could you tell us something about the North Korean ship that has now apparently docked in Iran?

General HOAR. Yes, sir. The ship is Dae Hung Ho, which I will describe as the Ho because I am not sure I can say the title of the ship three times in a row without messing it up. We were told sometime ago that the Ho was believed to be carrying Scud missiles; this was not confirmed. We were asked to go ahead and track that ship. There was a flurry of information early on that the ship should be boarded and it should be turned back. It appears from my observation from Florida that the disposition then was discussed at some length with the lawyers, and that there had been some confusion about our ability to intercept ships that were going to Iran as opposed to Iraq. As I mentioned earlier, we have had an ongoing program since August of 1990 on intercepting ships going to Iraq in furtherance of the U.N. program of reducing unauthorized materials to Iraq. We have no similar program with Iran.

We, Central Command, were asked to track the Ho. The last report that we had of that ship was that it was south of Sri Lanka; this information was provided by a merchantman from a friendly country. We had direction and speed and no other information. We allocated what we had available and considered reasonable to look at this region, to watch for that ship, bearing in mind that we had no charter to turn that ship back or stop it. I would tell you that had we been able to locate it at sea, and know the exact time at which it was going to dock at Bandar Abbas, that there would have been some intelligence things that we could have done that would have told us a great deal.

The fact of the matter is that we used the assets best suited for tracking that ship in a concerted effort over a period of about 10 days. These included surface ships, national systems and airplanes. It involved ships from the carrier battle group America, and shore and carrier-based aircraft. We were unable to locate that ship, clear and simple. We made every effort to locate that ship and we were unable to do it. Another ship, the Iran Salaam, under similar circumstances was found, was hailed, and that ship bound for Bandar Abbas is continuing in that process.

What we have lost by our failure to pick up that ship is that we would have been able to alert our intelligence colleagues to watch for that ship and to determine more specifically what was there.

Why did we miss it? There are two possibilities. One is that initially we pulled all the assets into the area to do the investigation—close in to Bandar Abbas, and the Gulf of Oman—to make sure that that ship was not already proceeding close in to the Gulf



and to be sure that it was not going to Iraq. At the same time we found that one of the most difficult areas for us to be sure that the Ho was not going to slip past us was if it traveled along the Indian coast, the Pakistan coast and into Iran. We used Navy aircraft with a photo capability to run that route every day. We worked, essentially, out to the east along that coast. As we got sufficient ships together—sufficient assets on—we believed then that the search should be moved out from the Gulf of Oman because we were sure, to a reasonable degree of certainty, that the ship was not inside the Gulf of Oman. When we moved that search out at sea, which would have given us greater coverage early on and more opportunity to respond, it is my belief that the Ho, at the time, slipped through the net because we had changed the search regimen.

If you are looking for the guy that is responsible for letting the Ho go through, you are looking at him.

Mr. HUTTO. Some speculation that the Scuds might be headed for Syria. Would we be able to monitor and see what happens here?

General HOAR. This would have been the advantage had we known in advance when exactly the ship would have arrived at Bandar Abbas. We would have had the ability to at least try and get the information that you are suggesting. I would not rule that out. We are continuing to monitor that situation.

So the situation—I am completely familiar with the gravity of the situation, and the importance of that ship for intelligence reasons.

Mr. HUTTO. General Hoar, you gave a good explanation and good reasons for the F-15s. But I am concerned about arming these nations. I thought one of the big thrusts following the conclusion of Desert Storm, the Persian Gulf War, was that we were going to try to get together with other nations of the world so that we could have cooperation. When we refuse to sell a weapons system to a country, then the other nations would likewise refuse, and that way you wouldn't have the argument: "If we don't sell them, somebody else is going to sell them to them."

So whatever happened to that plan?

General HOAR. I think that is very much in line with the President's view. The difficulty is that we have had less than success in limiting the Russian Republic in selling arms. We have had less than success in limiting the Koreans, and less than success in limiting the Chinese. Then there are a whole host of countries that are largely described as "the West" that sell technology. We are all familiar with the possible drain of technology out of the former Soviet Union to various parts of the world.

In the face of all of this, the continuing rearmament of some of the countries in the region, we also had the problem that we are going to drawdown in the U.S. Defense establishment. There is no question that the Central Region is vital to U.S. interests, and we have to find a reasonable way to provide for the defense of that region. We cannot, nor should we, be the sole protector of that region. We have to encourage coalition warfare. We have to encourage the countries of that region to gain and achieve a legitimate ability to defend themselves in a small crisis and make a major contribution in the event of a large crisis. Throughout this is the issue of deterrence. If we have a strong coalition, well trained and well equipped

in the Gulf, and backed up by UK, French, U.S., and other Arab countries, the likelihood that a ruler of another country, Iran, or Iraq, would again embark on an adventuresome excursion to attempt to seize another country, or to stop shipping to prevent the flow of oil out of that region, is much less likely. At the same time, all of this is progressing in parallel with the peace process between Israel and the Arab countries. We foresee that both of those issues are very important to the peace and stability of the world, and particularly to that region. We feel that the kinds of weapons that are being suggested, and the sort of thing that I have suggested to you here this morning, are entirely within the legitimate defense requirements of the countries involved.

Mr. HUTTO. Thank you, sir. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN Larry Hopkins.

Mr. HOPKINS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. General Hoar, welcome to our panel.

The objectives, or one of the principal objectives of this hearing this morning, as outlined by the panel, is to identify the threats against which the United States might have to project force to protect the U.S. interest.

Let me give you a little backdrop, if I may, before I pose my question relative to budget cuts, because at some point that becomes a paramount threat.

Several years ago—and I attribute this to the chairman, the good work of the chairman—several of us had an opportunity to visit Baghdad during the war between Iran and Iraq. Through the chairman's efforts, we had an opportunity to sit down and talk with Mr. Aziz.

There had been some speculation by the news media, confirmed at that time by our intelligence, that Iraq had used chemical weapons against Iran and in some cases its own people. I took the opportunity to ask Mr. Aziz if he could verify that fact. He did not hesitate. He said, "Yes, we have used chemical weapons." As alarming as that was to me, even more alarming was the next statement that he made, with no questioning from me or anybody else. He voluntarily said, "If we had the bomb we would use that." Now that was a direct quote from Mr. Aziz 2 years ago.

Now, with that backdrop, let me, if I may, put a little bit into perspective about where we are as far as our cuts are concerned as it relates to protecting our interest.

General Motors announced just a few days ago the closure of some automobile plants with the loss of approximately 16,000 jobs, and that alarmed the markets in the United States. Well, DOD is currently losing about 16,000 people a month, which has not alarmed very many people at this particular point. Now, earlier this year, General Motors announced a 4-year plan to downsize, resulting in a loss of 75,000 jobs, and this announcement shook the financial markets. The Army alone will eliminate 75,000 personnel in just 11 months of the current fiscal year.

Now, the above examples of General Motors and DOD are based on the President's defense bill. Let me hasten to remind you that the Budget Committee's proposal will double those figures. Now, my question to you is, at what point does that become more of a threat than the threats that you face in the region, or that part of



the world? Where do we get to the point where we cannot protect our interests in this world, from your professional standpoint?

General HOAR. Yes, sir. Let me characterize it this way, and we have touched on this in several different ways already this morning. My responsibility, of course, is in the Central Region. I agree, as the chairman and other people have mentioned, that this is not only critical but very high on the list of most likely crises that we might have to face in the future.

I believe that the base force—the force that had been developed in the Department of Defense and is a part of the President's proposal for the DOD for the next 5 years—can meet our obligations in the region under some circumstances. If we build the coalition partnerships that we need in order to have adequate friends in the region that are prepared to fight, if we are successful in providing prepositioned material that will cut down on our requirement for strategic lift—allowing us to bring troops to the region, and not heavy equipment—if we have enough warning and the support of the countries in the region, and that support will come from continued presence and exercises; we would be able to meet our responsibilities in that region with the base force.

I have serious doubts about my ability to meet my obligations in the Central Region if the base force is cut. It seems to me that to meet our peacetime requirements of deterrence and forward deployment, and on top of that to respond to a major crisis in that region, given the fact that there will be other requirements elsewhere in the world, the base force is as low as I can sign up to in terms of what we need to meet the responsibilities in the Central Region.

Mr. HOPKINS. Thank you very much.

The CHAIRMAN General Hoar, let me follow up on Larry Hopkins' questions just a second.

Basically, do you see any contingency which would require more assets than you had, or that General Schwarzkopf had in Desert Storm?

General HOAR. I believe that we can do it with less, and we will have to do it with less and the base force offers us less. But we have learned some lessons, Mr. Chairman, as a result of Desert Storm and Desert Shield, and I have alluded to several of them—the coalition building, the prepositioning, improved strategic lift.

The CHAIRMAN You say we are doing with less, and that is true. Across the board there is less. But, in terms of assets available to CENTCOM for another Desert Storm, the various proposals out there including base force and including several of the ones that we have been putting together maintain a Desert Storm capability for a rerun of some kind, and we may or may not have the same enemy, but a return of Desert Storm in that region, what you have is a capability that is based upon a Desert Storm model and say we ought to keep that capability and whatever we cut, we would cut in other places. As you know, the base force anticipates not only a contingency in Southwest Asia but also contingencies in other parts of the world.

I am asking you, in terms of your capability and in your region, if you had a Desert Storm equivalent, I mean a Desert Storm repeat, a duplication of the Desert Storm capabilities, can you imag-



ine any realistic combinations of threats that would exceed what we faced in Iraq at the time of Desert Storm?

General HOAR. No, sir. I think that in terms of the total force required, a resurgent Iraq would be the principal threat. That would involve large numbers of ground forces. But bear in mind the size of that commitment—7½ Army divisions, 42 tactical fighter squadrons of the Air Force, 6 carrier battle groups with 80 aircraft each, some 500 Marine aircraft, 2 Marine divisions—is not going to be available in a way that would allow that to be moved to the area. We have treaty requirements elsewhere in the world that cannot be abrogated.

I can tell you from my own experience in the Marine Corps that during that year as operations deputy to Gen. Al Gray in Washington, I was specifically charged with finding ways to get the forces to the region. The 93,000 marines that went to Southwest Asia could not reasonably be expected to be available in the base force. They just can't be——

The CHAIRMAN Why is that?

General HOAR. Because out of a 159,000-man Marine Corps, you are not going to be able to close bases, close air stations, shut down Marine guards in embassies, take marines off ships elsewhere in the world, take people out of training, close down formal schools—you can't do it. Just because the arithmetic shows that you have 159,000 on the books, the fact that you move 93,000 to a crisis area doesn't allow you to just say that you have enough. There are all of these other things that go on in terms of overhead, training, and other contingencies and responsibilities.

The CHAIRMAN I understand that, and you have got to take that into account. Indeed, we need to do that in terms of looking at these various options about whether, in fact, we do need the same kind of commitment. We started in Desert Storm with the notion—on the planning books—that we could not move troops out of Europe, and, indeed, in the previous world of the Soviet Union you couldn't move troops out of Europe, because you were courting disaster. If you had to move the troops out of Europe to fight somewhere else, you were inviting the Warsaw Pact to cause trouble because you were weakened in Europe.

It is a different world now, and we need to go back and look at all of those other commitments that we had in the past to see whether in fact we still need to maintain those commitments.

General HOAR. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN Second is the issue of the Reserves. The second reason why we had trouble in Desert Storm was the general commitment that in fact we needed to fight this war potentially without calling up the Reserve. Well, clearly we have to call up the Reserves in the future and we have to use the Reserves. So we are going to have to use some other planning practice.

But basically, in terms of your assessment, if you could get a plan that would say, "Look. If General Hoar needs a Desert Storm equivalent in the future he would have a Desert Storm equivalent." That, essentially, would make you comfortable that you could deal with—and I am not talking out 20–25 years. Who knows what is going to develop? You know we look at these things in roughly 5-year increments.

General HOAR. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN Because that is about as far ahead as you can look with any reasonable expectation of being able to understand the world.

But, if you are looking at the current situation—Iraq, Iran, terrorism, maybe Syria—basically whatever plan—base force, option C, whatever it is that we give you, if you say we will be able to—if worse comes to worse, be able to replicate a Desert Storm force that you see in your region could handle the problems?

General HOAR. I think that that is critical. I would also add that when you get Gen. John Galvin and the Commander in Chief of the Pacific Fleet, Adm. Chuck Larson together, they will again describe their reservations in terms of commitments to Japan, commitments in Korea and continuing commitments in NATO that would also continue unabated even if the majority of the forces were moved to the Central Region to fight the war. I think that is the principal issue, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN It is the principal issue. But I think that when looking at the threats in the world, you got the greatest claim on them; and, unfortunately, General Galvin has less claim on them. But that is for a different argument with General Galvin later.

General HOAR. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN Next is Martin Lancaster.

Mr. LANCASTER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you, General, for a very successful first appearance. We are glad to have you in your role and glad to have you here today.

General HOAR. Thank you, sir.

Mr. LANCASTER. One of the time-honored problems we face is how we effectively gather intelligence and whether or not we can adequately do so without the least high-tech intelligence and the oldest intelligence, and that is human intelligence on the ground.

How do we stack up now? Are we doing better? Are there inadequacies that we need to deal with? If you would, just evaluate the role of human intelligence in the region and whether or not we are getting what we need for now and the future?

General HOAR. Yes, sir. As a general statement, I would agree with you that our human intelligence in the Central Region continues to be deficient. I think the reasons, of course, are self-evident. It is an entirely different culture from ours and we have, perhaps, over the long-haul not devoted the time and attention to that region that we might have in years past. The friendly powers had more interest and more presence in that region than we do.

But I think it is fair to say that in recent years in particular, the intelligence community has had a great deal of interest in technical acquisition of information. Although the technical information is important and so central to so many things—including the success of the fight this past year—human intelligence is frequently the means of getting predictive information about what is going on. This is the area where we are always deficient in the Central Region, in the sense that while we have excellent means to determine what, for example, the Iraqi military has and what the Iranians have, our ability to look to see what is going on in that country among the leadership, and what the long-range plans are, is another matter indeed.



What is required is a long-term commitment to that goal. I have made my views known to the people in the intelligence community that could provide that kind of help. I feel confident that they understand the issue, and I believe that they will move on it.

But I agree 100 percent with you, and particularly in the Central Region, that there is a lot of room for improvement.

Mr. LANCASTER. Thank you. Throughout your testimony you refer to the importance of joint training exercises. Of course, that was demonstrated very clearly in the success of Desert Shield/Desert Storm. But I wonder if you have found, since that operation, any need to adjust your joint training schedule? Also, if you could assess for us the degree of cooperation that you have had from other countries in your AOR? Are they not only providing an appropriate level of cooperation in the field, but also in resources: fuel, financial support, other ways of being helpful to planning for their future joint security that they must be an equal partner in, and not depend on us being their protector?

General HOAR. Yes, sir. As I mentioned in my opening statement since 1989, which was the last pre-war year for exercises, our exercise program has increased fivefold. We anticipate that we will conduct 86 exercises this year in the region. Those are all combined exercises.

By definition, we don't run exercises out there if we don't run them with somebody in the region. In other words, in everything that we do we must convey to our partners and our friends in that region that we are there to work with them, not to go out there and do the job while they hold our coat. So all the exercises are done in a combined fashion with the countries in the region. For the most part, they are joint in the sense that more than one service participates in them as well.

Have we been successful? In varying degrees and I will give you examples. In order to be successful in running a coalition exercise program, we need to move in small steps in those countries that have fledgling armed forces with minimum capability. It does no good to bring in one of those magnificent battalions from the 24th Infantry Division and show off as to how capable a mechanized U.S. Army division can be. It is only worthwhile when we take it in small steps and walk before we run.

So our exercises vary enormously from country to country in size and in complexity. In some places we are absolutely at the building-block level. In other areas, for example with some of our air force counterparts in the region, we have exceptionally well-qualified forces that are able to train routinely with the U.S. forces.

There is a feeling of great interest in combined exercises in the region. All of the countries in the Gulf participate, as well as Egypt, and Kenya. All of those countries participate in a wide variety of exercises. The countries that have the means of assisting and paying the freight on these things absolutely do. Other countries, where the countries are not as well off, of course they pay their own way. In the case where there is military assistance provided, it is provided indirectly from another source.

I think we are making progress. We are now moving to the point where we expect to see this year, multi-lateral exercises, including



2 or more countries from the region participating with the United States. That is the direction in which we hope to go in the future.

Mr. LANCASTER. You have already responded to questions with regard to a command presence in the region. But I assume that in this area of joint exercises that a command presence in the region would make that effort even more effective.

General HOAR. Yes sir it would. It is clearly very useful to do that. I would tell you that my own approach is to visit the region regularly and to meet with the senior military people and in some cases to meet with the senior political leadership as well to foster these kinds of activities. Then some of the young fellows that work for me travel almost continually to the region to set up terms of reference for exercises and agree on exercise objectives in the beginning in order to be sure that we nurture these relationships and keep everybody on board, and most importantly, not to embarrass anyone, because of the great disparity of capability throughout the region.

Mr. LANCASTER. You mentioned in your statement the importance of the C-17 for airlift.

General HOAR. Yes sir.

Mr. LANCASTER. This committee has shared for several years now the high priority that the Marine Corps has placed on another aircraft in development, the V-22. I wonder if you would comment on the role that this capability—if we don't want to talk about the V-22 itself—would play in your carrying out your mission in your particular AOR and whether or not that capability is possible using existing helicopter resources?

General HOAR. Yes sir. Let me say, first of all, that from my point of view the Marine Corps is absolutely in need of a replacement of their medium-lift helicopter. What helicopter or what aircraft that is is better decided by someone else other than me, except that it ought to have the survivability and the capability, and be able to fly off ships, which cuts down the possibilities considerably.

Let me speak to the V-22, then, in the abstract, as an aircraft that does a lot of things. I think the first thing is the payload, the speed, and the self-deployability, which again is an enormous advantage. When we talk about the problems associated with moving large numbers of people or equipment to a region, anything that can get there on its own legs is a great advantage. That is true for the V-22.

Beyond the Marine Corps capability, there is another aspect of this that is very important. That is the special operations capability for deep penetration, and just as important, extraction. For those gallant young men that go deep behind enemy lines, an aircraft of the V-22 type is most important.

Additionally, for combat search and rescue there is no aircraft in the inventory right now that could meet that requirement. I must tell you that I can't go into great details, but I wish that today we had a more capable combat search and rescue aircraft that could be used in the event of a crisis.

Mr. LANCASTER. Thank you.

The CHAIRMAN Herb Bateman.

Mr. BATEMAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. A very hearty welcome, General.

General HOAR. Thank you, sir.

Mr. BATEMAN. I am very impressed with your written statement as well as your oral testimony today.

I am, perhaps, guilty of adhering too rigidly to Murphy's Law. But in the part of the world in which you deal it seems like it may be a pretty valid premise. For a number of decades this country had, as a pillar of its relationships in the Persian Gulf, a relationship with the Shah of Iran. We poured enormous resources into supporting the Shah and building up his military capability as the presumed basis for assuring stability in the area.

Lots of things have happened since then. We have seen the Iraq-Iran War, with a tilt on our part to see that Iran did not win that war because of our concern largely about Islamic Fundamentalism and its spread throughout the Middle East. Today, from the newspapers we learn of increasing tensions and problems as far away as Algeria because of the surge of Islamic Fundamentalism.

We could, as I see it, again adhering to Murphy's Law, place ourselves in a position where our assumptions vis-a-vis the stability of other governments in the Persian Gulf may be as wrong as they proved to be with the Iranians. There is no assurance either next year, or if not then, a year or two from that, that you may not have some upheaval, some unrest, some instability in major states in the Persian Gulf. The very same states that we have relied upon and with whom we now conduct joint training exercises, who have provided us with infrastructure, who have done many things that were critical to the degree of success and the degree of promptness and lack of casualties that we experienced in the Persian Gulf War. All of this could put us in one tremendous predicament because all of our national security interests that were threatened by the events of August 1990 and forward could again occur without anything like the coalition that was put together under the past circumstances. Without any of the infrastructure that was put together, but with the same degree of peril to our national security interests.

I guess I am making more of a statement than asking a question. But because of these concerns it certainly occurs to me that the base force that the Joint Chiefs and with input from you and the other war-fighting chiefs is something that we would depart from at very substantial risk to our national security. If there is anything further you would like to add with reference to the degree of risk we face if we were to come down further from the base force concept as the Joint Chiefs have laid out and as the Secretary of Defense and the President have approved it, I would like to hear it.

General HOAR. Yes sir. I think that I have touched upon most of the points, but let me respond to one aspect of your discussion with respect to the security of the countries in the Gulf. It is important to realize that for the most part these countries fell under the sway of a colonial power in one form or another for the vast majority of the modern period. As a result, the political infrastructure is quite different than what we see in the West. As a result, there is clearly some possibility that there will be upheaval in the future



with all of the problems that exist out there. Clearly the Muslim revisionist movement is one that needs to be watched very carefully.

We see in the future that most of the countries in the region will continue to see the validity of keeping oil and sea lanes of communication in the region open, which is in the best interest of everyone. I would say most. But, from our point of view, we believe that the central aspect of coalition operations in the Gulf is built around the Gulf Cooperation Council, the six countries of the Gulf, with the assistance of other countries in the region. Clearly, Egypt is a country that has expressed great willingness to help, and, indeed, did early and with large amounts of forces during Desert Storm and Desert Shield.

None of that withstanding, I must say again that I believe that we could replicate the results of Desert Storm and Desert Shield with the base force if we have that coalition support, and if we move early on ambiguous warning to move assets to the region. Those are preconditions of success with the base force. Clearly, if those things weren't in place, even the base force would not be adequate.

Mr. BATEMAN. Thank you, General.

The CHAIRMAN I have a quick followup question. Are you bothered by the lack of transportation assets in the base force? We had the head of TRANSCOM in here yesterday, and he tells us that even after they followed up on the MRS study and the new option—the middle option which is what they had, what the decision was, and spent the money—he says that after that you will get the combat elements of  $4\frac{2}{3}$  divisions moved in a month and a half, and the full combat, combat support, combat service support in 3 months.

We are going to be relying awfully heavily on future Saddam Husseins doing what Saddam Hussein did, which is to essentially go along and then stop. If it takes us 3 months to get  $4\frac{2}{3}$  divisions—this is after implementing our plan that replicates Desert Storm's 7 or 8 divisions—you are talking about 6 months again. It just seems to me that one of the great weaknesses in the base force, and one that we tried to address in the options that we presented, was more lift.

General HOAR. Sir, I couldn't agree more. Sealift and airlift are both very high on my integrated priority list; I have no argument with you. But I would point out a view that may diverge from General Johnson's view. That is, one of the problems associated with moving forces from the United States to the region is not just the lift, but the marshaling and the development of the ports and getting the ammunition—and I know the Mobility Requirements Study spoke specifically to that. But that is key.

It is also true, in my judgment, that 30 days after the decision is made to move major forces you can find all the ships in the world that you need. All you have to do is hire them. The key is the first 30 days. After that, you can rent them from the Japanese, the Germans, the Liberians, whoever happen to have ships.

But sealift is critical, but it is most critical early in the crisis. Then we get into the problems of how many ships can be at berth



in Savannah to move the 24th Infantry Division or how many can go down to the Gulf ports to move——

The CHAIRMAN As our discussion involved yesterday, the key thing is to move the equipment that you can't hire the ships to do because they are not built to take the heavy equipment—the M1 tanks and the big, heavy stuff.

General HOAR. Yes sir.

The CHAIRMAN You can hire ships to move the sustainable equipment, the food and the ammunition. In fact, you probably want aircraft to move the people.

General HOAR. Yes sir.

The CHAIRMAN But to move the heavy equipment there isn't any substitute other than military lift because the decks won't hold tanks.

General HOAR. Usually only the main deck will hold these——

The CHAIRMAN So what you need—it comes back to the point—is more lift. Of course, it is a sore point with Congress because for 3 years now we have put lift into the budget and it still hasn't been spent. As I say, it is a sore point around here.

We have got more lift in our plan. We have been authorizing and appropriating money for lift, but we don't have any lift.

General HOAR. Mr. Chairman, I agree with your view 100 percent. We are in woeful need of lift and I support your efforts to provide that for us.

The CHAIRMAN Norm Sisisky.

Mr. SISISKY. Thank you. Good to see you, General.

General HOAR. Yes sir.

Mr. SISISKY. Of course, there is another aspect to this, prepositioning heavy equipment. What I don't understand, what is the problem in doing it? What is the reluctance of people that we may have to protect? It is just beyond my comprehension what the problem is.

General HOAR. It is very hard to discern, sir. I would speculate with you, but I don't think, in fairness to the countries in the region, that I would like to do that in open forum. It clearly involves issues of sovereignty and of U.S. presence in the region. Each of these countries has radical elements in the government, people that continually make the presence of U.S. forces in that region a subject of discussion. They believe that Western elements present in those countries will overturn the established order, that Western decadence will slip into those cultures.

Much of this is encouraged by other countries that wish to limit U.S. presence in the region.

Mr. SISISKY. I understand that, General. Have we asked Israel to preposition heavy equipment?

General HOAR. I believe Israel does have some equipment prepositioned.

Mr. SISISKY. Have we asked them to do more? Or is that a political problem?

General HOAR. I can't answer that.

Mr. SISISKY. It just seems to me if you want to get their attention that is all you have to do. I would just leave that.

General HOAR. Israel, as you know, is in the European Theater, sir.

Mr. SISISKY. Well, it is pretty close.

General HOAR. Yes, sir. But I can't answer the specifics of that because I am not familiar with them.

Mr. SISISKY. The first thing I got hit with this morning in a meeting: You are on the Armed Services Committee. How in the hell did they lose the ship?

Now, General, I have got to tell you this. Your explanation was pretty detailed. I don't think this is going to go away. At the beginning you may have made a mistake by putting limited assets on it. Then you talked about the American carrier battle group, the national systems, everything imaginable. I can't figure out how to tell somebody, with all of the assets that this Nation has—I know that it is a big ocean, a lot of commerce around there—how we could lose one ship that we had been following for 10 days, as I understand it—

General HOAR. We have not been following it for 10 days, sir.

Mr. SISISKY. But we knew it was there. Let's put it that way.

General HOAR. We knew it was in the Indian Ocean, sir.

Mr. SISISKY. I beg your pardon?

General HOAR. We knew it was in the Indian Ocean. The area of the search involved 800,000 square miles. I take full responsibility for not finding it, but as long as you bring up the issue the size of the search area was fairly significant.

Mr. SISISKY. Eight hundred—

General HOAR. Thousand square miles.

Mr. SISISKY. No way to identify ships—

General HOAR. Lots of ways, sir. National systems.

Mr. SISISKY. I don't want you to be impatient with me.

General HOAR. No, sir.

Mr. SISISKY. Because these questions are going to come up—

General HOAR. No, sir. I am happy to answer them.

Mr. SISISKY. I thought it would be great to do it right here.

General HOAR. I am happy to answer them. I am the person that is responsible, but I must tell you that the task is more difficult than it would appear at first look.

Mr. SISISKY. OK. Now, you also said—let me get back to the F-15E. There was also the F-15H there too, wasn't it? What is the—

General HOAR. The F-15H is the air-to-air variant, sir.

Mr. SISISKY. You talked about interoperability.

General HOAR. Yes, sir.

Mr. SISISKY. That certainly makes a lot of sense. The only problem I have with that is I look down here at all of these countries that you are responsible for—are we going to sell all of them aircraft to be interoperable with the United States? Because it gets back to what Mr. Hutto was talking about. The only thing in that conversation that I noted—I think I wrote it down correctly, maybe I didn't—is that the F-15E is a good defensive weapon. It is also a very good offensive weapon too, is it not? Does that uncork the military dimension somewhat? Don't forget, only one nation—Egypt—recognizes Israel.

General HOAR. Yes sir.

Mr. SISISKY. If you look down the list of all these countries, what does this do, from an offensive standpoint, to the balance?

General HOAR. It is clearly an aircraft that can be used as an air-to-ground weapon either in the offense or the defense. There is no question about it. If I were a military planner in Israel, I would be very concerned.

The fact of the matter is that Saudi Arabia, in particular, is frightened for its national existence because of the two countries that are in close proximity, Iraq and Iran. In my judgment, they do not perceive Israel as a threat to them, nor are they militarily interested in threatening Israel. I think as long as the royal family that has been in place in all of Saudi Arabia since 1920, and in a portion of it for many, many generations before that remains in power, that this is prudent risk.

Mr. SISISKY. But you are a military planner.

General HOAR. Yes sir.

Mr. SISISKY. If you were a military planner in Israel—I think you said it—you would be nervous.

General HOAR. Of course I would. That would be my responsibility.

Mr. SISISKY. So how do we solve that problem from a military standpoint?

General HOAR. No, I understand exactly what you are saying.

Mr. SISISKY. How do we solve that problem? Do we sell them another type of aircraft—Israel—to balance that out? Or give it to them? What do we do?

General HOAR. Let me pose a different set of problems to you that I think would allay the concern of my counterpart in Israel. Earlier we discussed the large-scale sale of U.S. military equipment to Iran during the time of the Shah. In that military sale were F-14 fighters—Navy fighters—perhaps one of the very best aircraft available at that time, and still very capable today in the U.S. inventory. That plane, which was only sold to Iran—to my knowledge it was not sold anywhere else in the world to any other country—never played a significant role in the 8 years of the Iran-Iraq War. The reason for that was the only source of spare parts for the F-14 was the United States.

Their F-4s, much older but much more available throughout the world, always played a role. Today we see them still flying. There was a black market availability of spare parts for those F-4s.

But the F-14 never played a significant role, and their operational ready level was quite small. What I am suggesting to you is that should the United States sell Saudi Arabia an advanced air-to-ground attack aircraft that we will continue to be able to exercise some control. I should think that that would assuage the concerns somewhat of the military planners in Israel.

Mr. SISISKY. General.

General HOAR. Yes sir?

Mr. SISISKY. I am not a military person. But just off the top of my head, that argument doesn't hold water. You are talking about an air war; you are not talking about a 3-year war there. You are talking about something pretty fast in the air. Saudi Arabia has the ability. I assume they were using our aircraft in Desert Storm.

General HOAR. Very successfully, sir.

Mr. SISISKY. They had parts and they had good pilots; they were trained in this country. I would assume the same thing would hap-



pen with the F-15Es and Hs. You are talking about a long-term aspect. Why the Iranians didn't use F-14s probably was not because we cut it off. The pilot training probably—and I'm just guessing that. Of course, they couldn't use them now because it has been a long time since we cut them off.

General HOAR. They still have them, sir. But during the war they didn't use them and they saved them to keep them in reserve in case they were attacked.

The suggestion that you make relative to the Saudi Arabians attacking Israel, I think, is based on the fact that there would be a major change in government in Saudi Arabia that is quite different from the one that exists today. I would suggest to you that that would unhinge many, many things in that part of the world. I think that the present government is most concerned with the immediate threats to the Gulf, which is my responsibility as well.

I am fully aware of our responsibility to the territorial integrity of Israel and I don't mean to minimize the importance of that as a national objective. But the more compelling threat in the Gulf is from Iraq and Iran.

Mr. SISISKY. Thank you.

The CHAIRMAN Beverly Byron.

Mrs. BYRON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. General, let me welcome you today. I think we have a few tough questions to ask you and I think it is extremely important that we get the proper answers.

First of all, in response to Mr. Hutto and Mr. Sisisky—the 10 days of hide-and-seek and tracking of the Ho. Are there assets that we retired that would have been beneficial and helpful in that mission?

General HOAR. I think that the assets that we used—the surface ships, the S-3 aircraft off the America, the P-3 aircraft that were shore-based in the region, the LAMPS helicopters that were flying off the surface ships and the photo missions that were flown by F-14s—were all top-of-the-line, current kinds of equipment that were available and were used.

Mrs. BYRON. Would an SR-71 have been effective?

General HOAR. I believe it would have been.

Mrs. BYRON. Let me change the subject a little bit. One of the key reasons why we were trying to track that ship was because it had a potential to be carrying Scud missiles.

General HOAR. Yes.

Mrs. BYRON. As we all know, we looked in horror and fear a year ago when there was a potential for chemical and biological weapons to be used in Desert Storm and Desert Shield. I don't think—I came in a little late, but I don't think anybody has touched on your testimony in that arena, and I think it is a key area and a very critical one as we look to the future and we look to the threat.

It wasn't too many years ago that I was part of a delegation to Israel for what was supposed to be a 5-minute courtesy call on Menachem Begin and it ended in a 2½-hour dialog on the mission that the Israelis flew into Baghdad to destroy the nuclear plant there. There is no question in anybody's mind today that Iraq has biological and chemical capability. There was no question last year as we looked at Desert Storm develop that our troops were ill-prepared to meet that kind of a scenario.

I have asked this question again at almost each hearing because I don't hear anybody else carrying this concern, and it is something that concerns me greatly. We have seen the chemical/biological capability, and the scientific infrastructure, as you have stated today, is still in place. I am concerned that we had to ramp up in that arena—woefully inadequate protection in that arena. Many of our troops very concerned, very scared, very apprehensive about operating in that type consequences with the use.

I was pleased to note at a hearing that I recently held with our military medical personnel that served in the operation, they said once the anthrax and the capability was given to our troops they became very comfortable with using the equipment that had been designed for their protection. Once they familiarized themselves, their responsive time and their comfort level were far superior than it had previously been.

But that is after the fact. Your responsibility is looking at a world where we are not dealing with the most charitable individuals. I mean, that type of a world and that type of an endeavor, I think we have to put chemical and biological at a very high priority.

Could you tell me what you perceive is our capability and what you perceive should be done in this arena?

General HOAR. First of all, I would say that I agree 100 percent with your assessment of the seriousness of this. There is no other region in the world where chemical and biological weapons offer more potential for horrendous results should they be used. As you know, chemical and biological weapons are frequently described as the poor man's nuclear weapon.

The other thing that is very discomfoting is that any country that has a fertilizer industry can make chemical weapons. If they have a pharmaceutical industry, they can make biological weapons. So the ability to detect in advance and to take the necessary steps to prevent that from happening is quite difficult.

In the case in point you are absolutely correct. Iraq had an enormous chemical capability and a fledgling biological capability, but quite dangerous nonetheless. The leadership in our military, I believe, was truly taken by surprise by the size of this capability in the sense that while we knew that it existed, as we began the run-up during Desert Shield we saw the size and complexity that we were up against. As you know, there were some 15 major initiatives that were begun during that period with lighter weight protective clothing, shelters that would provide some protection, reconnaissance vehicles, and decontamination capabilities.

What has happened now is that all of the pieces are in place now to work to achieve those things, and there is a DOD program that is ongoing. I have, again, made my concern now through the integrated priority list on the importance of defense against these kinds of weapons. What I believe now is the continued pressure—that as defense spending goes down—there will perhaps be, if we are not careful, a slackening of interest in defense against these kinds of weapons, which I think would be a terrible mistake.

We have the lessons to be learned from the war. There is movement right now. The question is, is it going to be fast enough, and



will it be thorough and will we stay the course? I would clearly appreciate your continued support of those programs as well.

Mrs. BYRON. I guess, General, what really disturbs me is that time and time again I sit on this committee and I ask questions and I am told again and again by the witness that I agree with you 100 percent, I agree with you 100 percent, I agree with you. I am not going to be here next year to have anybody agree with me. The thing that concerns me is somebody had better pay attention because the chemical and biological threat is not going to go away.

We have just spent a lot of time today talking about a ship that we couldn't find that may be carrying, and probably was carrying Scud missiles. Now, we all know the fear and the horror that the people of Israel saw night after night descend upon them. We saw the community in Pennsylvania where a large number of their young people were wiped out with an incoming Scud missile that had a potential for chemical and biological. We better wake up and look at the threat in your region in this arena because it is one that, in my estimation, is very, very real, and very much one that we should be concerned about.

The CHAIRMAN One last question, General Hoar. You are now in charge of the command that conducted the Operation Desert Storm. What are the lessons learned? What changes have you made in the planning or any changes that you have instituted as a result of lessons learned from Desert Storm?

General HOAR. I would say that from the standpoint of planning—I have touched on some of them already—is the need for coalition building, for early movement of forces, and the importance of prepositioned equipment both ashore and afloat. One of the things that I haven't mentioned that is very important, of course, is the improvement of technical means to support the intelligence activities of a commander in the field, not only to provide the information, but provide it in usable form, on a real-time basis, to commanders on the ground. That was, as you know, a problem during the war.

The points that Mrs. Byron brought up about chemical, biological and nuclear weapons are key. The protection against friendly fire is an important issue that has to be worked out and has not been mentioned here today. Again, there are initiatives that are working. We are going to press both the the Army and the Marine Corps who have a large stake in this. They have changed their curriculum in school and they have worked at the National Training Center in California and the Air-Ground Training Center at Twenty-nine Palms to incorporate a greater understanding of these problems, which are key as well.

I think that we need to make improvements in dissemination of intelligence. We have to take care of this friendly fire issue. We have to have the defensive capability against nuclear, biological and chemical warfare.

We also need to have the communications in place in advance—the Defense Satellite Communications System that would give us the architecture to be able to carry out the command and control requirements.

So, again, those things are in place and they are working. Because of the proximity to the war, I believe that they are all on



track and there is still a lot of interest. What will remain to be done is to keep that interest high as we move into the outyears, and to make sure that those things are adequately taken care of.

The CHAIRMAN Do you know what is the status right now of the Pentagon's postmortem on Desert Storm? Every once in a while a rumor goes around that it is about to be released. Then time passes, it submerges again, and then times go by and then another set of rumors. This has been going on. Do you have any idea where it is or when it is coming out?

General HOAR. I have been misinformed, Mr. Chairman. I thought you had it.

[Laughter.]

The CHAIRMAN That is a different issue.

General HOAR. I was under the impression that it had been forwarded. We have seen it in various forms, beginning last summer. We have had a shot at it all the way along, and, as you know, there has been a great deal of interest in how the thing was worded and how it was put together.

But I am under the impression we have seen it for the last time. I am told, and I was under the impression that it had indeed been forwarded to you.

The CHAIRMAN Not officially.

General Hoar, thank you very much. It was a very helpful, very interesting, and very informative morning. Thank you, sir.

General HOAR. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

[Whereupon, at 11:30 a.m., the panel was recessed, to reconvene subject to the call of the Chair.]

## CINC ATLANTIC COMMAND AND CINC SOUTHERN COMMAND

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HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,  
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES,  
DEFENSE POLICY PANEL,  
*Washington, DC, Tuesday, March 17, 1992.*

The panel met, pursuant to call, at 1:15 p.m., in room 2118, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Ike Skelton, presiding.

### STATEMENT OF HON. IKE SKELTON, A REPRESENTATIVE FROM MISSOURI

Mr. SKELTON [presiding]. I will call the panel to order. The chairman has been temporarily delayed in a meeting that he really cannot leave, so in order to speed this along and not have the two gentlemen waiting, we will begin.

The chairman would have made this opening statement, so I will forthwith read it.

Today, the Defense Policy Panel welcomes with us Gen. George Joulwan, Commander in Chief of the Southern Command, and Adm. Leon A. Edney, Commander in Chief of the Atlantic Command. Thanks to some good luck with scheduling, they are able to appear together. Their combined expertise should give us a good picture of what is happening so close to home in the Caribbean and Latin America.

I will let our chairman finish this statement.

The CHAIRMAN. Finish it. Read the statement.

Mr. SKELTON. The panel plans to discuss three kinds of issues this afternoon. The first is the Commanders' assessments of the dangers they are planning to face in their respective areas of responsibility. Now that the Soviet threat has collapsed, we are experiencing a fundamental change in the way we plan our defense. Our principal threat now is from regional aggressors, not the Warsaw Pact or Russia. So it is important to have a clear idea what to expect.

The second issue is the shape of the forces capable of meeting the threats of the new era. For example, we understand that the top priority in this region is supporting counterdrug activities. We also understand that the Southern Command doesn't have many forces of its own to conduct this mission and relies on forces temporarily assigned to it. We would like to discuss the pluses and minuses of this arrangement, including the possibility that counternarcotics support operations will decrease as forces are reassigned to a major regional contingency.

The third issue before us today is the size of the forces necessary to provide suitable defenses. There have been two contingencies—

in Grenada and Panama—which have offered us an example of how U.S. forces can be used in the region. This afternoon we would like to ask whether there are other kinds of contingencies that would require a substantially different force than what was used in Panama or Grenada.

This examination of regional threats is part of a series of hearings the Policy Panel is holding to allow the Armed Services Committee and other members decide the level of defense our Nation will require in the 1990s based on the real threats we face. Although our immediate task is figuring out the fiscal year 1993 Defense Budget, it will be hard to do our work properly unless we have some idea of where we are going. We hope that by having this discussion now, we will be able to forge a consensus on a reasonable threat-based defense program for the future.

Gentlemen, we welcome you. I welcome our chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Bill Dickinson.

**STATEMENT OF HON. WILLIAM L. DICKINSON, A REPRESENTATIVE FROM ALABAMA, RANKING MINORITY MEMBER, DEFENSE POLICY PANEL**

Mr. DICKINSON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I would like to join you in welcoming General Joulwan and Admiral Edney here today and I look forward to their testimony.

Our committee is faced with one of its most difficult and challenging tasks in recent history. To paraphrase Dick Cheney, can we manage a defense build-down without screwing it up? History says that we can't. At least we haven't in the past. We could repeat the miscalculations that drove previous build-downs that inevitably led to subsequent disaster in U.S. foreign and military policy. Or instead we might make the right choices and protect our unparalleled military capability, although smaller in size. We need your views on two big issues.

First, as CINCs you are in an unequalled position to advise us with regard to the threats and the forces needed in your areas of operation. Where are we in the continuing fight against the drug traffickers? What are the implications of the Panama Canal Treaty on SOUTHCOM? What is the threat from the Shining Path insurgency in Peru? How will the reduction in naval forces affect LANTCOM's mission.

Beyond this, I would ask you both to use this opportunity, to the fullest, to counsel the panel on the adequacy of the force structure options that have been presented to us. Do we ratify the President's "base force" plan as a security blueprint for the future, or do we adopt one of the four proposals developed by our chairman, Mr. Aspin? Among the five force structure options there are deep and fundamental differences.

Many have taken the time to point out the weaknesses of the base force, but few have critically assessed the proposed alternatives. We would ask you to help us evaluate the alternatives. I am afraid that Congress would provide for a force structure with little or no input from those charged with defending our Nation if we didn't have these hearings. America has built down foolishly in the past and, unfortunately, too many fine young men and women have paid the supreme cost as a result.



Gentlemen, I look forward to your testimony. We have a real interest in your testimony here as it relates to Panama and what we might reasonably expect there and in that area.

So thank you, Mr. Chairman. We look forward to your testimony.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you. General Joulwan, if you want to start, and then Admiral Edney. The floor is yours, gentlemen.

**STATEMENT OF GEN. GEORGE A. JOULWAN, USA,  
COMMANDER IN CHIEF, U.S. SOUTHERN COMMAND**

General JOULWAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Distinguished members of the House Armed Services Committee, I am deeply honored to appear before you today on the military strategy and the requirements of the U.S. Southern Command.

At the outset, let me thank this committee for your support of Southern Command and for our efforts in Central and South America. I particularly appreciate the special interest shown by Mr. Mavroules' Subcommittee on Investigations in our counterdrug endeavors.

Mr. Chairman, I have a prepared statement, and if you concur, I would like to enter it into the record and then briefly summarize it.

The CHAIRMAN. Without objection.

General JOULWAN. In doing so, Mr. Chairman, I want to make the following points:

First, it is important to recognize that, as in Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union, change is evident throughout Central and South America. Fifteen years ago, there were only a handful of democracies. Now, all 19 countries have some form of democratic government with civilian elected leadership, and all are allied with the United States.

While the outlook is bright, problems remain. Weak political institutions, corruption and economic inequalities threaten future growth and development. Insurgencies still are a threat in several countries. It is also important to remember that each country of Central and South America has its own strengths and its own weaknesses. Too often we lump all these nations together and oversimplify the issues. We must bear in mind that each country is at a different level of political, economic and social development.

The second point. Traditional threats to democracy and regional stability, although much diminished from only a few years ago, remain. Insurgencies in Guatemala, Colombia and Peru threaten fragile democracies. The demise of communism has not lessened the violence of these insurgencies. Indeed, in Peru the Sendero Luminoso continues to wage a vicious war against the peoples of that nation. The Sendero Luminoso are the Khmer Rouge of Latin America. The Sendero Luminoso's strategy is to use violence to destroy democratic institutions, to stop citizens from participating in local government and to destroy the functioning economy.

Although there is no immediate threat to the Panama Canal, the United States must retain the capability to ensure the neutrality of this international waterway past the year 2000. Should the American people decide that a conventional threat requires a U.S. military response, the Secretary of Defense's base force is adequate to project U.S. power into the southern region.

Third point. The strategy to deal with the non-traditional threats in my area of responsibility is evolving. We conduct peacetime engagement or forward presence operations as detailed in the January 1992 National Military Strategy. The tools we use include security assistance, International Military Education and Training (IMET), nation assistance, mobile training teams, deployments for training and exercises. The intent, Mr. Chairman, is to focus these assets on an Ambassador's country plan in order to develop host-nation capability and enhance host-nation wealth.

We in SOUTHCOM support ambassadors in host nations. We build mutual trust and confidence. We provide focused intelligence and other support for host-nation forces. In implementing this strategy, SOUTHCOM operates at the operational level while we support country teams at the tactical level.

Most important, Mr. Chairman, we do more than provide equipment and training. We impart values and ideals in order to enhance professionalism in the militaries of the region. The role of our citizen-soldier in the Reserve components is especially important in SOUTHCOM. Not only do the Guard and Reserve provide a significant portion of the force to implement our strategy, but their presence is a strong visible example of how the military acts in the framework of democracy. Recent events in Venezuela underscore the importance of this initiative.

The fourth point. The narcotrafficking threat to the countries of Central and South America is real and growing. This criminal narcotrafficking is well resourced and worldwide. Its tentacles reach into every country of this hemisphere and threaten the very democratic institutions we are attempting to strengthen. Traffickers corrupt and intimidate government officials, judges, police and the military. They have no respect for a country's sovereignty and violate borders with impunity. Convincing evidence is growing that they help finance insurgent movements which increasingly look to the narcotraffickers for resources, rather than the former Soviet Union and/or Cuba.

The narcotraffickers often pay those who assist in cocaine, not dollars, creating a drug consumption problem from Belize to Chile. Mr. Chairman, in the past 15 months I visited 15 countries, and every president with whom I met voiced concern over the threat posed to their nation and to their democracy by the narcotraffickers. In my opinion, the narcotrafficking threat to Central and South America is more serious than that posed in the past by Cuban and Soviet-sponsored subversion. There is now a consensus among the nations of the region that the entire narcotics problem must be attacked on a regional basis, not just country by country.

I am encouraged by the recent successes in the source countries of the Andean Ridge and also in the transiting countries of Central America. It is important to remember that in this fight it is the host-nation forces that must engage the narcocriminals, and they are. The Secretary of Defense directed that combating drugs is a high-priority national security mission and elevated the mission priority. I have made supporting counterdrug operations SOUTHCOM's top priority.



My instructions also direct that no U.S. forces will be involved in actual field operations, and we are not. My guidance is to provide support to host nations through our U.S. ambassador and country team, and I do.

Mr. Chairman, it is also important to remember that in this fight SOUTHCOM is but one of several U.S. agencies involved in the war on drugs. Indeed, we are not the lead agency. But how well we provide timely and accurate support relates directly to the success of host-nation operations. We are making progress. Our cooperation with host-nation forces through the ambassador's country team with LANTCOM's Joint Task Force IV and with Forces Command has never been better. These efforts have contributed to host-nation law enforcement agency successes. The war on drugs will be a long one. To be successful the United States, in my opinion, must be in it for the long haul.

The fifth point. Panama continues to show progress 2 years after Just Cause. The economy is strong and democracy is taking root. Crime and violence are still too high, and drug consumption and trafficking remain problems. On the positive side, Panama has signed a money laundering bill and ship rider agreement, both directed at the criminal narcotraffickers.

In addition, Mr. Chairman, SOUTHCOM continues to provide for the defense of the Panama Canal and now has an improved plan for implementing the Panama Canal Treaties. We are also working closely with U.S. Government agencies in a newly formed Panamanian Presidential Commission to create the best conditions for successful treaty implementation. The Panamanians are developing a master plan and marketing plan for property reversion, and the Canal Commission now has a Panamanian administrator, with the work force over 87 percent Panamanian. There are still concerns on the composition of the Panamanian National Police, who are mainly ex-Noriega soldiers and policemen. However, recent civilian graduates from the year-old Police Academy are now entering the force.

Finally, Mr. Chairman, in El Salvador President Cristiani and the Salvadoran people have brought peace to their country after more than a decade of civil war. It was a significant victory. Our Nation's support and economic and military assistance were crucial in bringing peace and freedom to this small Central America nation. If the FMLN insurgents demobilize over the next 8 months, as they have pledged to do, then the Salvadoran armed forces will be well on the way to a 50-percent reduction.

It is important that in the next crucial phase of the peace process, from now until 31 October, the United States continue to support President Cristiani and stay engaged. If we do, true peace will be realized by the people of El Salvador.

Mr. Chairman, in the past year these have been significant positive trends in Central and South America. With diminished threats elsewhere in the world, we have an opportunity to apply assets and attention to the southern half of our hemisphere. Security assistance funding is one of my primary tools, and the small 4 to 5 percent we now receive for 19 countries should be maintained, or even increased, in today's austere financial climate.



Key programs such as the Caribbean Basin Radar Network, the Command Management System, and intelligence collection platforms such as Airborne Recce Low, need to be completed. Then host nations will help timely and accurate information on the war on drugs.

In conclusion, the United States must stay engaged politically, economically and militarily in Central and South America. If we do, continued peace, freedom and prosperity are possible. If we do, a more secure, stable southern region will emerge. If we do, I believe we can continue to make significant progress in the war on drugs in this decade. To stay so engaged will require the best of intentions, efforts and commitments by all elements of our Government.

Mr. Chairman, thank you for the opportunity to appear today and update you on the U.S. Southern Command.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you, General.

#### PREPARED STATEMENT OF GEN. GEORGE A. JOULWAN

Mr. Chairman and distinguished members of the House Armed Services Committee, I am deeply honored to appear before you today to discuss the U.S. Southern Command. At the outset, let me thank you for the special interest and support by many members of this committee in my command. I will address my view of the strategic importance of Central and South America to our national security. In so doing, I will outline Southern Command's military objectives, military force capabilities, and the strategy that links our objectives and capabilities. I will also detail the forces needed to accomplish these objectives, my priorities for the region, and our operational requirements.

This past year has continued to see unprecedented change in the world order. Indeed, 30 years ago as a second lieutenant, I watched the construction of the Berlin wall and then, in 1989, as a Lieutenant General Corps Commander, I watched the Berlin wall collapse and the iron curtain fall. The after shocks of the collapse of communism are still being felt in the former Soviet Union and throughout Eastern Europe. At the same time, U.S. forces were tested in the Persian Gulf region and won a stunning victory.

While the victory of freedom and democracy in Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union and the Gulf War captured the world's attention, equally impressive accomplishments were realized in Latin America—to include a cease-fire and peace accords in the 12-year civil war in El Salvador, enhancement of liberty and democracy in Panama 2 years after Just Cause, consolidation of democracy in Nicaragua, and important advances in regional cooperation by host nations in the war on drugs. As we reassess our national military strategy, the importance of Central and South America becomes more apparent. We have vital economic, social, and security interests in the southern half of the Western Hemisphere, and we are faced with serious issues that have a direct impact on our national interests and that of our allies. My intent today is to detail those threats, the strategy to deal with them, and what we need to get the job done. In doing so, I first will describe briefly the area of operation and provide an assessment of the region.

#### THEATER OF OPERATIONS

The U.S. Southern Command area of responsibility (AOR) extends nearly 6,000 miles, from the southern border of Mexico to the tip of Cape Horn. The entire continental United States could easily fit within South America.

It is a region of extremes. Several democratic governments are threatened by violent insurgencies. In numerous countries, wealth is concentrated in the few, while many live in abject poverty. In some countries, vast natural resources continue to remain untapped because they are not accessible; in others, overexploitation of fragile environments is mortgaging future generations. Illegal narcotics are a very real, very direct threat to the sovereignty of many of these emerging democracies. Infrastructure to support economic and social progress is poorly developed. Many lack the basic human needs we take for granted.

But South and Central America is, more importantly, a theater in transition, reflective of many successes which give us cause for optimism. As I noted at the outset, 15 years ago Latin America was dominated by military dictatorships; today de-

mocracies thrive. Leaders of these nations understand the need to meet their citizens' desires for freedom, peace and opportunity. They want to develop their national economies without destroying their natural resources. Countries plagued by the criminal narcotics trafficking industry are developing the national will to defeat the traffickers and are undertaking the difficult task of developing alternative crop programs for the campesinos. Political reform, in many countries, has been accompanied by economic reform, and there is movement away from centralized statist economies toward free markets.

#### THEATER ASSESSMENT

In Central America, the civil war in El Salvador has come to an end with the signing of the peace accords in Mexico City on the 16th of January of this year. In accordance with the accords, the transition to peace will take place over the next 9 months. This transition began on 1 February and, by 31 October 1992, we should see permanent peace in El Salvador after 12 long years of fighting. Nevertheless, the next 9 months will be crucial ones for the people of El Salvador and they deserve and must have our full support. We need to stay engaged. Elsewhere in Central America insurgency continues to trouble Guatemala, and in Honduras criminal acts continue to be carried out by terrorist groups professing a Marxist/Leninist ideology. Nicaragua's fragile democracy continues to emerge, but much remains to be done to firmly establish civilian control over Nicaragua's armed forces. Although abuses have not been eliminated, we see continuing positive progress in the human rights area in all of these countries. Of particular importance is the fact that Central America has increasingly become a transiting route for narcotics flowing from Latin America to the United States. We are encouraged by the increased awareness demonstrated by Central American nations to this threat and the initial steps being taken. However, much remains to be done by these nations in the way of developing their capabilities to effectively deal with the use of their countries as narco transit points into the United States.

The situation in Panama remains mixed. The economy has rebounded, and last year's GNP growth rate of 9.3 was an indicator of this upward trend. This economic surge mirrors the confidence of the people and their democratic government. Crime remains a principal concern in Panama, as does drug trafficking and consumption. While the Panamanians are working hard at building a solid, professional police force and former PDF officers continue to be replaced, morale and pay within the PNP remain low—and this results in a less effective force.

The Government of Panama has taken those initial steps necessary to prepare for the receipt of properties transferred under the Panama Canal treaties. A Panamanian presidential commission has been created and is in the process of creating a master use plan and a marketing plan. The Panama Canal commission is now headed by a Panamanian, and over 80 percent of the work force is Panamanian.

In the Andean Ridge, economic problems, coupled with the combination of vicious insurgencies and narcotics trafficking, pose an immediate danger to democracies in this region. However, the Andean Ridge nations are developing both the will and capability to meet the threat posed by the narcotics trafficker. There now is an increasing recognition among these nations that their efforts are not simply a fight to keep drugs off the streets of American cities, but an essential battle to defend their sovereignty and to preserve their democracy. While several years ago, several of these countries considered drugs a boon to their economies, today they understand that narco dollars do not improve the welfare of their people and do not lead to long-term prosperity. The narcotics trafficker is a criminal who corrupts the democratic institutions these nations have struggled so long to develop. Thus, with a clearly emerging national will in the Andean Ridge nations, a consensus on a cooperative regional approach toward dealing with the narcotics trafficker threat is now being developed.

In the rest of South America, despite great potential, economies and democracies remain fragile. The burdens of debt and low economic growth continue to handicap popularly elected governments. Progressive leaders are undertaking ambitious programs of economic restructuring and privatization that will cause short-term dislocations, but lead to growth over the long term. We have seen that as pressure is applied in the Andean Ridge, narcotics trafficking activities are spilling over into neighboring countries. Within these countries, however, we have also seen a growing awareness and will at the national level to utilize both their law enforcement agencies and military forces to conduct counterdrug operations.

#### ASSIGNED FORCES

The U.S. Southern Command consists of a headquarters; three service components, U.S. Army South (Army), USSOUTHAF (Air Force), CINCLANTFLT (Navy);



a special operations command component, Special Operations Command, South; Joint Task Force Bravo; and security assistance organizations.

Located at Quarry Heights, Panama, Headquarters U.S. Southern Command provides command and control for assigned and attached forces.

U.S. Army South, at Fort Clayton, Panama commands the principal in-theater ground forces. The ground forces consist of a light infantry brigade with supporting aviation, engineer, military intelligence, military police, and logistics units. A military intelligence brigade and signal brigade provide theater support to the unified command.

USSOUTHAF, 12th Air Force at Bergstrom AFB, TX, maintains a forward element, the 24th Wing, at Howard Air Force Base, Panama. It provides command and control for assigned and attached Air Force units. A limited airlift and airport operations capability is also maintained at Howard Air Force Base. Additional fighters, detection and monitoring aircraft, and intelligence platforms regularly deploy temporarily to support counterdrug efforts. However, most Air Force support occurs on a mission basis, with my air component providing necessary command and control.

CINCLANTFLT, Commander in Chief, Atlantic Fleet, Norfolk, VA, has forward elements at Fort Amador and at Naval Station Panama Canal at Rodman for command and control of naval forces in our area of operations. Units presently in Panama include Navy special operations personnel and a special forces boat unit, two minesweepers for defense of the Canal, and a Marine Corps security company.

The Special Operations Command, South, at Albrook Air Station, Panama, provides command and control for special operations forces assigned or committed to the AOR. Assigned forces are currently limited to two special forces units in Panama.

Joint Task Force Bravo at Soto Cano Airbase, Honduras, provides rotary wing airlift, and training and logistics support to U.S. military activities in the area.

The security assistance organizations of Southern Command consist of 16 military groups and offices operating in conjunction with embassies throughout the region plus the military liaison office in Mexico. They administer the security assistance programs and assist host nations in determining their requirements. On delivery of materiel, they coordinate training for host-nation forces and follow-on logistics support.

Although forces assigned to the command are minimal, many personnel deploy into the region for periods of training, either on deployments for training (to train themselves) or as mobile training teams (to train host-nation forces). To demonstrate the magnitude of this effort, I would note that Southern Command has about 10,000 military personnel of all services assigned, but that, this year, over 25,000 personnel will deploy into the theater to 18 countries on approximately 500 deployments. Many of these deployments involved Reserve component units, which perform vital humanitarian and civic action missions in support of the SOUTHCOM mission.

Finally, in case of an armed conflict or other serious emergency, crisis response contingency forces would deploy to the theater. We train to meet regional contingencies and rely heavily on CONUS-based contingency forces and strategic air and sealift to accomplish our assigned missions.

#### STRATEGY AND MISSION PRIORITIES

Based on my assessment of the region and our strategic objectives, I have developed a strategy centered around four priorities for the command. They are:

- Support counterdrug efforts.
- Sustain the negotiated peace settlement in El Salvador.
- Promote liberty in Panama.
- Enhance professionalism in the militaries of South and Central America.

#### COMBATING DRUGS

The counterdrug fight is my No. 1 priority. The narcotrafficking empire is a well-resourced, worldwide, criminal network and a threat primarily to the fragile democracies of Central and South America, and to a lesser degree, even that of the United States. Narco tentacles reach into every country of South and Central America and much of the world. They corrupt the judicial system, the police, and the military. Violence and crime have increased. The narcos often pay those assisting their illegal activities in cocaine, not dollars—and drug addiction is now on the rise in many countries of Central and South America.

The National Command authorities have provided me clear guidance for the war on drugs. Secretary Cheney has directed that the war on drugs be made a high priority national security mission and that the CINCS elevate the mission priority



within their commands of actions to combat illicit drug production and trafficking. I have done so. The Secretary also directed that substantial assistance be provided to U.S. Government agencies and foreign governments engaged in counterdrug operations. That assistance includes training, reconnaissance, logistics, medical support, command and control, planning, and civic action. The President directed that no U.S. forces would be involved in actual field operations. We are not. However, we are involved in assisting host nations in their fight against the narcotraffickers and in providing an operational level focus to the counterdrug fight in my area of responsibility. The SOUTHCOM counterdrug strategy also reflects the guidance in the January 1992 *National Military Strategy* of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. We are a forward presence command and we conduct forward presence operations, to include operational training and deployments, security assistance, protecting U.S. citizens abroad, combatting drugs, and humanitarian assistance. In the war on drugs, the *National Military Strategy* directs the U.S. military to continue to enhance its detection and monitoring capabilities and to encourage and assist other nations to develop the operational capabilities necessary to stem the flow of drugs.

Based on this guidance, the counterdrug strategy in SOUTHCOM is based on the concept of providing support to our U.S. ambassadors and their country teams in their efforts to develop host-nation capability and public and political will. Our strategy also entails the provision of counterdrug support to host-nation law enforcement agencies and those elements of the military forces engaged in the counterdrug fight. Most importantly, ambassadors are in the lead; SOUTHCOM is in support. SOUTHCOM's focus is at the operational or regional level because of the extent of the narcotrafficking process. That process extends from the chapare region of Bolivia, to the upper Huallaga Valley in Peru, to the processing and distributing points in Colombia, and to the multiple transiting countries of Central America. It is a massive criminal network that is both complex and sophisticated. Since the narcotrafficker does not respect the sovereignty of national boundaries, our intelligence collection capabilities must be applied theater-wide. The intent is for the command to do predictive analysis and to pass on fused intelligence to the ambassador. The SOUTHCOM role at the tactical level is to provide the host nation, through the U.S. ambassador and country team, the assistance requested in a timely manner. U.S. forces are not direct combatants. Host-nation police and military conduct the actual fight. The key is to focus these host-nation capabilities at the right place and at the right time. It is the host nation that must demonstrate the will and capability to defend its sovereignty and protect its democracy. During this past year, we have seen a substantial increase in awareness by the host nations of the threat their countries face from narcotrafficking and a corresponding willingness to engage in the counterdrug fight. Not all of the region's nations are as involved as others, but the Andean ridge countries are clearly committed. This commitment is most evident in the forces and capabilities these nations have developed specifically for the counterdrug fight. Two years ago there was little to show for our initial counterdrug efforts, but, at this point, I can report that a substantial capability does exist among the Andean Ridge nations. Significant increases in host-nation law enforcement units specially trained in counternarcotics and the provision of aviation support to the police have produced mobile forces capable of responding to U.S.-provided intelligence. Obviously, there is much work to be done. However, I again wish to emphasize that progress has been made, that we are succeeding in developing the counterdrug infrastructure so vital to waging effective operations. We have taken the first steps in a long-term battle. However, unlike Desert Storm, victory will not come quickly or cheaply. To realize success, we must be committed to this fight for the long haul.

Colombia and Bolivia have developed counterdrug capabilities within their armed forces. Bolivia has an infantry battalion fully trained in counternarcotics. Colombia has specially trained strike units from their army and successful riverine units from their navy. Moreover, all of these nations have added robust capability in their air force. We must continue, through our training, support, and security assistance efforts, to help build these capabilities. We must also continue to insist on the end game use of these forces by the host nation. There are clearly opportunities on the horizon for greater self-sufficiency by some of the nations, particularly Colombia as their capabilities fully develop.

I am concerned about clear and increasing linkage, confirmed by our intelligence agencies, between the narcotrafficker and insurgencies, particularly the Sendero Luminoso in Peru. It is my view that, in order to effectively support Peruvian counterdrug efforts we must be prepared to deal with this demonstrated linkage between the narcotrafficker and the insurgent. Much of the coca growing areas of Peru are in the hands of the insurgents. It is impossible for Peruvian police and law enforcement agencies to confront narcotraffickers in areas which the government can-

not control. Peruvian military must be able to secure these areas before effective counterdrug efforts can be mounted.

Particularly encouraging to ultimate success in host-nation counterdrug efforts is the level of developing regional cooperation. The nations are not just talking with one another; they are actively involved and engaged in regional, combined efforts. This past year, the Support Justice operations set the stage for expanded regional efforts. In these multinational operations, we and the host nations saw the benefits of orchestrating individual nations' actions, while measuring narcotrafficking reactions on a regional level. There were many tactical successes. Labs and bases were destroyed; narcotrafficking aircraft were brought down, major traffickers were arrested or surrendered, and a substantial number of narco aircraft were confiscated. We are now in the middle of Support Justice III, a multi-national operation conducted by Peru, Ecuador, and Colombia—focused on the interdiction of air-trafficking. These nations are sharing intelligence, exchanging liaison officers, and refining techniques and procedures for controlling their own forces. Support Justice III is a success story—not just in narco aircraft forced down—but in the confidence building measures taking place between the nations of the region. These nations have committed their own air, ground, and riverine forces to the operation. We will continue to nurture such regional efforts and work to expand them. We are also seeing some encouraging signs from the spillover countries, as well as the Central American transit nations as they become increasingly aware of the narco threat and develop their own capabilities to combat it.

#### EL SALVADOR

Peace came to El Salvador in 1991. The challenge will be to sustain this peace through the elections in 1994. President Cristiani's leadership was key to reaching the peace accord, and the El Salvadoran Armed Forces (ESAF) supported their president throughout the negotiations. Most impressive was the professionalism of the ESAF tactics on the battlefield and their demonstrated concern for the human rights of the El Salvadoran people. The former convinced the FMLN insurgents that they could not win militarily, and the latter won, for the ESAF, the respect of the El Salvadoran people. In addition, the ESAF demonstrated great flexibility in their support for the negotiating process. This is a new El Salvadoran armed forces. The trends toward respect for human rights and civilian control of the military are all in the right direction. However, the next 9 months will be critical to the peace process. During that time, the FMLN communist insurgents will dissolve as a military force, and the ESAF will begin to reduce by 50 percent and restructure its forces. It is important that we continue to support President Cristiani and the ESAF as the president rebuilds his nation. It is also important to understand that the ESAF will remain as the military institution of a free and democratic El Salvador. It will assist in reconstruction. It will provide needed stability and security. The ESAF must be capable of demonstrating the resolve necessary to ensure that the FMLN complies with the peace accords. To achieve success, our support to the ESAF must be at an appropriate level, one which will ensure that peace is maintained and that El Salvador is capable of quickly rebuilding after so many years of war. Mr. Chairman, we must stay engaged in El Salvador during this next critical phase in the peace process.

#### PANAMA

Two years after Just Cause, Panama continues to make progress toward a stable and democratic government. After 21 years of dictatorship, democratic Panama is beginning to develop economic and political institutions which will serve as the foundation for future growth and prosperity. Problems still remain. The crime rate and violence are still high. Drug trafficking still exists and drug consumption has increased. The Panamanian police force, comprised mainly of former PDF soldiers, is not yet a professional law enforcement organization. On the positive side, the economy is showing great strength, the government has signed money laundering and ship rider agreements, and drug seizures have taken place. Also, about 700-1,000 civilian police are graduating yearly from the Panamanian police academy.

In 1991, President Endara appointed a presidential commission tasked with effectively managing the transfer of U.S. properties and facilities to Panama. The commission has made substantive recommendations and is now developing a master plan and marketing plan for the former Canal Zone. Our intent is to support the Panamanians and to create the best conditions for success. But, in the end, it must be a Panamanian plan supported by the Panamanian people.

In 1991, we laid a good foundation on which to build confidence in the Panamanians as we implement the Secretary of Defense's approved treaty implementation



plan. With the implementation of this plan, we must continue to monitor the steady development of the Panama National Police (PNP) as a positive force for stability in Panama. While U.S. military forces are not involved in training the police—that is a Department of Justice responsibility—we will continue to monitor PNP capability as our own forces are drawn down.

Relations between the United States and Panamanian people remain good and are getting better. In July of last year, over 100,000 people turned out to celebrate U.S.-Panamanian friendship week. We continue an active nation assistance program, oriented toward improving the lives of the citizens of the republic. Our Fuertes Caminos projects have been a great success—United States and Panamanians working together to open roads, build schools, and bring health care to the outlying provinces.

#### MILITARY PROFESSIONALISM

A key element of our strategy in the region centers around developing programs to enhance the professionalism of host-nation militaries throughout the region. The roles and missions of a military force in a democracy are new concepts to many of these armies, and our programs must be designed to impart our values and ideals, as well as to provide equipment or training. We have seen positive signs in this regard over the last year. The Hondurans are developing their own national defense university with joint military-civilian participation. El Salvador has requested information concerning how it might develop a similar program. Human rights training is now featured in military schools throughout Central and South America—to include El Salvador, Peru, Honduras, and Colombia. U.S. military staff judge advocate officers are providing assistance in helping host-nation militaries restructure their military justice systems. In Peru, military prisons are now open for inspection by the International Red Cross. In addition, a high level of attendance by the regions' militaries at our professional schools continues. Recent events in Venezuela underscore the importance for continued interaction by the U.S. military and the militaries of Central and South America.

#### OPERATIONAL REQUIREMENTS

Southern Command can execute its strategy in the theater within the resources currently allocated. The services and the Department of Defense do well in supporting this command. However, there are several important programs which are essential to SOUTHCOM's strategy, and I need your support. The first of these is the Command and Management System (CMS), which will become the primary means of transmitting real-time counterdrug information. It provides secure voice, data, and imagery capabilities to U.S. ambassadors and law enforcement agencies. As we complete installation of CMS in embassies and forward operating locations in the Andean Ridge, we need to expand the system to meet our regional requirements throughout the theater. Second, the Airborne Recce Low (ARL) program will provide us with a combined imagery and signal intelligence gathering capability. It will be a capability tailored to the environment of counternarcotics work on an airframe that meets the unique requirements of this command. Under the control of USSOUTHCOM, it will afford us the responsiveness and agility we need. Imagery from ARL will be releasable to host nations, giving us a significant advantage in targeting and enabling host-nation law enforcement and military forces to more rapidly respond to counterdrug contingencies. Additionally, the Caribbean basin radar network will form the backbone of ground-based detection and monitoring in the transit region. This system, in deployment, is a multi-national cooperative effort significantly enhancing our ability to interdict narco air traffic.

Finally, many other smaller programs support the command's activities in all of our mission areas. These areas include command and control enhancements, detection and monitoring systems, intelligence systems and operations, mapping for uncharted areas, and exercises. I need your support for these programs in order to ensure that we maintain the momentum in the fight against the narcotrafficker.

#### CONCLUSION

I would be remiss if I did not talk to the future. Nowhere in today's changing world environment is there clearer evidence of the potential to further U.S. national interest in peacetime than in the Southern Command. I am pleased with what has occurred over the last year, and I am more optimistic than ever about the future. We are making inroads in disrupting the narcotrafficker's ability to act freely within the region. Cooperation between our ambassadors, country teams, and Southern Command is superb. Technological initiatives are multiplying our capability to suc-



ceed in an era of limited resources. Cooperation between multiple agencies is the norm—interagency operations do work!

Finally, in evaluating our relationship with the countries of Central and South America, it is important to remember that we are more than just partners and allies—we are friends. We share a common heritage, a common border, and a common threat—narcotrafficking. Our economic interests in the region are self-evident. The desire for social change and respect for human dignity are goals shared by all peoples of the Western Hemisphere. The United States must stay engaged—politically, economically, and militarily. If we do, continued peace, freedom, and prosperity are possible. If we do, a more secure, stable southern region will emerge. If we do, I believe we can continue to make significant progress in the war on drugs in this decade. To stay so engaged, however, will require the best of intentions, efforts, and commitment by all elements of our Government.

Mr. Chairman, in closing, I just want to tell you that the strengthening of democracy in Latin America is being accomplished by the same kind of fine young men and women who restored democracy in Kuwait just a year ago. Last year before your committee, I noted that, as we build down our forces, my No. 1 priority will be to retain the quality of the men and women we have in today's military. That is still my No. 1 priority. These dedicated men and women and their families must be provided a decent quality of life and treated with the respect and dignity they deserve.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman, on behalf of all the men and women in the Southern Command, for this committee's support and for the opportunity to appear before you today.

The CHAIRMAN. Admiral, the floor is yours.

#### STATEMENT OF ADM. LEON A. EDNEY, USN

Admiral EDNEY. Thank you. Good afternoon, Mr. Chairman and distinguished members of the House Armed Services Committee. I appreciate the opportunity to appear before you. I have provided the panel a copy of my full report and I ask that you enter it into the record.

The CHAIRMAN. Yes, without objection.

Admiral EDNEY. The past 12 months have seen many changes and events that could not have been predicted by even the most clairvoyant sage. The quick and decisive victory in Desert Storm demonstrated to our country and to the world the high quality and state of readiness of the U.S. Armed Forces.

As the first order of business, I would like to thank this committee and the American people for the support that enabled this tremendous performance. This committee has been instrumental in supporting the needs of our Armed Forces. Thanks to you, we had the right equipment and the manpower to do the job. The Goldwater-Nichols Act was a strong player in enabling joint warfare concepts to be brought to fruition so dramatically by our troops on the battlefield.

The security interest of this country will need your support even more in the years ahead. We have never built down as well or as wisely as we have built up. We must do it better this time around.

In the current public debate over our Nation's defense requirements in the post-cold war era, I am concerned about the size and the speed of defense reductions well beyond the base force presented by this current budget. Some are equating the dissolution of the Soviet Union and the demise of the Communist bloc with the end of all significant threats to the United States. The amount and the rate of change we have experienced on the world scene has created increased instability and an increased potential for regional conflict and miscalculations. There are over 30 conflicts ongoing as

I speak. It is still a very dangerous world out there. No one has to create imaginary threats to our peace to justify sufficient forces to protect U.S. security interests and our involvement in world leadership. All you have to do is read the daily newspapers. They are reporting violence, open conflict, and of more concern, the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction including increased trade in nuclear technology, apparently to the highest bidder.

So now is not the time, in my judgment, for the United States to disengage from our leadership responsibilities and our ability to contribute to the constructive change below the threshold of open conflict. This requires a credible military force, one that is capable of reassuring our friends and our potential foes alike of our commitment to protect our interests, and to contribute to regional stability.

Defense expenditures and force levels can be, and are being, significantly reduced within this country and by many of our allies. The question is not why do we need military forces, but what is the right base level of forces to support the missions and the tasks that we are assigned? Are we buying the right mix and the right quantity to execute our National Security Strategy without putting excessive burden on our people? Will such an action result in returning to the hollow forces of the 1960s and 1970s, should we be unwise enough to go this route?

In making these judgments, we must be able to understand that in today's world we are being asked to deal with multifaceted, unpredictable threats, rather than the traditional predictable cold war scenario. Because of our premiere leadership position, the United States is not only expected, but is often the only nation that can take a leading role in responding to naked aggression, or to humanitarian disaster relief, as well as creating an environment which contributes to regional stability and security.

Within this environment, I would like to list my top war-fighting command concerns and war-fighting priorities. You should remember that the naval forces of the Atlantic Command support the European Theater in the Mediterranean and the Central Command Theater in the Persian Gulf.

Nuclear deterrence remains our Nation's top defense priority, since only nuclear weapons can destroy American cities and threaten our national existence. With the increased proliferation of nuclear, chemical and biological weapons, as well as the increased Third World countries' ballistic missile capabilities, I believe the development of guaranteed protection against limited strikes should be pursued by this country with a degree of urgency.

In the conventional area, the fact is 1 year after Desert Storm the requirements for forward-deployed naval carrier battle groups on station, airborne early warning aircraft, and tactical fighter squadrons with supporting tankers to cover the troubled areas of the Middle East and the Eastern Mediterranean, are significantly higher today than before the Gulf crisis. Closer to home, the Castro regime in Cuba remains as a bastion of the past, clinging to a broken ideology and a deteriorating economic environment.

The various potential scenarios for a change of leadership include security concerns for the southern United States, which we in the Atlantic Command are watching closely. The fragile democracies in



many of the Caribbean nations make increased support for security assistance a top priority. You will get a great return for the small dollars we spend. This support and assistance to develop security forces, trained and disciplined to be loyal to an elected government, is essential for democracy to survive. It is the answer to the problem in Haiti. Our roads, school and hospital construction programs have even higher payoffs, and I urge you to continue to support these programs.

Concerning counternarcotics, the focused detection and monitoring efforts by Department of Defense assets, throughout the Southern and Atlantic Command area of responsibilities, have contributed significantly to an increased end game search and seizure efforts by law enforcement agencies with increased efficiency and increased results. Unified command and joint agency cooperation and coordination is at an all-time high, as is the interaction of host countries along the Andean Ridge in Central America in General Joulwans command and throughout the Caribbean.

The secret to winning the counterdrug effort is by stopping the demand for drugs in the United States. But, in the meantime, those who traffic in this poison are doing so at an increased risk and cost. Our future generations deserve that we continue this effort. My highest priority continues to be for programs that support the people of our Armed Forces, those who sustain the family separations and the arduous lifestyle of our military profession. They deserve a quality of life that is commensurate with the magnitude of the contribution they make on a daily basis. This should not just be focused on when they are called on to fight.

My top combat readiness priorities are replacement of the A-6E with an aircraft that is capable of hitting the toughest targets, unrefueled, from 600 to 700 nautical miles away with very low attrition. This requires stealth technology. The replacement of a Marine Corps medium-lift helicopter requirement is urgent to replace the aging CH-46. The new aircraft must have increased survivability and range in an environment that will find it more and more in demand to respond to noncombatant evacuation situations and instability in the Third World, incidents which we have done separate from the Persian Gulf on four different occasions in the last year.

Airlift and sealift replacement. The C-17 is essential to meet increasing demands on airlift for long-range regional contingencies and human assistance disaster relief roles. I believe the available sealift funds were properly applied by Congress. The purchase of a mix of available ships, those that are available on the open market, while making new construction a priority, should meet our immediate sealift requirements. We also need secure, survivable, jam-resistant space-based communications such as the MILSTAR program. Communications is the secret to crisis management success.

In conclusion, the reduced threat to the U.S. security interest, as a result of the astounding changes in the world events over the last few years, justifies the significant drawdown in military forces and related reduced spending represented by the current budget. If these cuts are to be executed, while retaining the current quality of our force and the fiber of our industrial base, then they must be done in an organized and a balanced manner. In this process, we



must continue to give the top funding priority to the support of those people I mentioned. I will trade weapons and equipment for quality of life for our people. It is people that win wars, not machines.

We must train to fight the next war with a continuous upgrading of tactics based on imaginative exercises that stretch the imagination of our tactical commanders and the performance of our troops. To do this, we must fund required operating hours, required exercises and required weapons firings, as well as state-of-the-art facilities for basic and advanced training. This includes full support for postgraduate education and joint war colleges.

We must sustain full war-fighting capability of our remaining equipment by properly funding maintenance and repair accounts, and supporting an aggressive research and development effort, one that assures our technological leadership and a qualitative lead should we be forced to go back on the battlefield.

In my 35 years of service to this country, I have never had the opportunity to serve with finer, more capable men and women than those making up the Atlantic Command or, in fact, throughout the Department of Defense. It is in large part due to this reality that I am completely optimistic about our future. I might also add that the leadership of General Powell and Secretary Cheney has been the best that I have ever served under in those 35 years.

We at the Atlantic Command are changing our way of operating. We are changing our training. We are changing to meet the realities of today and the future of tomorrow. As we grow smaller, it is not a case of doing more with less, but rather applying a fundamental principle of what some call "total quality management" and we call "total quality leadership," and that is by reducing the margins of error in our processes and therefore doing more with what you authorize us.

I thank you for your dedicated support of our Armed Forces and for the privilege of serving this Nation in this capacity. I wish you well in the tough decisions before you. Decisions which will determine America's ability to respond to our national security issues and our world leadership responsibilities well into the 21st century.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you, Admiral.

PREPARED STATEMENT OF ADM. LEON A. EDNEY, USN

#### CONGRESSIONAL TESTIMONY

Mr. Chairman and distinguished members of the House Armed Services Committee, as the Commander in Chief of the Atlantic Command, it is indeed my distinct honor and pleasure today to discuss with you the Atlantic Command and its role in our National Security. I will provide you with an updated overview of the various responsibilities of the Atlantic Command relative to the changing world environment; discuss the primary missions, force structure and operational issues relevant to the Atlantic Command's responsibilities; and list the leading priorities as I see them. Since July will mark the end of my 35 years service to the defense interests of this great Nation, I will conclude with a discussion of several areas of concern to me and to the future of the forces under my command.

The past 12 months have seen changes and events that could not have been predicted by even the most clairvoyant sage. The quick and decisive victory in Desert Storm demonstrated to our own country and the world, the high quality and state of readiness of U.S. Armed Forces. That crisis also demonstrated the wisdom of only engaging U.S. forces in a conflict that has the support of the American people. While many of the so-called experts predicted grave consequences before the fact—alluding

we had bought the wrong equipment, our sophisticated technology would not work in the heat and sand of the desert, our troops were not trained for this environment, casualties would be high, etc., etc., the fact is they were all wrong. The U.S. All-Volunteer Armed Forces are the finest, best trained fighting units ever assembled. Our technology is second to none, and our troops are trained to use the equipment provided, bringing mobile maneuver warfare to the field of battle. The simplified joint command structure that allowed battlefield commanders in the field to run the war was the best I have seen in 35 years of service. You cannot do better than President Bush, Secretary Cheney, Gen. Colin Powell and Gen. Norm Schwartzkopf did backed up with 500,000 of our very best soldiers, sailors, marines, airmen and Coast Guardsmen. As the first order of business, I would like to thank the American people and the members of this committee for the support that enabled this tremendous victory. The spirit and uplifting messages of patriotism and support by the American people for our troops carried the day while the homecomings were awesome in warmth and human feelings of appreciation. We may have been playing on their turf, but we had the home team advantage of crowd support. This committee has been instrumental in supporting the needs of our Armed Forces. Thanks to you, we had the right equipment, training and manpower to do the job. Goldwater-Nichols was a strong player in enabling our joint warfare concepts to be brought to fruition so dramatically by our troops on the battlefield. Thank you for this combined support, the security interests of this country will need it even more in the years ahead.

#### THE CHANGING THREAT ENVIRONMENT

The world continued to change with incredible rapidity throughout 1991. In August, the Soviet Union withstood a serious coup attempt that failed and resulted 4 months later in the disestablishment of the Soviet Union. In its place emerged the Commonwealth of Independent States composed of some former republics of the U.S.S.R. while others are charting their own path. The Baltic States are now all independent. In a real sense, we are witnessing revolutionary transformations that are challenging our traditional world outlook and our established policies for dealing with the world situation. Many of the changes on the world stage are for the good. The Eastern European countries of the former Warsaw Pact and republics of the former Soviet Union are undergoing massive political, social and economic transformations. On every continent, we see, if not the triumph, the emergence of democratic principles with increased concern for human rights.

The end of the cold war and the emergence of democratic regimes was achieved by the constancy of America's and the western alliance's commitment to collective security. For over 41 years, the United States and her allies bore the cost of defending freedom and serving as a beacon for those who sought political freedom, human rights and economic opportunity. Today, we can see the positive results of our vigilance and steadfastness.

While we should applaud the end of the cold war and the emergence of democratic principles, we must remain alert to the great instabilities created by these transformations with incumbent risks to our national, as well as security interests.

In many of the emerging democracies, there are factors working against the success of the democratic process. Democratic traditions are weak or non-existent. The inability to distribute goods or provide the basics of shelter, food, jobs and health care for their populations provide hard tests for these nations. Yugoslavia degenerated into civil war as two republics declared their independence at a great price. There is widespread concern that this same trauma approaching civil war could occur among more heavily armed former Soviet republics. We need only to look at the face of the shocked and disillusioned Russian shopper experiencing the first wave of price increases to realize that the ultimate success of democracy in Russia and the other emerging nation states cannot be taken for granted.

#### WHAT IS THE THREAT

In the current public debate over our Nation's defense requirements in the post-cold war era, I am concerned with those who seek increased size and speed of defense reductions that go well beyond the base force presented by this current budget. Some are equating the dissolution of the Soviet Union and the demise of the communist bloc with the end of all significant threats to the United States. Pundits even sarcastically wonder what threat the Pentagon may create to justify continuing excessively large defense budgets while we have so many pressing needs on the homefront. I would like to share my perspective as one who is charged with executing our defense strategy. The future cannot be accurately predicted; however, we must accept and adapt to the realities of what has happened. The dismemberment



of the Soviet Union as we know it is permanent. Our military requirement to maintain a balance against the residual Soviet, now Russian, threat is of less urgency. As each day passes, and we see the continuing disintegration of the forces of our former adversary, one thing is certain, the Warsaw Pact and the Soviet Union will not reform. Russia and the CIS bring different force structures and coalitions to bear. One can safely predict, however, that instability in the world and the potential for regional conflict will not lessen in the next 5 to 10 years. It is still a dangerous world out there. No one has to create imaginary threats to peace and our security interests. All you have to do is read the daily newspapers. Today, 35 conflicts are being fought around the world. Ten nations have confirmed stockpiles of chemical/biological weapons and the means to deliver them, 10-15 are estimated to possess or to be approaching nuclear weapons capability. Thirty-two nations currently possess ballistic missiles that could carry weapons of mass destruction—including two underdeveloped nations that cannot be categorized as friendly to the western industrialized nations or the interest of world peace. The newest and most pressing concern is that the nuclear technological expertise of the former Soviet Union might fall into the hands of the highest bidder able to purchase these materials and services.

On other world fronts, we see government stability challenged by nationalist and ethnic tensions. In the more extreme form, such tensions have led to massive civil unrest and violence approaching civil war as is the case in Yugoslavia, Ethiopia, Georgia and throughout much of Africa. At the same time, terrorists continue to plot to achieve their political objectives by creating an environment dominated by fear and indiscriminate acts of violence against innocent bystanders. Violence is also propagated by drug cartels who work to undermine the legitimacy and effectiveness of duly elected governments so they can continue to traffic in the billion dollar illegal drug trade. The illegal drug trade is also a direct threat to our own national security. Illegal drugs pose a real threat to the people of the United States: in terms of lost lives; in the rising violent crime rate; and in the destruction of many communities throughout our country.

From my vantage point, I do not see a kinder, gentler world out there. It is not a world that makes it difficult to justify sufficient forces to protect our interests as put forth in the base force level requests before you.

As more and more nations are now embracing the free political process, free market economic opportunities and addressing concerns for human rights, now is not the time for the United States to disengage from the leadership of the democratic movement. In this uncertain environment, we need to remain engaged as a spokesman for constructive change. We also need to remain engaged with a military force capable of reassuring friends and potential foes alike of our commitment to protect our interests and contribute to regional stability. In a world undergoing such rapid, wide-sweeping transformations, we need to maintain sufficient military forces to permit our national interests to be achieved below the threshold of conflict and to be able to respond resolutely alongside our allies to any individual or coalition of threats to our security interests.

#### FORCE LEVEL DETERMINANTS

We all recognize that defense expenditures and force levels can be and are being significantly reduced. The question is what is the right base level of forces to support the missions and tasks assigned. The question is not why do you need military forces, but what are you going to use them for and are we buying enough of the right kind to preclude putting an excessive burden on our people, thus returning to the hollow forces of the 1960s and 1970s.

To make these judgements, we must understand that in today's world our military must be able to deal with more than traditional security threats. We must be able to respond to threats and humanitarian taskings emerging from the continued gap between the haves and have nots of the world. We will find that, increasingly, it will be hunger, poverty, disease and the loss of hope for improvement that will provide the street armies for those who would promise change at any cost—usually violent change. In this environment, we can expect to see large masses of population move across borders as witnessed by the Kurds in Turkey or closer to home with the Haitians. One constant in this equation is the United States will be looked to above all other nations for its global military reach and capabilities whether it be in response to armed aggression or humanitarian disaster relief. Because of our premier leadership position, the United States is not only expected, it is often the only Nation who can take a leading role in the creation of new mechanisms for promoting world stability and security in the post-cold war era. The fundamental requirements



our forces must meet to be responsive to our national military strategies in support of our national security strategy are to:

- 1. Ensure strategic and conventional deterrence;
- 2. Meet U.S. and alliance commitments to regional stability through forward presence;
- 3. Maintain credible, ready, crisis response forces to support U.S. interests;
- 4. Retain a viable Reserve with the capacity to reconstitute combined Active and Reserve forces to meet any coalition of existing forces that could place our nation or U.S. interests at risk;
- 5. Lead the effort to interrupt the flow of drugs to the United States; and
- 6. Invest in sufficient R&D to maintain our technological edge.

In order to further define sufficiency of forces required, you must understand the employment doctrine for engaging our forces should they be committed to fight. These are:

- 1. Requires national support.
- 2. Requires clearly defined and achievable objectives; and,
- 3. Once committed, the execution of tasks will be left to military commanders in the field (a novel concept we had a hard time with in Vietnam).

In today's environment, we in the field will apply:

- Joint command and joint forces;
- Superior mass to the crisis;
- Full logistics flow and ammunition support early; (gone is the graduated response theory); and
- Surprise and maneuver warfare.

This will all be done while seeking to achieve our objective with minimum loss of American and allied lives.

#### AOR PERSPECTIVE

*General.* The Atlantic Command area of responsibility includes over 45 million square miles of ocean and borders 50 nations from the North to the South Pole between the continents of North America, Central/South America, Europe and Africa. The command's geography is primarily maritime oriented. In addition, the maritime forces of the Atlantic Fleet are the same forces that support CINCEUR and share with Pacific Command support for CINCCENT's force requirements in the Persian Gulf theater of operation. In peacetime, Atlantic Command forces provide nuclear and conventional deterrence while contributing to regional stability and reinforcing our commitment to maintain sea lines of communications. Atlantic forces form the backbone of NATO's linkage between North America and Europe. We are expanding increased efforts and committing additional sea and air assets to the interdiction of the flow of drugs throughout the Caribbean as well as the western coast of South/Central America. In an era of increased regional instability, Atlantic forces are more and more involved with non-combatant evacuation of U.S. citizens; anti-terrorism/ clandestine insertion operations; as well as stop, search and seizure operations on the high seas. The major security concern in the Atlantic is Cuba. As the Castro era winds to an end, naturally or by internal/external push, we must have adequate forces to meet our Cuban contingency. The difficulty is in the short distance between Cuba and southern Florida.

From a CINC's point of view, the cold war concept of employment was easier. Force levels were justified and procured based on a visible excessive threat.

Now our immediate challenge is to define sufficient force levels to protect U.S. interest in peace and respond to future crisis determined to be risks to our security. We also must retain the capability to regenerate sufficient forces to successfully defend U.S. interests against the potential for a major threat based on war-fighting capabilities that exist today and new coalitions that may be brought to bear in the future.

#### NUCLEAR DETERRENCE

This mission remains our nations top war-fighting priority, recognizing only nuclear weapons could destroy American cities and our national existence. The significantly reduced number of these weapons held by the United States and Russia resulting from START agreements and additional commitments between Presidents Bush and Yeltsin are welcome and completely compatible with our security interests. This June, the new Unified Strategic Command will stand up under the direction of General Butler in Omaha. The transition of responsibilities and billets from

Atlantic Command to CINCSTRAT is progressing smoothly. As nuclear deterrent forces grow significantly smaller, this consolidated unified command is a step in the right direction. With the increased proliferation of nuclear, chemical and biological weapons technology, as well as increasing Third World countries' ballistic missile capabilities, the development of Guaranteed Protection Against Limited Strikes (GPALS) must be pursued with a degree of urgency. I strongly support the redirecting of SDI development in this direction. Pursuit of joint GPALS programs with responsible major nuclear powers including Russia has merit.

#### CRISIS MANAGEMENT WITH SMALLER FORCE LEVELS

The break up of the Soviet Union and its associated bloc, with a confrontational foreign policy supported by massive threatening armed forces, has allowed the United States to significantly reduce the size and forward-deployed posture of its Armed Forces. While this is particularly true as it applies to the land mass of Europe, the fact is, 1 year after Desert Storm, the requirements for forward-deployed on-station naval carrier battle groups, airborne early warning aircraft, tactical fighter squadrons and supporting tankers to cover the troubled areas of the Eastern Mediterranean and Persian Gulf are significantly higher than before the Gulf crisis began. In the maritime arena as we move from 14 to 12 carrier battle groups, we must change our way of doing business if we are to provide an acceptable personnel/operation tempo to meet a sustainable quality of life for our people as part of our peace dividend. We also must be able to surge trained, combat-ready units with full operational capabilities to bring the required mass to bear on any crisis that our national command authority directs. We are exploring alternative deployment options to meet our presence commitments by combining the increased fire power of Tomahawk-equipped surface action groups and submarines together with the rapid reaction capabilities of marine amphibious ready groups to selectively allow more flexible scheduling of our CVBGs. The reduced high end of the threat environment allows for measured response options and massing superior forces at the crises scene of action rather than continuously keeping unnecessarily large numbers of forces forward deployed in all areas of high instability. This concept is currently being demonstrated with the Eisenhower Battle Group on deployment to the CENTCOM AOR. She is currently steaming out of the Persian Gulf, passing through the Mediterranean and will participate in a major NATO exercise off Norway prior to returning home to Norfolk. The America Battle Group deployed to the Mediterranean was diverted into the Red Sea to cover the highest contingency response requirement during this period. This enabled the Saratoga Battle Group originally scheduled for the NATO exercise, to save over 30 days of OPTEMPO time and \$8 million in operational funds. The Saratoga Battle Group meanwhile is prepared to surge for crisis response and will relieve America in the Med/Red Sea in early May. This type of scheduling will require closer coordination covering longer periods of time between all major Unified Commanders. The cooperation and commitment to do this is solidly in place. The base force levels presented in the budget before you enable meeting our current and projected commitments utilizing this type of scheduling flexibility and other changes in the way we do business. We simply cannot significantly reduce forces and maintain the burden on our people of cold war level or even increased operational taskings due to increased unstable regional situations.

#### THE TRAINING OF NAVAL FORCES

There is a great deal of work to do for our military forces to adjust to the new environment of multi-Polar interests and greater instabilities. Not just in the joint arena, but particularly on the maritime side of the equation. There is a tendency among many naval officers to assume the environment at sea and, therefore, the response remains the same. After all, what really is new? If you believe this, you are part of the problem. In the Navy, we have an urgent need to define new concepts that are both relevant to the new strategy and responsive to the current instability facing the world community.

It is a luxury to know your enemy, study his tactics and train to take advantage of his weaknesses. We did this vis-a-vis the Soviets for 41 years. Now we must train to capabilities and be ready to deter unknown adversaries.

Our command post and live training exercises must strengthen the doctrine and tactics required to respond to this new environment. We must not just exercise for exercise sake or exercise to yesterday's threat.

Currently in the Atlantic Command, we have shifted away from the exercising of threat-specific general defense plans replacing them instead with exercises oriented toward the maintenance of war-fighting capabilities. Team Work 92, a NATO exercise to be held this month in the Norwegian Sea, is such an exercise. It is not a



cold war exercise. There is not simulation of the old Soviet threat or old Soviet tactics. We have not substituted a Russian scenario with existing Russian capabilities. We will emphasize joint operability with multinational forces and ensure that the results of the encounter are relevant tactically. Commanders will be given the flexibility to attempt to validate the success or failure of their tactics through actual results achieved.

In another arena, the Atlantic Fleet's Ocean Venture exercise, to be conducted off our east coast this May, will be a joint (Army, Air Force, Navy) exercise. We will apply lessons learned from Desert Storm. An Air Force led Joint Forces Air Component Commander (JFACC) will be integrated with a Carrier Group Commander's staff. In this way, we will be able to exercise a new JFACC MOU being established between CINCLANTFLT and Tactical Air Command . . . soon to be Air Combat Command. The roll back air campaign, if it was ever valid, has changed. Today we must be prepared to go for the jugular with the best combined efforts of our air assets simultaneously hitting the enemies eyes and ears . . . that is his command, control and key air defense nodes normally located downtown. This is in accordance with our current doctrine.

#### NATO-SACLANT VIEW

Today, even our former adversaries recognize the importance of NATO's contribution to European peace and stability. Many have asked to join the alliance. Most recently, Russian President Boris Yelstin established NATO membership as a long-term political aim. The newly formed North Atlantic Cooperation Council has provided a vehicle to incorporate shared goals with our former adversaries.

As we move toward a more cooperative relationship with the new Commonwealth of Independent States, and they, together with the nations of Central and Eastern Europe, struggle with massive internal failure, I give NATO good grades for its responsiveness to the pace of change that has exceeded anyone's imagination, let alone ability to predict and stay ahead of events. In the last year, with a degree of urgency through countless meetings, dozens of document drafts, and an unparalleled degree of cooperation, NATO agreed and endorsed at the Rome summit, a new Military Committee Document 400, a military strategy implementation document, while simultaneously the major NATO commanders developed our new force concepts and associated force structure. At the same time, we undertook efforts to review the readiness and availability document, and we embarked on a comprehensive command structure review. It was, from anyone's perspective, a busy and remarkably successful year's work.

It was proper and timely to re-evaluate the fundamental principles of the Alliance and in particular the security commitments which in reality is the glue that makes this Alliance so unique. In so doing, we have reinforced that which is of sustaining value, while demonstrating the capacity for change, flexibility and progress. The Alliance today provides an insurance policy representing our security interests during an unprecedented era of shifting political and economic power centers.

Within my SACLANT area of responsibility, the concept of an overarching maritime force structure is being adjusted to support the recently approved NATO strategic concept. Reaffirming the Alliance commitment to a common defense, where an attack on one is an attack on all, the new strategy validates NATO's role as a defensive alliance whose primary objective is to maintain a credible deterrence to conventional and nuclear threats to its individual and collective security. In this regard, the linkage between Europe and North America remains essential. The Alliance welcomes a stronger European defense identity, some refer to as the European pillar. This will entail multi-national integrated force structures with hopefully more clearly defined arrangements for complementarity between the emerging European economic community's security identity W-E-U. The challenge is to accomplish this within Alliance objectives while maintaining the viability of the North American linkage. Within these broad objectives, NATO will seek improved cooperation and dialog to achieve a whole and free Europe, peaceful solution of world problems, and additional progress in the area of arms reduction. While contributing to stable, peaceful conditions, NATO must keep its guard up against the proliferation of high technology weapons capable of mass destruction and maintain a credible capability to regenerate conventional, and if needed, nuclear forces sufficient to deter or defeat a major threat to Alliance security. For the short and mid-term, crisis response will receive increased focus within NATO's governing body.

#### CARIBBEAN ISSUES

A. *Cuba*. The Castro regime remains as a bastion of the past clinging to a broken ideology. Although Castro has given an occasional indication he would like improved



relations with the United States, he has taken no concrete steps in the area of human rights or openness with his society to justify optimism for peaceful change. In fact, with regard to dissent and human rights, the Castro regime is in the process of a crackdown. As the realities of an increasingly austere economic environment hit home on the Cuban people as a result of the non-continuation of massive Soviet aid and inflated prices paid for Cuban sugarcane, we see increased efforts by Cuban nationals to seek asylum in the States. The various potential scenarios generate serious security concerns in the area of another mass exodus like the Mariel Boat Lift or a last ditch, futile attempt by Castro to embarrass his Yankee nemesis to the north. We in the Atlantic Command are watching these developments closely, and are well prepared to handle any contingency.

*B. Haiti.* Developments associated with the coup in Haiti and the resultant exodus of migrants have required the temporary deployment of over 1,800 joint forces to Naval Station Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, for over 6 months. The performance of this joint task force under Brig. Gen. George Walls, USMC, has been superb. The lessons learned in Provide Comfort were extremely helpful. To date, the Defense Department has spent over \$25 million on Humanitarian Assistance to Haitians in GTMO.

*C. Nations Assistance and Security Assistance.* Nation assistance programs in the form of engineering readiness and training projects as well as medical readiness and training programs by Army, Air Force, National Guard and Navy Reserve Construction Engineer/Medical Units continue to pay great dividends in the area of nation building in support of the democratic process. These programs include road widening, paving and repairs, bridge repair, constructing school additions, medical clinic buildings and barracks for local security forces. These Humanitarian/Civic Assistance efforts funded through the developing countries exercise program promotes goodwill and strengthen the bonds between the United States and the people as well as the government leaders throughout the Caribbean.

Another area of foreign assistance which provides huge returns for the limited amount spent is the dollar expended from the Security Assistance program. The benefits derived from the Foreign Military Financing Program (FMFP) and International Military Education and Training program (IMET) lay the groundwork for a positive and productive relationship with the defense/security forces of neighboring democratic societies within our hemisphere. These forces are often dual tasked with both police and military responsibilities. They are continuously underfunded, minimally trained and struggling to turn the tide for democracy against the influence and assets of powerful narco-traffickers and other threats to stable democracy. The allocation of FMFP funds enables purchase of U.S. limited goods and services such as coastal patrol boats and helicopters. IMET dollars provide the opportunity for the future military leaders of these countries to be exposed to our values and training methodology. Security Assistance FMF funds allocated for the Caribbean in the fiscal year 1993 Congressional Presentation Document amounts to only \$7 million. An increase to \$12 million is needed to sustain in-place country programs which would provide quantum dividends for struggling democracies in our hemisphere which have long been neglected due to the majority of program funds being dedicated to a few select nations. The return for this modest investment would be apparent in our combined war on drugs as well as providing increased stability to these struggling democracies.

#### COUNTERNARCOTICS

The focused leadership of detection and monitoring efforts by DOD assets has contributed significantly to increased end-game search and seizure efforts by law enforcement agencies with increased efficiency and results. The total quantity of cocaine seized by these combined efforts in calendar year 1993 equalled 70.5 metric tons which was 62.3 metric tons higher than the previous year. The increased effectiveness of interagency coordination, shared intelligence, joint operations and operational cooperation resulted in significant distributions to the flow of drugs as well as confiscation/destruction of drug delivery assets. Coordinated Concentrated Intelligence Collection efforts demonstrated the capability to convert real-time intelligence to operational detection, monitoring and seizures. Continuing efforts are needed to increase the coverage of fixed radar sites to increase the probability to narco air trafficking and allow concentrating limited AWACS assets to focus on tracking targets of interest to end-game seizure. Joint agency coordination/cooperation is at an all time high as is the interaction of host countries along the Andean Ridge, Central America and throughout the Caribbean. Atlantic Command signed an MOU with the Netherlands for cooperation between military units in counterdrug detection and monitoring. Similar efforts are being pursued with the United Kingdom, France and Canada. The secret to winning the counterdrug effort

remains to stop the demand in the States, but in the meantime those who traffic in this poison are doing so at increased risk and cost. Our efforts have caused the traffickers to change their pattern and mode of transport. Use of large shipments in commercial container ships and potentially commercial aircraft is on the rise. The key remains instantaneous communications of detected activity, shared intelligence and constant vigilance. Our future generations deserve this effort.

#### PRIORITIES

*Quality of Life.* The cutting edge difference between our Armed Forces and anyone else will always be the quality of our people. My highest priority continues to be for programs that support the people of our Armed Forces who sustain the family separations and arduous life style of the military profession. They deserve a quality of life commensurate with the magnitude of the contribution they make on a daily basis and particularly when called on to fight. If we are to continue to recruit and retain sufficient quality individuals for the kind of military we have demonstrated in Desert Storm and will need in the future, it is important that full funding for quality of life programs be preserved as we reduce in size. These programs include, but are not limited to direct incentives such as family housing, quality accessible medical care, increased capacity childcare, pay and allowances that catch up and keep up with the Employment Cost Index and improved gymnasium/physical fitness facilities. In addition, we need to continue strong support for quality of life programs that support morale, welfare and recreation requirements. The following quality of life issues merit special mention:

a. As we draw down forces to meet the presidential/congressional mandate, compensation and bonus incentive programs will have increased importance in ensuring recruiting and retention of those individuals with identified special and highly technical skills.

b. I favor 801 and 802 Housing Programs to fulfill our critical shortfalls in this area because they provide quality, attractive homes at minimum annual as well as long-term cost to the taxpayer. These programs are a good business proposition that involve a mutually beneficial contractual relationship between civilian contractors and the Government. Our servicemen and women are the direct benefactors at the lowest available cost. I urge continued and increased support for these programs.

c. The Tri-Care Medical program underway in Norfolk is an important initiative to provide better health care and access to medical service for all Armed Forces personnel in a given catchment area. The objective is to supplement active medical capabilities primarily required for combat casualty care with imaginative contractual arrangements that provides for peacetime as well as wartime Active, dependent and retired personnel medical needs while reducing the growing CHAMPUS bill. I strongly support these initiatives and encourage continued focus on meeting our medical service and support needs as a primary factor in measuring quality of life.

d. Childcare. The quality of our childcare is high. The problem is we need additional capacity in an era of dual working parents. This is particularly critical as we encounter more and more military families where both spouses are Active military.

When I visited GTMO just before Christmas and talked to our military police battalion on duty in GTMO attending to Haitian Migrant security requirements, over 30 percent had spent two successive Christmas' away from home (Desert Storm and Haiti) and over 15 percent have spent three and four successive Christmas' away from home (Desert Storm, Haiti, Panama and normal deployments). The America Carrier Battle group which returned from the Gulf War the last of April 1991 returned to the Mediterranean in late October 1991 for another 6-month deployment. This type of dedication, sacrifice and disruptive family homelife must be kept in mind when funding quality of life issues. Our people are our most valuable asset and they deserve a high quality of life. Your continued focus and support in these areas are needed and appreciated.

#### TRAINING AND READINESS

As we grow smaller, we must maintain a high state of training and readiness. The funded flight hour, steaming hour and ground combat field maneuver funding in this budget represent the minimum required and must be fully funded. Joint combined training is the highest priority and it is being enthusiastically pursued. Smaller numbers of naval forces and lower threat levels will require more training to be done on deployment. Training requirements have increased for non-conventional warfare techniques, special operating forces, anti-terrorist and mine-countermeasures. In addition, the remaining requirement to provide outer envelope training for the high end of the risk curve to ensure superiority in the air/land battle, air superiority at sea or ashore as well as superiority in anti-submarine warfare, anti-



surface and electronic warfare tests the limits of the operating funds provided. Our commitment to fund training including adequate active annual firing allowances for all weapons and missiles to provide confidence within our troops and credibility in the eyes of any foe must remain fundamental. We do fight the way we train. We trained properly for Desert Storm, and we must be trained properly for the next crisis or it will increase the risk to the lives of those we commit to defend our national interests.

Our current doctrine is correct and it calls for assigning overwhelming force levels to any conflict that requires deterrent presence and potential offensive action. To do this with smaller forces and still meet maintenance upkeep as well as PERSTEMPO/OPTempo requirements requires increased imaginative coordination of long-term scheduling between unified commanders. I am pleased to report this process is well underway.

*Force Levels.* I believe the force levels associated with the base force presented in the budget before you are prudent. To go deeper faster as some Members of Congress have outlined would place our ability to reduce in a balanced manner at risk and could jeopardize the quality as well as the readiness of our forces. In addition, the amount of instability in the world in relation to our role as the world's only legitimate military superpower would find our remaining forces over tasked at the risk of returning to the shallow forces of the 1970s and early 1980s. We need time to incorporate the significant changes already directed as well as time to see if the world politic allow us a more benign role with less visible presence. Certainly, turmoil in Iraq, the apparent goal of Iran to lead the Islamic fundamentalist world with a potential unstabilizing influence throughout Northern Africa, the uncertainty of whether South Africa will dissolve apartheid without massive violence, continuing unrest between Pakistan and India, continued Chinese isolation from the Mainstream of Nations, a deteriorating situation in Cuba and continued challenges from international drug trafficking all lead me to believe further cuts below the base force established by this budget are not only unwise, but risk our ability to influence events below the level of open conflict. In addition, I am concerned that we have not and will not be able to close bases, shipyards and the infrastructure as rapidly as needed to focus the remaining limited funds on sustaining the quality of our forces. Any addition in areas of personnel cuts will further exacerbate the downstream balance of mid-level petty officer and officer leadership necessary to sustain the quality of our forces 7-10 years hence. For all these reasons and more, this statement does not allow time to articulate, I urge the Congress to provide a predictable, balanced and stable defense force level goals to work toward, which is what the base force represents.

Replacement priorities. Even in a declining environment, to remain viable as a military leader, follow-on equipment must be developed and produced. My top war-fighting priorities in order of priority are as follow by order:

a. AX. Carrier aviation must have a replacement aircraft for the A-6 that enables hitting targets in high-threat areas, unrefueled from 600-700 miles with very low attrition. This requires a very low radar cross-section profile (stealth technology) and 3-6 precision delivered 1-2,000 pound bombs. The A-6E is a 25-year-old aircraft that risks high attrition in the required tasking. We need this capability now and will be 10 years behind at the most optimistic IOC.

b. USMC Medium-lift Helicopter. This requirement is also urgent in view of the aging H-46 Status. The aircraft must increase survivability and range in an environment that will find it more and more in demand to respond to non-combatant evacuation situations and instability in the Third World. The designated aircraft should also meet urgent requirements for a higher speed, survivable special operations force insertion aircraft as well as combat search and rescue in a high-threat environment.

c. Airlift Replacement. The C-17 is essential to meet increasing demands on aircraft for long-range regional contingencies and human assistance/disaster relief roles.

d. Sealift. The available funds properly applied to purchase a mix of available ships on the open market while purchasing some specifically designed, new construction units should meet this requirement.

e. MILSTAR. Secure, survivable, jam-resistant, space-based communications will be a differentiator in any future conflict.

f. Replacement submarine. A follow-on to the improved 688 that is smaller, cheaper, but leading the state of the art in quietness, system sound processing and tactical envelope is essential for strategic and high end of the threat superiority as well submarine force levels.



## R&amp;D AS MODERNIZATION

I strongly support the need to invest more in research and development in order to stay on the leading edge of technology. The concept of developing advanced technology through concept development and placing it on the shelf assumes you can get it off the shelf in time to meet a threat. This time is unlikely to be available. I am also concerned that the cost of R&D without the production tail/carrot may be prohibitive. Weapon system improvements should be developed and incorporated into required modernization of existing platforms. Full systems as well as incremental modernization/upgrade must continue to be incorporated on a routine basis in conjunction with shipyard overhaul and aircraft depot level maintenance periods. Delay of platform replacement and system modernization would place our future war-fighting capability in jeopardy and not support the required industrial base. This is particularly true in the environment of ship design and production. One area of upgrade/modernization that is urgently needed in my judgement is to convert current ASW-only helicopters into a dual-role attack helicopter capable of offensive action against fast patrol boats, coastal shipping and oil rigs. We also need to explore a concept of funding as we drawdown to envisioned peacetime commitments to hedge our reconstruction/surge capability bets in the event the decisionmaker's crystal ball is not too clear.

## MAINTENANCE OF REAL PROPERTY AND BASE OPERATING FUNDS

Our aging facilities have an alarming and escalating backlog of maintenance repairs due to inadequate funding of maintenance of real property and base operating accounts over the years. This trend must be corrected with requires increased funding as a matter of priority in this area or risk a deteriorating plant situation that is unacceptable. No successful commercial enterprise could tolerate a plant replacement/maintenance upgrade cycle at the programming factor and levels U.S. military installations are funded at. I urge increased attention in this area.

## FINAL THOUGHTS

The reduced threat to U.S. security interests as a result of the astounding changes in the world events over the last few years justify the goal of a 25-percent drawdown in military forces and related defense spending by 1995. This represents a decrease of 530,000 personnel from the peak of the military build up in the 1980s. If these size cuts are to be executed while retaining the current quality of force in the remaining 75 percent and the fiber of our industrial base, then they must be done in an organized and balanced manner with a common end target. The pace of these events need time to settle out the degree which U.S. forward presence was related to the Soviet cold war posture rather than regional instability unrelated to the Soviets. This issue needs to be identified before further cuts are considered.

My concern remains that additional actions to further reduce national defense force levels, if done at this juncture, could do irreparable harm to the quality of our force and seriously degrade the long-term interest of national security. The pace of world developments and remaining uncertainties in east-west as well and north-south relations requires careful coordination and complex interaction to achieve balanced reduction, simultaneously meet existing commitments and achieve force reduction requirements associated with the base force. I believe the reduction of in-place forces in Europe and Korea serves to increase the importance of Maritime force levels with forward presence free of base rights considerations. Ensuring the capability to maintain secure sea lines of communications to support reinforcement and resupply operations to meet any major regional crises involving alliance security also takes on added significance. Air superiority will be required at the scene of any crisis which will require the joint application of combined Air Force and Naval Carrier assets. Increased sealift and airlift also must receive high priority.

To effectively manage the size reductions proposed, and yet still culminate in a quality, credible fighting force that is tailored to counter the perceived future national security requirements, three things are of vital importance:

a. We must continue to give top funding priority to support our people in all aspects of quality of life improvement. I will trade weapons and equipment for . . . people win wars not machines.

b. Training to fight the next war with continuously upgrade tactics based on imaginative exercises that stretch the imagination of our tactical commanders and the performance of our troops is fundamental to success. To do this we must fund required operating hours, exercises, and weapon firing as well as state-of-the-art facilities for basic and advanced training. This includes full support for Post-Graduate Education and Service/Joint War Colleges.

c. We must sustain full war-fighting capability of our remaining equipment by properly funding maintenance/repair accounts while supporting an aggressive research and development effort that assures our technological leadership and qualitative lead measured by equipment available for battle.

In my 35 years of service to this country, I have never had the opportunity to serve with a finer, more capable group of men and women than those today making up the Atlantic Command and, in fact, throughout DOD. It is in a large part due to this reality that I am completely optimistic about the future. I might also add the leadership of General Powell and Secretary Cheney have been particularly noteworthy. We at the Atlantic Command are changing our way of operating and training to meet today's realities and the above-outlined goals. As we grow smaller, it is not a case of doing more with less, but rather applying a fundamental principle of TQL by reducing the margins of error in the process and doing more with what we are authorized.

I thank you for your dedicated support of our Armed Forces and for the privilege of serving our Nation in this capacity. I wish you well in the tough decision before you which will determine America's ability to respond to national security issues well into the 21st century.

The CHAIRMAN. Bill Dickinson.

Mr. DICKINSON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I have one rather broad question for you, General, and then a couple for the Admiral, if I might.

General, what is the biggest threat to the U.S. national interest that you see in your area of responsibility?

General JOULWAN. I think the primary threat is that posed by the narcotrafficker. He corrupts the very democratic institutions that we are trying to assist. I mentioned in my statement that what we are finding now is where the United States was the primary consumer of drugs, the narcotrafficker is now paying off those helping him with cocaine. I had a prime minister of a small country, before I even could begin the dialog, say "General, I need your help. The narcotraffickers have bought land in the northern part of my country. They are landing aircraft day and night, violating the sovereignty and democracy of my country. They are paying off my citizens that are helping them in cocaine, not dollars, and they are selling that downtown in a major city." He said, "I now have crime and violence erupting and drug consumption is up. My judges are being corrupted, my police and military are being corrupted. I am about ready to lose my democracy from within."

I heard that same plea not only in the northern part of the AO from Belize and Guatemala, but also in Chile. I think we have a real timebomb on our hands with the threat posed by the narcotraffickers.

Mr. DICKINSON. The big threat to our national interest, if not national security, is not military in nature. It is the drug trafficking. Let me ask both of you, I guess, the same question.

What is the index or the measure that you will use in determining success in the drug war? You say we have made it more expensive for them, but I don't think we have cut down the flow coming into the United States. What is the mark that you would measure success against?

General JOULWAN. My area is a little different than Admiral Edney's because I am dealing in the source countries and the land part of the transiting countries. But I think that in the larger sense you have to go after this production base. I think Admiral Edney is right. The demand must be reduced in the United States. But



we are seeing these tentacles reach into Europe and Asia where the price is two or three times higher than in the United States.

But you have to go after the source. We are now starting to see—Colombia, for example, had nearly 80 metric tons seized last year. The Colombians are having a campaign to put many of the narcotraffickers in jail. They are attacking not only the Medellin, but the Cali cartel. Thus, the success has got to be measured in small steps and we have to be in it for the long haul. It is not something that is going to happen in a 100-hour war. This is going to take a long effort.

Therefore, I think that the national will of the nations involved is the best measure of success.

Mr. DICKINSON. Wait a minute now. That might be something to which we would aspire. But, if the supply keeps increasing—I don't care how much we interdict—we aren't winning. So at what point will you say—and that is what I am asking you about—the measure of success. When do you know that the good guys are winning? Because we haven't cut down on the supply coming into this country, I don't think.

General JOULWAN. I think we have substantially affected the supply.

Mr. DICKINSON. I didn't say we haven't affected it. I said we haven't reduced it—from all I can read in the media. I am not a member of the drug interdiction group. But from all I can read and hear, the price on the streets is not run up because of the scarcity of supply. I just wonder what is our mark. What do you work against to say, "Hey, man, we are winning now"? We don't see it.

Admiral, can you help him.

Admiral EDNEY. It is a very difficult and complex equation, but the question you are asking is the same: Why do we have policemen and why do we fight organized crime? This is an organized crime effort. The way I measure our effectiveness and the contribution we are making is the impact that we are having on that organized crime. In other words, the impact that we are having on the governments in General Joulwan's command. The fact that I have signed two international agreements with European countries and I have three more in negotiation, is an awareness of the current networking, not only of our own agencies, but the world intelligence and law enforcement agencies that says that people are going to live under law and order and not going to subject themselves to the drugs.

Now, within that capability we are making tremendous inroads. We are being invited into the Caribbean Islands. We go down with members of General Stiners' psychological warfare group as they introduce the method in which you can educate the people to be aware and alert to the dangers of drugs. Essentially, if it passes through your region, you are going to become a user to it.

I look at how we have improved in the 3 years that we have been full time in this business. Some people were saying that we diverted assets back to Desert Shield and Desert Storm and therefore diluted our efforts. The fact of the matter is we got 8 times as many drugs during the time that we were fighting Desert Shield and Desert Storm. The fact of the matter is that we got over 71 billion dollars' worth of drugs that did not come to the streets of



the United States. This type of pressure, and the reason that you have to commit to it while you stop the use of it, is the reason that our future is our youth.

I also would say that the way that we addressed it in the military, which was to have a zero tolerance, is the only way to get it out of the Nation's usage.

Mr. DICKINSON. I don't want to monopolize the time, but I had one question especially for you, Admiral, if I may.

We are reading in the paper about the stationing of a carrier close to the Persian Gulf. The implication being that if the Iraqis don't agree to live up to their word and keep their agreement to destroy or allow us to destroy weapons of mass destruction, that perhaps we would go in again, militarily. As the President says, he is keeping all options open. He doesn't want to give the wrong impression.

But my question to you is, if we should have to do that, to go in to ensure that the U.N. resolutions are obeyed and take out the Iraqi's ability of mass destruction, could this be done just with the naval force, the Navy and Marines, or would we again have to go back to the Air Force and the Army?

Admiral EDNEY. I don't know of any tasking that I am aware of that would not be a joint tasking today. We are a joint applied armed force. So in my judgment, in this particular case, it would certainly take a combined effort, and it would depend on the specific tasking what the makeup of those forces would be. But it would be joint forces.

Mr. DICKINSON. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you, Bill. Let me ask the question to follow up Congressman Dickinson's question about the effectiveness of all of this. Tell me about this *Newsweek* article that talked about a report in the Bush administration. Let me read it to you. It is a little squib.

It says, "The Bush administration claims remarkable progress battling the cocaine cartels. But as Bush's men prepare for a summit"—this was before the recent summit—"with Latin America leaders next month, a secret Pentagon memo obtained by *Newsweek* paints a grim picture of a drug war stalemated by neglect, bureaucratic bungling and corruption. The 48-page report was prepared last fall by a Pentagon Latin expert. Among its findings: First, Bush's much-touted 1989 Andean Initiative so far has only marginally impacted the narcotraffickers. Second, Peru, a major coca producer, is in such a quagmire of deceit and corruption, attainment of U.S. objectives is impossible. Third, although the Medellin cartel is crippled, the flow of cocaine from Colombian processing centers hasn't been slowed down. Fourth, the micromanaging by Congress and bureaucratic inertia have held up antidrug aid to Latin America. In sum, the report advises against deeper Pentagon involvement in the war or avoid short-term, relatively ephemeral military solutions."

What can you tell us about that report?

Admiral EDNEY. Well, they are looking at a different war on drugs than I am looking at. The cooperation and the improvement in the interaction between intelligence communities, the DEA, the CIA, international law enforcement, and the unified CINCs pro-

vides on a daily basis, some absolutely eye-watering results. Some results that a covert interception of the narcotraffickers' analysis of what we are doing is that they can't operate in this area of responsibility anymore because of the effectiveness of the joint combined forces.

So I don't see, in my personal observation of the effort that we are putting out, the same story as the source of this memorandum.

The CHAIRMAN. But you have read the report, the memorandum, I take it?

Admiral EDNEY. Yes, sir.

General JOULWAN. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. Basically, what you are saying is that it just—that it doesn't jibe with the information that you have or the facts as you see them. Is that what you are saying?

Admiral EDNEY. That is absolutely correct.

The CHAIRMAN. Let me ask both of you, what is the state of our total amount of our resources being devoted to the narcotics traffic? In both of your areas of responsibility, what are we talking about on a daily basis in terms of the total amount of manpower and number of ships that are involved in a typical kind of steady state? What kind of resources is the U.S. military devoting to this effort?

Admiral EDNEY. I can talk specifically for the Atlantic Command and overall for the DOD. In fiscal year 1990 the DOD counternarcotics budget was \$450 million; in 1991 it was \$1.1 billion; and in 1992 it was \$1.15 billion. In the Atlantic Command, in 1990 it was \$113 million; in fiscal year 1991 it was \$200 million; and it will be approximately \$240 million this year.

The point that one must make is that the counternarcotics money provided by DOD is training and readiness money. We are still going to be flying and steaming those hours to provide our training and readiness, but it has just been rediverted to a priority mission on drugs.

The number of ships that I maintain has been just about steady and that is 5 combatant ships and an oiler from the Atlantic Command, and I interact with a ratio of 2-to-3 from the Pacific Command. We are currently sharing 1 to 2 AWACS between General Joulwan and the Atlantic Command, and I occasionally get a KC-135 tanker. The rest of the effort is associated with what we call a Caribbean Radar Network, which also interacts with the Southern Command.

The CHAIRMAN. General Joulwan.

General JOULWAN. Let me just add that we share some of the same assets, but in his September 1989 memo the Secretary of Defense said I could provide assistance in some training, planning, logistics, intelligence, communications, and civic action. The President's guidance was, however, no U.S. combat forces will be involved in actual field operations. On the support that we could provide to the nations involved in the counterdrug effort, we have on the average day, I would say, about 200 military personnel involved in some form of assistance throughout the region.

In addition, we try to integrate the intelligence apparatus to give us some focused intelligence to provide to the ambassador and his country team in the host nation. The intelligence agencies are in-



volved in trying to provide—segments of them—fused intelligence, as well as some collection platforms to include AWACS and others.

The CHAIRMAN. Do you anticipate that the number of military assets devoted to this will go up significantly? What is your prediction? I notice that your figures and your budgets—the budget devoted to it—has been going up. What do we look forward to over the next 5 years in this general field?

General JOULWAN. In my area, I would hope that some of the collection platforms like AWACS when decisions are made could be allocated to the war on drugs—more of them. Right now, as Admiral Edney says, we share one or two. We would hope that would be increased.

The CHAIRMAN. Any other area beside AWACS?

General JOULWAN. That is the primary area. I might add, Mr. Chairman, that I hope we can get into the term—“interagency operation,” where other agencies, DEA, Customs, Coast Guard and others, bring assets to bear. The P-3 by the Customs is a very key player, and I would hope that the fourth one would come on line and be used in the Southern Region.

Admiral EDNEY. To answer your specific question, I don't think that applying significantly more ship assets is the solution. The payoff in this business is intelligence—cued intelligence—so you can go to the needle in the haystack and eradicate the needle. We have been utilizing what we call concentrated intelligence assets, both national and local, in coordination with SOUTHCOM and the ambassadors down in the Southern Command area.

We are looking at our P-3s, with the idea of making some modifications in the area of radar to help with the other assets since that maritime patrol asset is not currently utilized as heavily for ASW which it was built for. We are looking at taking some TAGO ships that were intended initially for ASW assets and making them radar platforms and some HF/DF capability so that we can interdict more effectively.

We are looking for ways to do the mission at lowest cost in people and assets. I really can't afford to have an AEGIS cruiser down there doing this mission even though it is doing a great job when it is down there. It is just too expensive.

Mr. DICKINSON. Could I ask one more question?

The CHAIRMAN. Sure. Go ahead, Bill.

Mr. DICKINSON. A follow-on, if I might.

Are you inhibited by lack of authority or law? Do you need additional laws to give you the capability to interdict, forcing down or boarding, searching, whatever? Do you have all the legal authority that you need?

Admiral EDNEY. In my area, we have the authority that we need. That is, that all of my ships are in a joint cooperative effort with the Coast Guard and every one of my ships has a law enforcement detachment on it. So, when we stop a ship we transfer that command authority to a Coast Guard law enforcement detachment. Often it is a lieutenant, but that lieutenant is in command of that operation when it becomes a law enforcement operation.

Mr. DICKINSON. But if a Gulfstream III or IV comes along and it is very suspicious, and we believe or have knowledge that it is bringing in drugs, can we force it down? Can we compel it to stay



on the ground? Or can all we do is chase it back where it came from?

Admiral EDNEY. Right now, we either follow it to what we call an end-game, and we have been very successful in coordinating end-games with General Joulwan's forces and in-country forces. But we do not have the authority, nor do I recommend that we have the authority, to shoot down these aircraft. Certainly forcing down a small, light aircraft that is not communicating is a difficult problem to solve.

Mr. DICKINSON. Thank you.

The CHAIRMAN. Let me just get back to the questions that I was talking about and tell you where we are going with all of this. You said that narcotics traffic in the region has now become of major concern to you, and basically, we are in the business of trying to figure out what we need in the way of forces. That is why I was kind of curious as to whether you saw the future needs to deal with this problem making greater claims on military resources than they have now, or significantly greater claims on the military resources than you have now.

The numbers you are talking about are relatively small right now, and certainly not of the kind that would cause changes in the defense budget for this purpose only. You use these assets because they are available and it is an important goal. It is an important part of U.S. policy. But it is essentially, I guess, a by-product of other things.

Do you see in the future that we will actually buy and commit assets on a permanent basis to this mission?

General JOULWAN. I would just say one of the programs we have is called Airborne Recce Low. It allows intelligence to be immediately shared with host nations, if that is what you are referring to.

The CHAIRMAN. What I am asking is whether there are any special programs—an acquisition program—that you would buy specifically for this mission? In other words, you wouldn't use it in any other place and are buying it for this purpose? Or whether you would actually dedicate on a more or less permanent basis, and that doesn't mean they couldn't be pulled off in an emergency, but dedicate resources to this on a permanent basis? What I am asking is where you think this mission is going in terms of how we are going to deal with it in the future?

General JOULWAN. I mentioned the intelligence, which we do have a capability to provide for the host nation in a fused, focused way. This platform that I am talking about will allow us to do that more quickly and more effectively.

The CHAIRMAN. How does it work? What is it?

General JOULWAN. I would like to come back and show you what it does.

The CHAIRMAN. All right. OK, don't worry.

General JOULWAN. What it provides is the SECRET NOFORN on a photograph.

The CHAIRMAN. OK.

General JOULWAN. It allows it to be given directly to the host nation.

The CHAIRMAN. All right.

Admiral EDNEY. Mr. Chairman, I would like to answer your question in a broader manner, because clearly these aren't the forces that are of concern to me and the base force level.

First of all, I have read very carefully the papers you developed. I personally think these papers have made a significant contribution to the current, ongoing debate. I do, however, have problems with several of the basic assumptions that are in the papers. I don't believe that our base force is nothing more than the old "world order" approach. Rather, I believe the base force is the product of a fundamental strategy—a strategy based on the President's National Security Strategy. This strategy states that we are only going to commit forces when it is necessary. When we do commit forces, we are going to commit those forces in sufficient numbers to make sure that we can get the job done in a delineated period of time with minimum loss to our troops and allied troops. It is a strategy which brings a superior mass to bear on the problem and uses maneuver warfare.

It is a strategy that acknowledges we are going to use forces, not only for nuclear deterrence, but recognizes that we have a commitment to regional stability. In the strategy it says that we are going to do this with our allies. The National Strategy also calls for a forward presence. All of this is in addition to resisting the drug trade that we have been talking about.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you. I appreciate the comments. Let me just respond a little bit, and then I want to let the other members have a chance. But I would like to hang around here a little bit when they get a chance and we will continue this discussion, because this is very important.

A couple of things. First of all, on the issue of forward presence, we also have forward presence in the proposition that we are putting forward. The only difference is in Europe. I mean, under the base force the European number is 150; we have 75. Seventy-five thousand versus 150,000. Otherwise, in terms of the rest of the forward deployment, we don't have any quarrel with the base force.

The question is, if you are going to have more forward presence or less forward presence, and it goes to your point about the extra troops, you do in the base force, or General Powell or whoever put together the base force, has more troops in the base force than we do, particularly more Army divisions. What worries those of us who put this thing together is the lack of airlift and sealift to get them to where they want to be. So, one of the advantages that we have, or what we would claim is our advantage in our options that we are looking at, and particularly Option C, which is the one that we are kind of looking at more seriously than, perhaps, the others, is that it has more airlift and sealift. Therefore, if we really are going to have more troops at home, as opposed to abroad, and we want to move them there, we have got to have the assets to move them there or it doesn't really do much good to have a large number of divisions in the continental United States if you can't get them to the war.

Admiral EDNEY. Yes, sir, I agree. I supported that in my statement.

The CHAIRMAN. All right. The third is the Iraqi equivalent. Basically the point about the Iraqi equivalent is not to have a finely

tuned measure of whether it is .5 or .4 or .6. Rather, it is to ask the question, if you have the capability to do a Desert Storm equivalent—is there any threat in the Middle East Region and we asked General Hoar this, of course, because this is part of a thing where we are asking the various CINCs about their responsibilities—is there any threat in the region that is greater than a Desert Storm equivalent? In other words, is there anybody—is Syria, is Iran, is Iraq—right now able to put together a force that is greater than the Iraqi forces were in August of 1990? The answer, General Hoar said, is “No, there isn’t anybody,” but of course, there is a possibility that that can change and could develop, et cetera.

Then, of course, there is the issue that this is not the only region in the world where there might be trouble. There might be a difficulty in North Korea at the same time. But that is essentially how you might build the forces. I think we are on the same track in terms of looking at this thing. Looking at the question in terms of what are the threats that you might want to face and what is the force that you need to deal with them, and then figure out how you are going to get them there. That is essentially how we are building our force.

But don’t go away. Let me let these guys ask their questions and let’s get back to it in a second.

Ike, why don’t you ask some questions?

Mr. SKELTON. Thank you. Gentlemen, we welcome you to our committee.

Let me ask you, if you had the pencil and paper in front of you, what formula, if any, would you use to put together—for lack of a better term—this base force? Rather than taking what we have today and shave off the top or rather than use the example that you alluded to a few moments ago, Admiral, the Iraqi equivalent and the 1.2, et cetera, what formula would each of you use in crafting our forces for tomorrow?

Admiral, you go first. You have seniority.

Admiral EDNEY. Well, what we have in fact done with the base force through a series of meetings that General Powell had with his unified commands and his supporting CINCs was to analyze what regional instabilities would be of concern to U.S. interests and to allied interests, and then what kind of forces would you need in order to follow the strategy that has been laid out that I discussed. Then when you have got that for one region could you expect to have some smaller contingency in the AOR of a major regional contingency requiring simultaneous response. For example, as the Persian Gulf War went on, I had 3 to 5 ships off the coast of Liberia. Evolutions such as the current Haitian crisis will continue to go on no matter what goes on in a major region, and will continue for the foreseeable future. Whatever Mr. Castro is going to do the economic situation on his island will dictate.

We tried to define what was needed in forces to maintain that strategy. That is, forward presence so that you didn’t apply everything to one region. You had to have a balanced number of forces. You had to have enough forces to maintain a modicum of forward presence and still train and do the maintenance on those forces. I agree that the fundamental policy that we are talking about is not a cold war policy. It is one where we will surge the base force that



is going to be required to get involved in anything that this governing body and the executive branch decides to do.

When we came up with that, we also recognize that we used to be in an environment where the threat defines what you ask for, and we are now in a budget constrained environment. So we cranked all of those in to come up with a formula that is the base force you have presented to you, and it took something close to 9 months of interaction with General Powell and the CINCs.

Mr. SKELTON. General.

General JOULWAN. Let me answer it, if I can, this way. I think that there is so much uncertainty that what you need is versatility of the force. If I could share with you an example of when I took command in the Southern Command in November of 1990. Within the first 2 weeks—and I know the Nation was riveted on Desert Shield at that time—we had in the Southern Command 3 coups, an insurrection and an offensive began in El Salvador.

I would like to show you, if I can, a chart—and if we can pass out chart 1 and 2—to show you what I was faced with. In today's parlance it would be called a major regional contingency in Desert Storm and a lesser regional contingency in what may have developed in Panama.

Let me tell you what I was faced with on December 4th and 5th. It may get at your question about why we need versatility in the force. This is with the current force, not the base force, not Option C. What we were faced with on the 4th and 5th was an insurrection in Panama where an ex-colonel, a police captain escaped, had taken over a major headquarters of the police. We didn't know what was going to happen. In all of the provinces he was urging rebellion, and I was looking around for forces available.

The 18th Airborne Corps had deployed. The 2d Mech had deployed, and I looked around for forces. I was calling JCS and others. One of the first to call me was Admiral Edney, which was reassuring, to discuss what could we generate. I just would tell you that forces were assigned, but even under those situations of the current force it was very tough to generate a force. In fact, I Corps was committed, and that is normally focused on the Pacific, as a planning headquarters.

I would think with the base force it is possible, but it is going to be tougher. Mr. Chairman, with Option C I would say the risk would be very high. Let me add at the same time that this was going on—show the next chart—in El Salvador there was an offensive—chart No. 2, there was an offensive by the FMLN. This occurred in November and December, same timeframe, and I was faced with how do I take what forces or what resources we have, and particularly in the terms of lift, in order to surge assets into El Salvador. They had—the FMLN shot down 3 or 4 planes with SA-14s—very sophisticated surface-to-air missiles. Our whole 10-year effort was in jeopardy. Morale had plummeted. I made a visit there in December and came back and reported to the national command authority. We needed to surge logistical assets: helicopters, aircraft, et cetera. It was very difficult to get those lift ships, but we did get lift ships and within a short period of time surged them into El Salvador and tried to generate some combat power for President Cristiani.

At the same time that was going on, we also had the counterdrug crisis. What I am getting at is that here you have some examples, particularly the first one in Panama, that we were faced with a major regional contingency in Desert Shield and Desert Storm and a lesser regional contingency in Panama. It was very difficult even with the current force to try to generate what we needed. I would say it would be very difficult under Option C.

The CHAIRMAN. Let me ask this question. How did this thing in Panama resolve? What did you do there?

General JOULWAN. We had in place forces which, by the way, go way. The in-place forces of one brigade that is there backed up the Panama National Police. My instructions were that it should be a Panamanian operation. That is, their police need to go in and solve it. They did not have a reaction force. All they had were cops on the beat, so to speak, and they had a very well-armed 80 to 100 man force taking over the central police station. President Endara, in writing, requested U.S. assistance. I forwarded that to the National Command Authority. What I did was back the National Police up with small contingents of U.S. forces.

It was resolved when Herrera Hassan, who was the colonel leading the rebellion, was captured as he tried to leave the police compound.

The CHAIRMAN. But, if you had to do this with American forces, how many would you need? I mean, what are we talking about?

General JOULWAN. Well, let me tell you the unknown. That is what I am saying. There were at that time 10,890 Panamanian—ex-Panamanian soldiers now on the Panamanian police force. Involved in this attempt was, I would say, less than 100. What we didn't know was exactly what would happen next. He had captured the radio station and was broadcasting to all the provinces, to the police in those provinces, the ex-soldiers, to join him. If it had developed into the sort of situation where you had not just one area of where these insurgents were located, but 10 or 15, and a growing support—hundreds and thousands joining the fight, we would have had a very difficult situation. The forces that we had available then was one brigade in Panama. We were allocated one division in the United States and a planning headquarters called the I Corps.

The CHAIRMAN. The ideal one for that would have been the 82d Airborne, I guess.

General JOULWAN. Which had deployed.

The CHAIRMAN. Which were not brought back. Why weren't they brought back? The point was on the Desert Storm/Desert Shield—I mean, the speculation was, I know back here in Washington was that you might need the 82d to go for fire brigade somewhere else and it was important to get the 82d over there early because you were trying to prevent Saddam Hussein from being tempted to keep going into Saudi Arabia. But once you had heavy forces over there, why didn't we bring the 82d back? I mean the 82d would have been the one that should have been available to you.

General JOULWAN. That is probably a question for Secretary Cheney. I would only say that at this time the heavy force had not totally closed. This was in December.

The CHAIRMAN. December. OK.



General JOULWAN. I would say that it had not closed, and I think all the forces on the ground were needed.

The CHAIRMAN. The El Salvador case, what did you need there? What kind of resources were you—

General JOULWAN. Primarily what we were trying to do there was get lift, airlift, to deliver the equipment into El Salvador. Again, H.T. Johnson—General Johnson—did carve some special aircraft out, and this occurred in January—and you all know what occurred in January of 1991, that is when the war in the Gulf started—and was able to generate special aircraft with certain countermeasures on them to go in and bring these needed supplies in. From that time on, the El Salvadoran armed forces have had 45 out of 48 battalions in the field and have performed extremely well, not only on the battlefield, but in the area of human rights and protecting elections, et cetera, and have been very flexible in negotiations. I think it was a turning point of our effort in El Salvador.

The CHAIRMAN. Option C, of course, has got more lift in it than the base force has.

General JOULWAN. Well, I think the base force has a variety of lift, which comes close to equating what you have, Mr. Chairman. But I would agree with you, many of us have agreed that lift is very important, sea and airlift, to a more agile, versatile force.

The CHAIRMAN. Norm. Ike. Anybody.

Mr. SKELTON. Well, I have one question that I would like to ask, really, of you, General.

In visiting CINCs and others in different places the question of IMET comes up. That is not in our jurisdiction. I wish it were. But would you, for the record, tell us the importance as you see that in assisting these other countries through the IMET program?

General JOULWAN. I think it is vital. It is money well spent, and we get immediate payback. One of our priorities in the Southern Command is enhancing the professionalism of the militaries in the region. We think we have to do more than just sell equipment or provide training. There are values and ideals of how does a military operate within a democratic political system. IMET gives us the opportunity to do that, and I think we ought to be increasing our efforts in IMET at least in the Southern Command.

The CHAIRMAN. Norm.

Mr. SISISKY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Welcome, gentlemen.

Basically, all the questions that I had concerned the base force. I might say, Admiral Edney, you said you read the different plans. However—and you explained it very well, by the way, better than anybody has explained it here, and I would like to get a copy of that, if you have it.

Admiral EDNEY. That was just off my head, Congressman, but I would be happy to share it with you.

Mr. SISISKY. As long as I have you here, I would not let you go, Admiral Edney. You made a statement—and I have been a critic of naval aviation—you know that. What has been happening in the last 2 years in naval aviation.

Admiral EDNEY. Yes, sir.

Mr. SISISKY. Now, you made the statement, and I will read it, that a replacement aircraft for the A-6 that can go 600-700 miles



with low attrition, requires a radar cross-section profile, which is stealth, and can deliver 3 to 6 precision-delivered 1,000–2,000 pound bombs. You say we are 10 years behind.

I think you may be off there. We are further than 10 years behind. As I understand it, even if everything goes well, it will be 2005 before we get that first aircraft.

Admiral EDNEY. It is one of the most serious shortages that I see in our war-fighting arsenal.

Mr. SISISKY. There is no question. For some reason, Mr. Chairman, we have tried hearings on naval aviation, we have tried everything. I don't know what to do anymore to get the Navy to get active in the aircraft. You know what is happening with the E and F model. The cost of the R&D now going up. I just don't know what to do.

But you understand the seriousness of this problem of how to get these airplanes.

Admiral EDNEY. Yes, sir.

Mr. SISISKY. Thank you for your observation. Thank you.

The CHAIRMAN. Herb Bateman.

Mr. BATEMAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you General and Admiral for your testimony today. I have found your elucidation on the base force, as contrasted to the other options that have been laid out, one of the most helpful exercises that I have been able to participate in. I would like to return to that. Then, Admiral Edney, I have a question that my colleague General Blaz has asked that I put to you and that will be a little bit more specific.

My concern is that we have in the base force concept the work product of the Joint Chiefs and the unified commanders—who are the operational people to whom would be assigned the responsibility for conducting military and naval air operations—and that has defined something that is now described as the base force. You make it very clear to me, at least, that this is not something that is done just by taking what we had and “whacking” some of it off. Rather, it is driven by a geopolitical view of the world and the contingencies that can arise.

I, frankly, have some concern as I hear some of the contingencies discussed, as to whether some of them which may be imminently realistic have even been taken into account and which would be a lot more serious to our strategic interest than those which are frequently talked about. Maybe there is a certain element of diplomacy and discretion in not talking about some of the scenarios that I can see coming at us, and I want to do this and say this discreetly.

But the Arabian Peninsula, as we fought the campaign against Saddam Hussein, may not be the same political environment in the future, even next week, next year, as it was during the time we fought that campaign. It could be dramatically different and, in its differences, deprive us of the infrastructure that was ours to use in Saudi Arabia with some of the most modern ports in the world and some of the most modern airfields in the world.

To repeat the successes of Desert Storm in that kind of an environment would take an extraordinarily larger force if you were going to accomplish the objectives in anything like the same timeframe and with the same degree or minimum degree of casualties.

I am very curious as to whether or not both those two, General, Operation Just Cause—if you would care to comment upon the assumptions of Option C, which apparently you have looked at, in terms of the adequacy of the number of people that were involved.

The other thing that I would like you in particular, General, to comment on is if we are going to adopt a budget-driven Option A, B, C, D, or whatever it may be, that calls for some doubling of the reductions that have been proposed by the Secretary of Defense and the administration.

There are those who say that we are going to have to take 300,000 more people out of the Active Duty military services. I'm curious to know how much difficulty you are having with meeting the end-strength reductions that you have already been tasked to accomplish without involuntary separations.

Is the voluntary separation initiative working? Are the other incentives for people to retire or to get out proving sufficient, especially given the condition of the economy? Are you finding that there is no alternative but just to turn out, whether they like it or not, totally involuntarily some of our best career people?

So if you would care to share any of those views and then, Mr. Chairman, time permitting, I do have that one short question for Admiral Edney.

General JOULWAN. If I can recap, sir, I think that based on the Just Cause example that you mentioned, if I could have chart 6, just so we all know the frame of reference we are talking about, we talk about a Panama equivalent.

I put this up there, because I think it is important when you look at what we had in the way of forward presence forces, deployed forces, as well as follow-on forces, and then what was in place. We had a very large infrastructure already in place in Panama: command and control, ground logistics, fuel, and airfield, all of those things that, and I think we have to be very careful, may not exist elsewhere when you talk about using, the "Panama Equivalent."

I wanted to make that point that, when you look at this, it is a tailoring of forces. I think you want to give your military commanders the opportunity to tailor forces to meet a threat, and whether it is this one or what occurred in December of 1990 or in El Salvador or even for, in my area, the narco threat, you want to have versatility of the force, and that is what the CINCs, the Chiefs and the chairman talked about at some length: How do we get versatility in this force to be able to meet our national interests?

The second point has to deal with if we have to take out another 100,000, 200,000, or 300,000. As an ex-commander in Europe, before I went to the Southern Command, I spent 14 years in Europe and just commanded a corps over there. As we were dealing with how do we scale back the force, we were talking in the area of 35,000 to 40,000 a year that we could take out without breaking the force.

I believe we are now taking out 70,000 to 80,000 this year, and to add on to that an additional couple of hundred thousand, it gives me great concern about whether we are going to take care of the troops and their families and do it right. That is of great concern as we build down the force. I think it is very important that we do it right, and many of our commanders are very concerned with



the burden that places on people that have volunteered to serve their country and their families.

The third point was the voluntary separation. I believe they are all excellent programs. To me, the issue is, many of these troops volunteered to serve their country, and it is very difficult for them. Many of them want to continue to serve their country. I think the plans are out there. We are trying to make it accessible and to pass out the information and provide all the assistance we can. But there is, I think, a number that you are dealing with that, once you go beyond that, you end up creating a certain amount of hardship that I would caution against.

Mr. BATEMAN. Thank you very much, General.

Admiral, under the question that General Blaz asked that I pose is one that relates to your statement on page 24 with regard to the priority of a medium-lift replacement for the CH-46. General Blaz requests that you elaborate and tell us what, in your view, is needed in terms of capability and when it is required, and there may be some overtones of V-22 in this question.

Admiral EDNEY. Well, I can tell you what I need, and what I need as a replacement for the CH-46. For the required mission, I would like to have more range, and more speed and more maneuverability.

I am well aware, as this body is, that there are difficult decisions that have to be made when you are going to make the types of cuts that we are making in our defense establishment. As I said in my testimony, I have never worked for a better listener or a better leader than Secretary Cheney, but even he can't afford everything that is needed. I have the requirement for a medium-lift replacement and the question is, when is that requirement need going to be met—by 1993, but no later than 1994. The vehicle used to meet that goal that I leave to the procurement process. But that process and time are moving on to get a replacement for the CH-46.

Mr. BATEMAN. Thank you, Admiral.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Lancaster.

Mr. LANCASTER. Thank you.

Admiral Edney, I'm going to follow up on that, because I was going to ask you about the V-22, too. I know that the Secretary's position on the V-22 puts our uniformed personnel in a difficult position. But, is there any research program going on that would lead you to believe that procurement will be possible in 1993-1994 that replaces the CH-46 except for the V-22?

Admiral EDNEY. Yes, sir, there are a variety of options. Just as you look at the changing of the threat environment and the changing of the regional security environment and the diminished defense dollars available, there are a variety of R&D options associated all the way from a modification of the CH-46 to a variety of other helicopter responses. They are all helicopter response options that I am aware of at this time.

Mr. LANCASTER. But none of them meet these requirements that you say you have for range, speed, maneuverability, other than the V-22. Is that correct?

Admiral EDNEY. You have to differentiate. When you talk to someone who may be tasked to fight, I'm going to always tell you



what I would like to fight with. But the requirement to meet the contingencies that we see can be met by a helicopter vehicle.

Mr. LANCASTER. I am going to ask both of you this question because, to be honest, I don't know who should answer it. In a Merchant Marine and Fisheries/Coast Guard hearing last week, I was disturbed to learn that the aerostats have been down since the first of the year and that the choke points, that those aerostats protected by interdiction, are now pretty well open. The Coast Guard indicated that our efforts at interdiction are seriously jeopardized by the Department of Defense's failure to keep those aerostats up. I wonder, which one of you can respond to that, why they have been allowed to go down and when you are going to get them back up.

Admiral EDNEY. I believe the majority of that is in my area of responsibility. The fact of the matter is, I monitor the up and down status of the aerostats on a daily basis. As I looked at the chart this morning, although I don't have it in front of me, there were about three that were down out of about 16.

What you are talking about is an aerostat that was turned over to the Defense Department without any funds to operate them, and they cost about \$41 million, and they have had very little relative return. Without the required funds we consolidated those four in addition to some SASSs, which are sea-based aerostats, to get three and a half good ones out of five—actually six total.

So the fact is that the smaller ones have not been supported because the funds weren't there, and, in my judgment, I would apply the funds probably to additional assets in order to give better coverage.

That aerostat is useful for a small choke point. It covers a limited amount of territory, and if you know it is there you can fly around it.

Mr. LANCASTER. So you would disagree with the Coast Guard that their efforts have been seriously jeopardized by the aerostats being down?

Admiral EDNEY. Well, I can't speak for the Coast Guard on this specific endeavor, and I know that they place a high value on those assets, but neither they nor we had the money to make the upgrades. By the way, they all need significant upgrades to make them capable to support the desired netting situation.

Mr. LANCASTER. General Joulwan, also in another hearing unrelated to that one, we heard testimony with regard to a change in the role of Secretary Stone and the leadership of the Panama Canal Commission in an effort to further remove military leadership from the Panama Canal in order to establish precedence for the future when the Panamanians take it over that they be civilian leadership rather than military leadership in charge of the canal.

It is my understanding that the Army objects to the civilianization of that leadership. I wonder if you would care to comment on the impact of our continued insistence on military leadership in the Panama Canal and what impact that will have when the Panamanians take over and want to put military leadership in control of the canal.

General JOULWAN. I think I will let Secretary Stone answer that. It is a policy question. As far as I'm concerned, Secretary Stone's

board—really, it is for the Secretary of Defense—is working quite well. They are involved in some very key issues. It is primarily a civilian board that is working with the Panama Canal Commission. I have seen it in operation. I am convinced that they are heading in the right direction.

As I mentioned, 87 percent of the Canal Commission work force is Panamanian. The administrator is Panamanian. I think they are heading for noon, December 31, 1999, when they will turn over as a very viable, credible operation. There has also been a consultative committee appointed which is also looking at how we make sure that in December 1999, the labor laws and the other maintenance requirements are also in place.

There is an enormous amount of work, sir, that is going on in that area to make certain that when it is turned over the Panamanians can operate it and operate it effectively. I don't sense a problem with the Department of Defense's involvement in doing that.

Mr. LANCASTER. But would you be concerned if the Panamanian Minister of Defense were in charge of the canal when that shift is made?

General JOULWAN. They do not have a Minister of Defense, but I think they have appointed a Panamanian presidential commission which deals with canal issues. The President of Panama has done that. That commission is working very closely with Secretary Stone in the region.

Mr. LANCASTER. Excuse me. That is not the question. Would you be concerned if the Panamanian Minister of Defense were in control of the Panama Canal once it is turned over to the Panamanians? Are we not setting a significantly bad precedent by continuing to insist on this role for the Pentagon in the running of the Panama Canal?

General JOULWAN. I don't believe it is in the business of running the canal, sir. The administrator is Panamanian. We also have a mission through 1999 to defend the canal, and we also are in the process of reverting properties back to the Government of Panama. There is an interagency effort to do that, but, again, the Department of Defense has the lead.

Mr. LANCASTER. Admiral Edney, in your testimony you have once again demonstrated that since Desert Storm the Pentagon has "got religion" on sealift and airlift. Of course this pleases the committee, which has been trying to get more, especially Sealift, capacity over the Pentagon's objection for many years. Do you, in fact, see that commitment not only in words but also in actions to address what we have seen as a problem for some time but the Pentagon didn't? If so, in what way?

Second, and related to that, I am somewhat concerned when I hear that we may be buying some of the sealift from the open market—that we might buy that sealift from Eastern European shipyards instead of U.S. shipyards. I wonder if you would comment on that.

Admiral EDNEY. I certainly didn't mean to convey that I knew how we would buy that shipping. But to answer your specific question, certainly as a unified CINC I have "got the religion," and I believe that the seriousness of the Secretary of Defense and the Secretary of the Navy is fully behind the increased sealift require-



ments. In fact, if I were to compare Option C and the base force, you show a number eight, which represents our SSL-7s that are there now, but there is clearly in the budget the intention to purchase some 15 additional roll-on/roll-off and another eight. That would be more than the 16-plus that I have seen in Option C. So the commitment is there and it is serious.

My need is to get as much war-fighting capability as I can for the least amount of dollars. In my judgment, our shipbuilding industry—and I have talked to Newport News several times on this issue—should be able to compete with the number of commercial ships that are being built in the world today. I believe there are over 900 ships currently built, and there is not one being built in an American shipyard.

But having said that, I think that is an issue worth looking into, and we should build some of those ships in our own shipyards. I also know that there are available roll-on/roll-off vehicles that one could get more of because they are relatively new and they are available on the open market. They could be purchased immediately and put them in the Ready Reserve Force. If I had my choice on how I would fight the next conflict, that is what I would do. But how we purchase them and how we produce them, as long as we get the most bang for the buck, I will leave that up to this committee.

Mr. LANCASTER. Just a comment. I think it would be a very shortsighted policy for us to get the most bang for the buck at the expense of our own shipbuilding capability, which I think is in serious jeopardy. If we continue to let that capacity erode, then in the long run—in my opinion—we are going to be much worse off because we are not going to have the capability that has been so important to our Navy in the past in being able to get those ships quickly at high quality from our own shipyards. We have no guarantee that these Eastern European shipyards that may be able to provide us something short term would be available to us in future contingencies, and if we have no shipyard capacity then we are going to be in real trouble.

Admiral EDNEY. I certainly support the revitalization—if it's not too late—of the maritime industry of this Nation. But, I also know that we have additional problems other than just bottoms, and that is that the maritime unions of the world are operating diesel and sometimes gas turbine engines, but they are certainly not operating 600-, 900-pound steamplants. The need to convert the Ready Reserve Force that we have on the James River and a variety of other places is rather urgent. I was just making a comment associated with that.

If it could be done and I could get the same lift capability, which is the urgent need, for the same dollar in the same timeframe, I would welcome them being built in U.S. shipyards, but I have that need now.

Mr. LANCASTER. Thank you.

The CHAIRMAN. Beverly Byron.

Mrs. BYRON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Let me say first of all that I was delighted that both of you in your written testimony spent as much time as you did on talking about people. As you were giving your testimony, I wrote down



“people, people, people,” and then “number one priority of people,” because those of us that have worked in the vineyards for a while trying to bring that quality up are very, very concerned as to what is happening and whom we are drawing down.

I am very concerned that the quality ones that we have seen develop over the last several years are going to be the first of our military volunteers that are going to take off the uniform and go home. That concerns me deeply.

Admiral Edney, you talked a little bit in your testimony about the nuclear capability. I think you said 10 to 15 countries should have that capability shortly. An area that I have deep concern about is the chemical and biological area, and I think you said 10 countries have weapons and delivery systems.

Do you find that anywhere in the SOUTHCOM arena you would be concerned about a biological or chemical capability being developed currently?

Admiral EDNEY. I would let General Joulwan answer that question for more specific knowledge, but from my responsibilities in the Atlantic Command, there is definitely one to two areas where that capability is a potential and is of concern.

Mrs. BYRON. OK.

We talk about nuclear capabilities as a threat, and we talk about chemical and biological capabilities as a threat. I don't think we can talk about threats without looking at drugs as a threat, and there is no question that in the SOUTHCOM arena there is a very strong concern in our Nation and our population about the drug threat.

As we look at trying to address that—and I know you have identified the threat, I know you have worked with other South American countries to help them develop their own infrastructure to counteract that threat—what can we as a nation do that is not being done?

As we draw down our military, I look at as a potential for utilization many of our systems in the drug arena and in the drug war, just as we have used them in the past in other arenas against a war. There is no question in my mind that the drug war is a war, and it is one that is being waged on the streets of this Nation. Can you give me any input on that?

General JOULWAN. Well, let me again show a chart, because I think you have to understand the total extent of what we are dealing with.

How about putting number three up there, if I can.

Mrs. BYRON. We have got six, one, and five. We will get them all out.

General JOULWAN. Let me show you. This is, at the heart of your question: What can we do? I think first of all we have to understand the extent of the threat, and this threat—

Mrs. BYRON. You are not going to answer my chemical or biological—

General JOULWAN. Oh, I'm sorry. I know of no country in the Southern Region that contains that.

Mrs. BYRON. OK.

General JOULWAN. I'm sorry.

Then we will go back to our drug threat.

I put this up there because I think you can look at the extent of what you are dealing with. In looking at the chart, you will see that 30 percent of the leaf is grown in the Chapare region of Bolivia and about 60 percent in the Upper Huallaga in Peru. Chemicals are brought in from throughout the world to make that leaf into paste and base. Then it is transported on hundreds of aircraft between Bolivia, Peru, and Colombia, where it is then processed into cocaine and then moved on thousands of ship and air movements from Colombia into Central America, the United States, and throughout the world.

This is a vast criminal network, and you say: What needs to be done? I will tell you, as Admiral Edney correctly said, whatever we can do in law enforcement, drug rehabilitation and education, and reducing the demand in the United States. But I think it is also an international problem. I think the international community needs to be involved in this.

There are points that we are trying to help address in the Peru-Colombia-Ecuador-Bolivia area: For example, helping those nations protect their sovereignty and their borders with air interdiction, and there are radars and some assistance in training we can give them to fight the violation of their borders and their sovereignty at the source.

We are also trying to work in transit with those countries in Central America and in the Caribbean and with LANTCOM to try to interdict the flow once it leaves the Andean Ridge. But it is a huge problem, and I think we have to be able to—when you say what can be done—to recognize the problem in the United States, the problem it poses in transit, and attack it at the source where these cartels are running billion-dollar operations, and where they have hundreds of thousands of farmers working in growing the leaf. It is just not military. It is economic. It is social. It is aid, et cetera.

Mrs. BYRON. Your current jurisdiction is SOUTHCOM.

General JOULWAN. Yes.

Mrs. BYRON. We have for years looked at the Golden Triangle, coming out of Afghanistan, and the poppy fields there, moving through the Mediterranean to European markets. Do you feel that the South American market has surpassed the movement that we have seen for years from the Golden Triangle?

General JOULWAN. For cocaine, yes. Cocaine coming out of Central and South America—it primarily comes from Central and South America, about 100 percent of it. I would say that for cocaine, which is in many cases the drug of choice in the United States, this is where it comes from.

Mrs. BYRON. Do you have the assets that you feel are necessary for the mission that you have been given?

General JOULWAN. We would like to have more, particularly in terms of AWACS and detection and monitoring assets for the region. I have talked to the chairman about that. He is looking at it, and once the threat sort of stabilizes in the Middle East and also as the dust settles in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union, I feel those assets will be made available.

Mrs. BYRON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Admiral EDNEY. Mr. Chairman, may I make a comment?

Mr. ORTIZ [presiding]. Sure. Go right ahead.

Admiral EDNEY. Mrs. Byron, you and I go back quite a few years from the time I was Chief of Naval Personnel. I want to personally convey to you as a senior, also retiring, naval officer how much we appreciate your dedication to the quality of people in our Armed Forces. You have been a tough taskmaster to hold us to commitments to our people. You have been willing to go to the far off places, the most arduous duty stations. You ask tough questions and go back and get results. Our people are better off because of what you have brought to this committee and to the service of the Congress. I personally wanted to thank you for that.

General JOULWAN. I second that.

Mr. ORTIZ. Thank you. I seem to agree with you. We don't know what we really have and appreciate until we lose it.

I will go to my good friend from South Carolina, Mr. Spence.

Do you have a question?

Mr. SPENCE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I think that most of the questions I wanted to ask have already been asked and answered very adequately. But if I could get the benefit of your expertise, both of you, on one question that bothers me. With all the downsizing of our military, and I'm afraid—parenthetically—we are cutting back too fast and too much. It is hurting us in all kinds of ways, not only from the standpoint of our military preparedness but also economically, releasing so many people into the public—the job market—further flooding that market, cutting back on our defense industrial base, putting people out of jobs, losing our capabilities in that area and cutting back on our military end-strength. A lot of people think we should not have much of a forward-deployed presence overseas. I would like to get your ideas on that. What are your views with regard to our forward deployment of forces?

Admiral EDNEY. Well, I think that comes to the crux of the issue associated with the force levels that are being debated. My judgment and my experience have been that I have never sailed with a tasking to fight the Soviet Union when it was a union. I don't believe that the Soviet Union or the Warsaw Pact is going to reform. But, I do believe that today we live in a more unstable world, and there is more potential for conflict in areas in which we have longstanding commitments; whether it be the Middle East or the Eastern Mediterranean. I believe that a credible U.S. presence is required not only in the Mediterranean but in the Persian Gulf, where I have responsibility to provide forces. I have spent a great deal of my naval career in the Pacific, and I know that those nations out there want U.S. presence for stability. They look on us as someone who is rational, and there are not too many rational leaders in the unstable parts of the world.

I am one that feels that you can provide more stability and reduce the risk of committing our forces to fighting by having a forward presence. It is part of the President's National Security Strategy. In order to do that and still be able to surge when you have a crisis, you need a certain level of forces and my concern is that we don't go below that. So I am in favor of forward presence.

I think even with the forces coming down the way they are, we have to change the way we are doing business. Forward deploy-



ment cannot be supported if we continue to use the numbers that we presently have in the places that we have been used to going throughout the last couple of decades. But forward presence, I believe, is in the best interests of this country.

General JOULWAN. I would agree with that, sir, and I would just add a couple of points. First of all, I think that what has served us well is that we not only have a war-fighting strategy, we have a deterrence strategy. I think forward presence actually helps us deter conflict by having forces on the ground forward deployed. I think it also is in the area of stability, and it really allows us to have influence in the region that we would not have if we did not have forward presence of our troops.

Therefore, I would think deterrence, stability and influence are very key reasons to have forces forward deployed.

Mr. ORTIZ. Chairman Bennett.

Mr. BENNETT. Thank you.

I was just listening to what you said about forward presence. I would like to ask the admiral if he feels that the drawdown—given the world's tensions at this moment in history—means that we still have to have a flexible forward presence best represented perhaps by the Navy, in the areas where they can be moved from one spot to another. Is that your opinion? I judge that is what you have stated.

Admiral EDNEY. Oh, absolutely, and I think that is why the numbers game becomes very important. If you are not able to do that, then the burdens are going to be on your people.

As you are aware, and I think most of the people in this room are aware, we are doing that right now. That is, we have moved the Eisenhower out of the Persian Gulf through the Mediterranean. Now, it is off of Norway, and I will be leaving right after this testimony to observe her operations with our NATO allies in that region. That shows the flexibility and mobility of a credible force that can operate in the hot, steamy weather of the Persian Gulf, and then without ever coming back to the United States, also operate aircraft day and night in northern latitudes with freezing ice on deck.

When we did that relocation with the increasing concerns of our Nation for the situation in the Eastern Mediterranean and the Persian Gulf, General Hoar and General Galvin didn't feel totally comfortable. But the commitment is that if you need that asset, you will turn it back around and you will provide other assets. Certainly the mobility and flexibility of naval forces, where they don't cross any boundaries, and don't have much political baggage with them, convey a definite signal. They can come and go whenever the political will that we work for decides it is time to display a highly valuable asset.

Mr. BENNETT. Thank you very much.

Before I get to the next question, I want to thank you for all the wonderful assistance you have given to the defense of our country through the years. You ought to feel proud and happy about yourself. Certainly the country is grateful to you for what you have done and wishes you well.

Admiral EDNEY. Thank you.

Mr. BENNETT. Now, a problem associated with what you just referred to. That is, to show flexible presence when it is needed and then when it is not needed, have the ability to pull back. It seems to me that this is tied into the personnel problem a bit, because if you have the Navy sailors and officers at sea too long it is going to deter some of the highest quality people who are now in the service from reenlisting or continuing their service. That concerns me because we are living in an era of very complicated weaponry. I don't like to point out the mistakes that have happened, but I think all of us can think back a few years. I think about myself as an infantry soldier with simpler weapons, where I wasn't always the great commander that I should have been or the great soldier I should have been. That has happened—we don't talk about it too much, but it has happened even with very intelligent people under the pressure of the moment don't always respond perfectly. Things are very technical today and that takes an innate ability. Not everybody has the innate ability to handle complicated things like the AEGIS weapons and things like that.

That worries me. In other words, if we have a lower educated person, it might well be that we would lose battles that we might otherwise win. Isn't that your feeling about it as well?

Admiral EDNEY. No question about it. We have got the highest quality, best trained force in all of our services that we have ever had. I am particularly concerned that we not make decisions that within a given fiscal year in which the only way that you can meet the bottom line is by a significant reduction in people. When you do that you usually don't pay the full price until about 5 to 7 years later. It is very hard for us to predict what we are going to need 5 to 7 years later, but I do believe that this reduction has to be done in a balanced way.

I was impressed recently when we had the Master Chief of the Navy come down to Norfolk, VA, just about 3 weeks ago. He was on a local news station for people to call in. He was only able to answer four questions. He had 300 phone-ins in that period of time. Cox Cable allowed him to come down for a full ½ hour of phone-ins, and we had people calling in from all over the Hampton Roads area with concerns like: I am a nuclear power submariner. I see that the SSN-21 is not being supported. Do I have a job? This amount of training that I have gained, can I count on a career? A lot of concerns that I just didn't recognize were at that level.

So we have got a lot of concern out there, and we also know that we have got a very quality force. I think we have to be very careful that we don't break the machinery while we are reducing this force.

Mr. BENNETT. After the great victory of Desert Storm, there are things that run through my mind. For example, what if there had been an enemy presence attacking the Navy and its convoys going to Saudi Arabia. That worries me about the way we look at submarines today. In other words, a lot of people feel that the acquisition of submarines is sort of obsolete because they didn't have much to do in that war, and, of course, that is in a very exceptional war. It is not the kind of war that is likely to ever occur again.

So whether we have the SSN-21, which, of course, I would favor as a follow-on, but if we have that or the SSN-688, there isn't any



indication we need to greatly reduce the number of attack submarines is there?

Admiral EDNEY. I think like all of the forces that are being reduced, when you take the total changes that have gone on with the dissolving of the Soviet Union and the change in the CIS there is room to reduce some of the numbers. The fact of the matter is that by the turn of the century, whatever Russia is doing, she will have over 100 first line submarines. I don't know what her foreign policy will be at that time. The fact of the matter is there are over 260 going to 300, high-quality diesel submarines that are being sold around the world. Certainly the air independent propulsion submarine that is being built in Europe is an extremely high-quality submarine. This Nation must continue to have a credible and substantive submarine force to meet its national interests.

Mr. BENNETT. I have only one other question, and I don't know to whom I should address this question. Can you give any insight as to why we were unable to locate the North Korean freighter that was apparently carrying the Scuds?

Admiral EDNEY. I saw some of the comments. I can't recall whether it was this committee or the SASC, but the specifics of how you task and when you task and when you get the authority to apply full forces, is key to that equation. Not having been privy to how that direction went because it was in CENTCOM's area of responsibility, I don't think I could make an appropriate comment, sir.

Mr. BENNETT. You are sort of implying—and I am not trying to get you into any trouble at all—that it might not have been physically impossible, but a command omission or something like that.

Admiral EDNEY. I just don't know the flow of information on that process.

Mr. BENNETT. When they find out I think we ought to know. Because we here in Congress are confessing to a lot of sins these days, so other people ought to join in.

[Laughter.]

Admiral EDNEY. I do know finding a ship at sea is a difficult problem. But, I am not familiar with the details of that situation.

Mr. BENNETT. Thank you very much. I have no further questions.

Mr. ORTIZ. Thank you. General and Admiral, I am also glad to see you. I am sorry I am a little late. I just left another meeting.

Admiral, I have a question. As a former sheriff and as a member of the Select Committee on Narcotics Abuse and Control, I am deeply interested in the Department of Defense's role in our War on Drugs. The President has requested approximately \$1.3 billion in fiscal year 1993 for drug interdiction and counterdrug activities for the Department. As you know, Admiral, the U.S. Customs Service has a small fleet of P-3 airborne early warning drug surveillance aircraft that are based in my district in Corpus Christi, TX. By all measures, that program has been very successful in detecting airborne drug smugglers who attempt to penetrate the United States and Mexico from Latin America.

Now this has been brought to my attention. That CINCLANT has recently proposed to the Secretary of the Navy that as many as 6 to 8 Navy P-3 ASW aircraft be retrofitted with the capability to enhance surveillance and monitoring of drug operations. I am



also told that the Secretary's initial reaction was positive. This is testimony before the Senate Appropriations Subcommittee on Defense, which was held on March 3.

I strongly support this proposal and believe that an equally strong case can and should be made for home basing these P-3 aircraft alongside Customs' aircraft now in Corpus Christi.

Could you give the panel your thoughts on this innovative proposal to help the war against drugs. I know that while the Navy should deploy the new P-3 ASW aircraft wherever the threat is, would it make sense to put them right next to the Customs' planes that are now in operation and based there in south Texas?

Admiral EDNEY. Certainly. That proposal was generated through the challenges we are going through now of how to better divert our assets from some of the cold war missions to the current counternarcotics effort. So because of the reduced threat in the area of submarines associated with the former Soviet Union. We were looking at different solutions to the problem. I agree with you that the P-3 aircraft flown by Customs are highly effective within the counterdrug war.

Regardless, that was the genesis of the recommendation, and I think you can get very effective equipment with an airplane and a radar that is already built, and all you have to do is marry the two. That is why I made the proposal, and I would certainly agree. On a daily basis, General Joulwan and myself utilize the interaction of the Customs' P-3 aircraft, and in fact Carol Hallett's entire, wonderful Customs organization. I would be in favor of dual basing, joint basing and mutually reinforcing one another. I am a strong supporter of the efforts of Ms. Hallett and the Customs Bureau.

Mr. ORTIZ. Thank you. I certainly appreciate your dedication and your commitment to the war on drugs. I don't speak for all members of the committee, but I know that we stand behind you and support you very, very strongly.

Do we have any other questions or any other testimony at this time? Mr. Spence.

If not, the meeting stands adjourned.

[Whereupon, at 3:15 p.m., the panel was recessed, to reconvene subject to the call of the chair.]

## CINC SPECIAL OPERATIONS COMMAND

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HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,  
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES,  
DEFENSE POLICY PANEL,  
*Washington, DC, Thursday, March 19, 1992.*

The panel met, pursuant to call, at 10:15 a.m., in room 2118, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Les Aspin (chairman of the panel) presiding.

### STATEMENT OF HON. LES ASPIN, A REPRESENTATIVE FROM WISCONSIN, CHAIRMAN, DEFENSE POLICY PANEL

The CHAIRMAN. The meeting will come to order.

This morning the Defense Policy Panel continues its series of hearings aimed at building a consensus behind a prudent threat-based defense for the 1990s.

The dangers posed by the Soviet Union and the Warsaw Pact for more than 40 years have disintegrated after two modern revolutions. Regional aggression is the principal threat we will face in the post-cold war world.

This shift calls for a fundamental change in the way we plan our defense. We must thoroughly examine the real threats of the new era, then we must build our forces from the bottom up to ensure that we have the capabilities we need. Merely subtracting from our old cold war force structure won't prepare us adequately to meet the challenges of the future.

Today the policy panel welcomes Gen. Carl Stiner, Commander in Chief for the Special Operations Command to help us look ahead. General Stiner is one of the most experienced men in the military today, and we are very honored to have this opportunity to draw on his expertise.

Most recently, General Stiner was the operational commander of Operation Just Cause in Panama under the able overall command of Gen. Max Thurman. General Stiner has done his own assessment of current regional threats which will be at the core of our discussion today.

We would like to know what this work tells him about how to ensure our national security in the years to come. Furthermore, we would like to hear how he made those assessments and their relationship to the Pentagon's seven threat scenarios revealed in the press.

There is already general agreement that special forces will play a more prominent role overall in the smaller military of the future. We would like to know what those forces ought to be, will there be a greater emphasis on peace time activities? Will there be changes in the way special forces project our presence?

Although the immediate issue before us is developing a fiscal year 1993 defense bill, we need to have some sense of the capabilities, like special forces, that we want in the outyears of the future. Without knowing our goals, it is hard to make a good start now.

General Stiner, as I understand your opening statement will be in public testimony. Then right after your opening prepared statement, and before we go to questions and answers, we will go closed.

General STINER. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Before we start with General Stiner, let me call on Bill Dickinson for his comments.

**STATEMENT OF HON. WILLIAM L. DICKINSON, A REPRESENTATIVE FROM ALABAMA, RANKING MINORITY MEMBER, DEFENSE POLICY PANEL**

Mr. DICKINSON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

General Stiner, it is a genuine pleasure to host the Department's head "secret warrior." As you know, I spent a productive morning with members of your staff several months ago, but unfortunately our paths did not cross.

This committee has an enormous respect for your unique talents and that of the men and women under your command. We tend, however, to focus on the more exotic special operations missions conducted by the SEALs and Delta Force, since that somehow seems more glamorous and catches the headlines.

For that reason, few of us really appreciate the more routine, and I use that word respectfully, work that special forces do every day around the world. In particular, I am referring to nation building and humanitarian assistance activities in which they are engaged.

As I know you are fond of saying, "Your forces aren't forward deployed, they are forward employed." Because special operations are usually small and low visibility, they are often the only politically acceptable way the United States can demonstrate its commitment to democratic forces in many regions of the world.

So with a world full of potential insurgencies, narcoterrorists, and countries seeking to acquire nuclear, chemical and biological weapons, we cannot afford any diminishing of SOF's presence around the world. In fact, I strongly support an expanded forward presence role of the SOF as we draw down our conventional forces and bring many of them home.

As such, I will resist any effort to reduce your small but multifaceted force as Congress debates whether the base force is too big, too small or just about right in a changing but uncertain world.

We appreciate your presence here, and General, we look forward to your statement. Thank you very much.

The CHAIRMAN. General Stiner, the floor is yours, sir.

**STATEMENT OF GEN. CARL W. STINER, USA, COMMANDER IN CHIEF, U.S. SPECIAL OPERATIONS COMMAND**

General STINER. Mr. Chairman and distinguished members of the House Armed Services Committee, I am deeply honored for this opportunity to appear before you and to discuss the capabilities and the strategic utility of our Nation's Special Operations Forces,



and with your approval, I will submit a comprehensive statement for inclusion in the record of the testimony.

The CHAIRMAN. Without objection.

General STINER. Mr. Chairman, I want to thank you and this committee for your support of our Nation's Special Operations Forces, and thanks to your wisdom and support, our Special Operations Forces, which include special operations, psychological operations, and civil affairs forces from the Army, the Navy, and the Air Force, are in the best shape ever, and they remain ready today.

#### SPECIAL OPERATIONS FORCES

Our Nation's Special Operations Forces are a critical part of the President's base force concept, and as we look to the future, they are ideally suited for support of the President's National Security Strategy and the chairman's National Military Strategy. They will play a vital role as instruments of U.S. national policy or foreign policy in meeting the challenges that the United States is likely to face in the foreseeable future.

The post-cold war international environment presents the United States with security challenges that are unprecedented in ambiguity, diversity, and risk, but by the same token, unprecedented in opportunity.

The Special Operations Forces of the United States, or SOF as they are referred to, are essential to a balanced national defense posture in this complex international environment. They are versatile, ready, and uniquely capable of operating in all political-military environments, from peacetime training, internal defense, and nation assistance operations requested by our allies and international partners, to full-blown conventional warfare.

As such, our Nation's Special Operations Forces are a crucial instrument of U.S. national policy in our efforts to promote international stability, to reduce conditions that create human misery and fuel insurgencies in selected countries around the world, and in responding to crises that threaten our interests.

#### VERSATILITY OF SOF

The versatility and capabilities of Special Operations Forces give them a particular usefulness and demonstrate that they are an integral and essential component of the base force concept. They can be employed in a variety of roles where political constraints restrict the use of highly visible, conventional forces.

In conflict situations, Special Operations Forces are a combat multiplier that, when integrated with conventional forces, maximize force potential and capability as we witnessed in Operations Just Cause and Desert Shield, and Desert Storm. In peacetime, they are applicable as instruments of our national policy.

#### SOF NATIONS ASSISTANCE

The strategic utility of SOF across the operational continuum has been demonstrated daily during the past year. Just last year alone, over 250 special operations teams were employed in 73 different countries in every region of the world. Many of these deployments

provided a significant and needed presence in areas where no U.S. military forces are stationed or are regularly deployed.

Today, in addition to the 223 Special Operations Forces that remain deployed in the Persian Gulf in support of Operation Provide Comfort, and the 157 who are down in Guantanamo caring for the displaced Haitian nationals, an average of 4,000 Special Operations Forces are employed daily in 36 different countries and every geographic region of the world, performing foreign internal defense missions and nation assistance activities, supporting the theater CINCs in their efforts to assist friendly host-nation governments with problems that threaten their very existence.

These soldiers, sailors, and airmen are forward employed, performing their respective missions at the grassroots level where the problems are found. Today, Special Operations Forces survey and assessment teams are also working with American embassies in several European countries assisting with language requirements and working to determine what type nation assistance SOF can provide when U.S. assistance is requested.

The maturity, the language skills, and the regional focus that Special Operations Forces possess give them a capability like no other force to assist, train, and educate a host-nation's military force, not only in military and civic action skills, but in the roles and responsibilities of the military in a democratic society.

Successful advisory assistance depends more on effective cross-cultural communications and personal relationships than on formal agreements. The use of Special Operations Forces in military-to-military training activities and contacts can also be very important in buttressing fledgling democracies against the intense pressures of development.

In several African and Central and South American countries, SOF are working with host-nation military and government officials in civic action programs and internal defense. For example, in Africa: Zimbabwe, Namibia, Niger, Ivory Coast, and in South America: Colombia, Bolivia, Peru, and Ecuador. Special Operations Forces are training host-country military and government officials in counterpoaching skills, basic soldier training, small unit tactics and techniques, communications systems and procedures, medical cross-training, and developing programs for the distribution of food and water.

#### SOF COUNTERNARCOTICS EFFORTS

Special Operations Forces continue to be active in the ongoing war against drugs and narcoterrorism.

As a supporting command to the regional CINCs, SOCOM provides both personnel and resources. Typical counter-drug support includes communications support, training with host-nation forces on riverine and small boat operations, military skills, and overt peacetime psychological operations training directed at gaining support for U.S. counter-drug efforts, defeating narcotrafficking, and educating the local populace.

#### USSOCOM FISCAL YEAR 1993 BUDGET

Now, a word about SOCOM's portion of the President's budget. Everything in our budget is essential for maintaining the readiness

that our forces require, and for giving our Nation's Special Operations Forces, the capability they require for protecting and promoting our interests for the future. We are asking for only a little more than 1 percent of the total DOD budget.

Now that we have assumed control of our own program and budget, we must continue to be permitted the opportunity, and provided the resources, to modernize our capabilities with planned joint and interoperable systems. We need the resources to conduct research and to develop equipment that meets our validated requirements, while continuing to upgrade present systems.

Remaining at the leading edge of technology is very important to the future of SOF and to the credibility of our Nation. Our most important modernization effort for the 1990s is for improved air and maritime mobility systems.

SOF must have the operational capability to infiltrate and exfiltrate forces into and out of denied areas under all threat conditions. This is a fundamental capability that was demonstrated repeatedly during Operations Just Cause and Desert Storm.

If I may, Mr. Chairman, I would like to use about seven charts to discuss the potential of Special Operations Forces and the utility of Special Operations Forces as we look to the future.

[The following information was received for the record:]







# UNITED STATES SPECIAL OPERATIONS COMMAND

173


- **SUPPORTING MISSION:**

- PREPARE ASSIGNED FORCES TO CARRY OUT SPECIAL OPERATIONS, PSYCHOLOGICAL OPERATIONS, AND CIVIL AFFAIRS MISSIONS AS REQUIRED.


- **SUPPORTED MISSION:**

- PLAN AND CONDUCT SELECTED SPECIAL OPERATIONS, IF DIRECTED BY THE PRESIDENT OR SECRETARY OF DEFENSE.

# SO F MISSIONS ACROSS THE CONTINUUM









# STRATEGIC PERSPECTIVE

- CHANGING THREAT TO US NATIONAL INTERESTS
- THIRD WORLD REALITIES:
  - SOCIO - ECONOMIC DECLINE
  - ETHNIC STRIFE
  - SPREAD OF RELIGIOUS FUNDAMENTALISM
  - POLITICAL INSTABILITY
  - RESOURCE SHORTAGES
  - NARCOTRAFFICKING → NARCOTERRORISM
  - WEAPONS PROLIFERATION
  - TERRORISM AS AN INSTRUMENT OF POLICY
- WORLD IS LESS STABLE
- INCREASING OPPORTUNITIES TO ATTAIN NEW DIMENSIONS OF FREEDOM AND DEMOCRACY



# **SOF ROLE IN NATIONAL STRATEGY**

- **MUST EMPHASIZE MILITARY CAPABILITIES TO  
ACHIEVE TWO OBJECTIVES:**

- (1) DETER OR COUNTER VIOLENCE**
- (2) PROMOTE NATION ASSISTANCE**









# UTILITY OF SPECIAL OPERATIONS FORCES

- SOF IS LOW COST/HIGH PAYBACK
  - 1% OF TOTAL PERSONNEL
  - 1.1% OF DOD BUDGET
- SPECIALIZED BY REGION... EFFECTIVE ACROSS OPERATIONAL CONTINUUM
- IDEALLY SUITED FOR LIC AND NATION ASSISTANCE
- POLITICALLY ACCEPTABLE WHEN CONVENTIONAL FORCES ARE NOT
- JOINT SURGICAL STRIKE CAPABILITY
- SOF - CONVENTIONAL FORCES OPERATING TOGETHER MAXIMIZE FORCE POTENTIAL/CAPABILITY

The CHAIRMAN. Do we have a mike for him to carry over there?

#### USSOCOM MISSIONS

General STINER. I can speak loud enough if it will pick up.

First of all, our mission falls into two categories. The first is a supporting mission and approximately 90 percent of everything we do is in this area. It is my responsibility to provide the combatant commanders, the unified CINCs—regional commanders—trained and ready Special Operations Forces, psychological operations forces, and civil affairs forces to carry out missions in their theaters in accordance with their plans and in support of the country teams that are a part of their region.

From now on, when I refer to SOF, I am including all Special Operations Forces except what we call our surgical forces, and we keep them fenced to respond to national crisis, as I will mention in a few minutes.

What I am referring to here are all Green Berets. I am referring to the SEALs that are out in these countries. I am referring to special air operations assets, to Army air operations assets, and all of those from the Army side of the House as well as the Navy and the Air Force.

I am also referring to all psychological operations and civil affairs forces. These three kinds of forces are integral to the process of total readiness and total capability, whether for a peacetime assistance situation or a combat situation in support of a regional CINC.

It is like a three-legged stool. If you fail to include one in the planning, the stool does not stand up very well, and neither do you have the total capability that SOF brings to the battlefield or the regional requirement.

The other 10 percent of what we must be prepared to do, which is a critically important mission from a national standpoint, is to be prepared to respond at the direction of the President and the Secretary of Defense to some crisis that is threatening the interests of the United States—a crisis that is normally beyond the capability of the CINC in whose area it is to respond.

This may be because he does not have the right kind of forces to deal with the situation. It may be because he does not have the lift, the right kind of lift, to get them there or the right kind of command and control capability. In this situation, we get the order direct. We can respond wheels up with an appropriately tailored task force within 4 hours, going anywhere in the world, to accomplish the mission.

What might fall into this category? Well, it could be a complex mission, such as, for example, a cruise liner that has been hijacked on the open ocean. That is one of the most challenging targets we have because most of them have over a thousand rooms that have to be searched and cleared, and there are usually twice as many nooks and crannies in the belly of that ship where explosives could be hidden or where terrorists could hide that have to be cleared and searched.

Or, it might be the takeover of one of our embassies in some remote part of the world by some extremist group that has already started killing people and throwing American bodies out the win-



dow or over the walls and the time for negotiations has long since passed. Those are the missions that we train for on a daily basis and that we support.

This chart reflects the continuum of conflict starting from the low intensity end all the way up to general war of the nature that we recently experienced with Iraq, or a regional type conflict. These are the mission categories of Special Operations Forces, at least the kind that we performed in Desert Shield and Desert Storm.

The point that I want to make by this chart is that SOF is applicable across the entire continuum of conflict. You can see that some of these mission areas here start very early, in peacetime assistance-type military activities, such as foreign internal defense, counter-terrorism, psychological operations, and civil affairs.

#### SOF COMBAT OPERATIONS

As we progress on up the spectrum of conflict toward combat operations, others become applicable. Again, those are the mission areas that we train for every day and the missions that we performed in Desert Shield, Desert Storm, and most of those in Panama.

The average American would probably look back to the period when the Vietnam war ended and say, "Well, with the exception of a couple fracasos that have dominated the news in the last couple of years, we have had a period of relative peace." Not so.

This chart shows that there have been 24 contingency operations since the end of the Vietnam War that the United States has been involved in. Some were rather small so most folks have never heard about them, but some were rather large and complex, such as the Panama Operation Just Cause, where 55,000 U.S. troops were involved, of which approximately 4,000 of whom were Special Operations Forces troops, and Desert Shield and Desert Storm, with 540,000 U.S. troops 10,000 were Special Operations troops.

Where you see these asterisks, it indicates that SOF was involved—95 percent of these contingency operations, in a very key and crucial way.

The world has changed dramatically over the last couple of years. The United States has won three wars. We won Operation Just Cause in Panama, we won Desert Shield and Desert Storm, and we won the cold war. We won those because we had the right kinds of forces and we were ready.

#### POST-COLD WAR CHALLENGES

But the relative world order has changed dramatically over the last 2 years, with the coming down of the Berlin Wall and the disintegration of the Soviet Union as we knew it.

No one really knows where this series of events, as a result of what has taken place in Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union, will lead. All is not at peace yet, though, in the former Soviet Union. We must not forget that there are still some 127 ethnic groups in the southern part of the former Soviet Union, and they all are not at peace with each other. It remains to be seen how all of that will play out.

While all this was taking place, nothing was occurring in these developing countries to alleviate the conditions that make many of these countries so dangerous. Let me just highlight a couple:

- The spread of religious fundamentalism. We don't know what that will portend for our interests in the future, but we only have to look back over time. I think that we can see, and all will agree, that there have been more people who have lost their lives in religious wars and causes than for any other reason.
- Dropping on down to narcotrafficking, which leads to narcoterrorism, and respects the human dignity of no person, of no government, and no boundaries of any nation. Indications are that this will become worse in the future.
- Weapons proliferation, we saw some of that in the war with Iraq. Many of these Third World nations are pursuing their own weapons of mass destruction. It appears from all intelligence reports, that this will worsen as we look to the future.

Some of these Third World nations view terrorism as instruments of their national policy. When you take a combination of these factors here, or these realities that I have listed, motivated or dominated by a government that is motivated for these reasons, it could result in a contingency that could occur on very short notice that the United States would have to become involved in.

From this standpoint the world today is probably less stable than it was before the Berlin Wall came down. This is because when the Soviet Union was the other part of the bipolar organization, or power in the world, the Soviet Union dominated many of these Third World countries, dictated to them what they could do, what they could not do, and they owed their livelihood to the Soviet Union. Now they have been turned loose to pursue their own goals and objectives.

We say the world is probably less stable today than before the Wall came down, but we also say that it provides increasing opportunities for new dimensions of freedom and democracy if we have the national will to take advantage of those opportunities, and if we use our military forces and their capabilities as instruments of U.S. national policy in taking advantage of those opportunities by helping those nations that want our help and that deserve our help.

#### SOF PEACETIME UTILIZATION

Special Operations Forces are the best forces in a peacetime situation to do that. As we adjust our national strategy to compensate for this changed world situation and threat, we must emphasize the military capabilities to achieve two objectives.

The first is to deter and/or counter violence with the right kind of forces and the second is to promote nation assistance by helping those countries with problems that need our help.

As I look at this map, it reminds me of two things, especially the yellow highlighted portions. One, that last year we had 251 teams, and I define a team as anywhere from two people to several hun-

dred people, and they were in 75 different countries, in every geographic region of the world.

As I look at that map today, we have out there 3,994 teams, and they are in 38 countries, in every geographic region of the world.

As was mentioned by Congressman Dickinson, our people are forward employed, they are not forward deployed on any exercises. They are out there responding to those countries that want our help and that have problems, problems of incipient insurgency, disease, poverty, lawlessness, those kinds of conditions that, if left without some help, will normally result in the downfall of that friendly government and could result in the contingency operation, or a larger operation, for the United States in the future. That is what they are doing every single day.

Those same approximately 4,000 troops will be there come Easter, come the 4th of July, or those that will replace them in those same 38 countries or other countries, and that is the way it is every day with SOF.

The point that I want to make here is they are performing as instruments of U.S. national policy in furthering our interests with those countries and in those regions where our help is needed.

I would like to end this little briefing with this chart. SOF is very low cost but very high payback. We are only 1 percent of the total DOD personnel strength and only 1.1 percent of the total DOD budget. Moreover, our forces are specialized by region.

What that means is that our forces are far more mature than the usual forces that you find in the combat units, and the support units in the respective services. For most of our units, we take only officers and NCOs, and they have to meet certain criteria before they can be selected for these units.

Then, in particular, with regard to Green Berets, they are put into groups that are focused and oriented on certain geographic regions of the world. They study the language and they study the culture so that they are the most effective they can possibly be when they are committed to these situations.

They are effective across the entire operational continuum of conflict. They are ideally suited for low-intensity conflict and nation assistance-type activities. They are politically acceptable when conventional forces are not. Politically acceptable more so to the host nation that has the problem that needs assistance politically acceptable to our leadership, you here in Washington. Even though they are the best trained combat troops in the world, they are looked upon as assistants and helpers, teachers and trainers and nonprovocative. Whereas, if you put a platoon of the 82d Airborne or a platoon of marines in one of those countries, they would be considered combat and therefore provocative.

We have the best joint surgical strike capability in the world, and when we go into closed session, I will be able to tell you more about that, and we are going to keep it that way. When you use SOF and conventional forces operating together, you maximize force potential and capability—and what I mean here is what you witnessed and saw manifested as a result of how we used Special Operations and conventional forces in Panama and in Desert Storm.



## SUMMARY

Mr. Chairman, in summary, our Nation's Special Operations Forces provide our national leadership and the theater CINCs with the capability and latitude of options for best dealing with the challenges that we are most likely to face for the foreseeable future, ranging from specialized peacetime operations to equally specialized conflict support. They represent our Nation's finest and most capable forces.

You don't read about them much in the papers because they don't seek glory for themselves, yet they do not hesitate to lay it on the line for their country when called upon to do so. In the last two major combat operations, Just Cause and Desert Storm, 31 gave their lives in combat, and 100 more were wounded, proportionately more than any other military service.

Mr. Chairman, once again, I appreciate the opportunity to appear before this panel and to present my views. I ask for your continued support for our Nation's Special Operations Forces, and they will continue to give you and our Nation their very best in meeting our future security needs.

In my judgment, there is no better investment for our future as well as for the countless millions around the world who suffer from disease, poverty, and oppression and who now, more than ever before, look to the United States for leadership and hope.

Thank you very much. I will be glad to answer your questions.

## PREPARED STATEMENT OF GEN. CARL W. STINER

## INTRODUCTION

Mr. Chairman and distinguished members of the panel, I appreciate this opportunity to appear before you to discuss the strategic employment of our Nation's special operations forces—a capability of increasing importance in our rapidly changing world.

The post-cold war international environment presents the United States with security challenges that are unprecedented in ambiguity, diversity, risk—and opportunity. For the first time since the 1930s, no single power confronts the United States as a clear and present military danger. However, the failure of communism and the end of the cold war do not eliminate threats to U.S. interests, negate U.S. responsibilities to friends and allies, nor void the necessity for potent, versatile and ready U.S. military forces.

The special operations forces (SOF) of the United States, comprised of special operations, psychological operations and civil affairs forces from the Army, Navy and Air Force, are essential to a balanced national defense posture in this complex international environment. Special operations forces are versatile, ready and uniquely capable of operating in all political-military environments; from peacetime training, internal defense and nation assistance operations requested by allies and international partners, to full-blown conventional warfare. As such, our Nation's special operations forces can be used as an instrument of U.S. national policy in its efforts to promote international stability, foster economic and political pluralism, and reduce conditions that create human misery and fuel insurgencies in selected countries around the world.

Special operations forces make significant contributions to U.S. defense strategy by (1) deterring and, when directed by the National Command Authorities, taking direct actions to counter threats to U.S. interests; and (2) supporting the political, economic, social and military infrastructure development of nations around the world in order to neutralize instability, promote legitimacy, and foster pluralism. Language skills and regional and cultural familiarity enable SOF to make unique contributions toward protecting and promoting U.S. interests across the operational continuum. Special operations forces offer the National Command Authorities and defense policymakers a low-cost, viable capability for demonstrating U.S. interest and resolve in every region of the world.

The versatility of special operations forces gives them a particular advantage and usefulness. They can be employed in a variety of roles where political constraints restrict the use of high visibility conventional forces. In conflict situations, special operations forces are a combat multiplier that, when integrated with conventional forces, maximize force potential and capability. In peacetime, they are applicable as instruments of our national policy.

As Commander in Chief, U.S. Special Operations Command (USSOCOM), I have global responsibility for providing combat ready Army, Navy and Air Force special operations forces to the war-fighting CINCs who are directly responsible for furthering our Nation's security interests throughout the world. In addition, when directed by the President or the Secretary of Defense, I am responsible for planning and conducting selected special operations.

Our Nation's special operations forces remain ready; our strategic capabilities across the operational continuum have been demonstrated daily during the past year. During fiscal year 1991 alone, USSOCOM employed 2,000 teams in 75 countries in every region of the world. Many of these deployments provided a significant and needed presence in areas where no U.S. military forces are stationed . . . or regularly deployed.

Today, in addition to the special operations forces that remain employed in the Persian Gulf Region in support of Operation Provide Comfort (Residual) and who are caring for displaced Haitian refugees and supporting Operation Guantanamo (GTMO) at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, USSOCOM has forces employed in 32 different countries in every region of the world. These soldiers, sailors and airmen are professional instruments of U.S. policy. They are forward employed, performing their respective missions every day of the year, from the grassroots level—where the problems are—to the ambassadorial level, giving advice and assistance and coordinating requirements, all for carrying out the interests of the United States.

For example, USSOCOM's special operations, psychological operations and civil affairs forces are providing assistance and training to host-nation forces and officials by assisting doctors and medical officials in disease prevention and child health care, caring for and feeding displaced persons, supporting our Nation's fight to combat the scourge of drugs, and assisting host-nation foreign internal defense activities through military-to-military training programs. Additionally, when requested by host-nation governments, special operations forces are working together with conventional forces engineer units and host-nation forces building school houses, roads and medical facilities. Today, special operations forces survey and assessment teams are working with American embassies in several Eastern Europe and Pacific region countries participating in language immersion training and working to determine what type nation assistance support SOF can provide when U.S. assistance is requested.

Our Nation's special operations forces are ideally suited for support of the *National Military Strategy* (January 1992) and play a vital role as an instrument of American foreign policy. Your recognition that special operations forces represent a tremendous capability at a relatively low cost and your continued support have helped improve our posture significantly.

#### THE GLOBAL ENVIRONMENT AND U.S. SECURITY

In recent years, we have witnessed some momentous events; dramatic progress in strategic arms control negotiations, the end of the cold war, a major military victory in the Middle East with a coalition led by the United States, the withdrawal of Soviet forces from Eastern Europe, the collapse of the Warsaw Pact, and the demise of the Soviet Union as we have known it for the past 40 years. But in the midst of all this change, there remain some constants which necessitate tempering hope with realism.

Improved relations with the countries of Eastern Europe and the republics of the former Soviet Union, and the accompanying reduced risk of global nuclear warfare should not obscure our view of the realities of a world that will continue to grow more dynamic, complex and ambiguous. The only thing certain is that the United States no longer faces a monolithic union intent on defeating it. International turmoil, aggression and conflict are not things of the past. There will still be numerous conflicts that either directly or indirectly threaten U.S. interests.

Drives for regional hegemony, resurgent nationalism, ethnic and religious rivalries, rising debt, drug trafficking and terrorism will challenge the international order as it has seldom been challenged before. Widely available and sophisticated conventional, nuclear, biological and chemical armaments, coupled with new means to deliver them, will render the international arena even more volatile. Within developing nations, dramatic increases in population and growing dissatisfaction with



the perpetual gap between rich and poor will continue to be major causes of unrest and insurgency; the problems associated with rising political and economic expectations will be even more pronounced. Social upheaval could lead to the establishment of repressive regimes that may threaten the very security interests the United States is trying to nurture and preserve.

As a result of these conditions, the number of viable players in international politics will increase significantly. New combinations of power will develop while traditional international relationships will be called into question. In a world marked by competing political, social and economic systems, there will always be those who consider their interests at odds with the United States.

These realities present diverse and ambiguous security challenges to the United States. These challenges range from immediate to long term, from overt aggression to latent political instability, from the resurgence of powerful repressive governments to a variety of renegade regimes and unstable rulers, from terrorism to narcotrafficking. Capabilities for countering one threat may be ineffective or unusable against another threat.

*The National Security Strategy of the United States* (August 1991) points out that a primary objective of the United States in today's international system is to champion "a stable and secure world where political and economic freedoms, human rights and democratic values flourish." In this regard, the ability of the United States to provide leadership and to exert military and economic influence globally is unmatched. International security will not rest on the good intentions of individual countries and leaders; Iraq's bold invasion of Kuwait demonstrates the perils of such security approaches. The challenges to global stability are such that they are unlikely to be mitigated without active engagement by the United States. The distinctive role of the United States is rooted not only in its power, but also in its values. The United States cannot solve all the world's security problems. However, it must remain the country to whom others turn in distress.

#### U.S. DEFENSE POSTURE AND SPECIAL OPERATIONS FORCES

The Armed Forces of the United States, in concert with other elements of U.S. strategy, are an effective means for contributing to a stable world that is based on the rule of law, self-determination, political and economic pluralism, and regional cooperation. In this evolving international era, our military forces continue to support U.S. and allied security interests with versatile and ready land, maritime and air forces. The U.S. military responds to threats to U.S. interests with forward-based forces under unified commands, reinforced as needed with rapid deploying forces from the continental United States. In addition, our military forces are employed in peacetime military activities requested by, and in support of, Third World governments aimed at fostering political legitimacy, democratic values, and viable civic infrastructures.

Long before the end of the cold war, growing nontraditional threats to U.S. interests prompted the revitalization of special operations capabilities as a vital component to our Nation's defense capabilities. The U.S. Special Operations Command has been given broad responsibility to maintain versatile and ready special operations forces to support theater unified commands and, if directed by the National Command Authorities, to exercise command of selected special operations. In addition to the execution of critical combat roles, tailored special operations forces support nation assistance programs at levels politically acceptable to host nations. U.S. special operations forces provide the National Command Authorities and the theater unified commanders with the flexibility required to execute options ranging from specialized peacetime capabilities to equally specialized wartime support, while at the same time aggressively preparing for a demanding and challenging future.

#### SPECIAL OPERATIONS FORCES—THE FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLES

The distinctive capabilities and characteristics of special operations forces rest on five fundamental principles that prepare the force for any mission. First and foremost, special operations units require *high-quality and mature soldiers, sailors and airmen*. Additionally, *intense training* and *highly advanced technology* give special operations forces the specialized capabilities required by their mission areas. *Forward-looking doctrinal—development* and *versatile force structures* ensure that training and technology remain focused on future threats and missions. Uncompromising adherence to these principles will guide our Nation's special operations forces today and provide the foundation for successfully meeting future challenges.



### *Quality people*

The most important of these fundamentals is the selection and retention of high-quality soldiers, sailors and airmen for special operations forces. High-quality people enable special operations forces to meet challenges across a broad spectrum of mission requirements with maturity, skill and initiative. The long-term readiness of special operations forces requires the development of personnel programs, with the military services and USSOCOM working closely together, that promote the growth of a vigorous and competitive force.

Volunteers for special operations units must first demonstrate their maturity, intelligence, combat skills and physical toughness in their parent services, and then successfully complete an extensive, rigorous selection process. Such a selection process provides special operators ready to work under the most demanding and stressful conditions, to include situations where the reputation of the United States may rest on the successful completion of an assigned mission.

Experiences in recent years demonstrate that it is the motivation, training and high calibre of the special operations soldiers, sailors and airmen that contribute most significantly to the versatility and readiness of our Nation's special operations forces. For example, special operations forces successfully executed special reconnaissance and direct action missions deep in enemy territory in support of the campaign plan during Operation Desert Storm; they supported humanitarian assistance operations in northern Iraq during Operation Provide Comfort, disaster relief operations in Bangladesh during Operation Sea Angel and today are employed assisting and supporting displaced Haitian refugees on Operation Guantanamo; they secured key command and control facilities, patrolled critical waterways and provided operational intelligence during Operation Just Cause in Panama; and, together with the services and intergovernmental agencies, special operations forces continue to vigorously support our Nation's counterdrug strategy.

As in the past, the very finest volunteers must be attracted to forces with demanding, uncompromising standards and challenging missions. Ensuring that this tradition continues is vital to the future success of special operations forces.

### *Specialized training*

The second fundamental principle of special operations forces is the necessity for rigorous and demanding training to exacting standards. Only first-class training guarantees readiness for war. Training must include not only autonomous special operations exercises, but regular and demanding joint training with conventional land, maritime and air forces. Special operations forces train for missions in contingency operations and war that, in accordance with joint and service doctrine, only they conduct. Therefore, special operations training must be as challenging and as exacting as the demands of contingency and wartime missions.

Special operations skills include language proficiency and cross-cultural, regional orientations that enhance their effectiveness during peacetime military assistance activities in support of theater unified commands and friendly foreign governments. For example, a special operations soldier provided linguistic and information support for the U.S. Ambassador to the People's Republic of Mongolia during a recent humanitarian/medical assistance operation. In Cameroon, a small team of regionally focused special operations civil affairs forces inoculated over 58,000 people against the deadly meningitis disease and treated an additional 1,700 people for a wide range of ailments. For many of these Cameroonian people, it was the first time in their lives to have seen a doctor. These same skills serve as force multipliers in conflict, especially in combined operations with allies and international partners. This point was ably demonstrated during Operation Desert Shield/Desert Storm when special operations forces were attached to coalition units for coordination and liaison, training in tactics, combat techniques and procedures—to include planning and calling for close air support—and for support during the liberation of Kuwait.

Leader training, especially mid-career professional development, is of particular importance. In addition to the outstanding leadership training provided by the services, special operations leaders must refine their tactical and technical skills, sharpen their focus on the integration of special operations forces in joint operations, and increase their understanding of the unique requirements inherent in peacetime military assistance activities. Integrating special operations capabilities into computer-driven command post exercises and battle simulations will also enhance the training and tactical proficiency of both conventional and special operations leaders.

### *Technological superiority*

The identification and exploitation of emerging technology are vital to special operations forces. When combined with proper planning and execution, technological

superiority is a vital special operations force multiplier which has been decisive in offsetting enemy superiority in numbers, firepower or mobility.

High-technology research and development are key components to special operations modernization planning. Special operations and service research and development programs are, and will be, closely coordinated to preclude wasteful duplications and to take advantage of shared capabilities. Special emphasis will be given to developing improved mobility programs, flexible command and control systems, enhanced night vision capabilities, and integrated communications systems for special operations and conventional forces at every level of command. These programs enhance the ability of special operations forces to respond rapidly and to conduct synchronized, deep penetrations into and out of denied areas. Technological exploitation is enhanced by the relatively smaller size of the special operations community and enables shorter decision and implementation timelines.

To develop and field the right systems on time, special operations research and development programs must be carefully tailored, closely managed and aggressively pursued. A primary challenge in this area, therefore, is to discriminate among emerging technologies and to select those that, through further development, provide the greatest benefit for the resources expended.

#### *Modern doctrine*

Doctrine for special operations forces must be sufficiently flexible to permit operations in a joint or combined environment, or as an autonomous, joint force. Special operations doctrine must also focus on the coordinated integration of special operations capabilities with conventional forces to achieve maximum combat power and effectiveness. To successfully meet these requirements, it must address the broad range of special operations capabilities, from mid-high intensity conflict such as Operations Just Cause and Desert Storm to humanitarian and security assistance programs, symbolized by Operation Provide Comfort in northern Iraq. In these operations, special operations forces were required to transition overnight from a combat role to a provider of humanitarian and security assistance.

While special operations doctrine proved effective during Operations Just Cause and Promote Liberty in Panama and Operations Desert Shield/Desert Storm and Provide Comfort in the Persian Gulf region, continuous updating is needed to provide a framework for future special operations force structure and modernization decisions.

#### *Force structure modernization*

An effective force structure must posture special operations forces to implement doctrine and execute strategy in the face of a volatile and uncertain threat environment. Versatility and technology must be emphasized to overcome the intrinsic disadvantages in size and firepower. Special operations forces must be structured to meet the requirements of the theater unified commands and to take advantage of technological advances.

To this end, the 3d Special Forces Group is well on the way to becoming a reality. The final battalion is scheduled for activation in fiscal year 1993. The 3d Special Forces Group, with its African and Caribbean orientation, gives our Nation's special operations forces the capability to fully support the most likely areas for nation assistance requirements to include Central/South America, Africa, the Caribbean Region, the Pacific Region, Eastern Europe and Southwest Asia. The 1st and 2d Battalions of the 3d Special Forces Group have not been idle while awaiting the 3d Battalion's activation. Rather, the Group Headquarters and the 1st Battalion were employed on Operation Desert Shield/Desert Storm and, most recently, both battalions have been involved in deployments for training and mobile training team missions in their area of responsibility.

Reserve component special operations forces play an important role in enhancing the versatility of the total special operations force. In addition to combat capabilities, Reserve component special operations forces possess individual and unit civil affairs and humanitarian assistance skills uniquely suited for peacetime military assistance activities supporting friendly foreign governments. Force planning must continue to ensure that Reserve component capabilities appropriately meet anticipated strategic requirements and modernization plans.

Adjustments may be needed in the Active/Reserve special operations force mix to reflect the changing requirements demanded by a different kind of strategic environment than that which served as a basis for force structure decisions during the cold war. USSOCOM must have the Active component capabilities to meet requirements for short/no-notice contingency and humanitarian assistance operations in more than one theater of operations at a time. The simultaneous employment of large contingents of special operations forces in just this last year alone in Operations



Desert Shield/Desert Storm/Provide Comfort/Sea Angel/Guantanamo demonstrates the need for this capability.

An area that merits concern is our requirement for in-theater logistical support. In the past, special operations forces have depended on the services' in-place logistical support structures to meet the bulk of SOF sustainment requirements. However, as service structures are drawn down, it can be expected that forward-deployed logistical infrastructures will be reduced. This will require SOF to deploy its own tailored support and sustainment organization with forward-employed special operations forces. Our 528th Special Operations Support Battalion (SOSB) is currently manned with approximately 163 troops. We have garnered lessons from Operations Just Cause and Desert Shield/Desert Storm and will increase the 528th SOSB end strength to meet the requirements of forward-employed special operations forces. USSOCOM is working closely with the Army on this force structure requirement.

Maintaining an effective mix of Active ground, maritime and air forces, with a corresponding Reserve structure to provide for sustainment and depth, is a cornerstone of U.S. national security strategy and a tenet for special operations planners.

#### SPECIAL OPERATIONS FORCES—VERSATILE AND READY

Since December 1989 the United States has fought two major combat operations. Operating in conjunction with conventional forces in both cases, special operations forces contributed directly to the achievement of decisive victories. When employed properly and synchronized with other battlefield assets, special operations forces are combat multipliers that provide commanders capabilities that will extend their vision of the battlefield, increase their flexibility and enhance their initiative.

While Operations Just Cause and Desert Shield/Desert Storm were underway, other special operations forces continued to serve worldwide in peacetime military activities involving foreign internal defense, security assistance, civic action, counterdrug and counterterrorism, and humanitarian relief operations. Using specific skills requested by and tailored to support host nations and theater CINCs, these special operations forces were employed to assist with improving a host-nation's capability to carry out public functions and provide services. In the process, the use of special operations forces enhanced host-nation and international support for U.S. regional objectives.

Simultaneous employment of special operations forces in these peacetime military assistance activities, in contingency operations like Just Cause and in war during Desert Storm, demonstrates the versatility and readiness that are the hallmarks of special operations forces.

#### *Versatility*

Versatility will be an essential characteristic of all U.S. Armed Forces in the coming decades, not just special operations forces. Our Nation's leaner military forces will be challenged by a growing number and variety of potential threats and opportunities. Each service offers unique capabilities to the National Command Authorities and the unified commanders that, when focused and properly integrated, support and advance U.S. security interests.

Highly trained and technologically advanced special operations forces offer their own brand of versatility that is uniquely applicable in a changing, ambiguous international environment. The capability to either forward employ special operations forces or to base them in the United States for rapid projection provides significant flexibility to U.S. defense planners.

In most developing countries, there are discrete economic, social and security problems that affect both the quality of life and a government's ability to function. Helping a country meet the fundamental needs of its populace is the crux of any nation's assistance effort. Special operations forces are particularly adept at nation assistance tasks that require cultural familiarity, linguistic skills and long-term commitment. Characterized by small, flexible units with a wide variety of specialized skills and regional expertise, special operations forces provide numerous forms of training and assistance to host countries. U.S. participation in nation assistance initiatives often works best when it remains inconspicuous; the relatively low profile of special operations forces is especially appropriate when U.S. presence is a sensitive issue with the host country. The use of special operations forces in focused nation assistance programs, coordinated with country teams and in support of theater unified commanders, can advance the interests of the United States while assisting developing countries.

The maturity, language skills and regional focus that special operations forces possess give them a capability like no other force to assist, train and educate a host-nation's military force, not only in military and civic action skills, but on the roles



and responsibilities of a military in a democratic society. Successful advisory assistance depends more on effective cross-cultural communications and personal relationships than on formal agreements. The use of special operations forces in military-to-military training activities and contacts can be important in buttressing fledgling democracies against the intense pressures of development.

In this regard, SOF have been a critical ingredient in theater CINC efforts to implement country-specific nation assistance and information programs that apply military resources to prevent or reduce conditions leading to subversion, lawlessness, insurgencies and possibly regional conflict. For example, in Dominica, Navy SOF provided medical and dental care to over 300 patients, repaired local health care facilities, provided health care classes to Dominica health care providers and gave basic health care instruction to the local populace. In Nepal, a small 13-person Army SOF team trained Nepalese nurses and medics in basic field medical and trauma tasks. Seminars were conducted on advanced trauma topics to Nepalese doctors and nurse specialists. In both of these cases, host governments and U.S. ambassadors were enthusiastic about the expanded role of the U.S. military working with host-country military and government officials as a means for providing essential services to the local populace and educating the military on the contributions it can make to society in peace.

In Bangladesh, Army and Air Force special operations forces continue to train the Bangladesh Armed Forces in disaster relief operations. The training, according to the U.S. Ambassador, "has helped advance the interests of world peace . . . cement(ed) a solid relationship between the United States and the Peoples Republic of Bangladesh . . . enhanced Bangladeshi self-sufficiency for disaster relief operations . . . and raised the level of technical expertise in the Bangladesh military." Thousands of Bangladesh's isolated villages are now within an hour of assistance in case of another natural disaster.

In several African and Central/South American countries special operations forces are working with the host-nation military, government officials and, where appropriate, police in civic action programs and internal defense. For example, in Zimbabwe, Namibia, Niger and the Ivory Coast in Africa and in Colombia, Peru, Bolivia, and Ecuador in South America special operations forces are training host-country military and government officials in counterpoaching skills; basic soldier training and small unit tactics and techniques, communications systems and procedures, medical cross training, and developing programs for food and water distribution.

These examples are not atypical; rather, they are representative of the missions conducted by SOF day-in and day-out in every region of the world. As such, special operations forces offer an effective means of providing a low-cost forward presence. As these examples clearly demonstrate, special operations forces are relatively low-visibility, non-intrusive assets; thus they are often more acceptable to host nations than conventional forces. In this role, the benefits of special operations forces are substantial. First, through mobile training teams (MTTs), deployments for training (DFTs), and combined exercises, SOF foster military-to-military contacts with host-nation forces. By virtue of their regional orientation, language training, and cultural awareness, special operations forces are most effective when they are forward employed, living and working with host-nation forces. Second, SOF units project a positive impression of U.S. forces as a whole and may provide the basis for expanded military contacts in the future. Third, SOF are often deployed into areas experiencing insurgencies, instability or terrorist activity to provide advice, assistance and deterrence. These deployments signal the resolve of the United States to both allies and adversaries, enhance stability, and promote U.S. influence and access. Finally, because of their small size and relative autonomy, special operations forces can "show the flag" when a larger U.S. force may be politically unacceptable or unaffordable.

Using these same skills, special operations forces continue to be active in the ongoing war against narcotics trafficking. As a supporting command in the Department of Defense counterdrug effort, USSOCOM provides personnel and resources when requested to assist U.S. law enforcement agencies, for operations support to regional CINCs, and for training and assistance to host-nation military and law enforcement personnel. Typical counterdrug support includes airlift and communications support, training with host-nation forces on riverine and small boat operations and military skills, and overt peacetime psychological operations training directed at gaining support for U.S. counterdrug efforts, defeating narcotrafficking and educating the local populace.

The primary focus of USSOCOM's forces in the counterdrug effort has been in the U.S. Southern Command's (SOUTHCOM) area of responsibility and the U.S. southwest border area under the Forces Command Joint Task Force 6 (FORSCOM/JTF

6). USSOCOM's fiscal year 1992 contribution to these two commands' counterdrug strategy represents a 200-percent increase over fiscal year 1991 support; and this does not include special operations participation in combined military training or exercises in high narcotrafficking areas.

Additionally, special operations forces can be employed directly or indirectly to counter terrorism, subversion or insurgencies, consistent with the requirements of U.S. national security policy and objectives. Special operations forces are also capable of conducting complex crisis response contingency operations on short notice with great precision—from personnel recovery missions to supporting larger operations.

### *Readiness*

The change, instability, ambiguity and risk inherent in the international security environment expose vital resources to threats that could jeopardize the U.S. economy, the well-being of our friends and allies, and our overall national security position. Contingency operations in the future will most likely require some form of special operations early in execution including special reconnaissance or direct action missions, psychological operations or the conduct of clandestine or forcible entry by land, air or sea. Global interests and international responsibilities require that U.S. special operations forces be versatile and ready for rapid and unanticipated employment worldwide.

Special operations forces engaged in peacetime assistance programs in foreign countries may, with little warning, be required to transition to mid-high intensity combat in support of rapidly deploying conventional forces. In such cases, immediate demands for special operations skills and regional expertise will not allow time for retraining. Accordingly, maintenance of high combat readiness standards while special operations forces are participating in peacetime military assistance activities is imperative.

Other special operations forces, normally based in the United States, are available to immediately reinforce theater unified commanders as required, or to execute missions under control of the National Command Authorities. While special operations forces include a number of specialized units and skills, they are all organized and trained to operate in mutual support with conventional forces.

In addition to ready combat and support forces, special operations forces provide expert and technologically advanced command and control capabilities to unified commanders. These communications and data processing capabilities operate at every level of joint and allied command. Both tailored special operations combat forces and accompanying command and control capabilities are rapidly deployable, can be tailored to specific requirements, and are maintained at high states of readiness.

Sustainment of forward-employed special operations forces in conflict and peacetime military assistance activities contributes to a high state of readiness. As the forward presence of conventional forces is reduced, special operations leaders will continue to work closely with the services to meet the necessary sustainment requirements for forward-employed special operations forces. The continued development of tailored special operations support and sustainment capabilities is essential.

### MODERNIZATION

The DOD revitalization efforts in the early and mid-1980s were responsible for the outstanding performance of much of our technology during Operation Desert Storm. However, special operations forces were low priority players during that period. As a result, much of the equipment that has been made available in the past to support special operations forces was primarily designed to support conventional forces, but later modified to support special operations requirements. Now that USSOCOM has assumed control of its own budget, we must continue to be permitted the opportunity, and provided the resources, to modernize our capabilities with planned joint and interoperable systems. Today, special operations forces need the resources to develop equipment, upgrade present systems, and field a joint force that are based on the capabilities required to best meet the needs of the Nation.

**SORDAC.** The USSOCOM Special Operations Research, Development, and Acquisition Center (SORDAC), co-located with USSOCOM Headquarters at MacDill AFB and directed by a Senior Executive Service civilian, is responsible for program management, critical service related special operations program monitoring, and technical support functions necessary for effective management of acquisition authority and responsibilities. All USSOCOM Research, Development and Procurement funding is managed through the SORDAC. Additionally, the SORDAC serves as the focal point for the rapid response acquisition process that served special operations forces so well during Operation Desert Shield/Desert Storm. Currently, the SORDAC is



managing and monitoring over 300 programs, projects and systems of varying levels of technological sophistication.

The SORDAC is fully integrated into the USSOCOM budget and modernization process by monitoring and analyzing the execution of investment appropriations, conducting program reviews and preparing all necessary budget documentation to support special operations validated modernization requirements. Additionally, the SORDAC works closely with the USSOCOM planning, programming and budgeting and the requirements generation processes to translate operational needs into stable, affordable programs. The close integration of the acquisition process ensures that special operations forces will be adequately equipped to perform the full range of required missions and to take the lead in research, development, acquisition and testing of SOF-unique materiel and equipment.

Restricted manpower funding has slowed the intended growth of the SORDAC. Nonetheless, USSOCOM has been making steady progress in developing and implementing some much needed capabilities.

**MOBILITY SYSTEMS.** The most important USSOCOM modernization concern for the 1990s is for improved special operations mobility systems. SOF must have the operational capability to infiltrate and exfiltrate forces into and out of denied areas. This is a fundamental requirement that remains as valid today, and possibly even more so, as when the main threat to the United States was posed by the Soviet Union and the Warsaw Pact.

**AIR MOBILITY.** Neither a long-range SOF air exfiltration system nor a near-term program to acquire one exists today. The lack of this capability presents a severe shortfall to special operations mobility requirements and hinders the capabilities of the United States to respond to threats to national security interests.

Our modernization effort in short- and medium-range air and maritime infiltration and exfiltration systems continues. This requirement is necessary so that SOF can travel extended distances at night, employ forces in the mission area, and extract them before daylight. We continue to push the technical community in this regard.

The modernization of our Army special operations aviation helicopter fleet, specifically the 26 MH-47E and 23 MH-60K helicopters, will provide SOF with increased medium-range capability for low level flight in adverse weather and precision navigation through unfamiliar, mountainous terrain. Both of these helicopter systems are equipped with extended range fuel systems, including aerial refueling capability, forward looking infrared (FLIR) systems and upgraded engines. Currently, one prototype helicopter for each model has been delivered for testing; the first production models for the MH-60K and MH-47E will be delivered in the fourth quarter of fiscal year 1992 and first quarter, fiscal year 1993 respectively.

The 24 MC-130H Combat Talon II aircraft programmed for procurement will dramatically improve our capability to employ SOF. The aircraft is capable of low-level, night, adverse weather penetration of hostile air space to infiltrate or resupply SOF engaged in unconventional warfare, counterinsurgency operations and other directed special operations. Currently, 6 operational Talon IIs are flying, with an additional 11 operational aircraft scheduled for delivery by the end of this fiscal year.

**MARITIME MOBILITY.** The improved Navy SEAL tactical insertion craft and advanced SEAL delivery systems are required to build an effective maritime infiltration and exfiltration capability. By modernizing the SEAL delivery vehicles and swimmer life support systems, the readiness of the SEAL delivery vehicle platoons will be enhanced by upgrading equipment capabilities to increase speed and capacity for short-range missions.

We continue to look for a SEAL delivery system in the long term that provides increased range and speed, and which protects our SEALs from extreme cold water conditions. Such a system equates to improved probability of mission success, as the SEALs will be more capable at the target site. In addition, this delivery system will enhance the survivability of the delivery system's host ship.

The U.S.S. *Cyclone* Class Patrol Craft (PC) is progressing satisfactorily. The first ship, the "*Cyclone*," was christened in mid-February and will be delivered early this summer for commissioning. The mission of the PC is coastal patrol and interdiction, with a secondary mission of SEAL support. The PC, which is a non-developmental item (NDI) acquisition, will replace the aging MKIII patrol boats that served our country so well during Operation Earnest Will in the Persian Gulf and daily in Central and South America. The new PC is an ideal craft for "Earnest Will" type scenarios and for long-range coastal patrol interdiction missions required in the Southern Command's area of responsibility.

**OTHER SIGNIFICANT MODERNIZATION.** The AC130-U gunship will greatly enhance our capability for supporting special operations and conventional forces committed to contingency operations. The AC130-U will be the best gunship in the



world in terms of navigation, target acquisition, adverse weather capabilities, and accuracy and lethality of fires. An additional benefit of the gunship is its greater stand-off capability and its ability to minimize collateral damage with pinpoint firing accuracy. Currently, one prototype aircraft has been delivered for operational testing. The first production aircraft is scheduled for delivery in the third quarter, fiscal year 1993.

The Special Operations Command Research, Analysis and Threat Evaluation System (SOCRATES) continues to be a real success story. SOCRATES encompasses the total intelligence support needs for SOF mission activities, to include computers, communications and map and imagery handling equipment. This capability now exists at USSOCOM component commands and many subordinate commands. During Operation Desert Shield/Desert Storm we shared these capabilities with U.S. Central Command so both special operations and conventional forces would have unprecedented access to intelligence information prior to and during the war.

The Joint Advanced Special Operations Radio (JASORS), a communications capability offering a secure, low probability of interception and detection is progressing satisfactorily. This radio system will improve the survivability of special operations teams operating in denied areas. JASORS will be interoperable with communications systems used by conventional forces as well as theater CINC command, control and communications systems. We will begin early user test evaluations on these radios in fiscal year 1995.

**JOINT MISSION ANALYSIS.** An essential element of future special operations modernization decisions is the USSOCOM Joint Mission Analysis (JMA). The JMA is a detailed analysis of joint and unilateral operational concepts, requirements and capabilities for SOF as they apply to each theater. With input received from each theater CINC, the JMA identifies deficiencies and requirements for each theater in planning, force apportionment, doctrine, training, organization and materiel for special operations, psychological operations and civil affairs forces. The JMA has been briefed to the Joint Staff and has been undertaken in coordination with the services, theater CINCs and national agencies to analyze future theater and national mission area requirements for special operations forces.

All initial theater and global data have been collected. The JMA data are being analyzed to guide future force structure and research and acquisition decisions as they apply to the fiscal year 1994-1999 USSOCOM Program Objective Memorandum (POM). The JMA is an integral part of the USSOCOM POM analysis and decision process. The JMA data together with input from the USSOCOM staff and a capabilities and risk assessment analysis provided by the USSOCOM Army, Navy, Air Force and Joint Special Operations Command (JSOC) component commanders, will efficiently and effectively translate operational needs into a stable, affordable program. In and of itself, the JMA does not prescribe force or materiel alignment decisions, and it is not designed to address conventional force alignment issues.

#### USSOCOM BUDGET BY APPROPRIATIONS

Beginning in fiscal year 1991, USSOCOM became the first unified command to assume all responsibilities for its own programming (MFP 11) and budget. Prior to this, all SOF requirements resided in the separate Army, Navy and Air Force budgets and directly competed with other individual service requirements. Since fiscal year 1991, USSOCOM has prioritized SOF requirements based on the overall requirements and needs of our Nation's special operations forces. Similar SOF requirements of the various services have been consolidated into single projects or programs for more effective management of SOF resources. The wisdom of this budget and programming authority was amply demonstrated during Operation Desert Shield/Desert Storm. For example, in response to a U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM) request for rapid procurement of 24 items of specialized SOF unique equipment, working closely with the SORDAC, I validated 23 items and directed procurement of limited numbers of 19 items of equipment. The majority of the equipment delivered in the CENTCOM theater, accompanied by a New Equipment Training (NET) Team, arrived approximately 30 days after the initial CENTCOM request. Additionally, the budget authority has dramatically enhanced oversight of all SOF requirements and programs.

In general, USSOCOM's total budget decreased 13 percent from fiscal year 1992 to fiscal year 1993, although within the fiscal year 1993 budget the percentage devoted to Operations and Maintenance (O&M) increases appreciably over fiscal year 1992—by 11 percent.

FIGURE 1.—USSOCOM BUDGET BY APPROPRIATIONS

[In millions of dollars]

	Fiscal year 1992 (Ap- proved)	Fiscal year 1993 (Re- quested)
O&M .....	\$741,744	\$832,010
Procurement .....	985,830	682,122
RDT&E .....	265,479	262,859
MilCon .....	55,400	4,500
Total .....	\$2,048,453	\$1,781,491

## USSOCOM TOTAL OBLIGATION AUTHORITY




FIGURE 2. USSOCOM BUDGET BY APPROPRIATIONS (MILPERS included)

**OPERATIONS AND MAINTENANCE (O&M).** In fiscal year 1992, 36 percent of the USSOCOM budget will be spent on O&M, increasing to 47 percent in fiscal year 1993. The majority of this increase is due to accounting realignments between the service budgets and MFP 11. For example, JCP exercises for Air Force SOF, base operating expenses supporting Navy SOF, sustaining engineering for Air Force SOF and all Depot Level Repairables will be funded by USSOCOM in fiscal year 1993 rather than the individual services. O&M growth is also as a result of the completion of some procurement programs and the necessity to support these newly fielded systems with O&M funds. Within the O&M budget, 72 percent will be spent in support of special operations unit training including Foreign Internal Defense (FID) and nation assistance deployments, language training and contingency requirements.

**PROCUREMENT.** The fiscal year 1993 procurement budget decreases by 30 percent from fiscal year 1992 as a result of three of the USSOCOM major weapon system acquisitions (Army MH-47E, MH-60K and Air Force Combat Talon II) nearing completion. Despite this overall decrease, funding for some programs has increased. For example, the enhancement of communications equipment will establish common SOF systems with satellite capabilities and replace outdated systems that are difficult to maintain. The *Cyclone* Class Patrol Craft for Navy SOF continues as a strong procurement program with funding increasing by over \$21 million from fiscal year 1992 to fiscal year 1993. Additionally, increased procurement funding will improve the levels of munitions for war readiness and the support requirements for classified programs.

**RESEARCH, DEVELOPMENT, TEST and EVALUATION (RDT&E).** RDT&E funding levels remain fairly constant between fiscal year 1992 and fiscal year 1993.

Increased funding for psychological operations systems, JASORS radio systems, near-real time intelligence systems, night vision enhancements, reducing the electronic signature of special operations aircraft, the use of laser and directed energy capabilities and classified programs reflect the emphasis for SOF in today's ambiguous threat environment. The research and development programs for modifications on the AC-130U Gunship and the MH47-E/MH-60K helicopters are nearing production and have reduced funding levels.

**MILITARY CONSTRUCTION.** The Department of Defense deleted major construction programs for fiscal year 1993 consistent with base closure and drawdown actions throughout the services. As a result, USSOCOM will have no new military construction starts for fiscal year 1993. Previously funded USSOCOM military construction projects associated with the delivery of new weapons systems, quality of life, and operations and training are progressing satisfactorily.

**MILITARY PERSONNEL (MILPERS) FUNDING.** USSOCOM is carefully monitoring the trend of increasing MILPERS costs. Special operations missions are personnel intensive. A balance must be maintained in our budget so the MILPERS costs do not adversely impact on the readiness of special operations forces and their capabilities to meet the needs our Nation demands of them.

#### CONCLUSION

Today, the United States is in a position to positively influence the international security environment by fostering economic progress and political stability. In this regard, special operations forces are an instrument of U.S. national policy that play an increasingly vital role in a security environment fraught with change, ambiguity and risk. The versatility and readiness of U.S. special operations forces provide the National Command Authority and defense policymakers with a wide range of viable alternatives that make them uniquely capable of making significant contributions in such an environment by engaging in operations on two fronts.

First, the United States must continue to field a robust special operations force that is capable of deterring and countering an unprecedented range of threats to U.S. interests. At the same time, the United States must field special operations forces for involvement in peacetime military assistance activities to promote the objectives of U.S. foreign and national security policies; to foster international stability, to encourage political and economic pluralism and to reduce conditions that create human misery and fuel insurgencies in selected countries around the world.

The foundation of special operations readiness rests primarily on the combination of two of the fundamental principles of special operations forces previously discussed: continuing to select the best people provided by our Armed Forces and exploiting appropriate advanced technologies. These principles cannot be compromised. To do so would dramatically escalate the cost of future conflicts, in terms of lives lost and resources expended.

Mr. Chairman, once again I appreciate the opportunity to appear before this panel and present my views.

The CHAIRMAN. General Stiner, thank you very much for that very helpful and interesting opening statement.

We will now take a short break while we ask everybody who is not properly cleared to leave so that the room can be swept. Then we will get into questions.

[Whereupon, at 10:40 a.m., the panel was recessed, to reconvene pursuant to other business.]





## CINC U.S. EUROPEAN COMMAND

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HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,  
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES,  
DEFENSE POLICY PANEL,  
*Washington, DC, Tuesday, March 24, 1992.*

The panel met, pursuant to call, at 10:10 a.m., in room 2118, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Norman Sisisky presiding.

### STATEMENT OF HON. NORMAN SISISKY, A REPRESENTATIVE FROM VIRGINIA

Mr. SISISKY [presiding]. Today the Defense Policy Panel welcomes as a witness Gen. John Galvin, Commander in Chief of U.S. European Command and Supreme Allied Commander, Europe.

General Galvin's testimony will be a great help to us as we think through the kind of forces we need to ensure our national security in the post-cold war world. The administration currently plans to reduce the number of U.S. forces in Europe from 314,200 to 150,000 by the end of fiscal year 1995. These remaining forces will comprise the European base force, which we understand is expected to act as a hedge against uncertainties such as nationalism, ethnic tensions, and religious fundamentalism.

The panel would like to explore with General Galvin both the rationale for the size of the European base force and the purpose it serves. The decision to leave 150,000 U.S. troops in Europe was made after the first modern revolution in the Soviet Union ended the Warsaw Pact threat to Western Europe. But the decision was not revisited after the second modern revolution brought about the demise of the Soviet Union at the end of 1991. This appears to be evidence of a one-revolution plan in a two-revolution world.

The panel would also like to explore the near-term military threats we face in Europe for which we would need 150,000 American troops. The strife we are currently witnessing in Yugoslavia leaves no doubt that there will be conflict in Europe even in the post-cold war era. But the existence of violence, or the potential for it, does not necessarily equal the threat to American interests to which we must respond with military forces.

A final issue we would like to raise is burdensharing. Currently, burdensharing arrangements vary among our allies. We would like to hear an update on those arrangements and learn of any efforts underway to ensure fairer divisions of the financial burden.

We are working to take the first step toward creating forces that will meet the real threats of the new era. This will take all of our best efforts. We are very pleased to have General Galvin here today to help us.

Do you have a statement, Mr. Dickinson?

**STATEMENT OF HON. WILLIAM L. DICKINSON, A REPRESENTATIVE FROM ALABAMA, RANKING MINORITY MEMBER, DEFENSE POLICY PANEL**

Mr. DICKINSON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

General Galvin, once again it is a pleasure to welcome you before the panel. In the past, we have always valued your testimony. We are here, once again, seeking your views on the role the United States should play in post-cold war Europe.

As I see it, we are in the same predicament as the early Christians who had to choose between conflicting paths to salvation. St. Paul said hold fast that which is good. Though I do not wish to make you a modern day St. Paul, we need your candid evaluation of the alternative ideas of that which is good and those things which we can do without.

I would like you to comment on three issues that are at the heart of these alternatives to the base force strategy: First, several alternatives suggest the United States should buy only enough military force to fight wars and not deter them. Proponents of this option say that while a forward presence may be possible with the resulting minimal force structure, a forward presence is not the key component to a national strategy and is not a reason to buy force structure.

Second, it has also been suggested that 75,000 is the "right level" of forces for the United States to maintain in Europe. This number provides for one U.S. division and three forward-based bare-bones tactical fighter squadrons. But it could require faster and deeper withdrawal of U.S. forces than is already being undertaken.

Third, some contend that nearly doubling the President's fiscal year 1993 military spending cuts can be accomplished without hurting people or readiness. At least, that is what they say.

General Powell has described the situation in Europe today as one of a hot peace with wars and instability on the rise and our NATO allies and Warsaw Pact, former enemies, all desiring continued presence on the ground in Europe. However, despite the fact that the U.S. force in Europe for the past 40 years has helped to maintain the peace, many argue we should now come home and leave Europe to the Europeans.

I think this is a particularly shortsighted idea, but this is one of the things we have to wrestle with. It has been the history of promises made in the past that if we in the Congress cut defense spending—and this is part of the super-budget agreement—that any peace dividend, a savings in defense, should go to reduce our deficit. Now there is a very concerted effort to tear down what they call the fire walls and not save money, but spend it on social programs.

General Galvin, you appear before us at a crucial time; we look forward to your testimony. We hope you can help us hold fast that which is good.

Thank you for your appearance here today.

Mr. SISISKY. General Galvin, another warm welcome to you for appearing before this panel. If you want to paraphrase your statement, fine. We will enter your entire statement, without objection, into the record.



**STATEMENT OF GEN. JOHN R. GALVIN, USA, COMMANDER IN CHIEF, U.S. EUROPEAN COMMAND**

General GALVIN. I would like to paraphrase my statement briefly.

We are at the end of a long period of confrontation in Europe. The question that comes up before us now is how to shape the peace and how to ensure a stable future there. I think this is a little bit different from the idea of how do we respond to threats. That is really cold war thinking in the sense that we always had a massive threat hanging over us at the Fulda Gap, or the North German Plain; 200 divisions that could attack us in 48 hours.

As we read the Warsaw Pact plans later on, we found, indeed, there were attack plans laid out. Mr. Stoltenberg of Germany has said recently, with reference to the North German Plain at Schleswig Holstein, there were hundreds of nuclear weapons planned in conjunction with the old Warsaw Pact attack. Fortunately, all of that is now something we can put into the past as we look ahead to a new era and hopefully one that will be stable. It is not stable now. It is not predictable now. Therefore, what we need to look at here is what the American role is as a stabilizer and, of course, the questions that have come up recently: does the United States play alone and how does the United States contribute to a stable world?

That is the theme of meetings such as this right now. It is very clear, I believe, that the role of the United States in the future stability and security of Europe is absolutely vital to the security of the United States itself. We know that in today's world, even though alliances may be entangling, they are necessary. In this modern, small world, acting in a coalition fashion is what we hope to do.

When we think about ways to achieve a stable world, the first of those, of course, is to reduce levels of confrontation. In order to do that, we need to see the other side draw down on force structure. That has come about to a great degree and we need to draw down ourselves to the kind of force which would allow us to continue to provide an adequate security but at much lower levels than we have today. Of course, we cannot do that by simply subtracting something from the force. We have to start with a strategy, which we have done.

It needs to be a collective strategy, as well as a national U.S. strategy. The United States has been instrumental in pushing the new strategy at the Rome summit, but also at the one before that in London. Over the past 3 years, a strategy has been worked out and along with that, a new force structure and a new infrastructure. This includes such things as the way that we are looking at bases and pipelines and ports and a new collective NATO budget and, of course, a new approach by the United States. All of that is now in implementation. The forces in Central Europe of the NATO nations, are being reduced by something in the neighborhood of 30 percent; the United States reduction is much more, about 57 percent.

The command structure has been changed and will be reduced by 25 percent. The exercises we used to have, such as Reforger, have been changed drastically. We are doing about 50 percent of the ex-

ercises across the countryside that we used to do and substituting computer support in the place of the reductions there.

We are also, of course, reducing the infrastructure program. That comes down 20-30 percent. Right now it is at 22 percent reduction. The NATO budget shows no growth, so that means it will diminish by several percentage points in real forms each year in the future.

What this does is contribute to reducing the level of confrontation. In addition to that, the structures have been linked together. That is, NATO is linked to the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe, which provides a 48-nation structure, and soon to be a 51-nation structure, bringing in the Central and Eastern European countries and changes the whole question of whether something is out-of-area or not out-of-area for NATO when we are talking about 51 nations. Indeed, that question changes again when you imagine NATO is also linked to the United Nations, the Western European Union, and the European Community as well as the North Atlantic link. All of that puts the United States in a position of great influence as the strongest power in the world today in terms of that interlocking architecture of security.

For example, in the past 18 months we have seen eight different deployments under eight different aegis within these interlocked structures. So it is not a matter of simple theory, it is actual practice. We went to the Gulf with Gen. Norm Schwarzkopf and our allies, the Saudis, but also a number of other allies which were NATO nations. In addition to that, of course, Syria, Egypt, and many other nations were present. Nations also went to the Gulf under the Western European Union in the maritime arena of the Gulf itself. We went to Turkey to support Turkey as it was threatened by Iraq during the Gulf War; that was a NATO-led operation. We also had individual nations making responses with NATO forces. For example, it was the United States which moved Patriot missiles from Germany to Tel Aviv and Haifa when another crisis within a crisis came up; the Israelis looked as if they might get into the Gulf War, which we did not want to see happen. There was yet another deployment of NATO forces into Turkey in support of the Kurdish people when they reached their state of disaster in their emigration into the mountains right after the Gulf War. In addition to that, there was a move to Zaire by the French and Belgians with U.S. support. Then we had operations in Yugoslavia and the Commonwealth of Independent States, which are still ongoing: one under the United Nations, the other under a combination of European Community, NATO and individual nations.

So we have not only reduced the level of confrontation, but linked the structures together with operational experience. We have emphasized the processes that will give us stability such as arms control and non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. In addition, we have worked the relationships, that is, recognizing that communication is the most important aspect of stability and that our strategy, unlike strategies of the past, should take into account the security concerns of those who are not in our Alliance. We are doing that through the North Atlantic Cooperation Council and it has had its first meeting at the foreign minister level. It will soon have a defense minister level meeting, and there will be a meeting of the Chiefs of Defense staff. Gen. Colin Powell and I will be going



to a meeting with all of the senior military of the Central and Eastern European countries.

Beyond that, there is a fifth way we are trying for stabilization in this uncertain future in Europe and the surrounding areas. That is through crisis management; NATO is a crisis management organization. We managed the biggest crisis the world had for a long time, for 43 years; but now there also are regional, smaller crises, which can grow into something bigger. You know them, we all know them well here in the committee. There is Nagorno-Karabakh and the others. As we look at those, we are trying to be sure we are able, in a political military sense among the 16 nations to respond adequately in a time of crisis. Our strategy is one of response during peace, crisis, and wartime.

In peacetime, deterrence and solidarity are emphasized and hopefully, keeping stability so we do not have crises. If that gets out of hand, we then do a crisis response, which is one that is positive and productive such as we saw during the time of the Gulf War. The first thing that is necessary always in a crisis is to find more information, so we need reconnaissance of all kinds, whether it is satellite, ground radar, airborne radar, or other ways to find out what exactly is going on.

To practice responding to information we have established with the United States leading, a series of NATO exercises in crisis management. The first one will start next year in February. There will be an annual cycle of one exercise per year in which the political and military leaders of NATO get together and decide how they can better prepare themselves to respond to crises.

Specifically the American aspect of this is very important. It is the recognition, I think, that the United States cannot fall back within its own castle and draw up the bridge and think of its own security. In that matter it has to consider what happened in this past century. All the lessons of the 20th-Century tell us that a coalition approach to security and stability is the best, and, of course, the most important coalition for us is NATO.

We want to stay committed to NATO and stay influential in NATO. The way to do that is to demonstrate to our partners the commitment of the United States in terms of forward deployment of forces. But not at the levels we had in the past, but at levels that are more appropriate to the situation as we see it now. So we built the new strategy and underneath that the new force structure which provides us with a capable, competent ground, sea, and air force in Europe with which you are very familiar. We think the figure to support that force is 150,000.

We are now drawing down in that direction with an aim at 1995. The ramp is very steep; I am working on that. We have gone through the phase of conceptualizing and are into the implementation phase. As always, we are finding that the difference between conceptualizing and implementation is a lot of hard work.

Right now the main message I bring here—and I would conclude with it Mr. Chairman—is that we are on the right track. We are now coming down a ramp to reach the new force structure that matches the new strategy—the new collective strategy of NATO as well as the National Military Strategy of the United States. As I sit here right now, we are moving forces back to the United States.



I have moved 230,000 people—military and families—in the last 2 years back here. I will move 80,000 back this year. Originally, when we thought about how we would make this move, I met with the four-star commanders of the Army, Navy, and Air Force in Europe and asked them what they thought we could do if we moved back in a way that would be administratively correct. That would take care of people, not get us into real problems with moving household goods—try to keep people on base to avoid moving those who have a son or daughter in the last year of high school halfway through the year to a new high school back in the United States and consider all the other things that can come about in such a big move. We thought we could move about 30,000 a year back and do it without having problems with people. Right now I am moving back 80,000 this year. I am having some problems.

I am moving some people who vacate their house, leave their furniture, and somebody else moves their furniture out of the house and back to the United States. It is not something people like to do. I am going to England to get moving vans to move people out of Germany. All the moving vans in Germany are already on the road moving us. I am having a lot of difficulties in explaining to people why we are moving so fast. I know, for sure, that I cannot move any faster than this without this thing getting out of hand. I don't want to see that happen to the people. I do not want to see it happen to the force.

This past week we closed out my old command, the VIIth U.S. Corps. I was present with 10 of the former commanders of that corps who came to Stuttgart where there were 5 hours of celebrations sponsored by the Germans saying to us what they thought of our 43 years of service there. I was very proud. Ober Burgermeister Manfred Rommel, Erwin Rommel's son, gave a wonderful talk to us before a crowd of at least 15,000 people out in the central squares of Stuttgart.

At the same time, it is difficult to explain to soldiers the kinds of adjustments that we have to make to reach the force levels, but we are doing it. If we can keep with the current plan and look at 1995 as a time when we will reach about 150,000, there may be a lot of changes between now and then.

We talked about making a plan for dealing with a revolution. It has now faced two or three revolutions. I think that shows the flexibility of the plan we made. We knew this would be a dynamic situation. We built a plan to react to the dynamic situation rather than to meet some specific threat of the old cold war.

Thank you for this opportunity, Mr. Chairman, to say a few words in summary of my statement.

#### PREPARED STATEMENT OF GEN. JOHN R. GALVIN

Mr. Chairman and distinguished members of the panel, the scope and pace of change in the European political landscape continues to accelerate in an unprecedented manner. Clearly, the most significant recent change has been the political transformation of the Soviet Union. The overwhelming military threat to Europe posed by the Soviets is gone. In the place of the former Soviet Union, we have 12 independent states, some with nuclear weapons, all striving to solve their massive political and economic problems. Even with help from other nations, the potential for unrest is very high.

The disappearance of the Soviet threat has not brought assurance of peace and stability to Europe. Other disturbing forces have moved to the forefront. Regional

tensions remain and in some cases have emerged into open conflict such as Yugoslavia and Azerbaijan. Ethno-centrism has been a historical reason for many conflicts on the continent; new freedoms unleashed by the removal of totalitarian governments have allowed a resurgence of old grievances. Despite the good efforts of the United States in the peace talks underway between Israel and its neighbors, the basic issues remain unsolved in that region. In the past decade, the trend of fundamentalism has been on the rise. Drug trafficking, a worldwide problem, has increased through Africa, partially as a result of increased surveillance and interceptions in South and Central America.

The world in general and Europe in particular undergoing a period of profound change: a transition from the known and quantifiable to the uncertain and unpredictable. No one could have predicted the events of the last 3 years in early 1989. What lies ahead in 1995 and beyond is difficult to assess accurately. Threats to U.S. interests remain, but they are less clear and more diversified. Our understanding of the new situation is not based on a slogan, but on a thought process. The U.S. security requirement has taken a new, broader dimension. We must be able to deal with an unexpected crisis or war. Our new National Military Strategy has been formulated with these factors in mind.

In previous testimonies this year, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff outlined four foundations for U.S. security strategy: strategic deterrence, forward presence, crisis response, and reconstitution.

From my perspective as the Commander in Chief of the U.S. European Command, the key to our strategy is the forward presence of American military forces. We have had and continue to have a vital interest in European peace, stability and prosperity. In the first half of this century, conflicts and instability in Europe caused us to send hundreds of thousands of American troops to fight in two bloody wars to restore peace. Economically, we have been a significant trading partner with European countries and now enjoy a growing and sizable trade surplus with Europe of some \$17 billion in 1991. Much of our culture and heritage comes from Europe and almost 1.7 million U.S. civilians live and work there. In short, American security remains indivisible from European political, economic, and military stability.

After the first World War, we developed an isolationist attitude and turned our backs on Europe. In doing so, we left behind an unstable and potentially explosive situation. The lack of any cohesive structure or forum to resolve national disputes, coupled with intense political and economic nationalism, eventually led to war. Despite our reluctance, we came back to restore peace and protect our interests, but at a staggering cost in American lives and treasure.

The end of World War II left the same potential for further instability. The military power and growing ambitions of the Soviet Union as it began to dominate Eastern Europe influenced us to remain and caused the formation of the North Atlantic Alliance. Our presence for over 40 years helped prevent further Soviet expansion and fostered a setting for Western European nations to grow and prosper together. This U.S. commitment manifested by forward presence has paid off. The second half of this century has seen peace and stability. The difference between the first half and the second half of the 20th century can be attributed in great degree to one significant factor . . . the commitment of the United States as shown by the continuous presence of American military forces in Europe.

Now we are in a similar situation after another war. The cold war is over and our former adversaries now look on us as friends and helpers as they face difficult times. Although much has changed, the world remains too small, our economy too global, and our resources too limited to withdraw from Europe to "fortress America." History clearly shows that our military presence has a stabilizing effect on Europe while benefiting our own security. Our allies also recognize this fact. At the Rome Summit last November, they agreed that the "presence of North American conventional and U.S. nuclear forces in Europe remains vital to the security of Europe, which is inseparably linked to that of North America." For over 43 years, our involvement in NATO has been the mainstay of the Alliance.

NATO is the most successful security organization in history. North Atlantic solidarity and collective defense brought the cold war to a successful conclusion. We now need to view NATO from a new and broader perspective. While Western Europeans come to terms with the security implications of the political transformation of the Soviet Union, the Eastern Europeans are looking for new structures in which to anchor their security. NATO has the experience, infrastructure, and mechanisms to adapt successfully to the changing security environment. Over the past 2 years, at meetings in London, Copenhagen, and Rome, the Alliance developed and approved a new Strategic Concept to meet these new challenges.

The Concept proposes smaller forces, increased mobility, measured readiness levels, multinational forces, force generation, military-to-military contacts with former



adversaries and an emphasis on crisis management. NATO, through the North Atlantic Cooperation Council, provides a forum for the countries of Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union to discuss their security concerns. Poland, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, and even Russia have asked to join NATO. These countries recognize that NATO offers the best way to address their security requirements and is the only alternative to re-nationalized defense structures. In addition to increased dialog and cooperation with former adversaries, the Alliance has been active on other fronts.

NATO nations have used their forces at least eight times under the auspices of as many as six different organizations over the past 18 months. In the Gulf War, NATO Airborne Early Warning Aircraft and portions of the Allied Command Europe Mobile Force (Air) were sent to Turkey while other NATO forces were used to secure Mediterranean lines of communication. Naval forces from NATO countries were employed under control of the Western European Union. Forces from 15 NATO countries participated in the Desert Storm coalition. NATO nations under another coalition responded to the plight of the Kurds in Operation Provide Comfort. Patriot missiles from NATO countries were sent to Israel. Some NATO assigned forces were used to evacuate foreign citizens from Zaire; some NATO members, under the United Nations flag, have sent forces to Yugoslavia as observers and will send additional troops as peacekeepers.

NATO assets and infrastructure are being used in Operation Provide Hope today. In each of these instances, the response was by NATO assigned or earmarked forces, manned, equipped, and trained by NATO nations under various command arrangements to accomplish the mission.

America's leadership role in NATO relies on the presence of our military forces in Europe. The ability of the United States to influence events in Europe derives from our visible and continuing commitment to the Alliance. To meet U.S. security requirements in the European theater and throughout my entire command, we have developed a European base force. It considers the new security environment and constrained fiscal resources. We have taken care not to go too far too fast as a hedge against an uncertain future. In addition to its military capabilities, the European base force demonstrates to our allies that we are willing to remain involved as a leader in European security decisionmaking. The forces remaining in fiscal year 1995 will consist of:

A significantly smaller, but credible theater nuclear deterrent.

A capable Army corps which provides:

- the smallest unit capable of operational warfare
- the lowest level at which optimum air-ground interface is achieved
- a contribution to NATO multinational forces

3-4 Air Force Fighter Wing including one in the Southern Region: These wings provide:

- sufficient forces for airspace superiority/air support to ground forces
- support for Mediterranean operations
- our contribution to NATO air defense/strike commitment

A carrier battle group in the Mediterranean Sea that provides:

- maritime superiority
- power projection
- sea control

An amphibious ready group with its embarked marines that provide contingency operations throughout the theater.

In addition to these forces, the base force has sufficient intelligence, communications, air defense, and logistics including associated infrastructure to support the arrival of reinforcing units from the United States or to support deployment for out of area operations.

This force, totaling approximately 150,000 men and women (92,200 Army, 44,800 Air Force, and 13,000 Navy) is less than half the size of our forces just 2 years ago. We have tailored this significantly smaller force to show our commitment to NATO, ensure regional stability, provide a hedge against uncertainty, and maintain the infrastructure and logistical support for reinforcement or operations elsewhere. It can counter any emerging threats to our theater interests and gives the United States a combat capability for contingency use in support of U.S. strategic objectives elsewhere. Versatile and capable of responding to all levels of conflict, this force package is designed to take advantage of the capabilities of each service and to complement those of our NATO allies.



To maintain this substantially smaller European force, the required numbers of people, equipment, installations, and dollars are considerably less than our cold war commitment. In order to meet the challenges that we will face in the next few years, we have identified several key areas where our resources should be concentrated. We have taken our experience of the cold war and Operation Desert Storm, tempered it with a recognition of the scarce availability of resources, and developed a list of priorities needed to implement fully our draw down plan while retaining a credible combat force in Europe.

The most important resource requirement of the U.S. European Command continues to be the need to take care of our people. Through their sacrifices the cold war came to a close and victory was possible in Operation Desert Storm. They deserve a decent place to live and work, a community that provides for their basic needs, and reasonable health care. Last year, congressionally directed reductions in Real Property Maintenance Accounts (RPMA), European Base Operations, O&M, and foreign national hires reduced our ability to execute our mission. These cuts lowered support to our troops and their families and increased the costs of repairing and maintaining the facilities.

Our second priority is the readiness and training of our existing forces. The wide range of missions that our future force may have to execute requires us to have combat ready units. We continue to refine what I call the "right mix" of training activities. This mix includes the use of computer simulations, live and command post exercises, and combined arms and joint service operations. Integrating these different methods allows us to accomplish essential training at less cost and with less resources. The key to quality and realism in training is the Warrior Preparation Center. As a joint facility, it permits us to conduct training through realistic computer simulation thus reducing the requirement for large-scale live exercises.

My third priority is the maintenance of our investment in U.S. infrastructure in Europe. As we leave, consolidate, relocate units, and close down installations, the need for maintenance accounts and O&M funds continues. Some military construction projects will need to be completed on bases that we will retain. Our request this year is modest: only five projects totaling \$43 million. These projects at Grafenwoehr, Hohenfels, Rhein Main, and Souda Bay will maintain quality of life and environmental standards on those installations. There are no plans to close or eliminate operations at any of these bases.

#### GRAFENWOEHR—SANITARY LANDFILL EXPANSION—\$11.6 MILLION (USAREUR)

1. Project expands and upgrades sanitary landfill for use beyond 1993. Improved facility will be used by Grafenwoehr, Hohenfels, and Vilseck military subcommunities until the year 2007.

#### ADDITION/RENOVATION OF ELEMENTARY SCHOOL—\$7.4 MILLION (DODDS)

2. Project renovates existing facility and adds expansion of 35,000 square feet in order to meet projected student population increase resulting from Army base consolidations.

#### HOHENFELS—ADDITION/RENOVATION OF ELEMENTARY SCHOOL—\$13.5 MILLION (DODDS)

3. Project renovates 9,000 square feet and expands facility by 64,000 square feet. It also consolidates several scattered facilities into one location and provides for projected student population increases due to Army basing consolidations as part of the European drawdown.

#### RHEIN MAIN—SEWAGE TREATMENT FACILITY—\$3.1 MILLION (USAFE)

4. Provides for new sewage treatment facility that meets environmental standards for this major transportation hub. The old plant can no longer handle the volume generated by the base and fails to meet required standards.

#### SOUDA BAY—BACHELOR ENLISTED QUARTERS—\$7.6 MILLION (USNAVEUR)

5. Provides a new three-story, 48,000 square feet BEQ for 140 personnel. The building is needed to replace current inadequate structure and provide space for additional personnel arriving from Hellenikon Air Base in Greece.

With the cancellation of the Crotone infrastructure project, NATO is exploring several alternatives to determine a suitable location for the U.S. aircraft that meet U.S. and host-nation constraints. We expect to begin reviewing these options in April and NATO plans to readdress this issue in the next Defense Planning Committee meeting this spring. Host and user nations have thoroughly examined the NATO infrastructure program to ensure that only valid requirements receive funds.

The DOD budget request for \$221.2 million in NATO infrastructure funds in fiscal year 1993 is the minimum level for restoration of existing NATO facilities, nuclear surety projects and recoupment of prefinanced projects.

Strategic mobility is my fourth resource priority. Our forces must remain capable and responsive, particularly as we reduce our forward presence. The ability to introduce combat forces into any region will remain a strategic priority in the years to come. Operations in Southwest Asia showed that the first part of the mobility equation is to have basing and over flight rights with friendly nations. Our ability to deploy to many areas of the globe depends on our allies. For the rest of the equation, we need sufficient airlift and sealift forces combined with both land and sea-based prepositioned equipment to project U.S. power. The combination of supportive allies, strategic lift, and prepositioned equipment allowed us to assemble decisive combat power necessary for the mission to succeed. The uncertain future will require us to maintain this same degree of strategic flexibility.

My fifth priority is selective modernization. Operational commanders need systems that provide the best available mix of mobility, command and control, firepower, and communications. Wise choice of available and state-of-the-art systems ensures the greatest combat capability. The key to success on the modern and future battlefield is the ability of the commander to locate, identify, outmaneuver, and outshoot enemy forces. Some of these systems that proved themselves in the Gulf War were the Joint Surveillance/Target Attack Radar System, modern multi-role aircraft and helicopters, modern multi-role naval units, and modern amphibious lift.

Finally, I solicit your support for security assistance programs, particularly those in Africa. The established and emerging democracies need support. They face many challenges that include social, economic, and environmental problems complicated by poverty, AIDS, drought, and famine. We can help them through such programs as the Africa Regional Military Assistance Program that provides a number of nation-building activities. A small investment now will pay significant dividends in the years ahead.

The next few years will test our ability to meet challenges as yet unknown. Over the past 24 months we have seen over 40 crisis events and responded to 30 by using some dimension of our forward-deployed military power. Responses have run the gamut of military activities: humanitarian relief conducted from Turkey into northern Iraq, noncombatant evacuation operations in Liberia and Zaire, and full combat operations in Southwest Asia. European-based Patriot air defense units were sent to Saudi Arabia and Israel, and U.S. European Command forces are still actively engaged in Operation Provide Comfort and are now supporting Operation Provide Hope in the Commonwealth of Independent States.

In the past year we have continued realigning our European force structure. Although the Gulf War temporarily shifted the focus of our efforts, the intensity has not changed. We brought back VII Corps from the Gulf only to pack up thousands of its personnel and their families for return to the United States. We continued our drawdown where we left off and in some cases have stepped up the pace. Over the last 2 years, we have moved over 230,000 military, civilians, and dependents from Europe back to the United States while we moved over 90,000 troops to Southwest Asia. We are now withdrawing our forces at the maximum possible rate. We do not plan to reach the 150,000 figure before 1995. The infrastructure for personnel and equipment transportation is saturated. To increase the pace would not only require extraordinary measure (as well as significantly increased costs), but also adversely affect our service members and their families. Moreover, acceleration would decrease readiness levels for those forces remaining and disrupt base closure operations.

We have made tangible progress toward reducing our European base structure with the closure of 182 installations as of 30 January, or in other terms, a reduction of 13 percent of our holdings in Europe. Our early estimates indicate that the United States could receive in the neighborhood of \$1 billion in residual value from host nations over the next few years. The ultimate figure will depend on a variety of factors, but we are confident that residual value negotiations will return appropriate compensation for our investments. In addition, we are well underway toward full implementation of the President's nuclear initiative of removing our ground-launched nuclear weapons and have already eliminated U.S. chemical munitions from Europe.

As we reduce the size of our forward-based forces, other forms of forward presence may receive increased emphasis. Today some of my forces are rotational; for example, the Mediterranean naval and Marine units and some Air Force C-130 aircraft are assigned to my theater on a rotational basis. Although we have found this concept workable for certain units and missions, it may not be appropriate for many larger-sized units. Some studies have shown the rotational concept to be more ex-



pensive than accompanied tours. Short-term costs include maintaining two bases (one in the United States and one in Europe) as well as temporary duty and transportation costs. Over the long term, readiness levels and personnel retention become significant factors. While rotational basing enhances our forward presence and allows us to exert influence in areas where we have no permanent bases such as in Africa, it is not a substitute for forward-based forces.

To meet the challenge of uncertainty, respond to crises that affect our national interests, and continue our realignment in Europe requires a commitment from the United States. We must plan our forward-based force structure in a manner that ensures a credible deterrence, promotes regional stability, and provides a flexible crisis response capability. To carry out our new strategy, we need to continue to place our highest emphasis on taking care of our people giving them decent places to work and live, the best mix of modernized equipment, and the most realistic training we can devise.

The end of the cold war and political transformation of the former Soviet Union are watershed events that offer us an enormous opportunity to develop a stable and lasting peace in Europe. Central to realizing that goal is the principle of collective security. NATO, as an organization with over 40 years of cooperation and experience, is in the best position to respond to the broad range of challenges facing Europe during the coming years. Our support and leadership role in the Alliance offers the best hope for a secure and stable Europe.

History shows us that the security and stability of Europe are inseparable from our own. This basic truth has not vanished with the disappearance of the Soviet Union and Warsaw Pact. Our European forward presence protects America and American interests and provides a link that gives us the opportunity to influence important decisions that affect our common defense. It is in our best interest to remain involved and influential in European affairs. To do so, we need a competent, credible, and operationally significant force in Europe ready for multi-faceted missions.

Mr. SISISKY. Thank you, General Galvin.

Mr. Dickinson.

Mr. DICKINSON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

General Galvin, you know it is very difficult for the average person including myself—I am, I suppose, an average person—to relate to a trillion dollars or a billion dollars. But when it gets down to the amount of money you have in the bank, the bank notes you owe, or cashing checks, for instance—whether they are honored or not—people relate to this. They really react to it.

So when we start talking about drawdown in Europe and bandying these figures about, 150,000, 300,000 whatever, it is hard to relate to what that means. But when you get down to the anecdotal experiences of many, and are able to relate what this is doing in terms of quality of life and what it is doing to families and so forth—as you have done today—it is meaningful to whoever hears it and is very helpful to us in sustaining the position of the administration and your position in the drawdown.

We are drawing down 80,000 you say this year. Well, what does that mean? We wanted to draw down at the rate of about 30,000 a year; you get to 80,000. Is this 80,000 figure you mentioned, is that uniformed personnel? Does that include families, too?

General GALVIN. That is uniformed personnel.

Mr. DICKINSON. Plus families, household goods, automobiles and so forth?

General GALVIN. All of that is extra.

Mr. DICKINSON. You say we have to go to Great Britain to get transfer trucks because we soaked up the capacity on the Continent. That is telling.



What we need from you and from the Department of Defense is—if in fact this is so—why is it impractical to expect us to move even faster than we are moving now? What does this do to the families?

What is the physical capability? Not just the residual effect of how many we have over there facing a potential threat, but not only are we forcing people out of the service—and this is an incentive, early out is working to a large degree—but we are told, especially in the Army, that we are going to reach the point where we are going to start RIFing regardless of the voluntary outs. So if you are forced to draw down even more rapidly than the ramp on which you have put us, what would be the effect? What are some of the practical things that we can relate to?

General GALVIN. I thank you for asking that question. I will answer it this way. I would like you to think of a family now, let us say a family of a sergeant. Now this sergeant has shipped his family to Germany. The family has never been in Germany before. They do not speak German. This is not some sophisticated college graduate with a Ph.D. in languages or something. This is a sergeant, perhaps on a tanker somewhere. So when he gets over there, he manages to get his family settled in. Half of their daily lives are spent on the economy, so to speak. That is, there is not a place on the installation, so the family is living out in a German village somewhere. After he gets settled in, everything seems fine and we picked him up, this same sergeant, on this same tour, and sent him to the Gulf.

He went out with the VIIth Corps and fought the Gulf War leaving the family in Germany not knowing when he would come back from the Gulf War. The family did not really excel at assimilation into the countryside. After the Gulf War is fought, he comes back to Germany, at which time we tell him his unit is being drawn down.

So now the family is going to be moved back to the United States, as I said, in the middle of the school year, to an installation which he just finds out about at the last minute. At the same time, he does not know whether he is still going to be in the Army by the time he gets back to the United States. So he's not even sure, in moving to this next installation with his family, how long he will be there before somebody comes to him with a pink slip after all this effort has been made. Now he has moved to Germany, gone to the Gulf, come back from there, moved the family to a new installation, which is not the one he came from before, and does not know what will happen to him next.

This is not to discuss, for example, the effort to get his furniture together, take the car he bought in Europe, with European specifications, which he expected to keep for 3 years and try to sell it when everybody else is also trying to sell their car. There are 79,999 other people selling theirs and taking the kids back out of the school system and then trying to get them into a school system at this time of year. School systems back here are not all that flexible and do not even like that idea.

So these are some concerns. He will probably end up sending his family to stay with his mother because he doesn't have a house at the new installation in which to put the family. So they may miss 4 or 5 months of school as, in fact, my wife did when she was

moved this way when she was a kid over there. I mean some of this is not new. It is just the amount of it that is really new. So this is the kind of thing that I think a sergeant today is running into.

Mr. DICKINSON. We are experiencing that now. That is a situation today. Now if we try to double that amount, or substantially increase it, what would be the effect then?

General GALVIN. It would get out of hand. We would break the system. I do not know how to keep a system running where we initially planned for 30,000 and are now shipping 80,000; and I am talking about the military members only.

If we had to move any faster than this, I simply could not control it. What we would have is a lot of very unhappy people, very confused people, people who committed themselves over these years to the armed services and to their country. People who we brought in saying we want you to be all that you can be, and now what we want them to be is a recipient of a pink slip on the way back with the family from Europe after having just been away for a while fighting the Gulf War.

Mr. DICKINSON. I don't want to monopolize the time. I thank you for your comments. Can we, in fact, double the rate at which we bring them home? Or even increase it 50 percent and still have an orderly progression?

General GALVIN. No, sir, we cannot. We cannot. We are at the limit right now.

Mr. DICKINSON. Thank you.

Mr. SISISKY. General Galvin, again it is nice to have you here. It is nice to be talking about something other than Croton which we talked about for the last few years.

As you know, we had a sense of Congress resolution last year that called for 100,000 people in Europe. Of course, the good thing about it, as I told the Europeans, is that we said we are going to stay there. I attended the Werhkunde conference in Munich along with you.

I am not sure they care how many people we keep there as long as our commitment is to stay there. What I would like for you to describe to the panel is how—the rationale for the size of the European base force and the purpose it serves.

Speak to the different services. I think the naval commands would stay no matter what happened on continental Europe. I think I am correct there. Would you speak to that?

General GALVIN. I would appreciate the chance to do that. What we want to do is keep a competent force. I will start with the ground force.

In order to have the capability to fight something like a regional fight such as the Gulf War, what you need today is a ground force that is a lot different from the days of, say, Napoleon at Waterloo. He didn't have deep battle, air/land battle; he didn't have missile attacks possible on him and he didn't have the question of big air attacks. He did not experience the kinds of high mobility, high intensity fighting that can happen today. In order to do that operational art of warfare—and I would say the Gulf shows us that this is a watershed; the orchestration of combat power today is so dif-



ferent from what it was not only in World War II, but at any time up until the last 10 or 15 years.

It means that the ground unit has to be able to operate with sea and air units. It is all in one, three-dimensional, multi-national environment. A division by itself—and a division is about 15,000 or 20,000 people—cannot do that. It is designed to be largely self-sustaining on the battlefield, but it cannot run the deep battle, the air/land battle if, God forbid, it is necessary, the nuclear battle.

To do the operational levels you need a corps which has the long-range communications capability, the additional fire power, artillery, attack helicopters, logistical sustainment capability, and the planning capability to work there.

So the minimum, the smallest corps is a corps of two divisions. You cannot have a corps of one division. You would have a headquarters just sitting above another one. A two-division corps for Europe would have with the divisions cut down to the bare minimum, not the size divisions we have had over there in the past. When I commanded the VIIth Corps it was 73,000 people. We want a corps of about 70,000. There are five other parts that the Army ground force contributes to in Europe. Those are air defense, long-range communications, intelligence, logistics, and the officers and enlisted people in many different NATO headquarters, in other words, the American positions within those NATO headquarters.

Now in the air, we want to come from nine wings to about three-and-a-half. We will have two divisions there, but we will also have the deep battle and the kinds of packages that have to be built that will provide the electronic warfare capability, the tankers, the AWACS, the JSTARS and all the other support that air needs. So three-and-a-half wings.

Then we want to keep the Sixth Fleet in the Mediterranean but at a smaller, lower level than right now. We feel that with the better capabilities, we can keep a carrier battle group with less escorts. We want to keep the Marines in the Mediterranean because the Mediterranean has been, over the last 40 years, where half of all U.S. response in a crisis has gone. Historically, it is the most likely place, in terms of the U.S. responses, for something to happen.

When you look at that force, that amounts to about 92,000 Army, about 45,000 Air Force, and about 13,000 or so Navy ashore. That does not count the Navy at sea. There are other things that count to the European troop strength, but basically those are the numbers. That comes to roughly 150,000. We think that that is a minimum force, a kind of force our allies are keeping there. They are each fielding a corps.

The Belgians, for example, have a corps and the Dutch have a corps in the Central Region. These corps are all going to be mixed in a multilateral sense. That means although the command in peacetime still comes back to the United States or the national authorities, the wartime planning would see these units operating as a coalition. So within the American corps there would be a German division and within the German corps an American division. We would also contribute to the Rapid Reaction Corps and the Belgian Tri-National Corps. In this way we show not only our togetherness, our coalition, our standardization, our interoperability, but we pro-



vide for the kind of sustained effort at much lower levels. We could not do this—not have that kind of structure without multi-nationality. So we really have an entirely different kind of force from what we had under the first four decades of NATO. The figure that I would strongly recommend is that we come down from 326,000 to about 150,000.

Mr. SISISKY. Have you ever believed that our defense budget—and I hear this all the time on the floor and the arguments against NATO—that we spent \$160 billion a year on NATO. If these troops were not in Europe, they would be in CONUS. I cannot believe the savings would be that great.

Am I correct about that? Forget about the forward deployment, the value there. I am talking about actual dollar savings.

General GALVIN. Mr. Chairman, I don't know where \$150 billion comes from in these studies. I will tell you that my budget this year for the United States forces in Europe is about \$6 billion. That includes O&M, MilCon, family housing, and other procurement dollars. It does not include military personnel costs. Where the rest of that money goes, I don't know.

If you want to count everything that could ever possibly go to Europe, take the Marine Expeditionary Force at Twenty-nine Palms and other places on the west coast and count that in the European force because it might go to Europe. Indeed there is planning that that force could be used under some circumstances but those marines could go to the Pacific, or they could go any place.

If you want to take Gen. Colin Powell's plan for having an Atlantic force, a Pacific force, a contingency force, you are already up to \$150 billion plus \$150 billion plus \$150 billion. That is \$450 billion. Those forces can be used anywhere. They are not used just for NATO. The operating budget of U.S. forces in Europe is well under \$10 billion. So I do not see that \$150 billion as representing the cost of my forces in Europe.

Also, regarding this idea that the soldier or the service member, if he goes to Europe, costs us a lot more money, we have done six studies on this in the past 7 or 8 years. The studies show that if a soldier costs us a dollar in the United States, he costs us between \$1.10 and \$1.20 to be in Europe. The differential is 20 cents at its highest. You have to figure what you get for 20 cents, which is a seat at the table at NATO, the capability to be the most influential nation, the chance to have a strong effect on the shaping of the future security structure of Europe, and the security and stability of the United States for that kind of commitment. I think it is the best bargain we ever had in history.

Mr. SISISKY. I am glad you describe it that way, General.

Mr. Hutto.

Mr. HUTTO. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Welcome home, General Galvin.

General GALVIN. Thank you, sir.

Mr. HUTTO. I certainly share your concerns about drawing down too much, too quickly. It appears that we are even going toward a greater rate of drawdown. That concerns me greatly. Not only for the welfare and well-being of our military, but for the fact that we are decimating our military.

I am pleased to see in your statement that you plan to have a force that is ready; we won't have a hollow force. We will continue to have exercise and training. As chairman of the Readiness Subcommittee, I have two or three questions.

We understand the United States is attempting to gain more NATO support for offsetting some of the operations and maintenance costs in Europe, particularly those costs tied to the reinforcement mission such as fuel supply centers and POMCUS sites.

Could you describe the state of these negotiations and when we expect to see savings reflecting in this area?

General GALVIN. Yes, sir.

Ambassador Holmes from our own State Department has had the responsibility for negotiating and working this issue in Europe right now; and I think he has done a superb job. The Secretary of Defense has publicly announced over 450 installations for return to the host nations. We have about a hundred of those where we are currently negotiating recoupment of U.S. capital investment. Additionally, we just completed residual value settlement of 168 USAREUR installations returned prior to January 1990, and are expecting to receive DM 5 million. Furthermore, USAFE is anticipating receipt of \$3 million for the return of facilities of Decimonanna, Italy. We have come out ahead, that is on the plus side of the ledger in terms of those closures as far as exchange of residual value is concerned. In other words, there have been questions of environmental cleanup, but at the same time we also built structures which add value to the installations; so that is working its way through.

The burdensharing now is beginning to become a much broader question especially as we look at sharing the burden of the efforts in the Central and Eastern European countries. There NATO is doing a great deal. The Germans are the number one leaders in providing support, especially financial support, for the republics of the Commonwealth of Independent States, plus the Central and Eastern European countries.

We are looking right now at a number of initiatives which have to do with better ways to store our equipment in Europe with the assistance of European nations. As you know one of the biggest burdensharing efforts has been the willingness of the European nations to include the establishment of a new base in the Southern Region in the infrastructure programs, where we only pay 28 percent. We thought first it would be at Crotone. It is not now. We will be coming back to the Congress with new proposals when they are finalized. That was a very powerful burdensharing move because no national base has been built from scratch on that basis in Europe before. So the sharing of Crotone with us by the other NATO nations has been extremely helpful to us.

Now, I cannot comment on the specifics of the initiative to use the infrastructure funds for O&M costs, reinforcement assets. I do not know—I cannot give you something on that right now, except to say it is under negotiation. We will have to wait to see how it comes out.

Mr. HUTTO. You described very vividly the heartaches, the problems that our military is having with reassignments, getting the pink slips and so on.



I also understand that it is perhaps even more difficult to handle some of the logistics with the massive amounts of equipment, some obsolete, some usable. You mentioned a minute ago about the storage. How much of that is being sent back to CONUS? How much of it is being stored? Utilized elsewhere?

General GALVIN. Well, as you know, we took some of the most modern equipment out of Europe and sent it to the Gulf where it was transferred to some units that were coming from the United States. A great deal of that equipment then returned to the United States. So, in effect, we shipped it to the Gulf and then back here. Under arms control we are shipping out a lot of older equipment, for example, the M-60 tank series equipment to other nations. That was equipment that we would have had to destroy under the CFE treaty. So instead of destroying it, we are sending it to other NATO nations. They will destroy their own, even older equipment. Thus we will help to modernize the armed forces of Portugal, Spain, Greece, Turkey, Denmark, and Norway.

In addition to that, we also directly shipped back a great deal of equipment, ammunition and supplies from Europe. We have also put some of the equipment into our POMCUS, that is, our stored unit sets of equipment and to our war reserve stocks. The net result is a drawdown back to the United States, because we are lowering the overall level of days of supplies in the war reserve stocks.

Mr. HUTTO. Thank you, sir. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN [presiding]. Herb Bateman.

Mr. BATEMAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Welcome back, General Galvin. Always a pleasure to have you before the panel.

As I sat here and looked at your statement and heard your summary of it, I could not help but be taken with the notion that it is somehow extraordinary that the NATO alliance—the most successful alliance in history, having accomplished one of the most monumental victories in human history—is here with its commander and never had the ticker tape parade to celebrate that enormous victory. How nice it is to be able to celebrate such a victory without the bloodshed that normally comes with tremendous military victories; enough of that.

Mr. Dickinson asked the principal questions I am interested in. I am interested in them because I understand the General Accounting Office—one of our favorite agencies these days is doing some sort of analysis on the pace of the reductions in our forward deployment in Europe. They verified these concerns that you spoke to us about in terms of what we are doing to our people in the human equation that is involved in the pace of the drawdown that presently is taking place. I think we need to be very, very concerned about that.

The one thing I would like to hear you maybe elucidate a little further on that under the Department of Defense's recommended base force we will have 150,000 forward-deployed forces in Europe. Our NATO allies want a continued American military presence in Europe. It is very, very important to them.

Tell us how our planned 150,000 force level in Europe relates to the kind and size of forces that the NATO countries themselves will be deploying in Europe.



General GALVIN. Yes, sir.

Mr. BATEMAN. Do they match in terms of strategy? Do they match in terms of burdensharing?

General GALVIN. I believe they match. First of all, the Germans will maintain a force in Germany of 370,000. They will be the strongest nation deployed in the Central Region of NATO. The United States will be the second strongest with 150,000 forward deployed. This is looking only at the deployed force, the force which would be committed to NATO. Most other nations commit a higher percentage of their forces than we do; about 70 percent of the force they used to have. We committed 43 percent of the force we used to have there. So our reduction is significant, but nevertheless it is one with which the NATO nations are comfortable. It does keep a capable force deployed forward, which can interface and interoperate with a lot of standardization and multinationality with the other NATO nations.

I would leave it at that unless there is another——

Mr. BATEMAN. The answer is certainly adequate. You mentioned the German contingent of 370,000 as being the largest. Do you recall what the French commitment is?

General GALVIN. As you know, the French force is available but not actually integrated into the NATO force. The overall strength of the ground force, I would have to provide for the record. I would say the overall force is 450,000; land, sea and air.

Mr. BATEMAN. What I was coming to is some months ago when I was last at a North Atlantic Assembly meeting, there was concern about a joint French-German brigade. Is that joint brigade still expected to be operative and have any of the concerns of some of the other countries been ameliorated?

General GALVIN. The brigade has been expanded into a corps by additional units of France and Germany. There has been some planning by which the corps now, the French-German corps, would be used as the defense aspect of the European move toward unification. All that is going along fairly well now. First of all, the French and the Germans have publicly agreed that that corps would have a primary mission under NATO. NATO would have first crack at the issue of security that might come up, and then if NATO did not want to act, the German-French corps, perhaps under the Western European Union, could act.

This goes along with the question of interlocking institutions. It also is something that I think the United States should support in the sense that we have always supported since the end of World War II. I remember the discussions on the Marshall Plan and at the same time we were talking about the United States of Europe and European unity.

There are minor problems, but all in all, I think these things can be worked out. This is an aspect of burdensharing actually, because when we talk about the European versus the Atlantic link, we want to see the Europeans build up more strongly without damaging the Atlantic link. If we can make this happen with the French-German corps, which may have other nations taking part also—they are inviting other nations to take part; some are indicating they might if this is properly managed—it will work out fine and

will help a stronger European commitment to the Alliance and more willingness to sacrifice and support the Alliance.

Mr. BATEMAN. Do you see this Franco-German corps as being something that strengthens the Western European Union at the expense of NATO?

General GALVIN. Well, I think that in this country we need to make our point clear that we do not want anything to weaken the Atlantic link, or weaken NATO. We have voiced this concern to some degree and there has been positive response on the part of Germany and France indicating that they too do not want to see NATO weakened.

I would be less than clear if I didn't also say that there are differences in views in all this with the nations. I think that France would like to see Europe move more quickly to a greater role vis-a-vis the United States role in Europe, more quickly perhaps than some of the other European nations might. While there are differences in views, the general thrust right now is on track.

Mr. BATEMAN. Thank you, General.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Let me just follow up if I could on the very interesting and important questions I think Herb Bateman raised. On the issue of the German-French corps. Is your position that you are talking about here, is that the position of the U.S. Government? Or are the differences you talk about also differences of opinion within our Government about this policy, about a policy toward the German-French corps?

General GALVIN. Mr. Chairman, I, of course, am a little bit reticent about interpreting U.S. Government policy. However, I think at this time that the U.S. approach to this is a very simple one and that is if it doesn't hurt NATO, let's see Europe do more. It falls within I think that envelope.

The CHAIRMAN. Because the still secret, but leaked and oft-quoted DPG, comes down harder against the French-German corps than your statement. You were kind of leaning toward the notion. This one was definitely leaning against it.

General GALVIN. At the same time in the general sense, I am positive about it. In some of the very specific aspects of this whole organization, I, in my role as SACEUR and as CINCEUR, have had some concerns, some reservations. I have expressed those. There have been other concerns here. We have discussed our interest with the Germans and the French and other allies in Europe.

There has been an exchange of communications about this for some 2 years. In recent months and weeks, the French and Germans have come forward and have said some concrete and specific things; that NATO would have the preeminence when it comes to a question of security within Europe for all Alliance members; that the French-German corps would have a NATO role and it would also have a Western European Union role; that the Western European Union would move its headquarters to Brussels to be more closely associated with NATO; and that the permanent representatives in some cases would be the same people on both sides; in other words, the ambassadors, the day-to-day decisionmakers.

All of that looks pretty good to me and I would not want to be against this. Even though I have had my reservations, I have to



admit I think we need to support the move to European unity, support the European Community with the Western European Union assimilating itself. That is nothing new. It started out as the European Union and the European Unity started as a coal and steel association.

I believe what I am saying is pretty close to what I hear as the U.S. position as I go around Washington or talk to Ambassador Taft at NATO.

The CHAIRMAN. What is your understanding about two things: The relationship of NATO to the corps, and the second is out-of-area conflicts? If there is a call, a need for NATO to mobilize to do some military action as an alliance, is it your understanding that this corps is going to come in under your command as chief NATO commander?

General GALVIN. Yes, it is, Mr. Chairman. That has been stated, that the corps could be deployed under NATO and under my command.

The CHAIRMAN. What is your understanding about the use of this corps for out-of-area contingencies?

General GALVIN. Well, the whole question of out-of-area is beginning to show a recognition that this thing exists in a dynamic and changing time. We have already gone out-of-area, those eight deployments that I mentioned earlier. Seven were out-of-area; six of them included France, and only one was a NATO in-area operation, but all the NATO forces called for by our plans went.

Some people call this the coalition of the willing a new way to look at NATO in which the interoperability, training, and togetherness is one aspect. When it comes to a crisis, we don't know what kind of crisis it will be. We don't want to have a push-button approach to this, but be able to say "We have a crisis. What should we do about it?" Nations within the Alliance might say, "I will be involved or not." Other nations may say, "I approve of this, but I don't want to send anything." Other nations may say, "I want to stay out of this entirely," but end up going anyway.

The link of NATO to the Conference of Security and Cooperation in Europe, a 51-nation organization, begins to make the question of out-of-area something different from what it was before. I don't think, for example, the media has caught up with this. I think they still think they have a confrontational issue there so they say, "What will you do if you have to go out-of-area?" We have been out-of-area seven times lately.

The CHAIRMAN. To use the corps out-of-area would require approval of both governments, I take it?

General GALVIN. That is correct. Of course, the use of any military force within NATO would require the approval of the government from which the force comes under any circumstances, so that is not really anything different.

The CHAIRMAN. How big is this corps?

General GALVIN. It is a small corps, an expansion of the French-German brigade by several battalions. In the end, it will be a two-division corps and I don't know exactly what the figures of the corps would be, how many personnel will be in it.



The CHAIRMAN. Are these divisions bigger or smaller than our divisions? Is it a two-division corps that we are talking about, roughly?

General GALVIN. The French-German corps is basically a two-division corps. It will probably be around 35,000, although the total number of troops has not been resolved between France and Germany.

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Sisisky.

Mr. SISISKY. The problem is not only the position of the U.S. Government. Our other allies are not very happy with this Franco-German corps, am I correct, particularly the United Kingdom?

General GALVIN. The creation of the corps has caused a number of nations to express some concerns. Most of those concerns fall along the lines of does this hurt NATO in some way or does it hurt the Atlantic link? There is concern that it would be some kind of move which would place the United States at a disadvantage somehow. I think that what we are seeing now is most of those concerns are working their way to a solution, because everybody would like to see a strong European response in terms of sharing the burden of NATO, and this is one aspect of that. Also, everybody is supportive generally of the move toward European unity.

Mr. SISISKY. General, I hope you are right, but in my experience, particularly with the North Atlantic Assembly, there is great confusion and unhappiness over this thing. Maybe it is getting better, I don't know, but not from what I gather and not from listening to people that come here. There is still a lot of dissension and unhappiness over this.

General GALVIN. I would like to say that I have had my concern about this. Some of them linger on. This is not a simple question and there are some problems here, but I think we ought to accept the point that the force will be used within NATO and it will also be used within the WEU. If Europe is going to move toward greater unity, they need a security and defense identity and this is the way that they have moved toward that. They want to see something that is specifically European. There isn't entire consensus on that point.

The CHAIRMAN. Herb.

Mr. BATEMAN. The concern that one hears voiced, not so much at public sessions, but among NATO parliamentarians is the concern over a joint Franco-German military capability. It unites the two largest, most powerful continental European nations in a way that, given 300 or 400 years of European history, is disquieting to people who read it a lot and perhaps pay too much attention to it. I think that is the underlying thing and the rhetoric gets talked about weakening NATO or strengthening WEU and out-of-area discussions. But I think that the bedrock of the concern is the enhanced power associated with a Franco-German combination.

Did any of this come to light during the discussions among Western European countries as to how to react to the dissolution of Yugoslavia. Whether or not to recognize Croatia, Serbia—what role Western European countries felt they should take?

General GALVIN. First, let me say that, of course, people are concerned about a situation in which Germany has grown in power and now has united. But the question of France and Germany

working together in a military sense is seen by most people as stabilizing. In other words, you don't want the opposite to be true: France and Germany to be in a confrontational situation.

The question of Yugoslavia and the response to it by NATO was complicated by the fact that the major nations of NATO could not agree on a road ahead in Yugoslavia. Some supported one course of action and some supported another.

There were three questions of agreement. Without that agreement, NATO found it difficult to respond. Therefore the European Community responded, and now that has been superseded by the United Nations.

The CHAIRMAN. Richard Ray.

Mr. RAY. Good to have you here today, General Galvin. I know you are aware of the fact that in some quarters of the Congress, there is an interest in reducing troop strengths in Europe below the 150,000 figure. What would happen if such a move did take place and you lost another 50,000 troops, for instance?

General GALVIN. Well, I personally think that 150,000 is the level that provides us the competent, capable, adequate, reasonable, and comparative force to the other Alliance forces based on their capabilities. Many nations are much smaller than we are, but they are also committing a corps to the Alliance. I feel that we are drawing down now as fast as we can. I don't see how we could do it any faster and maintain control of it.

The figure is pointed at the year 1995. I agree that a lot of things are changing. We will have to continue to study that figure. I prefer to see us have a small but capable force rather than a hollow force. I feel that the kind of representation that we have governs how we sit with the other nations at NATO in terms of our own influence, and the shaping of the future of security and stability in Europe. If the situation changes or something is drastically different by 1995, we ought to be able to look at that then.

Mr. RAY. Mr. Hutto, Chairman of the Defense Readiness Subcommittee, raised questions to you. I understand your operations and maintenance funds are already reduced below the level that you would feel comfortable with?

General GALVIN. My O&M funds have been limited during fiscal year 1992 to approximately \$5 billion. That includes \$3.8 billion for Army, \$938 million for the Air Force, and approximately \$246 million for the Navy. I have five military construction recommendations that are critical for continued operations in Europe. I am particularly concerned about the funding level for maintenance and repair projects for fiscal year 1993. Additional funding is required to allow us to maintain barracks and other facilities in livable conditions.

The response of the Congress has been to cut practically everything out of this so that I cannot maintain the buildings. Even though I am turning back over 400 installations, I can't maintain the installations for the troops where we are staying. It is one of the most frustrating and tragic things that is happening to us. We cannot seem to get any kind of maintenance or construction funding for even the minimum things.

For example, I have a sanitary fill or dump at Grafenwohr. They told me that if I don't fix it, they are going to close it. I can't get



the MilCon funds to fix it, so I am in a dilemma. I have barracks of the Army, the Air Force and Navy that I don't want the troops to live in because of the poor conditions, but I can't fix them. It is embarrassing. Besides being bad for the forces themselves, it is embarrassing for us as a nation to be looking as shabby as we are in some places in Europe.

Mr. RAY. The sanitary landfill, that is an environmental concern you have that you don't have the funds to correct?

General GALVIN. That is correct.

Mr. RAY. There is an increasing concern about environmental issues. Could you discuss any role that NATO is taking with regard to the environment? I spent about 2 weeks in Europe in August with some members of the committee's environmental panel and found that there is real strong interest from some of your people there, Ms. Marsha Tripp and Denise Baden. We met with them in Bonn and talked about problems NATO may be facing in environmental areas.

Do you have comments to make about this?

General GALVIN. I knock on wood. We are doing pretty well so far in terms of closing installations and turning them back to nations. We have not run into significant environmental problems to date. Twenty years ago, we didn't know as much about environmental issues as we do today. So yes, we do have places where we have fuel tanks underground that have leaked or something else like that. But we don't have a major serious environmental problem in terms of turning back installations now. We have put a fairly good percentage of the funding that we have had into environmental protection, especially in this last decade in Europe.

Mr. RAY. I would like to leave with you a 57-page document that we prepared based on this trip that I think is pretty well done. We learned that NATO infrastructure funds could not be used for environmental cleanups, or certain environmental compliance projects, due to the failure to achieve unanimous consent among nations contributing the funds.

Five or 6 months ago, I spoke before the NATO meeting, to a number of these countries and called their attention to the fact that NATO needs to focus as a group and support you in that respect. I would like to leave this with you for your review.

General GALVIN. Thank you.

Mr. RAY. You might have touched on this already. Germany is contributing more toward its own defense now; is that correct?

General GALVIN. I would say that the German contribution to its own defense, especially when you consider the amount of money that has gone into paying off the Russians to get former Soviet forces out of Germany, has been enormous.

Mr. RAY. Since the Gulf War, is NATO, under your direction, changing its training exercises in any fashion?

General GALVIN. Yes, sir. Our training exercises have been reduced by 50 percent. We are not out on the ground as much as we were before. We are exercising much more the integration of land, sea and air from lessons learned in the Gulf and using computer-assisted exercises to do that.

Mr. RAY. Congressman Sisisky mentioned Crotone. Is that out of the picture completely, Crotone?



General GALVIN. In accordance with the rulings of the Congress, we are not going to do further work at Crotone. We are looking for options for stationing the fighter wing in the Southern Region some other way. It might be at several bases. We are working with the Italians and should be back here fairly soon.

Mr. RAY. I know there are political concerns with elections coming up in Italy. Will we be considering a place in Italy?

General GALVIN. We will still be considering a place in Italy for the 401st fighter wing. If I had only two fighter wings in Europe, I would want one in the Southern Region, and it should be in Italy. That is the center of the Southern Region.

Mr. RAY. For the record, I think the panel would be interested in knowing how much investment NATO managed to finally put into Crotone? Did we buy any of the land and do we have it in the possession of NATO, or did we not go that far?

General GALVIN. There was an amount committed to Crotone. That is still under negotiation now as to what NATO will recover. NATO has unanimously agreed, and I think it is another indication of good burdensharing, to put aside the money intended for Crotone and await the next initiative of the United States to see where we want to use this money.

Mr. RAY. We had heard that it could be as high as \$50 million. Could you clarify that for the record.

General GALVIN. I think we should recognize that while the United States pays 28 percent of the infrastructure program—which is a large amount—the Germans pay about the same. That means that for 28 percent, we get to use it all, and certainly we used it all during the Gulf.

[The following information was received for the record:]

The Italian Government, as the design and construction agent for NATO, has obligated approximately \$69.5 million for construction which includes \$41 million for Phase I, and \$30.2 million for land acquisition for the Crotone project. However, not all of the \$41 million obligated for Phase I construction has been expended. The original master plan concept required a land envelope of approximately 3,000 acres. The Italian Government, as the host nation, expropriated for NATO roughly 1,200 acres for the operational portion of the base.

Mr. RAY. We appreciate the job you are doing, General, and thank you for coming.

The CHAIRMAN. Let me follow up on the question about the number of troops. Again to Herb Bateman's question—you said that the size of the German Army is 370,000.

General GALVIN. The German armed forces; yes, sir by 1995.

The CHAIRMAN. How about the French?

General GALVIN. I don't know the figure. My guess is somewhere around 450,000.

The CHAIRMAN. How about the British?

General GALVIN. I will have to provide the figures.

[No information provided for the record].

The CHAIRMAN. What is the size of the British NATO contingent, the British Army on the Rhine?

General GALVIN. It is roughly two divisions, but that disappears under the new force structure and the British become the commanders and major contributor to the Rapid Reaction Corps. They will contribute one-and-three-quarters divisions plus a lot of the corps troops.

The CHAIRMAN. They will still be stationed on the Rhine?

General GALVIN. One division will be stationed in Germany and the other back in the UK, but both divisions will be part of a rapid reaction force; that is correct.

Another part of our strategy is variable readiness and the readiness of much of NATO forces will come down, including the alert capability. The rapid reaction forces maintain the old levels of alert capability so they can respond quickly to a crisis.

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Lancaster.

Mr. LANCASTER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

General, you mentioned that you are still trying to work out the appropriate mix of training for your forces in Europe. Could we talk more about that? You talked about Reforger and the use of simulations, but I am concerned more about the nature of the training.

Are we in fact still training for the tanks to come through the Fulda Gap or are we refocusing our training more on an urban scenario that might be more likely, like Yugoslavia or Lithuania? Are we still getting appropriate cooperation from host nations in providing training locations?

What is the local populations' reaction to support of training? Are we in essence getting what we need from our partners in training?

You mentioned the shortfall in O&M. How does that O&M shortfall affect your training schedule?

General GALVIN. The NATO force in Europe is a heavy force based on the fact that if you look around Europe at the countries of Europe, Central and Eastern Europe, the countries of the Middle East and the countries of Southwest Asia all have heavy forces. Today there are 10 new nations that are not a part of the old Warsaw Pact and not NATO, and they have 25,000 tanks altogether. So the main training, first of all, is heavy training, tank training, et cetera. I believe very firmly that it should be. It means that if we have to do something light, we can do that, but we better be able to do something like the Gulf if we have to and try to keep that capability among as many of our allies as we can.

We do that training without the same kind of cross-country maneuver that we were permitted to do in Germany, but not in the United States. Large-scale maneuvers are less acceptable now and therefore we have moved more to putting that training on training installations such as Howenfels, Grafenwohr, Wildflecken, Baumholder and other places where we can make a replica of the National Training Center at Fort Irwin, CA. We do the same kind of training, the heavy training that way. Everything is computerized, done with instrumentation so that we get an accurate understanding of our own capabilities. Gunnery is done the same way. So we don't do as much in the countryside.

For training of senior people above battalion level, at brigade, division, and airwing, we do a lot of that with computer simulation. We have built that up over the last 20 years. It is now accepted by all NATO nations and they take part in this training with us. So we are able to do orchestration. It is campaign planning and operational art, and that is working very well. I am very happy with the level of training.



Incidentally, it costs less than what we were doing before. You still have to put enough tanks in the countryside to get your time distance factors and Murphy's Law and the friction of war and all the rest. As of now, I am doing all right in the support that Congress has given me and the Pentagon has given me in the training levels. In other words, you pay for training by paying for parts that you break and ammunition that you fire and the fuel that you expend for your aircraft and ships. That is also called OP-TEMPO as well. Right now, we have come down quite a bit because we think the longer warning times are important, but the training levels are the last thing that I would give up. You can make your forces smaller. You can do a lot of things, but you can't train them any less. In Kuwait and Saudi Arabia it was the training that counted, and it will always be true.

Mr. LANCASTER. So what you are saying with regard to the question of urban training is not much, that is up to Special Operation Forces?

General GALVIN. In Europe we have some installations for house-to-house fighting and urban training and we take our heavy forces and send them through that training as well. We recognize that we might fight in built-up areas and I think we get an adequate amount of that training. So we don't neglect that. In fact, we and the Germans and others, have put a great deal of effort and money into urban training facilities. We have one in Berlin. We have one at Grafenwohr, and the Germans have several that we use in various places.

Mr. LANCASTER. As chairman of the panel that has jurisdiction over non-appropriated-funded activities, I am concerned about that area and would like to ask you a couple of questions.

As we drawdown forces, in some cases it will be inefficient to operate exchanges and commissaries and other non-appropriated-funded activities, clubs and recreational facilities. Is there a plan in place for how to provide a level of support for your forces and families without completely eating up all of the non-appropriated funds in losing operations?

General GALVIN. Yes. We are closing outlying installations and this means we are closing a lot of support for people who will still be remaining. I am doing the best I can to make sure that we get a balanced capability in the old areas where non-appropriated funds were the mainstay. I think that is coming well.

Mr. LANCASTER. Please provide us with more information about the plans you have for how this will be implemented, because it is of some concern to our panel.

[The following information was received for the record:]

Non-Appropriated Funds (NAFs) from U.S. European Command (USEUCOM) are already flowing back to the continental United States (CONUS) along with service members. The Army Air Force Exchange Service (AAFES) dividends that military communities (MILCOMs) receive to support Morale, Welfare and Recreation (MWR) programs are based on military strength. As forces draw down in Europe, AAFES dividends will decrease. Conversely, as the military population increases in CONUS there will be a proportionate increase in CONUS NAFs. Additionally, one-third share of U.S. Army Europe (USAREUR) Army Recreation Machine Program (ARMP) revenue is funneled to Department of the Army. Headquarters, Department of the Air Force (HQAF) has implemented a MWR capitalization program effective 31 March 1992. As a result of this program all excess cash from the U.S. Air Force Europe (USAFE) bases will revert to HQAF. Although USEUCOM forces are draw-



ing down, there will be a significant residual force. These service members that remain need the MWR programs that are supported by locally generated funds and complemented by AAFES dividends. Furthermore, during the transition from current troop levels to the projected end state, MWR facilities provide necessary quality of life support to families and service members making the move to new duty stations in CONUS or within USEUCOM.

Mr. LANCASTER. We are also concerned about the use of non-appropriated funds for what should legitimately be O&M funds. As you have fewer and fewer O&M funds, and you see a pot of non-appropriated funds available that you think might not be spent, there is a temptation to dip into them for what should be O&M functions. I just simply caution you that I hope you will be vigilant against that because it is inappropriate that those soldier dollars be used for what should be paid for by tax dollars. Do you care to comment on that?

General GALVIN. The GAO oversight of the reduction and the changes that we are making in Europe was mentioned earlier. We invited GAO to come and we provided facilities because we want that kind of oversight. We want the audit trail to be there on what we have done so there will be no questions about this.

I commanded the 24th Infantry Division—the victory division—in Fort Stewart, GA, for 2 years and was audited 44 times during that period because there is always something to audit. I accept that as part of command of military forces. We welcome people taking a look at what we are doing and providing us advice. We look for it constantly from people such as the IG, the GAO, the AAS, and I would hope that your conclusion with the panel would be that we have complied with the law and that we will continue to do so.

I certainly will provide you any information that you need and I will get that to your office, Mr. Lancaster.

[The following information was received for the record:]

Installation Non-Appropriated Funds (NAFs) are governed by service, Major Command (MAJCOM), and local Military Community (MILCOM) regulations and policies. U.S. Army Europe (USAREUR) Army manages NAFs through a well supervised budget and execution process at the Area Support Group (ASG) and USAREUR level. In addition, the ASGs prepare a spending plan to ensure appropriate use of funds. U.S. Navy Europe (USNAVEUR) Morale, Welfare and Recreation office carefully scrutinizes each MWR Fund monthly financial statement and MWR capitalization program, which became effective 31 March 1992. As a result of this program all excess cash from the U.S. Air Force Europe (USAFE) bases will revert to HQAF. The procedures mentioned above are designed to ensure funds are legally disbursed within the budget framework and not used for extravagant or unnecessary reasons.

Mr. LANCASTER. I am also concerned that we don't spend all of our non-appropriated fund money in Europe just to have them spent there, rather than maybe send some of the money home with the soldiers. Again, these are soldier dollars and I think we ought to be looking into ways that we can have those dollars follow the soldiers rather than perhaps spend those funds in ways that we will not get any long-term benefits. Has there been any thought in Europe about how we might have some of those non-appropriated fund dollars come back to this country to accommodate the influx of those forces back home?

General GALVIN. If I could expand on that question because I think it is an important one; that is, the dollars spent by soldiers

in Europe. I think that the overall percentage of dollars spent by soldiers in Europe is low. Dollars come back to the United States; 80 to 90 percent of what a soldier is paid in Europe comes back here.

We have had discussions on the committee of 500,000 checks that go to Europe. 500,000 checks don't go to Europe; they go to banks in the United States and are used to pay off mortgages to pay for schools and to pay taxes by soldiers, who by the way, are out using streets in Europe, not streets in the United States.

So there is a great misconception about the idea that there is a dollar drain in Europe through the American forces. Actually that is not correct. What we are doing is using non-appropriated fund money to make our activities attractive to the soldiers so that they do stay with us and spend their money there and that money comes back here. I think that is a successful system now. I will provide you details on that.

[The following information was received for the record:]

A portion of U.S. European Command (USEUCOM) non-appropriated funds (NAFs) are in fact returning to the continental U.S. (CONUS). NAFs from USEUCOM are already flowing back to CONUS along with service members. The Army Air Force Exchange Service (AAFES) dividends that military communities (MILCOMs) receive to support Morale, Welfare and Recreation (MWR) programs are based on military strength. As forces draw down in Europe, AAFES dividends will decrease. Conversely, as the military population increases in CONUS there will be a proportionate increase in CONUS NAFs. Additionally, one-third share of U.S. Army Europe (USAREUR) Army Recreation Machine Program (ARMP) revenue is funneled to Department of the Army. Headquarters, Air Force (HQA) has implemented an MWR capitalization program effective 31 March 1992. As a result of this program all excess cash from the U.S. Air Force Europe (USAFE) bases will revert to HQAF.

General GALVIN. But in terms of what the soldier does now, practically everything he spends—I think I could show you—works its way back to the United States.

Mr. LANCASTER. My concern really is about fairly large non-appropriated funded balances in Europe that may not be needed in Europe. Those soldiers that put dollars in those fund balances are now coming back home. The question was whether or not some of those dollars could be sent back here to improve recreational facilities, to build improved exchanges, that sort of thing. That is what I was really talking about.

General GALVIN. I will try to give you something on that. I am concerned that the thinking in the Congress is to get the money out of Europe before they get the troops out of Europe. I am very concerned that in O&M, that in MilCon, in non-appropriated funds there seems to be a rush to say let's get that money back. Morale is a bigger problem than it was before. I don't want to have the remaining troops feel that the rug is being pulled out from under them, but at the same time, I recognize what you are saying.

[The following information was received for the record:]

A portion of U.S. European Command (USEUCOM) non-appropriated funds (NAFs) are in fact returning to the continental U.S. (CONUS). However, NAFs must also remain in theater to meet valid obligations. NAFs from USEUCOM are already flowing back to CONUS along with service members. The Army Air Force Exchange Service (AAFES) dividends that military communities (MILCOMs) receive to support Morale, Welfare and Recreation (MWR) programs are based on military strength. As forces draw down in Europe, AAFES dividends will decrease. Conversely, as the military population increases in CONUS there will be a propor-



tionate increase in CONUS NAFs. Additionally, one-third share of U.S. Army Europe (USAREUR) Army Recreation Machine Program (ARMP) revenue is funneled to Department of the Army. Headquarters, Air Force (HQUAF) has implemented an MWR capitalization program effective 31 March 1992. As a result of this program all excess cash from the U.S. Air Force Europe (USAFE) bases will revert to HQUAF.

Although USEUCOM forces are drawing down, there will be a significant residual force. These service members that remain deserve the MWR programs that are supported by locally generated funds and complemented by AAFES dividends. Furthermore, during the transition from current troop levels to the project end state, MWR facilities provide necessary quality of life support to families and service members making the move to new duty stations in CONUS or within USEUCOM. USAREUR NAF accounts will also fund severance pay requirements for NAF employees.

Mr. LANCASTER. My concern is that some division with \$25,000 left over when it stands down does not throw a \$25,000 party just to get rid of the money. Rather, the funds should be used in a more constructive way back in the United States.

General GALVIN. I understand. I hope that we are managing better than that.

Mr. LANCASTER. You mentioned efforts at achieving arms control and non-proliferation of weapons. Eastern European countries had a very poor record in that area shortly after the Warsaw Pact began to collapse. Bulgaria announced that it is going to clean its act up a little bit. How are we coming with that particular effort?

General GALVIN. Non-proliferation in general—

Mr. LANCASTER. In particular in the Eastern European countries where the greatest concern existed soon after the Warsaw Pact collapsed.

General GALVIN. First of all, the ratification of the Conventional Forces in Europe Treaty is proceeding fairly well. As you know, in the former Soviet Union—the Commonwealth of Independent States—there is a great difference of opinion right now as to the percentages of equipment, what are called treaty-limited items, that each republic can have for itself.

Russia has asked for two-thirds of everything and others are objecting. There are other differences. So it is proceeding, but slowly. However, I hope we will get ratification of that. At the same time those nations who argue about this are nevertheless moving along with preparations for destruction of equipment and storage of equipment in such ways that it looks like compliance is going along fairly well.

On the chemical side, of course, the United States is the only one who has removed the chemical weapons from Europe. Other nations in the Central and Eastern European countries have not taken that up yet.

So the reason that I bring it up is that—I would say we have had some progress, but we are not doing enough on non-proliferation. We don't have the kind of agreement that we have had in arms control of conventional and nuclear weapons, so there is still the question of biological weapons, which are very easy to produce. Any country with a pharmaceutical capability can do that, even with nuclear weapons, which are still showing an expansion of the number of countries rather than a reduction.

On the nuclear side, all the strategic nuclear weapons appear to be centralized in Kazakhstan, Ukraine, Russia and Belarus as far as we can tell right now. Now the question is what will those four nations do with the sub-strategic weapons? That is a matter as you



know of some concern, because there isn't full agreement on that, either. Efforts are made to centralize the tactical nuclear weapons in Russia, but their high numbers and small size make the cause for concern.

Mr. LANCASTER. One last question, Mr. Chairman, if you will permit me.

In the last several years, we have often been frustrated by status of forces agreements which seem to be skewed in favor of the host country with regard to employment benefits, facilities, that sort of thing.

As we redefine our relationship with the host countries in Europe—I know that it will still be the State Department's obligation to be the lead agency on renegotiating—but is DOD taking an active role to clarify and make certain that some of the provisions that we had difficulties in dealing with in the past are going to be corrected as those agreements are reached?

General GALVIN. Yes, there is very close cooperation between Defense and State. Ambassador Letsky is working now in Germany on the negotiations for these agreements. I am constantly involved in this question and it goes right down the line. Right now I can tell you that we are doing pretty well. There is not a major problem on the docket right now.

Mr. LANCASTER. Oftentimes when we would visit with military personnel, they would point the finger at the State Department as being responsible for some of the problems that we were having. I hope that we are taking a very aggressive role in making certain that those problems are being corrected as we renegotiate the agreements.

General GALVIN. I believe that we are. For instance, Ambassador Kimmitt in Germany is into this very deeply and in detail.

Mr. LANCASTER. Thank you.

The CHAIRMAN. John Kyl.

Mr. KYL. General Galvin, I would like to echo my appreciation for your leadership. I think it has been critical to our success at NATO and we all appreciate your testimony here today.

I would like to return to a subject broached early in the hearing. Your expertise is obviously not only military, but diplomatic. That is obviously required in any NATO setting, but it seems to me that as we debate the level of force structure today, we are faced more with a diplomatic and political question than we are a military question.

My question is, what is the mission of U.S. forces today? Is it to be there politically? In which case do we need a corps of 150,000 troops? Is it to fight in-area only? There currently is, of course, no threat that we would be responding to. Is it to be deployed in a general environment from which troops can be deployed on a ready basis to hot spots; and if that is the case, is this the right type of force to be deployed in those situations?

Can these forces go out of area easily, considering both the political and practical problems? Is a corps force the best size and type of force for the kind of deployment that one might want to make in the area that you have testified to?

With the integration of European forces could we reduce our level below two Army divisions, for example? Wouldn't it be better

to plan now for a lower level by the year 2000, obviously being willing to reverse course should a threat develop, but to plan for a force less than 150,000, perhaps with greater flexibility, not light versus heavy.

In other words, the future is very dynamic. I guess the question is, is a full U.S. corps in the year 2000 our best foot forward?

General GALVIN. The mission of the corps is the NATO mission. The U.S. strategy is dovetailed into the NATO strategy. The mission has changed from immediate defense against a massive attack to a forward-deployed presence anticipating problems of crisis management and stability. We divide that mission as you slide over from a mission into an operational concept into areas of peace, crisis and war, which we could anticipate.

In peacetime, we think that the role of the U.S. force there should be as a stabilizer, as a sign of solidarity as a deterrent to any crisis arising and the kind of training which will provide stabilization and interoperability with the other allies.

If we slide into crisis, we need to have a response capability. Initially the response would be something like reconnaissance and so forth in order to provide intelligence and information on what the crisis was about. Then there would be political-military action.

We have established a new exercise cycle which replaces the WINTEX cycle.

This is a crisis management exercise on the political-military level extending through out NATO so that political and military leaders will understand each other and understand the potentials and responsibilities for responding or not responding in a crisis.

The type of force for crisis management could be almost anything. It could start with reconnaissance and so forth; it could go into support such as communications or chemical weapons protective gear, et cetera. From there, it could go into combat multipliers, sending fire power capabilities of various kinds, and from there it could go into heavy reinforcement of a given area.

There are so many possibilities and questions that we would not want to try to pick out one or two. The main problem is not being able to respond to the worst case, a heavy land, air, sea operation involving armor, fire power, mobility and the ability to operate in a three-dimensional campaign, of air, lands and sea.

We train to do that all the way down through the special forces. There will continue to be light forces training. We are doing this on a generic basis. In other words, we don't train to a specific event, but rather to a set of training standards. In other words, you would train a force to be able to march 200 miles and execute a defense and a variety of other tasks under different conditions and to a set of standards.

We do think that the forces might go out of area, but we are not sure exactly how. Whether NATO itself would decide unanimously to go out of area might be problematical. Since NATO is linked with other organizations and indeed the United Nations, then out-of-area becomes a different kind of question.

We have gone out-of-area seven times in the last 1½ years to different contingencies, but those have not been as NATO. NATO itself has stayed in the area, but nevertheless the forces from NATO nations were trained and able to operate together. In this day and



age, where interoperability takes a great deal of training, we want to be very careful to keep it up with our allies, especially our NATO Allies.

Do we have the best size and type corps for the mission? I think that we do; two heavy divisions, but small with adequate capability to be able to move to fight over long distance. To fight for a sustained period of time, to fight along with the Air Force and the Navy and with our allies is something that if you don't have a corps headquarters, you cannot do very well.

Most of the things that made the Gulf War what it was were concentrated at the corps level in the ground forces. I think a corps is the right type and the right size organization. We have set the corps at a smaller size than it was before. We want it to be robust. I think that can continue to be argued when we get to 1995.

We are obviously always able to respond on short notice because corps are trained to be tailored. They can be taken apart in pieces and put together in different ways. We don't need to do more planning than we are doing in order to be ready in 1995 if we are facing a new situation, a different phase of the dynamic and we need to come up with something different. But as far as we can see ahead right now, we ought to keep a ground corps in there in terms of the ground forces and keep an adequate air and naval force along with it.

Mr. KYL. That is a very complete and satisfactory answer. One followup, though.

With regard to the integration of our forces with European forces, could you foresee a situation after 1995, for example, where still retaining the corps concept our troops would be reduced in numbers from 150,000 to 80,000 as has been suggested by the chairman? Could you integrate other forces and still retain your corps command and capability?

General GALVIN. We could integrate forces into our corps and are planning to do that, but as part of our cooperative effort with other nations, we are also integrating our forces into their corps. We need a corps headquarters and two divisions. One division we could give away to a German corps and take in a German division, but it is hard to turn to the others and say we want you to put something in our corps, but don't want to put anything in yours.

Mr. KYL. If, by 1995, the threat in the region has not increased and there is continued pressure for us to reduce the size of our force, it seems to me that that is a small price to pay on the part of the Germans, or whoever, to integrate one of their divisions into a U.S. corps without reciprocation on our part.

I understand the symmetry, but it doesn't seem to me to be a hard case to make.

General GALVIN. You make the point if nothing happens. We have had eight deployments in the past 18 months. It could be between now and 1995 nothing happens, but I would be surprised if that is actually true.

Mr. KYL. General, no one has been stronger in support of the maximum amount of defense preparedness than I have. No one has urged more caution with respect to our drawdown. Everything is predicated on an improvement in the situation. That was built into my question and I would be the first to say let's go slow.



If that were to transpire, it seems to me that that might be the kind of thing that you would plan on. If Congress and the President said I am sorry, "We don't have another division for you to put in with the Dutch or the Germans," that at least operationally, conceptually, it is not out of the question to use one of their divisions and still retain the corps concept.

General GALVIN. Anything is possible. We need to stay flexible and we don't know what 1995 will look like. I prefer to say I am coming down from 326,414—mandated by Congress earlier—to 150,000 as a goal. But that goal is in 1995, so we are living in a dynamic world, the train is moving and let's just see what it looks like a couple of years down the road.

Mr. KYL. The only thing I would say in response to that is I think we have to understand the political dynamic and be objective and convincing in retaining the kind of force that we think is necessary right now. I think one way to do that is to at least express an open mind about the situation after 1995. The possibility might exist at that time, and the way that we might deal with it, all else being equal.

If we just try to justify our position on the notion that you have to have a 150,000-man corps, there may be more pressures coming from the other side to make us do stupid things like drawing down more rapidly than is efficacious.

We have to be very upfront about the various possibilities here. For example, it would make more sense to me perhaps to have troops in Israel or Korea than to have them in Germany, but we understand the political implications involved. So long as we can be convincing in our arguments, maybe we can support the Secretary of Defense and support you, but there is a lot of pressure to do foolish things here, and one way around that is to be sure that we can make the case convincingly for what we have.

General GALVIN. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Spence.

Mr. SPENCE. Thank you.

General, you have worn different hats and have been our point man in Europe for a long time. In our recent North Atlantic Assembly meeting, I was interested to see delegations from Poland, Hungary, Czechoslovakia, Russia, Lithuania, Estonia and observe the interchange back and forth—the Polish delegates criticizing the Russians for not withdrawing troops faster. After all these years now they have looked to NATO to help them and suggest in a way that they become a part of NATO, which brings me to my question.

Even Yeltsin of Russia has said that at some time in the future, Russia might want to explore the possibility of becoming a NATO member. Poland and Hungary and Czechoslovakia have expressed such desires. Is NATO considering membership for these routines and what are the pros and cons for becoming members?

General GALVIN. The Secretary General has not ruled that out and said that is possible down the line; that there would be some kind of membership for some nations. At the same time, I think that NATO, even though not allowing membership, has taken some very important steps with regard to the Central and Eastern European countries.

First, we said they are not our adversaries anymore. Then we asked them to have diplomatic liaison at NATO. Now we created the North Atlantic Cooperation Council in which all members have a seat at the table in a variety of ways. They can bring in the Defense Minister, the Foreign Minister, the head of state or military leaders. They can meet with the different committees of NATO and all the organizations within the NATO headquarters. We have a wide variety of other contacts that we are making with them also.

Last week I had 40 more of the officers of these countries in to the NATO School at Oberammergau for combined training with 40 of our officers. We are making a lot of effort to open up communications. Just as we saw with the Foreign Ministers last week. On 1 April, Secretary Cheney and the defense ministers will be meeting at NATO at the NACC level with all Eastern and Central European countries and our allies. Then the senior military people—Colin Powell will be going over on 10 April for the same kind of meeting with his military counterparts.

So there is movement, a sense of direction in this. Where it will lead, whether it will be some kind of new configuration, is a matter that I don't know. Certainly I think we are doing the essential thing that our new strategy tells us; that is we must recognize that our own security rests, to a certain degree on the sense of security that others have outside our alliance.

Mr. SPENCE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Charles Bennett.

Mr. BENNETT. I have been to another committee meeting during most of the morning. I don't want to trespass and repeat.

Please answer this one question: What can you not do, or what do you find will be very difficult to do under any substitute for the base force?

In other words, if you cannot achieve the base force, how will that affect your ability to do what is your responsibility for our national defense, in not only Europe, but elsewhere?

General GALVIN. First, I think the overall base force is a good, well thought-out force. I think it is hard to take some of the reductions that are there in the base force, but I understand the reason for them. I think that all strategy, national strategy included, embodies an element of risk. We do have a base force that embodies a fairly strong element of risk. It does not cover everything. It cannot possibly do that because when we look at resources balanced against strategy, we probably never could have the resources we would always want for the strategy you would build in order to be 100 percent secure. So we are not 100 percent secure; we are something under that. But it is a good force, it is a reasonable, logical force.

My part of it causes me to reduce to 43 percent of what I was before in forces, but it also causes me to take out of Europe a lot of the sustainment that I had there before. So I lose a lot of capabilities.

One good example is I will not always have a carrier in the Mediterranean; and so if something happens where we here in Washington have been accustomed to a very rapid response to crises involving Americans, it won't be quite as rapid as that in some cases on some days.

However, I think the idea of the Atlantic force, the Pacific force, the contingency forces, the structures that have been worked out by Colin Powell and Secretary Cheney are good.

I think you have to take into account the infrastructure which is enormously important to us. For instance, fighting the Gulf War. We need to realize the kind of contributions we made over the last four decades after World War II, which allowed us to have bases like Rota, Sigonella, Souda Bay, Ramstein and Rhein Main, among many others, permitted us to operate and reinforce. It is not just forces. It is a whole lot more.

Mr. BENNETT. How do you answer the question people put about the base force having been arrived at after the first revolution in Russia; and a second revolution occurring after that? The implication being that the base force is in some way too big?

General GALVIN. The base force was constructed to meet a situation of instability and unpredictability. That was the whole idea. We said from the start that we are not in the cold war. We are not faced with 200 divisions that could attack us through the Fulda Gap in 24 or 48 hours. We are faced with regional problems and a wide variety of other things that I think have become a well-known catalog of problems. They amount to uncertainty, unpredictability and potential instability on a relatively large scale.

We want to try to support nation building as they move through a truly enormous metamorphosis and become freedom-loving, independent, democratic supporters of free enterprise and market economies and human rights and all of that. But we are not there by any means. We are on a very dark, rocky road. So we built a force that could change with the changing times. We think it can. We built it from the bottom up.

Mr. BENNETT. Thank you.

The CHAIRMAN. There will be questions for the record. We would appreciate it if you answered them in a timely fashion.

General Galvin, thank you very much. You are always very, very helpful and very, very informative. We appreciate it.

Thank you.

General GALVIN. Thank you, sir.

[Whereupon, the panel recessed at 12:07 p.m., subject to the call of the Chair.]





## CINC U.S. FORCES, KOREA

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HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,  
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES,  
DEFENSE POLICY PANEL,  
*Washington, DC, Thursday, April 2, 1992.*

The panel met, pursuant to call, at 10:10 a.m., in room 2118, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Les Aspin (chairman of the panel) presiding.

### STATEMENT OF HON. LES ASPIN, A REPRESENTATIVE FROM WISCONSIN, CHAIRMAN, DEFENSE POLICY PANEL

The CHAIRMAN. The meeting will come to order.

This morning, the Defense Policy Panel is pleased to welcome as a witness Gen. Robert RisCassi, the Commander in Chief of the U.S. Forces in Korea.

Today's hearing is the second of three we have planned to examine our needs and requirements in the Pacific region, particularly Korea. It is especially important to reexamine the situation on the peninsula now that the Soviet Union has disintegrated and the world is no longer strictly organized into two superpowers' camps.

General RisCassi will be of great help to us in this work. The next few years will be critical ones for North and South Korea. Political negotiations aimed at reunification are underway, and some progress has been made. The next milestone may come in June, when detailed procedures for inspecting the North's nuclear program are to be settled.

Today, we would like to review in detail the current military balance between North and South Korea, including the strengths and weaknesses of each side. We would like to discuss the likely course of a conflict, General RisCassi, including the warning time we might expect and the North's probable strategy. We would like to pay special attention to the North's unconventional weapons capability.

Then there are a couple other items we would like to discuss. First of all, the kinds of forces the United States has committed and whether they are the right ones for this new era.

Essentially, what we need to look at is the fact the U.S. contributes primarily air forces, logistics and intelligence, which act as force-multipliers. We would like to talk about this arrangement and ask in what scenarios U.S.-based ground forces would be required for reinforcement.

We would like to discuss particularly—we know we committed air and naval forces, but we would like to ask your opinion, where, if any, you see significant numbers of U.S. ground forces beyond those already in the region might be required.

A related issue is burdensharing. At least one study has suggested South Korea is capable of assuming principal responsibility for its own defense by the turn of the century. They have a lot of advantages over the North, including population, GNP and high-tech economy. Why can't they just assume the major burden of particularly the ground forces portion of it?

Anyway, the Defense Policy Panel is working to develop a consensus behind a prudent defense program capable of meeting the real threats of the post-Soviet era. We look forward to General RisCassi's testimony to help us move toward this goal.

Mr. Dickinson.

**STATEMENT OF HON. WILLIAM L. DICKINSON, A REPRESENTATIVE FROM ALABAMA, RANKING MINORITY MEMBER, DEFENSE POLICY PANEL**

Mr. DICKINSON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and General RisCassi, it is nice to see you again. Just let me take a second to thank you and your staff for hosting an early Saturday morning working breakfast last December for members of this committee while we were visiting Korea.

While we visited with you, your hospitality was gracious, the chow was good, and most importantly, we had a very frank, useful discussion. I think that in the informal atmosphere we had there, we had a real meaningful exchange of ideas. This was very helpful to us in our report back to the committee.

As I am sure you are aware, last week Dr. Gates, Director of the CIA, discussed emerging security issues in the Persian Gulf and on the Korean peninsula in particular.

Among his assessments he said, "The prospect that South Korea would receive extensive combat air support as well as other support from U.S. forces is a potent deterrent, even to forces as strong as those North Korea has concentrated along the border."

As the United States military commander in Korea, I would like you to provide—discuss with us your assessment of what Dr. Gates meant by extensive combat air support and what he meant by other support. In other words, we are trying to get a feeling, he has in his mind one thing, and we didn't ask him to elaborate. I was wondering if you could help flush that out for us.

Our chairman expressed his preference for a post-cold war military force smaller than is proposed by the President. If, for example, this country were to become embroiled in two simultaneous major regional contingencies, the chairman's force level would provide sustainment for one contingency, but an air-only package for the second.

Assuming Korea were the second contingency, we need to know whether reinforcing by air support would, by itself, be sufficient? Two, are reinforcing ground combat elements needed in addition to an enhanced air package?

We will probably have to close the hearing to discuss these and other questions in detail. But it is my understanding that you will make an opening statement. We would like you to cover as much as you can in open session before we go to a closed session.

Needless to say, General, we all look forward to your testimony and appreciate your being here. If you would, in your statement,



please set the stage and tell us what is the difference now as to the U.N. Command there? Are we still talking about a treaty, the South Koreans and North Koreans are the principals now?

What has changed now, and if you would discuss that in your general statement, I would appreciate it.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you, Bill.

As I understand it, General Riscassi, we are going to listen to your opening statement in open session, but then go to closed session. Is that the arrangement?

General RISCASSI. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. General, the floor is yours.

#### STATEMENT OF GEN. ROBERT W. RISCASSI, USA, COMMANDER IN CHIEF, U.S. FORCES, KOREA

General RISCASSI. Thank you, sir. I would request, Mr. Chairman, that you accept my prepared statement for the record, and let me just paraphrase it in my opening remarks.

The CHAIRMAN. Without objection. Be sure to speak into the mike. Thank you.

General RISCASSI. Mr. Chairman, clearly the winds of change that blew across the European continent in 1989, although they took a little while, but did eventually blow southward and confront the Korean peninsula. Most notably was the first round of North-South talks, which were held in September 1990. This was the first time since the Korean War that the North and South sat down and discussed items of interest that ranged from economics through the military situation on the peninsula.

I think it would be fair to say, as we move forward to the current timeframe—where we have just concluded in the past month the sixth round of talks—that people were optimistic. That optimism has changed to encouragement.

Let me backtrack and explain why.

Clearly, the most destabilizing aspect on the peninsula today is trying to come to grips with the nuclear issue and the direction that North Korea is moving in the development of a device or a system; and the reluctance, after signing the Nonproliferation Treaty in 1985, to sign the IAEA Safeguard Agreement. The refusal allowed them to continue the development of a reprocessing facility, which was clearly going to be used for the development of a system.

They now have signed that codicil. However, it has not been ratified by the Supreme People's Assembly, an action we anticipate will transpire this month. So, the Nonproliferation Treaty and the legalities associated with it—in terms of coming to grips with the nuclear issue—the first of the requisite aspects will be codified, we anticipate, by the end of this month.

If you then take the process and scroll that forward to when the first individual could get in and look at the new facilities, we anticipate that if they took all of the time allotted, it would be at least June before the first IAEA inspection could take place.

In other words, we are concerned that the IAEA inspection procedure and process is not intrusive enough to allow for a sufficient

confidence level that North Korea has ceased and desisted in the development of a system.

Because of that, South Korea initiated an action which asked for a bilateral inspection procedure, a potentially more intrusive inspection regime.

In the sixth round of talks, an organization was created called the Joint Nuclear Control Commission, which in fact was put in being just to deliberate on the intrusive verification protocol associated with the nuclear development in the North.

However, the bilateral protocol means that the facilities, both United States and South Korean, would be open to inspection simultaneous with the North's facilities. North and South Korea have not settled on this bilateral inspection regime. The second round of the Joint Nuclear Control Commission just concluded yesterday, and there was no movement on trying to codify an inspection principle that would give us a degree of confidence associated with what I previously discussed.

So, a degree of uncertainty is still there in terms of the most destabilizing aspect on the peninsula. If you will, I would like to shift for a minute and talk about the East Asia strategy referred to as Nunn-Warner Phase 1. I would like to explain where we are on that process, how we try to look at the threat, what has transpired with regard to the threat from North Korea, what we have done in the South to improve our defense, and how we have adjusted our concept of operations to entertain the evolving threat.

First of all, at the end of this calendar year, phase one of Nunn-Warner will be completed. This means that the U.S. troop density on the peninsula will be down to 36,000.

Phase I called for some changes, one of which Mr. Dickinson mentioned, regarding U.S. visibility in United Nations Command activities at Panmunjon. One of the imperatives in phase one was for us—for me to appoint a Republic of Korea Armed Forces flag officer to be my representative in Military Armistice Commission (MAC) meetings in Panmunjon.

Since I made that appointment, there have been no MAC meetings at the flag officer level. The informal and formal meetings are still transpiring at the secretariat level, which is colonel level and lower.

The next point deals with adjustments to the war plan concept of operations. As we looked at the threat in the North, there have been tremendous physical and environmental changes on the peninsula.

What we tried to do is reflect from a strategic operational and tactical standpoint, what has North Korea done in the last 10 years that enhance their capabilities. We took a look at those three bands, if you will, focusing on their centers of gravity. Clearly, at the strategic level there has been a change.

The arrangements that North Korea enjoyed with the Soviet Union are fractured. They are no longer there. There has been some adjustments with the arrangements with the PRC, so North Korea's strategic center of gravity has shifted from what we knew 10 years ago.

At the operational level, since 1984, North Korea has done some very significant things in terms of organization, doctrinal changes

and positioning of forces that had to be entertained in the concept of operations. I will explore those further in closed session.

At the tactical level, we found that North Korea leveraged some changes from a positional aspect. These had to be entertained because they affected the way we looked at the defense of South Korea from 1953 all the way into the present timeframe.

After we analyzed North Korea in a strategic, operational, and tactical vein, we took a look at ourselves in that same relationship and looked at strategic, operational, and tactical centers of gravity.

Clearly, the strategic center of gravity of the Republic of Korea is its relationship and treaty with the United States of America.

At the operational level, we took a look at our force posture and made some determinations I would like to explore further in closed session. But we did take a hard look at what our operational center of gravity was, and how that interrelates with the centers of gravity in the North.

In other words, as you play these against one another, do the players comprehend one another's centers of gravity, or are they on two different planes of understanding? At the tactical level, we looked at what we had from a tactical reserve standpoint and tried to make some adjustments in terms of our thinking to make sure we were adequately positioned on the peninsula to handle a no-notice type scenario.

The last two or three points I would like to make in that vein is that we then sized all of this and made some analytical runs that supported our current force as a base. Then we made some adjustments. We made some intuitive adjustments.

Then we sized those intuitive adjustments against our experience in Southwest Asia in Desert Storm and Desert Shield. We satisfied ourselves with that litmus test that we were about right in sizing the U.S. force contribution to the defense of the peninsula.

We looked at it in the air dimension, which had to be significantly adjusted and made some changes in the rewrite of our concept of operations. We satisfied ourselves that the sea state forces were about right, both what we have had in the past and what we anticipate in the future.

Our land contribution changed appreciably in the modality of what type of force contribution we needed from land combat power. I will explore that a little bit further in closed session for you.

Then, to bind all of these changes together to execute the concept of operations, we took a look at our training profile. Not the United States Army's training profile or the United States Armed Forces training profile, but all of the training initiatives that we had put into the United States forces that paid off so handsomely in Southwest Asia. We asked ourselves what do we need to do from a coalition partner standpoint to inculcate things that served us well in Southwest Asia into the Republic of Korea Armed Forces?

We are already progressing on those initiatives.

One of the prime doctrinal publications is Training the Force, FM 25-100. We translated that into Korean, but more importantly, we proliferated it throughout ROK forces, and we see it taking hold. Will that transpire overnight? Absolutely not.

It will take at least 5 to 10 years. You have to get the young assessed officer just coming into the ROK force understanding how



to train a force prepared for the 21st century. We've started a number of types of training initiatives.

The ROK, on their own, have been enamored with our national training center. They are in the process of procuring land that would go into, not a national training center the size of ours at Fort Irwin, but a national training center that would permit them a live fire opportunity to train their force at the task force—battalion task force level as a minimum.

Mr. Chairman, I think I will stop on my prepared statements now, and I am prepared to take your questions.

#### PREPARED STATEMENT OF GEN. ROBERT W. RISCASSI

Mister Chairman, members of the panel, I welcome this opportunity to share with you some thoughts on recent events on the Korean peninsula and the continuing relevance of United States forces in Korea.

#### INTRODUCTION

The past year has been the most eventful year in relations between the two halves of Korea since the end of the Korean War. No matter what the outcome of ongoing initiatives, we have reached a pivotal point in the struggle between north and south. Korea is on the brink of enormous change. Powerful inhibitors remain in place, but change will come.

Yet, as we emerge from the cold war, it is critical that we not underestimate persisting regional tensions. Northeast Asia remains a divided region, full of emotional scars and distrust. Our military presence in Korea remains an irreplaceable investment, both for resolving the potentially volatile struggle within a divided Korea, and for sustaining peace and stability in one of the world's most dynamic and powerful regions.

I believe that all of you understand the importance of our role in Korea, but there are two questions which we need to address today. First, given the changes in the world and on the Korean peninsula, is the continued presence of U.S. forces in today's numbers still justified? Second, are the costs associated with the security of Korea, and Northeast Asia, equitably distributed?

#### CHANGING GEOPOLITICAL ENVIRONMENT

Since the end of the Korean War, the ROK and United States have adhered to a multidimensional strategy. This strategy focused on creating a strong deterrent to shield political and economic development in the south, on the assumption that a strong economy and democratic institutions would overpower the weaknesses inherent in the Stalinist state to the north. From the start, we sought to create and sustain conditions that would decide the struggle through political, diplomatic and economic power, rather than through the dynamics of military force.

The roots of this strategy finally bore fruit in the later half of the past decade. After 30 years of back-breaking labor, a period that earned the South Korean people the sobriquet as one of the hardest working nations on earth, the ROK fully emerged from the ashes of the Korean War. The 1980s were pivotal both in the maturation of democracy and full-blown economic expansion within the ROK. The 1987 transition of power between Presidents Chun and Roh was decided in free elections, and democratic reform has continued at a steady, uncompromised pace ever since. Throughout the 1980s, double digit increases in annual GNPs were repeated again and again. South Korean conglomerates expanded into global businesses with markets and partnerships around the world. The ROK became globally competitive in textiles, steel, shipbuilding, automobiles, petrochemicals, and electronics. In 1991, the per capita gross national product of the ROK rose to \$6,250. It is estimated that by the end of this century the ROK will double its current wealth.

On the diplomatic front, President Roh fostered a policy known as Nordpolitik. Through this policy, the ROK has sought to exploit the opportunities emanating from the end of the cold war and develop close relations with those nations with influence on North Korea. Designed not to isolate the north, the ROK wooed those states that had previously been aligned with North Korea in an effort to alter their partisan attitude toward the peninsular struggle.

The success of Nordpolitik has been heartening. Once Eastern Europe was freed from Soviet shackles, the majority of its states formalized relations with the ROK and ended their military support to North Korea. In 1990, the U.S.S.R. also estab-

lished formal relations with the ROK. At the same time, the Soviets restructured their economic relations with North Korea, putting an end to postwar subsidization policies, and insisting that future trade be based on hard currency. The republics of the Commonwealth of Independent States have built upon this foundation and relations between the ROK and the former Soviet states continue to progress. Even relations with the PRC have warmed considerably. Trade between the ROK and the PRC has expanded rapidly, to a level of over \$3 billion in 1991, and the Chinese and South Koreans have exchanged trade missions. Thus, the diplomatic conditions affecting the balance on the peninsula have altered substantially.

In stark contrast, North Korea remains in the impoverishing isolation imposed by the world's most authoritarian regime. Kim Il Sung, the longest ruling communist leader of the post-war era, remains in control. Over the past decade and more, Kim has been preparing the way for the eventual transfer of power to his son, Kim Jong Il. When the process is complete, North Korea will become communism's first instance of dynastic despotism.

I do not believe the transition could occur at a more difficult time for Kim or his son. North Korea's challenges today are greater than at any time since the Korean War. After more than 30 years of virtually continuous, albeit unimpressive economic growth, the north's economy is faltering. Hampered historically by neglect of its light industries, ideologically driven micro-management, foreign debt, and lack of foreign exchange, its economy is beset with problems. Last year, North Korea experienced negative growth. The failure of North Korea's post-war diplomacy contributed to this decline. Although Kim based his leadership on the theme of Juche, or national self-reliance, the great degree to which his nation was dependent economically on the Soviet Union and PRC is becoming increasingly evident. Shortages have begun to appear in food, fuel, hard currency and technology.

With the dissolution of the Warsaw Pact, the fall of communism in the Soviet Union, and the PRC's need to focus its energies inward, North Korea's economic survival is imperiled. Lacking a consumer oriented manufacturing base, and isolated by its fractured and antagonistic relations with the western world, North Korea has little possibility of a self-generated recovery.

These conditions set the milieu for the past year's events. In 1990, North and South Korea began a series of north-south talks at the prime ministerial level focused on establishing a direct dialog between the two states. The first four meetings had no substantive result, but were significant as the highest level negotiations to occur between the two nations. In January 1991, North Korea suspended the talks in protest against the annual Team Spirit field exercise.

While talks were suspended, the ROK announced its intention to apply for separate membership in the United Nations. With the end of cold war and the warming of relations between the ROK and the U.S.S.R. and PRC, the path was cleared for acceptance by the U.N. Security Council. On 28 May, after unsuccessfully attempting to convince the PRC to block the south's bid, North Korea announced that it also would apply for membership. In September, both Koreas entered the United Nations as separate states. In August, the north returned to the north-south bargaining table and a series of unprecedented agreements have followed.

The most destabilizing issue affecting security on the peninsula, and the region at large, has been the growing suspicion that North Korea is on the verge of developing a nuclear weapon. A group of facilities, some of which are operational and others of which remain under construction, are located at Yongbyon, about 50 miles north of Pyongyang. They include nuclear reactors and reprocessing and test facilities which clearly fit the profile of a nuclear weapons development program. Estimates are that continued progress could result in a nuclear device as early as next year.

Over the past year, this suspicion and the projected timetables captured the attention of the international community at large, and the Republic of Korea especially. Even prior to the saga of Iraq's nuclear program, the world was acutely aware of the risks of nuclear weapons in the hands of aggressive dictators, and pressure against North Korea was developing. Although North Korea signed the Non-proliferation Treaty (NPT) in 1985, it had refused to sign the contingent IAEA accord. The north insisted that the following conditions be met prior to signing: the withdrawal of U.S. nuclear weapons from the ROK; the establishment of a nuclear free zone in Korea; and, the removal of the U.S. nuclear umbrella over the ROK. The international community and the IAEA refused to accept any preconditions and continued to insist that North Korea abide with the NPT and accept inspections under the IAEA.

In the aftermath of Iraq, it became clear that an IAEA inspection regime was not a sufficient assurance of NPT compliance, and regional pressures on North Korea evolved into two separate tracks. The international community continued to press



North Korea to sign the IAEA agreement and accept inspections of its nuclear facilities. At the same time, the ROK government introduced the notion of a bilateral agreement covering the two Koreas that would include a separate inspection regime. Central to the Korean track was an agreement to ban reprocessing of spent fuel. While the two tracks were linked by intent, the negotiations were separate.

Following President Bush's September 1991 announcement to withdraw all naval- and land-based forward-deployed tactical nuclear systems, the way was cleared for the South Korean Government to pursue a dramatically fresh approach toward North Korea. Later in November, President Roh publicly announced the denuclearization of the ROK, and invited North Korea to reciprocate by signing a denuclearization pledge governing the entire peninsula.

The north responded initially by terming President Roh's claim of denuclearization as spurious and refusing to accept the offer. At a subsequent north-south meeting, the ROK Prime Minister reiterated President Roh's pledge and invited North Korea to join in a bilateral agreement for denuclearization. At the next meeting, North Korea insisted that any such pledge would rely on two conditions. First, that the north be allowed to inspect facilities and military bases in the south to ensure the withdrawal of U.S. nuclear weapons, and second, that the peninsula be made a nuclear free zone, with the U.S. nuclear umbrella publicly detached.

The north also maintained its historical insistence, reiterated throughout the north-south talks, that any bilateral security agreement should be preceded by the signing of a nonaggression pact between the two Koreas. The ROK, in turn, restated its historical position that the two Koreas must conclude an agreement that would permit family visitation and communications and economic exchange between the two states, as well as establish confidence building measures to reduce military tensions.

Finally, in a dramatic meeting on 13 December 1991, the two nations signed a 25 point "Agreement on Reconciliation, Nonaggression, and Exchanges and Cooperation," contingent on the understanding that North Korea would sign and implement a bilateral denuclearization agreement. On 31 December 1991, the representatives of the north and south agreed to a six point "Joint Declaration on Denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula."

Included in the nonaggression and exchange pact is a declaration of intent not to attack or subvert one another and the establishment of several confidence building measures, to include a military hotline and bilateral committees to manage military tensions. The nuclear agreement includes the following provisions: both Koreas agree to neither test, manufacture, produce, receive, possess, store, deploy nor use nuclear weapons. An additional codicil stipulates that neither nation will possess nuclear reprocessing or uranium enrichment facilities. Further, a bilateral inspection regime will be constructed between the two Koreas, including the right to perform challenge inspections of suspect nuclear facilities and military bases. The denuclearization pact is now in effect, but there still is no firm agreement on the structure or timing of the accompanying inspection program. At a 14 March meeting, the north and south agreed to work out procedures and regulations for mutual nuclear inspections at the Joint Nuclear Control Commission within two months after its inaugural session on 15 March. However, the ROK and United States maintain doubts about the sincerity of North Korean intentions.

Against the backdrop of the preceding 45 years, these are momentous events. Unfortunately, they do not resolve the security problems on the peninsula. Of immediate concern, although North Korea finally signed the IAEA agreement on 30 January 1992, it has yet to ratify the agreement, nor has it agreed to the terms of the bilateral inspection agreement between the two Koreas.

Continued stalling heightens the suspicion that the north is attempting to reprocess and stockpile enough plutonium to create a weapon before inspections are permitted. Alternately, there is concern it may be in the process of moving critical equipment and material to a more clandestine location or locations.

The ROK, with U.S. support, has been extraordinarily forthcoming and flexible in its approach toward the north. In an effort to sustain forward movement, the ROK and United States agreed to cancel Team Spirit 92. Continued North Korean intransigence, however, could well reverse the progress made to date.

On the other hand, there is evidence the north is feeling the pressure of its failing economy and it is cautiously implementing a number of initiatives. Last October, Kim Il Sung visited Beijing and asked the Chinese to increase economic aid to compensate for the sudden loss of Soviet assistance. Reportedly, the Chinese leaders rejected the request, noted that China has its own problems, and encouraged Kim to adapt the same style of economic reforms that China is undertaking.

For over a year, Japan has engaged in talks with North Korea concerning normalization of relations, but has made clear that normalization, and subsequent eco-



conomic benefits, are contingent on North Korean actions to relieve the nuclear proliferation concerns of Japan and the rest of the international community. Specifically, Japan has told North Korea that it must implement an IAEA safeguards agreement and also forgo reprocessing of spent nuclear fuel, before Japan will normalize relations. At present, Japan-DPRK relations are stalemated.

The ROK has also offered economic support to North Korea, and some trade has already occurred. Most recently, the chairmen of Hyundai and Daewoo visited Pyongyang and negotiated joint ventures with the North Korean Government. However, in the second week of March the ROK announced its decision to withhold further economic exchanges pending further progress on the issue of nuclear inspections. North Korea also announced its intention to participate in the UNDP assisted Tumen River Project, which is designed to open a free market zone in the Tumen River estuary, that would include North Korea, Russia, the ROK, the PRC and Mongolia.

Although there are a number of reports of significant food and energy shortages in the north, it is not clear how severe these economic problems are at this stage. Apparently the problems have not become sufficiently threatening to domestic stability to compel the north to open its nuclear facilities to inspection. The nuclear issue is a litmus test that will prove or disprove whether the north is prepared for fundamental change, or simply engaging in subterfuge to fend off escalating pressures.

If North Korea is suspected of continuing its nuclear development, then the progress achieved over the past year will retrench and economic isolation will increase. At the same time, the ROK and United States recognize that we have entered a new phase in the Korean struggle, one which will rely far more on diplomatic and economic measures, yet still conducted under the umbrella of a strong defense.

#### MILITARY BALANCE ON THE PENINSULA

Throughout the 1980s, while the ROK bounded forward politically and economically, North Korea focused on the growth, forward positioning and restructuring of its armed forces, a process begun in the late 1970s. Notwithstanding its remarkably small capital base, North Korea exploited the significant economies of scale in military hardware which characterized the communist economies of the cold war. For a fraction of the comparable costs to free world nations, North Korea was able to complete a large-scale growth, restructuring and repositioning of its armed forces.

The core philosophy guiding the north's program appears to have been the transformation of its armed forces into a highly mobile, extremely lethal, offensive force. The ultimate objective was to create a ground-based attack force, supported by air, special operations and sea arms, capable of unleashing a rapidly paced offensive operation on extremely short notice. Its armed forces were designed to create an early rupture of the combined defenses and follow up on this breakthrough with powerful exploitation forces.

The outlines of this intent are evident in the nature and composition of North Korean active force changes. During the early and mid-1980s, they created four mechanized corps and an armor corps from existing mechanized and tank units. Two of these mechanized corps and elements of the armor corps provide a highly mobile tactical exploitation force capable of exploiting penetrations in the forward defense. The remaining two mechanized corps and the rest of the armor corps have been designed to pass through the defenses north of Seoul and carry the offensive momentum throughout the depth of the ROK. To maintain an unrelenting, violent tempo of operations, North Korean doctrine emphasizes a feeder system which streamlines and distributes a constant flow of follow-on forces toward the front. The feeder system also offers the flexibility to concentrate forces in selected sectors, with minimal notice, to attempt to achieve decisive force ratios.

In addition, North Korea's highly trained special operations forces were enlarged and received additional equipment to assist in infiltration and rear area operations. The approximately 80,000 special operations forces are designed to infiltrate behind ROK defenses, to target airfields, seaports and supply lines, and to disrupt and undermine forward defenses to assist in achieving an early breakthrough.

Accompanying these reorganizations, North Korea continued to reposition its ground forces so that over 65 percent of its active forces are within 100 km of the DMZ. These forces are arrayed unequivocally for attack; their disposition and arrangement bear none of the telltale signs of a defensive intent. The purpose of this extreme forward deployment is to limit warning of attack available to the defense.

Just as the reorganization and redeployment of its forces signal the nature of its attack plans, the north's modernization programs evidence the doctrine that will

guide employment. The largest proportional expansion was in the addition of mobile artillery systems, creating a total artillery force of over 5,400 self-propelled tubes, 3,000 towed artillery pieces and 2,400 multiple rocket launchers. This creates a 2.3 to 1 advantage in artillery systems over South Korea, and shows North Korea's capability to concentrate and employ artillery in massive, unrelenting barrages to smash defenses and create a breakthrough. A force of over 4,000 infantry fighting vehicles was created, lending speed and mobility, and permitting infantry forces to keep pace with armored forces. At the same time, over 1,000 additional tanks were introduced, creating a total armored force of around 3,500 tanks.

The result of these modernization programs is an impressive increase in the speed, pace, and lethality of North Korean ground operations. A ground attack would be supported by over 670 naval vessels, including a mix of diesel submarines, 'mini' submarines, fast attack patrol boats, and new infiltration and amphibious vessels. Supporting air operations will employ over 1,400 aircraft of mixed types, to include 748 jet fighters of various vintages and capabilities.

The total strength of North Korea's military forces is over 6,000,000 personnel. Just over a million are in the active forces, while 5 million are reserves. These numbers are enormous for any nation. In the case of North Korea, ranking 40th in population with just over 23 million citizens, they make it the most militarized state per capita on earth. Other comparative rankings include; the fifth largest army; the sixth largest air force; the sixth largest submarine force; tenth largest tank force; fourth largest artillery force; and, the second or third largest special operations force. Operationally, efforts are underway to create stockpiles in excess of 60 days of supply. The total annual costs of sustaining and improving this force has been between 20-25 percent of the nation's GNP . . . a remarkable investment for a nation of such limited resources.

The overall effect of the north's programs on the military balance between North and South Korea has been detrimental. Avoiding any discussion of specific areas of strength or weakness, North Korea today enjoys superiority in a number of critical battlefield functions, if U.S. forces are excluded from the balance. The following table illustrates the static disparities:

	North Korea	ROK
Tanks .....	1.9	1
Armored personnel carriers .....	2.3	1
Field artillery .....	1.8	1
Muiltle rocket launchers .....	21.0	1
Anti-aircraft artillery .....	14.0	1
Bombers .....	82.0	0
Jet fighters .....	1.5	1
Transport aircraft .....	7.5	1
Combat helicopters .....	1.0	1.8
Attack submarines .....	24.0	1
Destroyers .....	0	10
Missile attack boats .....	3.5	1
Amphibious craft .....	5.7	1
Active infantry divisions .....	1.4	1
Armored brigades .....	3.3	1

While the quantitative imbalance is apparent, there are other measures that are more difficult to penetrate. North Korea has prioritized its force structure above, and at the expense of optempo, so some force elements are not presently at peak readiness. Employing its vast armed forces in a limited notice attack would be a difficult undertaking for even the most highly trained military force, so we assume some current level of degradation. Prior to an offensive, however, we would expect enhanced training activity to improve their prospects of success. Also, a number of North Korea's military systems are based on old technologies, updated with product improvement programs, but still limited in capability due to vintage. Yet, by and large, most of its critical fighting systems are still highly effective on the modern battlefield, and some key systems are very modern.

Factoring these considerations into the overall balance, the forward presence of United States ground and air forces remains vital to counterbalancing North Korean strength. Our judgements must be based on capabilities rather than predictions of intent. Training shortfalls, for example, can disappear rather quickly. North Korea's overall advantage is sufficiently robust that degradations due to training and tech-



nology limitations would have to be quite severe to outweigh its composite advantages over the ROK.

In the final analysis, successful deterrence rests on the counterbalance provided by U.S. forces. Any possibilities that North Korea might be tempted to employ its comparative force advantages are inhibited by the presence of U.S. ground and air forces.

These factors all weigh in considering the size and configuration of U.S. forward-deployed forces. The primary strength of North Korean forces, and its greatest overall advantages, lies in its ground forces. Because of this, I believe that the continued presence of an American division and a numbered air force remain crucial elements of forward presence. Were conflict to occur, large U.S. ground, air and sea reinforcements would be required, so it is imperative that we retain the capability, in theater, to accept and support an augmentation flow. Moreover, there are some functions, such as strategic and operational intelligence, which rely heavily on U.S. advanced technologies. As a result of these requirements it is also essential that the U.S. maintain its participation and selected leadership within the framework of coalition headquarters.

Finally, the forward presence of our military forces permits extensive and continuous joint and combined training. The value of this training is inestimable. It targets a key vulnerability of the North Korean forces, and ensures that in the event of a contingency, ROK/U.S. forces would be prepared to set the conditions of battle. Unlike Operation Desert Storm, where coalition forces had six months to organize and train, a North Korean attack would provide at most several days of warning and preparation. This places a premium on combined training, which is a habitual focus of our forward-deployed forces and participation in combined headquarters.

These units and military functions are the baseline force. Some manpower reductions may be possible while still protecting these capabilities. But future reductions must be bounded by the need to protect a ground and air combat presence, reinforcement capabilities and selected functions which are critical to readiness.

The base force articulated by the CJCS fully supports theater requirements. In conjunction with forward-deployed forces, the United States has a rapid and robust augmentation force available for deployment in the event of crisis. However, a major concern remains the sufficiency of strategic lift to deploy forces in a timely manner. Although strategic lift was sufficient to meet the requirements of Operation Desert Storm, the Korean theater faces the prospects of limited notice and the urgency of sudden North Korean offensive operations. Continued support for expanded strategic lift is essential.

#### U.S./ROK DEFENSE POSTURE

Closing the north-south imbalance is the highest priority program for the Combined Forces Command. It is a priority goal of the South Korean Government, one that is broadly supported by the people. While progress has been and continues to be made, there are multiple considerations that effect this effort. First, improvements must be applied across the full spectrum of military forces—ground, air and sea. Full self-sufficiency implies a self-defense capability in each dimension of warfare. The full cost of achieving multi-dimensional self-sufficiency is extremely large. The result is the requirement for a measured buildup and adherence to agreed priorities that reduce risks across the dimensions of warfare.

Second, the pace and extent of progress is limited by the resources available. Although the Gross National Product of the Republic of Korea is 10 times the size of North Korea's, it is still only around \$300 billion. The past year's defense budget was about 4 percent of the GNP, or approximately \$10.8 billion. Although this represents a 13-percent increase over the previous year's defense budget, less than half is available for defense improvements. The rest is required for personnel, training, maintenance and other programs.

In the past 2 years, the ROK has agreed to purchase 120 F-16C fighters, 8 P-3 Orion ASW aircraft, and 81 UH-60L Blackhawks, and it is in the process of completing delivery of 90 AH-1S Cobra helicopters. In addition to other force improvement programs, such as the K-1 tank, the 155 mm howitzer, and construction of submarines and surface frigates, the majority of which are accomplished through indigenous production, the ROK is committed to a broad and ambitious upgrade program.

The requirement to protect interoperability among combined forces and ROK willingness to continue spending over 80 percent of its foreign military procurements in the American marketplace carry the hidden burden of slowing the increase in military systems. This is due mainly to the high costs per copy associated with American produced military systems. If the ROK were to widen its procurements



to include Eastern European and CIS fighting systems, the asymmetry in numbers of systems would disappear in only a few years. However, this would significantly degrade interoperability between combined forces, probably result in ill feeling in the United States, and harness the ROK armed forces to less capable systems. Ultimately, it is a tradeoff of quality versus numbers. I believe the factors of price and time argue for the approach we are taking.


We have committed to a longer term program which exploits the technological differential between U.S.-produced and North Korean- or Warsaw Pact-produced systems. This methodology is being applied to selected war-fighting systems which are deemed to have a decisive impact within the overall balance of forces. At the same time, other procurements will compromise on technological impact, where costs and effectiveness are balanced appropriately. The ultimate objective will be a significant technological advantage in certain critical battlefield functions, and comparative parity in other functions.

The ROK sustains remarkably high levels of support for its own defense. A national draft system remains in place, supporting an active force of over 636,000 and a reserve of over 4 million. Last year, the ROK converted a number of reserve spaces to full-time active spaces, representing an actual increase in active forces of around 13 percent. From a population of only 42 million, this is an extremely large commitment, ensuring that virtually every healthy male performs military service. Moreover, ROK defense spending annually represents about a third of its total national budget.


In the midst of these efforts, the defense relationship between our two nations continues to transition. The actions directed to be accomplished in the first phase of the Nunn-Warner process have been, or are scheduled to be completed by the end of 1992. USAF force reductions have been accomplished, and Army reductions are on course. An ROK general officer has been appointed as the Senior Member of the Military Armistice Commission. Preparations continue for the appointment of a ROK general officer as commander of the Ground Component Command of the Combined Forces Command, and the disestablishment of the Combined Field Army has been agreed by both nations and will be completed by the end of 1992.

Planning for the second phase of Nunn-Warner was nearly complete when President Bush and Secretary Cheney announced that any further force reductions scheduled for Phase II would be suspended at least until the North Korean nuclear issue was resolved.

An additional objective set forth in the Nunn-Warner report was the requirement to encourage the ROK to assume a greater share of the cost-sharing burden for the stationing of U.S. forces. Considerable progress has been made and a bilateral agreement has been reached that will direct the apportionment of local currency-based costs through 1995. Using the 1991 level as the baseline, the ROK agreed to annual increases each year, ramping up to a level of one-third of all won-based cost by 1995, a figure we estimate to be about \$900 million. The following table illustrates the approximated amounts that have and will be contributed by the ROK:



There is a natural inclination to compare cost-sharing responsibilities of the ROK with Japan's recent agreement to assume a greater share of the costs of U.S. forces in Japan. Before making this comparison, it is important to note the significant circumstantial differences, the enormous difference in national wealth, and the vast gap between the respective national percentages of Gross National Product allocated to self-defense. The following chart shows the difference:



As this chart conveys, the ROK GNP is less than one-fifteenth of Japan's. Moreover, the ROK spends about 4 percent of its GNP on defense, whereas Japan spends less than 1 percent of its GNP on defense. Thus, in the broader balance of defense burden sharing, the ROK carries a far higher proportional burden than Japan.

Beyond this, it also is important to comprehend the difference in how we calculate the overall amounts of money contributed to forward stationing in the two nations.

In Japan, the costs of U.S. facilities is handled through a rental arrangement with the Japanese Government and rental and direct payment arrangements on U.S. facilities are included in the aggregate sum. In Korea, all U.S. facilities are provided rent free and therefore this cost is not included in the overall contribution. Economists would term this an opportunity cost, and it is variously estimated to be in excess of \$1.8 billion. If it were included, the total percentage of forward stationing contributions, absent U.S. personnel costs, would jump to over \$2 billion, establishing that the ROK is paying almost 75 percent of forward-stationing costs.

The ROK also provides other offsets which fall in the category of burden sharing. Among these is the KATUSA program, which provides over 5,200 Korean soldiers to supplement the troop strength of U.S. units. KATUSAs are handpicked soldiers who are assigned to and fully integrated within U.S. units. The ROK Army has also agreed to contribute a ROK heavy brigade to round out the 2d Infantry Division. These contributions permit the United States to field fully operational, ready units, but with absolute economy in U.S. manpower requirements. In any consideration of the full measure of burden sharing, it is important to note that over 95 percent of the forces dedicated to the role of deterring a North Korean attack are ROK armed forces.

Beyond 1995, we expect the burden of forward stationing costs to decline steadily as a function of three initiatives. First will be the probable withdrawal of additional forces under the second phase of the Nunn-Warner initiative. Second, will be continued efforts to convince the ROK to accept a higher percentage of stationing costs. Third, there will be reduced requirements under the theater's base realignment and closure plan.

Relocation and consolidation of U.S. forces in Korea is on track in three areas: (1) eventual removal of all U.S. military headquarters out of Seoul, the cost of which will be borne by the ROK, (2) conversion of air force facilities to collocated operating base status; and, (3) closure of army facilities through activity consolidation and force reductions. USFK has placed five facilities into collocated operating base status, and by 1 April 1992, will close five army facilities, commensurate with force withdrawals. Additionally, the 2d Infantry Division completed transfer of responsibility for its portion of the DMZ on 1 October 1991.

The theater has established a base realignment and closure office to coordinate and manage continuing efforts. Future reductions under the Nunn-Warner process will result in further base closings and realignment (the force cuts anticipated for the second phase have been suspended pending further progress on the North Korean nuclear issue). Fiscally, it makes good sense to align base closing with the force withdrawal scheme to avoid the costs of relocating units and facilities which will be withdrawn shortly afterward. The eventual end state is to consolidate the U.S. presence into enclaves at Camps Red Cloud-Casey-Hovey, Osan-Camp Humphreys, and Taegu-Pusan. A central principle of the base closure strategy is to retain those bases which have the best facilities, making optimal use of past infrastructure investments.

#### CONCLUSION

As the events of the past year have shown, Korea is on the brink of major change. Political, economic and diplomatic trends heavily favor the ROK. Only the military balance remains unfavorable.

The situation has grown far more complex in the past year. Diplomatic and economic dynamics are setting the pace of change. Nevertheless, the risk of conflict is still quite real. As internal and external pressures continue to mount, there is a possibility that North Korea may lash out. Moreover, North Korea is on the verge of changing national leaders for the first time in nearly half a century. We cannot with confidence predict the stability of the process or its outcome; nor can we anticipate the policies the north may adopt when it is complete. More ominously, North Korea has yet to take convincing steps to allay fears concerning its nuclear program.

South Koreans await the events of the coming year with a mixture of fear and optimism. Their fears relate to Pyongyang's nuclear weapons program, a premature pullout of U.S. forces, and the regional instability that would follow a U.S. withdrawal. At the same time, many South Koreans have begun to speculate that unification could occur before the close of the century. The past year's events have spurred this optimism and encouraged the ROK government to take bold risks in search of a more permanent peace and perhaps some form of union. Yet, the ROK also comprehends the attendant risks. In close cooperation with the United States, it is applying a very adroit, multi-dimensional strategy toward North Korea.

In the north there is still no sign of fundamental change. It remains in the grip of the most totalitarian system in the world, with policies and rhetoric that trace



back half a century. But the situation on the peninsula cannot remain in status quo for much longer. The south will continue to prosper and grow as the north declines.

The past year's events can be interpreted as a hesitant and reluctant awakening by North Korea that it will have to change its policies if it is to survive. The world of 1992 is far less conducive to aggressive, xenophobic dictators than the polarized environment of the cold war. But is also clear that Pyongyang wants to block change as much as it can and that such change as has occurred is due to external pressure, rather than a decision to reform.

The situation in Korea would not have reached its present, more hopeful stage were it not for America's commitment to ROK security and the forward presence which gives it credibility. This commitment allows President Roh's government to approach the north with flexibility and confidence and is vital to continued progress. As long as both the ROK and North Korea believe that U.S. forces are absolutely committed, the south can confidently continue a flexible diplomatic approach. So long as we continue to ensure that North Korea does not have a viable military option, the likelihood of a peaceful outcome remains strong.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you.

We will take a short break while we clear the room and then proceed with questions.

[Whereupon, at 10:30 a.m., the panel proceeded to other business.]



## CINC STRATEGIC AIR COMMAND

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HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,  
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES,  
DEFENSE POLICY PANEL,  
*Washington, DC, Wednesday, April 8, 1992.*

The panel met, pursuant to call, at 9:30 a.m., in room 2118, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Les Aspin (chairman of the panel) presiding.

### STATEMENT OF HON. LES ASPIN, A REPRESENTATIVE FROM WISCONSIN, CHAIRMAN, DEFENSE POLICY PANEL

The CHAIRMAN. Our meeting will come to order.

This morning the Defense Policy Panel welcomes Gen. Lee Butler, the Commander in Chief of the Strategic Air Command and Director of the Joint Strategic Targeting Planning Staff. His testimony on strategic nuclear issues will be very helpful as we develop a defense program capable of meeting the new threats of the post-Soviet era.

For decades we faced two primary threats which became the basis for our defense planning: A massive Eastern Bloc conventional attack on Western Europe and a massive Soviet nuclear attack on the United States. But two modern revolutions in the former Soviet Union have significantly diminished those threats.

The Warsaw Pact's conventional military superiority has evaporated, and with the demise of the Soviet Union itself, strategic modernization programs in the former Soviet Union have slowed down and may finally come to a halt.

These developments have shifted the bedrock on which U.S. nuclear policy was founded. But even more importantly, they have reversed U.S. interests in nuclear weapons.

Nuclear weapons used to be the great equalizer that allowed the West to compensate for having fewer conventional forces than the East. In the post-Soviet world, our conventional forces are now the biggest on the block.

But nuclear weapons continue to play the same role as before, making it possible for the United States to become the equalizer, unless changes are made.

The proliferation of nuclear weapons is now a principal threat. The spread of nuclear technology has continued for the last 20 years, basically obscured by the shadow of the superpower competition. The seriousness of the problem has now become clear thanks to Saddam Hussein and North Korea's Kim Il-Sung.

Today we plan to review these broad issues in light of the changed threats we face and the diminished utility of nuclear weapons.



How many nuclear weapons should we keep? What are our targeting plans for them? How much modernization do we need? What alert posture should we maintain for the forces that we have?

We look forward to General Butler's testimony on these questions. Before we begin, let me see if Bob Davis has any comments to make.

**STATEMENT OF HON. ROBERT W. DAVIS, A REPRESENTATIVE  
FROM MICHIGAN**

Mr. DAVIS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

General Butler, it is always good to see you. We welcome you here today.

The English poet W.H. Auden once wrote: "It takes little talent to see clearly what lies under one's nose, but a good deal of it to know in which direction to point that organ." This hearing is about making choices, because the end of the cold war has placed three main courses, so to speak, on the future of U.S. nuclear weapons directly beneath our collective national nose.

One course calls for cutting U.S. and Russian strategic nuclear forces to about 3,700 weapons. Secretary Cheney and General Powell are very forceful advocates of this position.

The second course, proposed by Mr. Yeltsin, contends that further reduction to a level of 2,000 to 2,500 per side can be made without damaging U.S. national security.

A third course calls for extremely low numbers of nuclear weapons, in the few hundreds, with some even calling for outright abolition.

Clearly there are risks associated with each course because we know that Russia will continue to possess the nuclear capability, well into the future, to destroy the United States. Russia continues to selectively modernize its strategic nuclear force, and as Chairman Aspin has pointed out, the evolving nuclear weapons command and control structure of the former Soviet Union remains uncertain at best.

For these reasons, General Butler, we would like your views on a number of questions.

Can we safely reduce our reliance on strategic nuclear weapons below 4,700? How should our smaller nuclear forces be postured? To what extent can conventional weapons take the place of nuclear weapons in our force planning? To what extent should reliance on emerging missile defenses supplant our traditional reliance on the nuclear triad of land and sea-based nuclear missiles and bombers?

In short, General Butler, this panel very much needs your advice as to the direction that we ought to point our nose, and we look forward to your testimony.

I thank you, Mr. Chairman. I might point out that, as the chairman is well aware, there are a whole bunch of meetings going on this morning. I am the ranking member of the Merchant Marine and Fisheries Committee and have an important markup at 10 a.m.

Welcome, General Butler. It is good to see you.

The CHAIRMAN. General Butler, the floor is yours.

**STATEMENT OF GEN. LEE BUTLER, COMMANDER IN CHIEF,  
STRATEGIC AIR COMMAND**

General BUTLER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. It is nice to be back before this panel.

As you can imagine, my first year and 2 months has been rather eventful. It has been my privilege and challenge to preside over a historic adaptation of strategic forces. The collapse of the Soviet Union unleashed forces that have swept over every aspect of our environment, in some form and require a transition in concepts for: bases and manning, alert postures, modernization programs, nuclear targeting policy and nuclear war planning, thinking about the concept of nuclear deterrence itself, and perhaps most importantly and dramatically, organization.

I would underscore that it is something of a bittersweet moment for those of us in Strategic Air Command that on the 1st of June this year we will stand down and establish a new unified organization, the U.S. Strategic Command. This agenda of change, of course, is not unique to SAC. But it is, I think, of unsurpassed importance, because it deals with the cornerstone of our national security strategy.

This litany of change is not a litany of woes. Far from it. It derives from an outstanding victory of Western values, commitment and sacrifice over four decades of containing an aggressive, hegemonic and global threat. In fact, those of us in the Strategic Air Command take enormous pride with respect to our role in leading to this happy outcome. We accept that a victory of such sweeping proportions must have equally momentous implications for our future, both collective and individual.

Clearly, then, I am not here to regret, but simply to report, to thank you, Mr. Chairman, and the members of this panel, for your longstanding support which gave us the tools and the encouragement to do our job. I am here also to seek a consensus with regard to a more promising but still anxious future, including the role of strategic nuclear forces. I would close by noting a profound sense of personal and professional satisfaction with regard to these extraordinary outcomes, the resolution of a frightening era in the march of history.

There are clearly still unanswered questions. The triumph of democratic values is still to be fully realized. The future can still go badly awry if our wisdom and commitment in dealing with success fails to match our foresight and courage in achieving it.

I would like to close with a quote from my prepared text that I will otherwise submit for the record. It is a quote I have carried around in my head for some time. It is from Gen. Omar Bradley as he neared the close of a distinguished career. He observed that "We have grasped the mystery of the atom and rejected the Sermon on the Mount. The world has achieved brilliance without wisdom, power without conscience. We know more about war than we know about peace, more about killing than we know about living."

I think mankind has a historic and unique opportunity to escape this indictment of moral backwardness, to tame the nuclear genie, and finally to extend the rules of law and civilized behavior throughout the four corners of the world.



Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I would be happy to address your questions.

PREPARED STATEMENT OF GEN. LEE BUTLER

Mr. Chairman and distinguished members, I am pleased to respond to your invitation and to provide for the record this report. It dwells on the rationale underlying the forces assigned to, and the programs requested for, Strategic Air Command. As I reflected on the flood of events which have transpired since my last appearance, it struck me that my efforts at that juncture to divine the post-cold war world were, in the words of one pundit, akin to Noah noticing the first drop of rain. Even the most prescient of futurists could not have foretold the compression of at least another decade of wistful hopes and imagined outcomes into the realities of the present day. The future is, in fact, now.

Thus, the Nation finds itself caught up in the classic challenge described by Thomas Kuhn in his landmark work, *The Structure of Scientific Revolutions*—adapting to the disintegration of a central, galvanizing paradigm. The organizing, motivating assumptions of the cold war defined our national purpose, dictated the thrust of our security policy and compelled the acquisition of an unparalleled array of military capabilities. With the collapse of this longstanding construct, we are awash in new opportunities, reemergent issues and profound problems. Our measure as a society will be taken over the next several years as we struggle to devise a new set of principles and a new consensus to reorient our society, to guide America's role in the world, and to define the size, composition and equipage of our Armed Forces.

To this latter point, no issue is more vital than the role of nuclear weapons as an instrument of national security policy. We are seized with this question in our relations with the nations emerging from the collapse of the Soviet Union. The appalling spectre of nuclear proliferation is the new global nightmare that threatens to spark an arms race with murderous portent. The passing of the cold war paradigm offers a perhaps fleeting opportunity to escape the indictment of Gen. Omar Bradley, who at the close of a distinguished career, observed that "We have grasped the mystery of the atom and rejected the Sermon on the Mount. The world has achieved brilliance without wisdom, power without conscience. Ours is a world of nuclear giants and ethical infants. We know more about war than we know about peace, more about killing than we know about living."

I have lived with the ethical dilemmas of nuclear weapons for nearly my entire career. My command is populated with men and women of deep moral conviction who go about their daily business of deterrence convinced, in the words of their motto, that "Peace Is Our Profession." No one has a greater stake than those of us in Strategic Air Command, as the cold war paradigm collapses. The cascading forces unleashed by the demise of communism have swept across our lives like a tidal wave. We have taken these into account in our war planning and in thinking about deterrence. In addition, alert postures have been dramatically revised; weapons systems sharply reduced; modernization programs abruptly cancelled or curtailed; a third of our bases closed; and, in poignant testimony to its historic success, SAC will quietly but proudly stand-down on the first day of June.

Let me be very clear. None of the foregoing is to be regretted. To the contrary, we have been fully consulted, actively engaged and wholeheartedly supportive of this remarkable litany of change. After all, these are the fruits of a long-sought triumph, the rewards of nearly 46 years on the nuclear ramparts. What matters now is the manner in which victory is consolidated, the orderly quest for a new paradigm, the patient reconstruction of consensus, the intelligent transition from old postures into new, and the preservation of an environment which will continue to attract and retain a quality force of volunteers.

Having been deeply involved, through dint of circumstance, in the definition and articulation of the new National Military Strategy and its corresponding base force concept, it should come as no surprise to this panel that I am strongly wedded to the precepts contained therein. I can attest that the vision from which the strategy proceeds and the assumptions which inform its proposed capabilities are rooted not in the old cold war paradigm, but in a lengthy inquiry into the likely course for a world in transition. That process predated the emergence of the CIS, but had already accepted and incorporated the most direct consequence of that eventuality: The invalidation of global war with the Soviet Union as a core planning and programming scenario.

Concerning the forces for which I now am responsible, I am confident that the new military strategy and its corresponding base force provide a solid foundation and intelligent roadmap for the transitional era that stretches as far as the strategic eye can see. As amended by the President's subsequent pronouncements on 27 Sep-



tember 1991 and in his State of the Union Address, they serve as guideposts for my observations today regarding Strategic Air Command and its priorities. I will address myself to four key issues: (1) deterrence in what promises to be a protracted period of disengagement from an era of enormous nuclear arsenals, both East and West; (2) nuclear force characteristics in the period of disengagement; (3) implications of nuclear force initiatives; and (4) force program recommendations in the budget under consideration.

#### DETERRENCE IN THE PERIOD OF DISENGAGEMENT

The revised National Military Strategy and its base force prompted significant modifications to our Nation's strategic force posture based on a clear appreciation of the changes in the world and the promise they hold. More importantly, these modifications accommodate the transitional period I refer to as disengagement, that is, the complex interaction among evolving international forces, related U.S. defense policy decisions, and the consequent force structure and posture adjustments. One of the most crucial issues we face during this period, for example, is how to deal with the residual capabilities of our former adversary, the Soviet Union, which now reside in various CIS republics.

Whatever the pronounced intentions of the current leadership, until the enormous destructive potential resident in the nuclear arsenals of the CIS is greatly mitigated, this Nation must retain a capability of comparable import. Even though the likelihood of nuclear conflict has virtually disappeared today, the absence of a competent U.S. retaliatory force could easily change the benign threat calculus we presently anticipate. Further, outcomes during the disengagement period could for quite other reasons run counter to our hopeful expectations. Thus it was that strategic deterrence was retained as a basic principle of our post-cold war military strategy and the base force.

Conversely, this is not classic cold war deterrence, marked by continuously airborne command platforms and bombers cocked on alert. The deterrence resident in the revised strategy is amenable to greatly relaxed postures, reduced and perhaps sharply reduced—forces, curtailed modernization, and rapid advances in arms control. It strikes a prudent modification premised on the following judgments:

- Deterrence does in fact provide a constraint on the behavior of potentially adversarial nuclear states;
- A U.S. nuclear deterrent force reassures our allies and encourages non-proliferation, albeit within limits bounded by rational calculations;
- A U.S. nuclear deterrent force is a key element in the pervasive international role we must continue to play well into the future.

A critical aspect of that role is to lead the effort toward stemming the pace and scope of nuclear weapons development, as well as other weapons of mass destruction. Some contend that deterrence is not applicable outside the classic cold war paradigm—especially when such weapons are in the hands of seemingly irrational leaders. In my view, the very fact that such leaders pursue nuclear capability implies a certain lethal rationality. They clearly understand the enormous power resident in these weapons, and cannot, therefore, ignore the prospect of being themselves subject to their effects. Thus, while such leaders may not be susceptible to deterrence as we understood it in the cold war, and while their calculation of cost and benefit may differ from ours, they are not immune to the prospect of escalation and the constraining influence that reality brings to decisionmaking even in the heat of battle. At a minimum, the existence of a nuclear deterrent force in the United States must be taken into serious consideration by any would-be aggressors with weapons of mass destruction.

#### NUCLEAR FORCE CHARACTERISTICS IN THE PERIOD OF DISENGAGEMENT

The principal characteristics of our nuclear force posture as the next chapter of the nuclear era unfolds will be safety, security, and operational efficiency. Safe forces are a function of intelligent design, exquisitely well-maintained equipment and highly trained, disciplined people. We have always done a superb job in this area. But as we enter the period of disengagement, standards are already being raised, and we must continue to seek improvements where prudent and affordable. A robust C<sup>3</sup>I and strategic warning network are still essential. A sound DOE complex including the national laboratories and a modest weapons testing capability is necessary to accomplish a variety of tasks associated with competent, responsible stewardship of nuclear weapons.

Secure forces require continued reliance on a Triad of capabilities—the bomber, ICBM, and sea-based missiles. Our future Triad will give less emphasis to land-

based ICBMs and ready bombers; this allows the bomber's substantial capability to be allocated more effectively to conventional war-fighting plans and roles. This shift in emphasis is already well underway following termination of the nuclear alert role of the bomber and with the planned growth in conventional capability of the B-1B force.

An operationally efficient force requires that we refine the nuclear weapons employment planning structure in light of the dramatic reduction in East-West tensions. As the Director, Joint Strategic Target Planning Staff, I can assure you that in response to Secretary Cheney's direction, significant progress has been made and will continue on this score. As I noted last year, we are continuously reviewing the targets in our nuclear war plans. We had carefully analyzed the weapon levels proposed by the President in his initiative of January 28, and I am confident in our ability to meet current and future targeting requirements. Beyond these steps, the JSTPS is working hard to develop a more flexible and adaptive planning process, one that will accommodate a world in which nuclear threats to our vital security interests are evolving in scope, diversity and potential.

#### IMPLICATIONS OF NUCLEAR FORCE INITIATIVES

The recent series of unilateral and bilateral nuclear initiatives underscores the necessity for intelligent force planning. Clearly, such planning cannot be based simply on arbitrarily derived levels. If deterrence and the military capability upon which it relies are to make sense, they must proceed from an orderly calculation of potential threats, key policy judgments and related guidance, war plan objectives, arms control goals and restraints, and modernization needs. Further, the forces must be postured, maintained and based in a relevant, supportable infrastructure. All of this is to say that a sufficient force for deterrence must be operationally, as well as fiscally, sound.

I was fully consulted on this complex of issues as President Bush, Secretary Cheney, and General Powell worked to restructure our nuclear forces in keeping with a changing world. As a result, through careful planning and management, SAC has been able to comply promptly and systematically with a breathtaking series of changes in force posture, structure, basing, organization, operational focus and nuclear war planning.

However, I must note that as we shrink our nuclear arsenal further, operational considerations will assume increasing weight in the process of determining how to reduce weapons levels. For example, the supporting infrastructure for our ICBMs and nuclear-role bombers will increasingly influence the number of warheads assigned to any single delivery system. As the force structure comes down, crucial judgments will come into play regarding the ability to hedge against technological surprise (to include failure), the cost to maintain a particular weapon system, and the size of the basing structure. In other words, there is a tyranny of small numbers that exacts an increasing price for misjudgment and hasty decision. Some options, once foreclosed, may well prove irretrievable. Never has consensus on the future size and capability of the Nation's strategic nuclear arsenal been more important.

Finally, I would like to echo the President's support for a system to provide Global Protection Against Limited Strikes. Although it does not fall directly within my purview, I view the acquisition of such a capability to be highly useful in deterring or thwarting a nuclear attack on the U.S. or its allies. With these foregoing considerations in mind, I will now address the program needs of the Strategic Air Command.

#### STRATEGIC AIR COMMAND FORCE PROGRAM RECOMMENDATIONS

The defense budget recommendation before you continues the process of disengagement, most notably by further reducing strategic nuclear force structure and eliminating or reducing the magnitude of ongoing programs. Collectively, these actions have led to a \$38 billion reduction in the projected costs for full production and deployment of SAC forces when compared to the 1991 program.

In reversing the momentum of decades of cold war planning and programming, we have provided for proper maintenance and modernization of those forces we must retain for the Nation's long-term security. Specifically, the programs noted below are essential to the mission of Strategic Air Command and are included in the budget request now under your consideration.

#### BOMBERS

The fiscal year 1993 defense budget provides for a force of approximately 200 B-52, B-1, and B-2 bombers. Today, the B-1 stands alone as the world's premier operational bomber. I have flown the B-1 through a variety of flight profiles and found



it to perform magnificently. It represents an extraordinary advance over the venerable B-52, with which I have considerable experience. In many respects, the B-1B is today at the same point in its operational maturity as was the B-52 at the same age. Both were built as interim bombers. Both were initially intended for a nuclear role. Both have had to adapt to major changes in their operational environment. Like the B-52, with a relatively modest additional investment, the B-1B will evolve into a highly flexible aircraft with great capability across a wide variety of both nuclear and conventional tasks. Thus, providing an organic maintenance capability, achieving enhanced weapon system survivability, and expanding the depth and breadth of conventional weapons capability for the B-1B are my highest priorities. The fiscal year 1993 budget proposal adequately funds these programs.

The decision to sharply limit B-2 production has required considerable rethinking with respect to the optimum operational concept for a small force of enormously capable aircraft. The unprecedented potential resident in the B-2, and the huge investment it represents, virtually demand that we make the commitment to providing the appropriate training base, proper maintenance, and adequate aircraft to ensure a viable force. To this end, I strongly support a fleet of 20 aircraft geared to an orderly program of operational beddown and growth in capability.

The B-52 will continue to play a key role in the bomber force for years to come, as the B-18 matures and the B-2 comes on line. As a cruise missile carrier in the nuclear arena, or in a variety of conventional roles, the B-52 is an essential adjunct to its more modern counterparts and must be properly supported.

### *Tankers*

The air refueling component of the Base Force, KC-135 and KC-10 aircraft, has proven itself time and again as an effective force multiplier. Moreover, a smaller Air Force, given major retirements of fighter and bomber aircraft, and a more fuel efficient Air Force, due to the KC-135 re-engining program and the advent of the C-17, have reduced the tankers' customer base. This, in turn, justifies accelerated KC-135A retirements, favors the continued conversion of remaining aircraft to R-models, and argues for shifting assets from the Active to the Reserve Forces. The resultant size and composition of air refueling assets will be well suited to the array of potential conflict options envisioned by the National Military Strategy.

### *Land-based Missiles*

ICBMs continue to bring to the Triad their unique qualities of prompt response, reliability, accuracy and day-to-day low cost. Further, as was recently demonstrated, another advantage of the ICBM force is its flexibility. Portions of the force can be at a 100-percent alert rate or, as after the 27 September 1991 Presidential initiative, can be removed quickly from alert and placed in a safe and secure status. Modest and highly selective modifications to the existing Minuteman III force are essential to reliably extend its service life and therefore reflect my highest priorities. To improve maintenance and reliability, a new guidance system for the MMIII force has been included in the fiscal year 1993 budget request. Similarly, funds to replace the missile booster solid fuel and to complete upgrades to missile launch control centers are high priority items that have been adequately funded in the fiscal year 1993 budget request. These modernization and upgrade programs will keep the MMIII force fully capable well beyond the turn of the century.

### *Command, Control and Communications*

Recent initiatives in the business of Command, Control, and Communications provide an excellent example of how streamlining in the post-cold war era can save millions of dollars. After careful analyses, we combined a number of emergency actions functions, thereby reducing manning and facility requirements, and permitting a major restructuring of the Worldwide Military Command and Control System Airborne Resources (WABNRES). This reduced the WABNRES fleet from 59 to 31 aircraft while still maintaining assured connectivity to the nuclear forces. With respect to modernization programs supporting nuclear C<sup>3</sup>, I would underscore the importance of a Ground Wave Emergency Network (GWEN) in providing a safer and more survivable means of alerting and launching all three legs of the Triad. Such investments in C<sup>3</sup> programs underwrite essential nuclear connectivity well into the next century.

### *Reorganization Initiatives*

Reorganization is an integral element of the emerging post-cold war paradigm. As you know, this may be the last opportunity I will have to testify before you as CINCSAC. During the last 9 months I have been an active participant in two independent, but mutually supportive reorganization efforts. One will result in the disestablishment of Strategic Air Command, Tactical Air Command and Military Airlift



Command and the creation of two new Air Force commands, Air Combat Command, and Air Mobility Command. This constitutes the most significant Air Force reorganization since its establishment in 1947, and reflects the new defense realities: the end of the cold war, reduced emphasis on nuclear weapons, a smaller force structure and persistent conventional threats to U.S. vital interests. The senior Air Force leadership acknowledged with this restructuring that in the post-cold war era, it is increasingly important that the Air Force be organized to take full advantage of the inherent capabilities of airpower, especially the contribution of SAC in the conventional arena. Accordingly, SAC's force program recommendations have been prepared with these organizational changes in mind.

While the Air Force was reexamining its organizational structure, Secretary Cheney and General Powell instituted a similar review at the field commands. A key conclusion arising from this process was that the success of the unified command structure dictated the need to correct a long-standing deficiency in the organization of the nation's strategic nuclear forces. Thus, at the President's direction a new unified command, the U.S. Strategic Command, is to be established providing a single field agent to oversee strategic nuclear and other assigned forces, bringing their organization into line with the intent of the Goldwater-Nichols Reorganization Act of 1986. This is a significant step forward, and represents a salutary advance in inter-service cooperation.

#### CONCLUSION

I will conclude by simply stating my most urgent priority and immediate concern: mitigating the anxiety and pain borne by SAC professionals in a restructuring made possible in large part by their contribution to the successful concluding of the cold war. They deserve a special measure of consideration and personal security as their lives suddenly take a wrenching new direction. Their accomplishments and unflagging devotion in the face of deeply unsettling change are a source of enormous pride and great confidence as the Nation turns to its new agenda.

The CHAIRMAN. Let's begin, then.

Bob, if you are going to leave, maybe we ought to give you an opportunity to ask questions first, if you have got to get to another meeting.

Mr. DAVIS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

General Butler, how important are nuclear weapons to ensuring U.S. national security today? Will that importance increase or decline in the coming years, and why?

General BUTLER. As we were recalculating national military strategy in light of the collapse of the Soviet Union, communism, and a profoundly changed world, we had to come to grips with what is still an enduring reality, albeit a less urgent one—the fact that there are a number of nuclear weapons still in existence.

So our conclusion was—and it is a prudent and cautious one, obviously—that while we don't impute any particular threat in the sense that threat is intention married to capability, to the existence of CIS nuclear weapons at present, the uncertainty of outcomes politically, within the individual republics, or collectively, with regard to the future of the CIS, the turmoil that we could anticipate, suggests that for the foreseeable future—and I have no idea what boundary line to put on that context—that it is prudent to maintain competent, responsible nuclear deterrent forces in this country. They have served us well for 40 years.

Conversely, the nature of deterrence has surely changed. This is not the deterrence of nuclear bombers sitting cocked on 5-minute alert or command and control aircraft continuously airborne. This is not the nuclear deterrence of inventories exceeding 10,000 weapons.

Happily, we have arrived at a state of affairs where we can make significant changes, but in a very phased and deliberate way. For

example, standing aircraft down from alert, standing the Minuteman IIs down from alert, which we are going to deactivate anyway. Taking measured steps to simply curtail or cancel modernization programs. All of these I think are appropriate and significant responses to a profoundly changed threat.

So at this juncture, I think deterrence still has meaning. I think that the existence of a reasonably modified but still significant U.S. strategic nuclear deterrent force is a calculation that has to enter the minds of anyone who might have a different idea for the future of the nuclear weapons in the republics of the former Soviet Union than we would prefer. I am comfortable with that.

I don't think there is any necessity to rush to take down our forces, particularly when we have other options that we are exercising with regard to posture and with regard to modernization programs. So I think what we are doing is appropriate and prudent.

Mr. DAVIS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I guess I am going to have to go, but I am going to try to come back. I have a couple more questions about the bomber force. But I will wait and return.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. General Butler, let me ask you about where you see the size of the force going, and what is it that we can do with the size of the force.

In the past, of course, we sized our forces based upon some notion of what targets we thought we needed to hit in the Soviet Union in order to maintain credible deterrence. Part of the calculation on the size of our force was what the Soviet Union was doing, because of the importance of perceptions and the necessity to maintain parity in a perceptual sense as well as in an operational sense.

Given the changes that are going on in the Soviet Union, the changes in the number of targets, and now at least for a while, I don't know that we can say forever, but for a while, a very cooperative administration in Russia. If in fact it is a situation where they will agree with us, practically to any level we can agree on, what numbers are we looking at here in this world of nuclear weapons in the new world?

General BUTLER. The short answer to your question is, I really don't know what the exact right number of strategic nuclear weapons is. I rejoice in the fact that the numbers are getting lower, that the 4,700 weapons, which the administration chose as its benchmark, and the calculation of which I was fully consulted on and supported, is lower than 6,000, which is lower than 10,000 or 12,000 or 13,000. So in that regard, I think what is most important is that the trend is in the right direction, finally.

With regard to where we might ultimately come out, I think that is a matter that engages us on a number of things. First and foremost, it has to be the product of an intense and mutually agreeable discussion with our principal interlocutors in the republics. While we have indications from President Yeltsin with regard to the possibility of lower numbers, at this moment that is simply a possibility.

With regard to the impacts of going to something like 2,000 or 2,500 weapons, I think other calculations come into play. For example, as we approach that level, is it time to readdress the Triad,



for example? How much effort, how much insurance, how many dollars do you want to put into maintaining three separate, calculatedly redundant nuclear offensive capabilities?

Clearly, at some lower level, to allocate very small numbers of warheads among three legs probably begins to lose at least economic sense. So that is a question which really hasn't been addressed yet, and I think it bears very careful discussion.

Second, we will have to reach some consensus with regard to the relationship between strategic nuclear deterrence and war-fighting considerations not only in the force structure but in targeting as well.

For years our targeting policy has proceeded according to a fairly consistent set of guidelines. That policy has not changed significantly. I don't think that at this juncture, it is really necessary to undertake that debate; although at some point surely we will have to begin it.

So with regard to some future number, as I think the Chairman of the JCS has already indicated, there is nothing that would suggest that 4,700 is set in concrete. On the other hand, at this point, if we are to maintain a Triad, if we are to continue to enjoy the insurance that comes from having three separate legs, if we are to continue to want to hold at risk a sufficient fraction of the capability resident, if nothing else, in the forces of our adversaries, it is still going to require a considerable number of weapons, given all the other things you take into account such as logistical support.

So, in short, I think 4,700 weapons is certainly not an unreasonable number. On the other hand, I don't think there is any compelling reason why that would be the last number. But that will ultimately be a policy decision.

The CHAIRMAN. Are you saying that 2,500 or 2,000 is not enough to maintain the Triad, or are you saying you don't know?

General BUTLER. I don't know at this juncture. I haven't undertaken any analysis. But I do think it is an essential calculation, a judgment that has to be made before we would go down to numbers that low, in addition to the questions of what you target, what risks do you take.

The CHAIRMAN. If you can't give us a number, try and help us by giving us the factors that would go into the number. In other words, if you can't say a particular number, one of those factors you would feel would be important to maintain the Triad, so—

General BUTLER. I would be happy to address that. The 4,700 weapons, as you know, are based on an allocation notion that was laid out by the President that would assign some 500 warheads to a single RV Minuteman III force. Obviously, at that point we would have terminated Peacekeeper as part of the negotiation process based on a positive response from Mr. Yeltsin and others that they would be willing to de-MIRV land-based ICBMs.

So now you are looking at several hundred land-based ICBMs. I don't think that is an unreasonable number. Land-based ICBMs are a very strong part of the Triad.

It envisions one-third reduction in the number of SLBM warheads. That is a pretty dramatic step. That is our most survivable force, and we paid good money for it. So I think the administration made a pretty remarkable decision to say we would cut those war-



heads by a third. That gets you down to something on the order of five warheads per missile.

At some point after that, as you draw down warheads on SLBMs, as you talk about the economics argument, you will pay an extraordinary amount of money to carry around fewer and fewer warheads on systems relatively more expensive to maintain.

Finally, with regard to the bomber force, at 4,700 weapons, you would allocate about 1,900 weapons to bombers. My preference as a targeteer would be that those weapons are cruise missiles, for the simple reason that a bomber pilot, particularly in a defended area, would like to do almost anything other than fly directly over the target.

So if we have no more SRAMs, as may well happen, those weapons would be cruise missiles. They give you a great deal of flexibility and latitude. They allow you to exploit the bomber force. They give me great latitude as a targeteer.

But at the same time, we have taken advantage of the bomber's flexibility, because I can assign all of them important SIOP roles. So 4,700 weapons offer a prudent, economical force which gives me latitude and flexibility, and a sound war plan that would be modified, certainly, as we come down to those numbers of weapons.

The CHAIRMAN. Back to the question of going lower. If you can't help us by giving a number—I understand you don't want to get out in front on giving a number—but help me with what are the calculations—

General BUTLER. Well, let me give you another one. I talked about the Triad and what point you might think that some leg is no longer economically viable. This evaluation requires confidence that the threat is diminished.

Another calculation would be what portion of your weapons do you want to allocate to a secure Reserve Force. That has always been an important part of the guidance. I don't think I should get too far into that in open session, but there is a secure Reserve Force. We have always sized it according to calculations about the inventories of other nations.

At lower levels, unless you change the size of the secure Reserve Force, obviously there are fewer and fewer weapons to allocate to a nuclear war plan itself. That is a very important calculation, as you bring the numbers down.

Then third, it goes to this issue of what are the size of the inventories of other nuclear states in the world? Again, in that regard, our policy always has been deterrence. Our most important concern now is which of the CIS republics, individually or collectively, have nuclear weapons and what turns out to be their total inventory and capabilities. Perhaps more importantly, why would they choose to retain sizable nuclear forces? Those are some of the puzzles we have right now.

While there is some dramatic change in former Soviet postures as well, whether ICBM or submarine or what have you, the indications that we currently have are that they are continuing with modernization programs, they are continuing to make change-outs in the field.

I have just been briefed by a team from Los Alamos and Livermore who visited their counterparts in the former Soviet Union.

Their indications are that Russian nuclear weapons laboratories will continue to be robust and well funded.

So I don't think that we really are at a point yet where we have an understanding with our former adversaries and current interlocutors with respect to where we mutually want to go with this business.

The CHAIRMAN. Let me pursue both of those or all of those issues. Take the Soviet Union itself. In what way has the targeting changed now? What are we talking about in terms of our capabilities or the number of weapons that you need to have an effective targeting on the Soviet Union?

General BUTLER. We have adjusted the war plan to what is obviously a rather sharp reduction in the number of available forces. The Poseidon submarines are coming out of the force. Perhaps we should have the room swept.

The CHAIRMAN. Go ahead.

General BUTLER. The B-52G aircraft are being retired. The Minuteman II is coming down. So obviously we have had to make accommodations in war planning for the simple fact that the weapons curve is coming down, and rather sharply.

The CHAIRMAN. Is it classified information as to what category of targets we target in the Soviet Union?

General BUTLER. I think it is if I say it.

The CHAIRMAN. If you say it?

General BUTLER. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. Oh. OK. But leave it at the statement that the number of targets—leave the classification out of it—the number of targets is reduced now because of the changes—

General BUTLER. Commensurate with the changing weapons inventory.

The CHAIRMAN. So the point about the weapons—tell me again what your point is about the weapons labs and what is going on in the weapons labs. Are you implying that you are under suspicion that maybe the Soviets are trying to continue their modernization, or that somehow they are trying to continue a strategic nuclear capability?

General BUTLER. No, it simply is a data point, Mr. Chairman, which says that given the choice of beginning to scale back their laboratories, take down those capabilities, send their scientists elsewhere, they have chosen not to do that. Instead they have kept them in existence and kept them well funded. If they exist, they are going to work on something, labs being labs and scientists, scientists. So it is a data point for me.

It says to me they are going to keep their labs modernized, perhaps to make updates to their weapons. I can't impute motivations, but based on an input that I have recently received, it looks like they intend to maintain in place and well-served an important part of the infrastructure of having a nuclear capability.

The CHAIRMAN. Would we want them to do that? If these people are not employed, one of the dangers that we have had a series of witnesses come to this committee talk about is this: What happens to the people in the Soviet Union who are not making nuclear weapons anymore? Might they be available for hire by Saddam Hussein, Qadhafi or Kim Il-Sung?



General BUTLER. If I thought the sole purpose of maintaining these laboratories was to continue to enhance the safety aspect of their weapons, I think I would vote yes, to keep them in existence. If I thought they were going to be in the business of turning out warheads of greater dimension or what have you, obviously I would not do anything that would enhance the capability of someone who is producing weapons probably for the sole purpose of targeting them on the United States.

The CHAIRMAN. What are we seeing now in terms of the modernization going on in the Soviet Union?

General BUTLER. Of all the areas of capability, conventional or strategic nuclear, it is interesting that they seem to continue to pursue most vigorously and robustly the strategic nuclear forces. But I don't want to overdraw that comment because they have made significant changes in their posture, including submarine patrol patterns and strategic long-range aviation, for example.

President Yeltsin said they were going to take several hundred ICBMs off alert. That is sometimes difficult to verify whether that is happening or not. But we have no reason to believe they won't do otherwise.

At the same time, as near as we can see, SS-25 modernization proceeds apace. We have yet to have concrete evidence as to exactly where they are going in their ICBM modernization and change-out programs.

So my sense is at this point, unless I see something to the contrary, for the next several years they are going to retain a fairly large ICBM land-based force, an SSBN force, and some semblance of long-range aviation.

The CHAIRMAN. Let me then——

General BUTLER. So I guess what I would say, Mr. Chairman, is there is no dramatic evidence of turn around, downturn at this point. On the other hand, there is a lot of inertia in those programs.

The CHAIRMAN. Let me just read you something and see whether you—here is what Director Gates said—it seems to be a little different in tone in what you are saying, but tell me whether you agree. This is a quote from Bob Gates:

"Earlier we had judged that the Soviets would preserve and protect their strategic programs, because of their symbolic importance as much as their deterrent value. But it is increasingly hard to see how Russia or any other republics with nuclear strategic weapons will be able to continue the modernization effort or even why they would want to, given the rapid dissipation of tensions with the West.

"Therefore, we should not be surprised if most or all Soviet plans for strategic offensive force modernization are abandoned for the foreseeable future. This is clearly not what the military wants to happen, only a reflection of the likely priorities of republic leaders and the economic facts of life."

General BUTLER. I don't quarrel with that, but notice his qualifiers. "Hard to see how." That is not concrete evidence. That is speculation. "Not be surprised if." Certainly we may in the near future begin to see concrete evidence but, what I am suggesting to you is, we haven't seen it yet. So I tend to be a little cautious about outcomes until I have seen them, because those are the realities, as a targeteer, that I deal with.

So, again, that is why I would urge no precipitous drawdown in forces until we have some better understanding of how the hard re-



alities of economic collapse play into their long-range plans for force modernization.

On the other hand, I certainly agree with Mr. Gates, I would be dumbfounded if they could begin to approach the kind of scope and pace of modernization that we have seen for the last several years. I would certainly hope not. Second, when the moment comes, obviously we will take that into account in some deliberate way.

It is just that I haven't seen the evidence yet. I think Mr. Gates would probably tell you the same thing based on how he very carefully couched his remarks.

The CHAIRMAN. He says particularly, "Earlier, we had judged that the Soviets would preserve and protect their strategic programs because of their symbolic importance as much as their deterrent value."

"Earlier" means that——

General BUTLER. An intelligence estimate. That is as much as I should say here. He is signaling something with regard to——

The CHAIRMAN. Whether there was a change.

General BUTLER. Right.

The CHAIRMAN. Let me ask you a question about trying to look to the future, what size forces we can ultimately get to. What is your view of the role of the number of weapons other nuclear countries ought to have on our force structure? I am talking now about allies such as Britain and France, if they are going to a force each of somewhere in the 900 to 1,000 warhead range each.

What would be the relationship? Should we have more of them combined? In other words, in what way should our calculations of the number of nuclear weapons that we have be related in any kind of way to the number that they have?

General BUTLER. As we were discussing earlier this morning, I just returned from visiting the French and the British SSBN forces and have previously visited their strategic aircraft forces. What struck me is the strength of their commitment to not only continuing current numbers, but modernizing. All of that, of course, is subject to change if the political alignment changes.

So, yes, that does say that we can anticipate that both of those key allies will have weapons inventories in the several hundreds, perhaps a thousand. With respect to the implications for our own forces, you get into fine-grain judgments about something that I suppose I would call gravitas, serious mindedness. The ability to speak and not only be heard, but have serious attention given to what you say when you come to the nuclear bargaining table and the future of nuclear systems proliferation or what have you.

It has long been the judgment that we should maintain inventories that exceed the collectivity of those of our allies, and it also spills over in ways I can't get into here with regard to the inventories of other nations.

Can I sit here and tell you that there is a strong, deliberate logic behind that? No, I can't, but at the same time I am quite comfortable with it. I think that there is something to be said for the weight that you bring to the table of reason or negotiation, bargaining.

So I think that that is not an unreasonable sort of benchmark to set. Of course, that is academic, as long as we also maintain a

policy of having an inventory that is on a par with that of the Russian republics in their collectivity. Someday it might be a more important and interesting question. At the moment, I think it is something on the margins.

So with respect to the size of our friends and allies, nuclear arsenals, this is something of a moot point. Probably the more important point, one that you have addressed, is how does it relate to nuclear weapons in the hands of other states, neutral or potential adversaries? What is the relationship of deterrence that we have noted in the cold war era between the United States and the Soviet Union, and the proliferation or the sheer existence of nuclear weapons in the hands of others?

As I have said in my statement, I certainly accept the proposition that it is a very different kind of deterrence, that nations hell-bent on acquiring a new capability may or may not care anything about the size of our arsenal, whether we test or what have you. However, in their calculations with respect to possible aggression, I think they simply cannot ignore, they cannot set aside the fact that if the United States has a vital interest engaged in the region or issue at stake, we have very competent nuclear forces. This is not to suggest we would use them, but it is certainly a factor that needs to be taken into consideration in their calculations.

The CHAIRMAN. But that would not be a factor in the size of our forces because there is nobody that would have any foreseeable capability of getting numbers in the range of our overall——

General BUTLER. That is correct. It goes more to the question of having competent forces, well-trained people, et cetera.

The CHAIRMAN. Is there any other factor, then? I am trying to isolate the factors that are going to be important in determining the size of our nuclear forces in the future.

Let's just assume we continue to have a friendly administration in Russia. Let's just assume that they say, we will go to whatever number you agree on, if you want 2,000, we will go to 2,000. If you want 2,500, we will go to 2,500, we will agree to any number you have.

Therefore, what number would we pick? Let me see if I can just summarize our discussion here. One factor you would say ought to be is this question of the Triad, and maintaining the Triad at a reasonable cost, so that basically the number ought to reflect the ability to maintain the Triad.

No. 2, clearly with the Soviet Union, you want to have the same number, at the least; you want to have an equal number with the Soviet Union, or with what is left.

General BUTLER. Forces that are mutually stabilizing. That is a very important part of the calculation.

The CHAIRMAN. The third would be the forces of the allies. We are the only other significant power in the world now. China is small, but we are talking about large numbers of nuclear weapons, a significant number, only in two other countries, Britain and France. Your calculation would be to keep forces that are greater than Britain and France put together. Is that what I hear you saying?

General BUTLER. I am comfortable with that, yes. I think that is appropriate.



The CHAIRMAN. Norm.

Mr. SISISKY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

General Butler, while you are here, I want to ask you some specific questions, because I don't know if you are going to be here when the debate goes on. Of course, we have been debating the B-2 for a number of years and for the first time I think I have an open mind.

Would you really make a case for having 20 rather than 15, while I have an open mind?

General BUTLER. How long will it be open, sir? Until the end of my remarks, perhaps.

The CHAIRMAN. Talk fast.

General BUTLER. Well, first of all, having long sought and been on record, obviously, for larger numbers than 20, for the simple reason that an enormous potential is resident in these aircraft, any number larger than 15 is important to us. But you ask why.

I think from an operational standpoint, the most important reason that I can give you is that five more airplanes represent something on the order of an additional 300 to 400 critical targets that can be struck in the first week of conventional operations at some distant point on the globe.

If we were fighting the initial stages of an air campaign from the United States because we didn't have access to local area basing, those additional sorties can be absolutely crucial to the theater commander.

So the first and foremost reason is that every additional airplane gives you vast increases at the margin with regard to what you can do operationally. But outside of the battlefield itself, there is the question of the day-to-day operational flexibility for training, simply having additional airplanes at your disposition.

Having commanded two B-52 wings in Strategic Air Command, with squadrons on the order of 17 or 18, I can tell you that airplanes occasionally don't do things you prefer, and may require a safety modification. You can quickly find yourself in a situation where you cannot keep your force adequately trained if you just lose one airplane from the daily flying schedule. So when you are down to those small numbers of airplanes, you are at the mercy of electrons going awry in the morning and so on.

So just to have more flexibility day-to-day and the tremendous increase in the margin of firepower of precision-delivered weapons in a campaign far from our shores, it is very important for us in the military to have as much capability as we can muster, particularly out of a system that has such enormous potential.

Mr. SISISKY. That seems a good explanation. Let me just follow on.

How long do you think the B-52s—which were first deployed in the 1950s and early 1960s—will last? Can you envision a bomber force in the future consisting of only 15 or 20 B-52s?

General BUTLER. Well, the B-52 airframe is one of the most remarkable things that has ever been created. If you didn't care about anything else like penetration capability, comfort of the crew, having to replace certain systems periodically, the body of the B-52 will probably last for another 20 to 30 years.



I have a 1969 Camaro which is doing pretty well also, but it is costing me a fortune to fix the carburetor every 6 months. So just in regard to the basic viability of the airplane, we made a wonderful machine.

On the other hand, if you take the Persian Gulf War as an illustration, its limitations become quickly apparent. We put B-52s into the theater with crews that trained for low-altitude deployment. The bombs we made available on the conventional side were bombs with fins that retard the fall of the bombs, so the airplane can be far away from the bombing spots. Lo and behold, we quickly found ourselves at 40,000 feet and our crews were not trained for high-altitude bombing.

It takes a while to remember how to bomb from that altitude. The offensive avionics systems are not optimized for that altitude. They don't have the capacity to take high winds into account. At 400 feet you don't care much about wind; the bomb gets to the ground pretty quickly. So we found ourselves in a situation where we had an old airframe, old weapons, and crews trained in the wrong environment.

The B-1, from my estimation, is a far superior airplane, one fully equipped for the conventional role. It can drop bombs at 600 knots, it can go right down on the deck, 100 or 200 feet. It drops them with great precision, great accuracy.

The high speed, the low altitude, the inherently low-radar cross-section makes it a much more survivable platform than the B-52. That is why we put such a premium on the upgrade of the B-1 in the fiscal year 1993 budget request.

So while it is still useful in the future to maintain B-52s in inventory because they add mass to your ability to drop dumb iron bombs on a target, depending on how future resources go, if it became necessary to reduce the bomber force, then my bomber force is B-2s and B-1s.

Mr. SISISKY. Since you mentioned the B-1 being in the upgrades, what upgrades do you see as essential to expand the depth and the breadth of its conventional weapons capability, and what priority would you want that done?

As a matter of fact, you are not asking for a lot of money in this year's budget for upgrades of current inventory.

General BUTLER. First, there are some constraints on what we can do. We have to give you some concrete evidence about our progress with regard to things like ECM side-by-side comparison. But with regard to priorities, first and foremost is to get away from the deferred logistics support situation that we have always been constrained by, and get into a posture of organic maintenance. I just see that as absolutely crucial.

Second, we need to continue to make enhancements to the airplane in order to allow it to carry modern precision-guided munitions. We have just certified the airplane to drop iron bombs, unguided, from low altitude and now from high altitude. But what we are looking for in the future is to give it the capacity to carry, to launch large numbers of precision-guided munitions.

Of course, it could, with some modification, carry the conventional ALCM, which we fired in the war. As you know, that infor-

mation has now been released. That is a rather long-range weapon of something less than high precision.

But, we need to give it the capacity to carry the modern family of munitions currently available and which are in development.

Third, we need to fix the ECM sweep. We need to get that done. Although the most important elements of survival at low level have to do with low altitude, speed low-radar cross-section and intelligent routing, in the world we face now you cannot know where all the mobile surface-to-air defenses will be.

In that regard, modern electronic countermeasure systems are vitally important. The B-1 is deficient in that regard. We have a program to make it supportable, to modestly enhance its capabilities so we can realize its original potential.

So those are my priorities, the money to give it capability to carry modern munitions, to fix the ECM sweep, and to allow organic maintenance.

Mr. SISISKY. Last year we had a little problem with low observability.

General BUTLER. On the B-2 program?

Mr. SISISKY. Can you give us the status of the low-observability testing?

General BUTLER. I don't know what has been addressed in open hearing, and that is an extremely sensitive subject. I think what I can say is that we are satisfied that that particular deficiency can be remedied.

There are two and perhaps three solutions for proceeding on that course. We are making judgments now about the most utile and economical approach. But there are no showstoppers with regard to fixing the problem.

Mr. SISISKY. I think that will come up again.

What is the current status of the C<sup>3</sup>I redundant communications system, which is a ground wave emergency network and communication installation program?

We have had real problems with that.

General BUTLER. Yes, I think we are currently awaiting a report from the National Academy of Sciences, and once we have that in hand, presuming it is reasonably supportive, as I have said in my prepared remarks, I would like to get on with the GWEN program. That is an important part of absolutely assured command and control connectivity to the forces.

Mr. SISISKY. Thank you very much.

The CHAIRMAN. Let me take you up on Norm Sisisky's questions on modernization, General Butler. Tell us what modernization is necessary now given the tremendous changes going on in the Soviet Union and the numbers of weapons coming down.

You have already addressed the issue of whether we should have 15 or 20 B-2s. That is one. But what about the other parts of the—

General BUTLER. The Triad?

The CHAIRMAN. Any other parts that you feel are particularly important to modernization, and why, and given the changes in the numbers coming down. The B-2, I think, is a special case, because—

General BUTLER. It is a special case.

The CHAIRMAN. Because of the consideration of the capabilities in the conventional area. That is a factor that all of us need to take into account.

General BUTLER. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. But that doesn't apply to anything that might apply to other parts of the Triad.

General BUTLER. That is correct. Of course, with regard to nuclear programs in general, it is hard to imagine a modernization program that hasn't been curtailed or simply canceled.

With regard to the ICBM force, as I said in my prepared remarks, my single greatest priority is to maintain the viability of the Minuteman missile, the Minuteman III. From that respect, a singular concern is the longevity of the guidance system.

In about 5 years, we will simply have to do something to improve the maintainability of Minuteman III guidance. That is a very high priority. We can address the question of greater precision at a later point. You might want to acquire greater precision in the event the Peacekeeper missile is taken out of the force in response to arms control initiatives.

So on the ICBM side, that is my highest priority, to maintain the viability of the Minuteman force.

The CHAIRMAN. To do that you need to do what?

General BUTLER. It is very important that we undertake an updating of the guidance system. It will simply become unsupportable in terms of its maintainability in about the 1996-1997 timeframe.

The CHAIRMAN. How about the missile itself? When did you anticipate that it may need to be replaced or phased out?

General BUTLER. As far as the body of the missile is concerned, it is something akin to the frame of the B-52. It has amazing durability.

What is necessary is something that we have already undertaken and must do periodically, what is called motor washout, that is, you have to replace the propellant periodically. It can be as long as 17 years.

So with regard to the Minuteman III, our studies tell us we can sustain it as a viable weapons system well into the next century, which, of course, gives us great flexibility with regard to arms control and not having to spend a great deal of money on modernization.

The CHAIRMAN. Go ahead. What other parts of the modernization program?

General BUTLER. Well, with respect to communications, I have talked about GWEN. We also feel strongly about the Satellite Communications System.

With regard to command and control platforms, no great urgency there. In fact, we are investigating an initiative to combine the EC-135s with the new generation TACAMO aircraft.

So from a nuclear standpoint, really very modest programs. Nothing beyond that that I would really underscore here, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. What about the D-5? Why is it necessary to continue to buy it if we are going to use the same warhead as the C-4? Why not just cancel the D-5?



General BUTLER. There are a couple of reasons, in my estimation. First, at some point we are going to have to replace the C-4. It is going to wear out. The cost to upgrade is about the same as putting in a D-5 missile right now, if we start now with the front-end costs.

Second, quite apart from the issue of the warhead, the D-5 missile guidance set gives you greater accuracy for whatever warhead you are carrying. If you want to maintain flexibility with regard to the number of warheads per missile or perhaps someday even the number of missiles on the boats, I think it is greatly to your advantage to have a missile which gives you flexibility in terms of accuracy in putting warheads on targets. So I would continue with the D-5 missile program.

The CHAIRMAN. Your calculations are based only on our need; you are not factoring the British capability into this calculation?

General BUTLER. That is a stand-alone requirement. I assume we would meet that obligation.

The CHAIRMAN. So even if we stopped the production of the D-5 for ourselves, you are saying your obligation is such that we need to continue it for the British?

General BUTLER. It is my understanding that we have made a commitment to the British to provide D-5 missiles. I don't think I should say more than that until I know more about the subject.

The CHAIRMAN. Give me the tradeoff with regard to SLBMs between deploying fewer missiles per submarine or deploying fewer warheads per missile.

What is the best way—if you are going to bring down the number of warheads on the Trident—what is the tradeoff? What are the calculations in that tradeoff?

General BUTLER. I think the tradeoff is—let me just extrapolate and take it to the extreme. Would you, for example, with 18 boats, accept a situation where you have one missile per boat?

I think the answer to that would clearly be no. That would be an extraordinarily expensive operation.

So my preference would be, since we went to the time, trouble, effort and expense to put 24 tubes on the boats, I would still put a missile in all the tubes, and I would vary the number of warheads with regard to providing flexibility for arms control, targeting, or other requirements. That would clearly be my preference.

The CHAIRMAN. Beverly.

Mrs. BYRON. Mr. Chairman, I apologize for being late. I do not believe you have gotten into too much about the Third World and Soviet economics.

We have made the decision for the first time in many years to take the B-52 fleet off alert. We have all talked about the change in the world situation. There is no question that what used to be the Soviet Union, the economics are a key factor to their future development.

But as we look at what our future posture should be, and as we develop for our future, which is the thrust of these hearings, how much emphasis do you think we have to put on Third World nations, on the changes in the Eastern Bloc? Can we, in open session,

go into what our new strategy is going to be on targeting in those areas?

General BUTLER. Is this on the nuclear side?

Mrs. BYRON. Yes.

General BUTLER. Well, with regard to the Eastern Bloc, the former Soviet forces and nuclear weapons there, of course, are being rapidly withdrawn. My concern, of course, would be more to the issue of the three republics outside of Russia who currently have long-range weapons. Kazakhstan, for example, has over a hundred of the SS-18s, which have always been the missiles at the heart of our concerns in arms control.

So with regard to those republics, not to mention Russia itself, I think it is very important that we take into account what their intentions prove to be. At this point, I think they are still quite uncertain.

Mrs. BYRON. How long and at what point in time do you feel we will have an understanding of what their intentions are going to be? First of all, you have to have a stabilization of the government.

General BUTLER. That is correct. I turned my crystal ball in to supply some months ago because it was giving me increasingly erroneous data. In fact, I have dropped the words "never happen" from my lexicon.

So with regard to speculating on outcomes of when things might stabilize with regard to the former Soviet Union, I guess my answer would be, it is probably going to take several years. Perhaps not several years from the standpoint of understanding where they might go with regard to their nuclear forces or their armed forces in general. But certainly several years with regard to whether or not those various republics proved to be economically viable, much less stable, and what sort of political systems that might endure.

So I come down on the side of prudence and caution with regard to making significant adjustments to such fundamental things like our nuclear forces until we have a better idea about that.

As far as Third World forces are concerned, with regard to their proclivities, their propensities, regarding nuclear capabilities, I think that is probably one of the most tenuous, difficult associations to try and sort out.

We did have a brief discussion earlier before you came in on this question: Does it make any difference to Third World nations what we do with our own nuclear arsenals? I think the answer is that perhaps it does, not so much in their calculations to get the capability themselves, but with regard to any decision that they might ever make with regard to employing a nuclear weapon.

There, I think they have to take into account our interests and our capabilities. But I couldn't in any way give you a concrete analysis of that. I think it is the sort of thing that works in that fuzzy world of deterrence, which is often difficult to articulate.

Mrs. BYRON. My next question would be, did you feel that the nuclear deterrence from some countries has predicated use of chemical or biological, which is the—

General BUTLER. I think the most difficult situation we might ever confront in that regard is the decision to intervene in some regional conflict where we have a vital interest at stake, knowing that our potential adversary has a nuclear capability. That puts a



whole different coloration on the decision of what kind of forces to put in the theater, what size, how to deploy them, and what kind of vulnerability to accept.

You recall, many years ago, as we were looking at our posture in Europe, we talked about pentomic divisions, whether we should organize the Army to take into account Warsaw Pact nuclear capabilities. We were concerned about any strategy that would place large numbers of men vulnerable to nuclear attack.

So it would make a huge difference to us whether or not a military adversary would put into place weapons of mass destruction. We always had lingering concern about Iraqi chemical or even biological weapons. We never fully put to rest fears about their nuclear capability. So, it is vitally important to us which nations in the world have nuclear weapons and what their intentions might be.

Mrs. BYRON. How about the stability of the governments of those nations?

General BUTLER. That, of course, turns out to be the nub of the issue. We call France and U.K. allies, and obviously they are, and we are never concerned about fears or threats from that quarter.

On the other hand, there are many other nations in the world, North Korea, of course, where the intentions of the government mean everything with regard to the possible acquisition of nuclear weapons.

Mrs. BYRON. Since you don't use the word "never," the reunification of North and South Korea might fall into that category?

General BUTLER. I certainly would harbor hope for that outcome. We saw it in Germany.

Mrs. BYRON. Germany was never going to be reunited, reunified.

General BUTLER. Here we have it.

Mrs. BYRON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Let me ask General Butler a couple of questions about some of the proposals that Boris Yeltsin, or people around him have been making, about how we might posture our forces.

One idea, that I think was his suggestion, is that we should not target each other. Now, I am not sure what that means. I guess it means that you don't pretarget. But what is your reaction to a proposal that both sides stop targeting each other?

Then I would like to ask about alert rates and a few other ideas. But let's start with the targeting.

General BUTLER. If one still believes in "trust but verify," I think that would be the single most difficult verification problem we face. I am quite aware, for example, that Mr. Yeltsin said recently that he will or has stopped targeting U.S. cities, for example. I have no reason to doubt the statement.

On the other hand, it would be interesting to know whether or not that order had been promulgated throughout the forces, whether it has reached the level of all of the launch control centers and the guidance set in every missile.

Further, given the size of the Soviet strategic arsenal and the number of targets one can envision in this country that have nothing to do with cities that might become subject to an attack in the wildly improbable eventuality, I am not sure it makes much difference whether or not they are targeted directly, because surely



the long-term effects from fallout would be just as severe as if the weapons had struck directly.

So in this business of what you target and what you don't, it can be a little bit disingenuous to say, I am or am not targeting this or that.

The CHAIRMAN. But if you don't target anything in the Soviet Union at all or they don't target us, what does that mean in the operational sense? What does it mean in practical terms?

General BUTLER. It means you have somewhat increased the time line for reintroducing targets into your guidance systems in the event you reach a point where you might want to target something that was ostensibly not targeted moment to moment, day to day. That, of course, is a fairly straightforward process. It just takes a little time.

The CHAIRMAN. So suppose you decided, for political reasons, that you didn't care about the verification, that you just wanted to put our nuclear forces in neutral. In other words, they are not targeted on anything in preparation for anything. But you just put them in neutral, and then we could target them depending upon the circumstances, and we might plug in Iraq, if Saddam Hussein were there, or North Korea, or Russia, or whatever.

How would that affect your life, and would that be a very difficult thing to do? Would it be time consuming?

General BUTLER. Curiously, there is an inverse relationship between the complexity of target planning—or perhaps it is not curious—and the amount of work it requires for the targeteers. The more options that you want, the greater flexibility you desire, the more you have compounded the challenge to targeteers, particularly if you still care about things like the size of weapons packages, deconfliction, et cetera.

Still from my perspective, I would be quite happy to comply with that sort of a change in guidance. As you know, from my standpoint it is simply a matter of acquiring the additional data manipulation capabilities to put into place the capacity to take guidance that comes instantaneously, that calls for several targets, translates it into rigorously iterated data that can be used by a bomber crew or ICBM force or an SLBM.

So certainly it is doable. It would take time to work out the options and probably some additional computing power for my folks.

The CHAIRMAN. Can you tell us in open session how long it takes to target or retarget an ICBM?

General BUTLER. Not in open session.

The CHAIRMAN. Let me ask then about alert rates. Clearly, we have already done something about alert rates the President and then President Gorbachev worked some changes in the alert rates—the bomber standdown, and other things.

General BUTLER. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. Other people have talked about the possibility of maybe doing something further with alert rates, doing something more with alert rates.

General BUTLER. I have read some of that.

The CHAIRMAN. Give us your reaction to that proposition. One of them, for example, is to take the warheads off.

General BUTLER. There are a succession of steps one could go through. The bomber, of course, is an interesting case in point. We took the bombers off alert, which means we took the weapons out and put them into the storage areas.

On the other hand, if the decision were made to reconstitute the bomber force back on alert, in the numbers we previously had, I can do that in 72 hours. But that is still 3 days. Whereas before it was a 5-minute alert capability.

The situation is a little bit more complicated with regard to ICBMs. Yes, you could remove the warheads, but there are some limitations with regard to storage you would have to take into account.

There are very strict rules with regard to the condition of a warhead, a missile RV, when it is not on the missile, in the silo, which, of course, is a very secure place, or not back on base in its special storage shelter.

It is important to understand that we don't have enough capacity on our missile bases to store anything other than a small number of warheads because that is just not the way we ever thought about managing the infrastructure. So, if you wanted to separate warheads from missiles, some significant portion of them would have to be stored in a location that might be quite distant, because those are limited as well.

The CHAIRMAN. By treaty?

General BUTLER. No, just by sheer limitations of storage facilities, by economics. Then you have the question of over-land transport. We also have very stringent rules about how many weapons can be transported by truck, by airplane, and under what circumstances. It is a time-consuming process.

The CHAIRMAN. The rules are by safety, then——

General BUTLER. That is right.

The CHAIRMAN. This is not an international obligation——

General BUTLER. That is right. It is by safety, which is, of course, the heart of everything we do with nuclear weapons.

So as you begin to calculate increasing intervals required to reconstitute alert, a lot of them would be driven by the sheer physical characteristics of how we manage the weapons and the storage that is available, et cetera. But certainly all of that would simply be a matter of policy.

The CHAIRMAN. The plus side of it, of course, is that if you are worried about an unauthorized or accidental launch from a disintegrating Soviet Union the logic chain would be a military that is suffering severe morale problems equals reduction in security, equals increased danger from an unauthorized or an accidental launch. If you take that logic chain seriously, then, of course, moving the warheads off on both sides would make some sense. I guess it would, as you say, increase the cost. I think there clearly would be some cost associated with it.

General BUTLER. That is the price of arms control.

The CHAIRMAN. But I guess whether you are willing to pay that cost depends upon your calculation as to how seriously you take an unauthorized or accidental launch danger.

General BUTLER. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. How seriously do you take an unauthorized or accidental launch danger?

General BUTLER. At this juncture, based on what I understand from reading the appropriate intelligence documents, I am persuaded that they still have a very stable, predictable and well-managed command and control structure with respect to their strategic nuclear weapons.

I am somewhat less optimistic with regard to tactical nuclear weapons, but I don't want to imply or impute anything with regard to that comment.

With regard to strategic weapons, from everything I have seen and read, from the very top down through their command and control structure, I think they are doing a very responsible and credible job.

With regard to predictions about the future, what would happen if the republics have a falling out, then of course greater concerns arise.

But on the other hand, if what I understand about their systems is correct, to the degree it parallels our own, the key to all of this is having launch codes. If they treat them the same way we do, then it is just very difficult to imagine how those might fall into the hands of some renegade launch crew. It would have to be a breakdown at the top of the structure.

I don't know what the likelihood of that is. At the moment I wouldn't impute a great possibility to it. But it is certainly a concern that has to be taken into account. It is on the table.

Things are in turmoil there. So at some juncture, it might be useful to suggest to them that we go to such measures as separating warheads.

I am sure that that is probably something that will be addressed at whatever time the administration feels it is appropriate. I would certainly support it.

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Spence, do you have any questions?

Mr. SPENCE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I apologize for being late. I had other meetings.

General BUTLER. It has been a busy morning in the Congress.

Mr. SPENCE. It goes without saying that the world has changed a whole lot in the recent year. In the past, the Soviets linked their willingness to reduce their offensive forces to the ABM treaty, and I guess we have been relying on our offensive strategic weapons as a deterrence.

Should we be putting more emphasis on our defenses rather than on our offensive deterrence capability?

General BUTLER. Well, clearly we are putting considerably less emphasis on our offensive forces, given the dramatic change we are making to the size of our inventories, retiring weapons systems.

With regard to the question of defenses, the administration, I think, has long been embarked on a prudent course with regard to pursuing the technologies that might some day lead to viable defenses of whatever nature. GPALS, of course, Global Protection Against Limited Strikes, is the current way we might proceed in that direction.

Today we have presently put our money into a robust development program, and I fully support that. The Joint Chiefs of Staff



have long been on record with regard to the prospects for SDI, but they also have set pretty clear benchmarks with regard to what a system would have to achieve with regard to reducing the threat.

There is a hope that we might be able to get to those objectives with arms control. I would be delighted if Mr. Yeltsin came back and said: Yes, we will de-MIRV our land-based ICBMs. That is the single-most important thing one could do to reduce our concern with regard to their ICBM forces.

We may be moving to a situation where it would be very useful for national security to be able to defend against the errant, unauthorized, accidental or renegade launch of a ballistic missile that would preclude the detonation of a nuclear warhead on the United States. The Joint Chiefs, all of us in uniform have supported that objective. I think we are moving toward it in a prudent fashion.

Mr. SPENCE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Jim, do you want to ask a couple of questions?

Mr. MILLER. General Butler, one of the issues that the committee is dealing with is the question of loose nukes or the possibility that nuclear material or weapons from the former Soviet Union might find their way out.

What is your view of the efforts to tag, count, and verify the destruction of nuclear weapons? Should we do it bilaterally, in other words subject U.S. nuclear weapons to the same kinds of controls?

General BUTLER. From a professional as well as a personal standpoint, I would support anything that gives us greater assurance with regard to the inventory of nuclear weapons in the former Soviet Union.

Interestingly, as I understand it, some of President Kravchuk's reservations with regard to returning nuclear weapons to Russia is he would like to have some international assurance with regard to their destruction. I think that is a prudent attitude.

So, yes, I think it is important that we have as good a grasp as we can possibly get with regard to the status of their weapons. Whether or not we would want as a Nation, as the United States, to subject ourselves to similar controls, would be a matter of a policy decision for this administration.

I will tell you, based on many years of experience in this, we know exactly how many nuclear weapons we have and we know exactly where they are and what condition they are in.

So as far as the United States is concerned, I think we set the model for the world in this regard. But with respect to other nations who might not have a responsible view or who might be in turmoil, yes, I think it would be very useful to have some explicit way to inventory and monitor the storage of those weapons.

Mr. MILLER. Thank you.

Let me follow up on a question that the chairman asked earlier about taking systems off of alert. As we continue in the direction we are headed with lower alert rates, we seem to be relying more and more on strategic warning. That is, we will have some indicators of change in the former Soviet Union to bring bombers back on alert, to bring more missiles on alert, if that were necessary.

How confident, in your view, can we be in the future that: A, we will have strategic warning if there is a political reversal, and B,

in the case where there were a warmer political climate preceding it, that we would act on it?

General BUTLER. With regard to part A of the question—how comfortable am I with regard to being able to reconstitute the force—it goes back to the point about the Triad we were discussing earlier. That is, as you come down and you have to make judgments about alert postures vis-a-vis the size and redundancy of forces, as long as we have SSBNs operating in some numbers out on the oceans, virtually invulnerable, with a significant retaliatory capability, as long as we have some fraction of the ICBMs on their relatively short alert warning timing, I am very comfortable with the notion of strategic bombers going off alert. In fact, I am the one that recommended it.

I think that to reposture bombers on alert, so you have the full robustness of the Triad that we had for many years, going back to October of 1957, to be able to reconstitute bombers on to alert in 72 hours seems to me to be very prudent and supportable.

So, yes, I think we can increasingly rely on strategic warning, given the fact that communism as we knew it, with its hegemonic aims and the people in Moscow who manifested those aims, has clearly changed from end to end. So I am quite confident in strategic warning.

Second, as far as acting on it, I am confident in that, too. Nothing that I have seen in recent or past history suggests to me that we won't act prudently on strategic warning.

I go back to the Cuban missile crisis, for example. The moment we saw evidence of the stationing of Soviet missiles in Cuba, we took rather forthright action. That was a very challenging thing for the government to do. But it was done, and it succeeded.

So I have no reason to doubt that any President won't act appropriately given evidence of that kind.

Mr. MILLER. Thank you, General.

The CHAIRMAN. Let me ask a question on another topic, General Butler, regarding the whole issue of first use of nuclear weapons.

As a country, we have been reluctant to sign up to the notion of no-first-use because nuclear weapons were not only a deterrent against the Soviets using nuclear weapons, but they also were in large part a deterrent against the Soviet Union using its conventional forces.

Because of the large numerical conventional advantage that the Warsaw Pact had over NATO, it was not an impossible scenario to imagine, with a conventional attack by the Warsaw Pact on Western Europe, that the West might want to use nuclear weapons first to offset the conventional advantage on the Soviet side and on the Warsaw Pact side.

Given the changes that we are now looking at—a world where the United States dominates the Soviet Union conventionally and NATO dominating the region conventionally—can you see any circumstances under which the United States might want to use nuclear weapons first?

General BUTLER. No, I don't think that I would try to imagine circumstances where we might go first.

On the other hand, I don't know that there would be a great deal to be gained, for example, by assuring some potential adversary,



not necessarily the Soviet Union—in fact I think that is probably the least interesting of the issues now—but some adversary who has access to and a penchant to use biological or chemical weapons, to give them the absolute assurance that we would never use nuclear weapons first.

I don't think it costs us anything significant with regard to not making that change in our declaratory policy, and as long as there might be any seed of doubt, any reservation engendered in the mind of someone who might be far less rational than any leader in the former Soviet Union with regard to what the United States might or might not do if our forces or people are subjected to an attack by weapons of mass destruction, I see no reason to change that policy.

The CHAIRMAN. How about a policy that declares that no-first-use of weapons of mass destruction?

General BUTLER. Well, it comes back to the same issue. With regard to——

The CHAIRMAN. Except that you are, of course, saying that keeping the option open—that if somebody else uses a weapon of mass destruction first, a chemical or biological weapon, then that changes the calculation. We would say we might use a nuclear weapon in retaliation. But suppose the declared policy is no-first-use of any weapon of mass destruction.

General BUTLER. That might have some appeal to nations who really don't have any aims or objectives inimical to our own. If I took someone of the mind set of a Saddam Hussein, however, I don't know why I would want to give him any comfort in that regard, any assurances whatsoever. I would much rather that he operated with some considerable amount of concern, reservation, and apprehension with regard to what we might do if he challenged our interest in severe ways. Perhaps I am old fashioned in that regard, but that is my personal opinion.

The CHAIRMAN. What about a pledge that says we would not use nuclear weapons against any country that does not develop nuclear weapons?

General BUTLER. The so-called negative security assurances? I think that is a matter for the administration to decide. But I think now——

The CHAIRMAN. Take, for example, the former Soviet Union. It is breaking up. In order to encourage a country like Kazakhstan or the Ukraine to give up nuclear weapons, should we say that we will not use nuclear weapons——

General BUTLER. Once they are nuclear free? I think that is more in the realm of where policy like that might be utile, and that is for the administration to decide. But that is not near in the category of concern that I would have with a very clear adversary.

The CHAIRMAN. Do you think it really is likely we would use nuclear weapons in retaliation against an enemy that used chemical or biological weapons against us?

General BUTLER. What we might do and what we do or don't assert that we might do are two very different things. For someone in my position, I think that I should probably leave it at that because I don't want to impinge on that policy one iota.

The CHAIRMAN. Go ahead.



Mr. MILLER. A final question, General. What is the status of the SIOP review? What is the status of the review of targeting that I believe Secretary Cheney asked you to begin a couple of years ago?

General BUTLER. I will tell you this has become a continuing process. We will probably be in the business of adjusting, addressing and modifying targets as far as the eye can see, and happily so.

With regard to the target review itself, it has been completed and when I finish the production of the current modification of the SIOP, all of those changes will have been brought into play.

On the other hand, as we continue to take weapons out of the inventory and make progress with arms control initiatives, et cetera, we are dealing with modification to a war plan which is very much like painting a moving train, a job that will probably never be done.

Mr. MILLER. Thank you.

The CHAIRMAN. General Butler, thank you very much. Your testimony was very, very helpful and very interesting. We appreciate your coming over to talk with us. It is a pleasure.

General BUTLER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

[Whereupon, at 11:05 a.m., the panel was recessed.]



## CINC PACIFIC COMMAND

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HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,  
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES,  
DEFENSE POLICY PANEL,  
*Washington, DC, Thursday, April 9, 1992.*

The panel met, pursuant to call, at 10:05 a.m., in room 2118, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Les Aspin (chairman of the panel) presiding.

### STATEMENT OF HON. LES ASPIN, A REPRESENTATIVE FROM WISCONSIN, CHAIRMAN, DEFENSE POLICY PANEL

The CHAIRMAN. The meeting will come to order.

Now that the Soviet threat has collapsed, we are undergoing a fundamental change in the way we plan our defense. The principal threat now is from regional aggressors, and the prospect of global war has been reduced.

Today the Defense Policy Panel welcomes Adm. Chuck Larson, Commander in Chief of the Pacific Command.

We will use our time with Admiral Larson to further our review of the situation in the Pacific. We will be interested in four specific areas, four particular questions.

First, we want to hear from the CINC your assessment of the potential threats to American interests in the Pacific and to assess the size and shape of the U.S. military forces that are required to meet those threats.

Second, we would like to hear the CINCPAC's assessment of the future role of Japan, South Korea and other regional powers in providing for their own defense and regional security. We want to know how the regional powers are exerting themselves to maintain the security of their part of the world and whether the U.S. contribution is necessary and appropriate.

Third, we want to discuss how the disposition and operations of forces in the theater might be changed in recognition of the disappearance of the Soviet threat. Are there ways we can use existing resources more efficiently now that our forces need not be constantly ready for global warfare with the Soviet Union?

Finally, in light of all of the changes in the region, including the removal of U.S. forces from the Philippines, we will want to review the basing support and burdensharing arrangements for U.S. forces deployed in the region.

Before beginning, Admiral Larson, let me call on Bill Dickinson to see if he has comments to make before we begin.



**STATEMENT OF HON. WILLIAM L. DICKINSON, A REPRESENTATIVE FROM ALABAMA, RANKING MINORITY MEMBER, DEFENSE POLICY PANEL**

Mr. DICKINSON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Chairman, Admiral Larson, good morning. I would like to compliment you on the fine job you are doing in the Far East. I recently led a delegation to that region of the world and heard only good things about your work. The wake you left smoothed the rough waters for us and helped make our trip a success.

As the Chairman said, we are going through a series of policy hearings to determine, in the broadest sense, what the world situation is, what we might expect in terms of threats to the capabilities, et cetera, in the Pacific.

But, focusing on an even more narrow view, as a result of the committee trip some of us made through that part of the world—we visited every ASEAN country. We tried to assess what was going to happen now that Clark and Subic are going to close. What do we do from there? How does that change our posture in that part of the world?

It was interesting that in every ASEAN country we visited, I somewhat facetiously mentioned that there is always Cam Ranh Bay we could go back to. I thought that would elicit a chuckle. Everybody took it very seriously and realized this was a possibility now that the Soviets have indicated their intent to withdraw. We built the base.

We have dispersed our activities there. I don't know what the current situation is with respect to ship repair—what dry docks we are now utilizing.

We seem to be welcomed. As a matter of fact, we are being sought by most of the countries that we visited and I heard nothing but affirmative things. I really did not hear anything negative about our presence there.

Everybody seems to want us there, but it seems they want us over the horizon. They don't want a permanent presence; but they want to feel our presence.

Anything you can do to help focus the picture a little more clearly would be very helpful. We do appreciate your presence here today. We look forward to your testimony. It will be very beneficial to us as we go through the worldwide policy picture and this will be a very important piece of the puzzle for us.

Thank you for your attendance here today.

The CHAIRMAN. Admiral Larson, the floor is yours, sir.

**STATEMENT OF ADM. CHARLES R. LARSON, USN, COMMANDER IN CHIEF, U.S. PACIFIC COMMAND**

Admiral LARSON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, Mr. Dickinson, distinguished members of the panel. I have a detailed statement I would like to submit for the record.

The CHAIRMAN. Without objection.

Admiral LARSON. I would like to make brief opening remarks as well to set the tone for some of the issues that you would like to discuss here today.

I really appreciate the opportunity to appear before this panel today as it deliberates on how to design the best defense for an un-

certain future. I think that uncertainty was really demonstrated this past year by the conflict in the Gulf, the dissolution of the Soviet Union, and some of the humanitarian operations we became involved in—things I would not have predicted.

Because we were ready to respond, friendly nations now respect our word and not-so-friendly nations respect our power. The world is somewhat disorderly, but it is at peace. I think America has an opportunity to expand its investment overseas and its prosperity at home.

I think today we have the greatest opportunity of the century to determine our own destiny because, years ago, when no one could imagine the threats and events of the past year, we got it right. We got it right with our strategy, our tactics, our people and our equipment.

Today we stand at a decision point in our Nation's history. As we build down, we must get it right again in light of the realities of this new era.

I believe the structure of our force for the future is an issue where reasonable men and women may disagree, but I think we all agree on the end we want to achieve. We want to defend and advance those interests which are vital to our security and our prosperity. These interests include the survival of the United States as a free Nation; a healthy and growing U.S. economy; a stable, secure world where democratic values can flourish; and close, cooperative relationships with our friends and allies.

Despite the upheaval of the recent months, I do not believe those vital interests have changed; but I do see a change in their relative importance. Number one used to dominate because of our focus on the Soviet Union. So our survival took most of our focus and most of our energy.

But with the demise of the Soviet Union and the easing of that threat to our survival, long-term economic interests have taken on much greater importance. No where is that change more apparent than in the Asia-Pacific region where 35 percent of our international trade takes place, over \$322 billion last year. Thirty percent of our 422 billion dollars' worth of exports takes place in the Pacific. That means that up to 2.5 million U.S. jobs are either directly or indirectly dependent upon those exports, those markets, those resources, free trade, and the ability to have access to those vulnerable sea lines.

Because our economy and our future are more intertwined with our neighbors to the west than ever before, we are also more vulnerable now to the pressures that could degenerate into local conflicts. Things like border disputes, ethnic and religious animosities, overpopulation, economic jealousies, and haves and have nots. At the same time the lethality of local conflicts has grown because of the spread of sophisticated offensive weapons and delivery systems. The prospect of third-rate leaders having first-rate weapons is of great concern to me.

While no one predicted the events of the last 2 years, we certainly anticipated the trends: The elimination of the short-notice global threat from the Soviets and the growing economic and security implications of regional stability. We have been proactive in managing the challenge of change.

Today our military strategy has a new focus. We promote democratic values and economic progress through multiple bilateral military relations in peace, and we can respond rapidly in crisis or conflict.

Our military structure is thoroughly joint. Goldwater-Nichols has been thoroughly implemented in the Pacific Command. As a unified CINC I have full authority over all the operations in my theater.

Our readiness remains high. We are prepared for a wide range of new roles from implementing ranks and humanitarian operations to peacekeeping operations.

Our strategy for this new era is working. Our military relations in the theater, from our traditional allies like Japan, Korea, Australia, to previously distant nations like India and Bangladesh, are improving.

Other nations are assuming more responsibility for our collective security, as evidenced by increased burdensharing in Japan, a transfer from leading to a supporting role in South Korea, new offers of access in Southeast Asia and the participation of more than 20 nations in the peacekeeping operations in Cambodia.

Despite a number of low-level conflicts, the region is relatively stable. Our Nation is at peace because of the forces you funded and the policies you supported.

I think under these positive circumstances it makes sense to reduce our force structure, and that is what we are doing. The East Asia Strategy Initiative, which guides our ongoing reductions, is a solid plan based on a sound strategic analysis of the future security environment. Its planned reductions are in keeping with the base force philosophy.

Of course, the Pacific is already, very much an economy of force theater. I cover over 40 nations, more than half the globe, two-thirds of the world population, and I only have 20 percent of the Active Duty Armed Forces of the United States. We have already reduced about 18,000 people in Asia. We plan to be down by a total of 32,000 by 1995. We will be out of the Philippines in December 1992. We are taking a fair percentage of the DOD reductions in the next 3 years.

We have a carefully crafted strategy and plan for this drawdown. It is working.

We have to be careful about these changes because the stability of the Asia Pacific region is fragile, and so is the morale and efficiency of our forces. Rapid, drastic change could shatter them both.

We should also consider the variety of threats to our vital interests and security commitments which still confront us today and will continue to do so in the future.

When I look, Mr. Chairman, at our area for threats or things that concern me, I would say they come in a number of forms. There are things that could entail combat, conflict; there are also things that could threaten our access to our vital interests out there.

When I look at the near term, I am most concerned about North Korea. It is an isolated, paranoid nation preparing to become a communist dynasty and perhaps a nuclear power at the same time.

My second near-term threat is the tense standoff between India and Pakistan, along the disputed line of control in Kashmir where



they fought three wars in the last 45 years. I visited there in October and stood on that line and watched the tense situation there. I was the first senior U.S. Government official to go there in many, many years.

In the mid-term, I am concerned about unforeseen contingencies. Those explosions of pent-up pressures which cannot be anticipated but must be contained lest the violence grow and threaten our vital interests in that area.

I am not recommending we be the 911 number for the world, but we are the leading citizen for that community with vital interests in the neighborhood. I think we have a lot to lose out there from the collapse of law and order.

In the long term, I am concerned about the military scramble that would follow if we destabilized the region by withdrawing and retrenching and by creating a vacuum from our forward-based operations.

When we look at that area, Mr. Chairman, I see five potential power centers. I think they would develop in a different way if the United States were not there as a balancer or stabilizing influence. The first three power centers I see are Russia, Japan, and the Korean Peninsula.

On the Korean Peninsula, I see a fork in the road. One fork is a divided peninsula with nuclear weapons in the North. The other is a peacefully united Korea, which in my view would necessitate a significant level of demilitarization because of the forces on both sides.

My fourth power center is China—the China, Hong Kong, Taiwan triangle and how that develops. My fifth is India.

I am not saying these are all enemies or those specifically would become direct threats to us. What I do mean is if we were not there in a leadership role to help balance those power centers, then I predict that in a few years some Asian power center in some form would emerge. It could be destabilizing and eventually threaten our interests in a serious way.

I don't know, Mr. Chairman, what the future will hold specifically, but I do know we need to be prepared for it. We need a force which is smaller but still adequate for the job, large enough to meet our daily commitments and deal with the contingency without destroying the base or stripping other areas of the world of essential forces. We need a force with the right people and the right equipment. The same high quality force you saw on display in Desert Storm last year.

We need a force with the right support in logistics and quality of life. We also need low-cost, high-payoff programs like the International Military Education and Training program, IMET, and title 10 to help us reach out and influence in a positive way the leaders of the future.

We need that force to be in the right place. That means enough of it forward deployed to influence the action on a daily basis. Power projection tomorrow cannot replace presence and commitment today.

Before I close, Mr. Chairman, I would like to recognize the men and women of the Pacific All-Volunteer Force who represent America in the Pacific theater. Every one of these soldiers, sailors, air-

men, and marines is an American ambassador. Their dedication and impressive performance of duty bear the mark of true professionalism. I am proud of them. I believe we owe them our full support. These are the people who protect our interests in peacetime and crisis. With your continued support, we will continue to maintain stability in the Pacific and assure America's security and prosperity in the years to come.

In closing, let me point out that in the last 50 years we have twice suffered a military catastrophe in my theater because we thought we could isolate ourselves from the world and secure our interests on the cheap. I recognize the budget realities of today. But as we draw down military forces in a new and more competitive world, I think it is important we get it right with our military strategy and with our military presence.

This committee has played a key role in crafting the force that won two major wars in the past year and made us the leading Nation in the world. Now I ask for your support in crafting a force to win the peace as well.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

#### PREPARED STATEMENT OF ADM. CHARLES R. LARSON

##### INTRODUCTION

Mr. Chairman, members of the panel, I know of no year in American history like the one just past, when in a span of a few months the United States won two victories over dangerous and determined enemies. In the Soviet Union, a system of tyranny seven decades old faced its own people in the streets—and ceased to exist. In Kuwait a brutal aggressor was pushed back behind his own borders, a friendly nation was liberated, and the rule of international law was upheld. We won the first victory by a strategy of containment, and we won the second by a strategy of coalition. As a result, friendly nations respect our word and not so friendly nations respect our power. Around us we see a world disorderly, but at peace today, with the opportunity for continued investment and prosperity tomorrow. I think we all deserve some credit—the Congress and the administration, the military and the American people. In facing these challenges, we “got it right” with our strategy, our tactics, our people, and our equipment, and our Nation is better off as a result.

But victory in the past is no assurance of success in the future. This past December, within sight of my headquarters in Hawaii, we commemorated the 50th anniversary of the attack on Pearl Harbor. We were reminded of the heroism and sacrifice of our citizens—but also of the terrible price a great nation must pay when it “gets it wrong”—when it elects isolationism and a less than optimum defense rather than engagement and an adequate military presence and capability.

Today we stand again at a decision point in our Nation's history. We must carefully consider our actions and their effect on world peace. We can maintain a military force capable of engagement in peace, deterrence in crisis, and victory in conflict. Or we can cut those forces to the point that they have inadequate influence in peace and run unacceptable risk in conflict. We must avoid this result no matter how tempting the promise of short-term profits.

We know that our own security and economic growth are now linked to the political progress and economic growth of others. When democratic values advance and free market ideas flourish, so do we. When democracy retreats and access to markets and resources is closed, our Nation suffers. We simply cannot withdraw from the new world and retreat to the comfortable isolation of pre-World War II America. We must go forward or be left behind.

What we can do is seize the new opportunities of a new age to build a better world—a world built on shared interests and shared ideas. By promoting democracy and democratic values and by supporting regional security and stability through our military presence, we create an environment for continued world economic growth. The need for our engagement and the benefits it can produce are especially evident in the Asia-Pacific theater where a combination of enduring and emerging realities provide us both opportunities and challenges for the future.



## ENDURING AND EMERGING REALITIES

The first reality is U.S. interests. We must continue to advance and defend interests important to our security and prosperity: (1) The survival of the United States as a free and independent nation with our values intact and our people secure; (2) a healthy and growing U.S. economy that provides resources for national endeavors at home and abroad; (3) robust cooperative relationships with allied and friendly nations; and (4) a stable and secure world where political and economic freedoms, human rights and democratic institutions flourish. These interests arise from enduring American values and are unlikely to change.

For over 40 years our attention has been focused on the very visible threat to our survival posed by the former Soviet Union. Now, however, there is a change as our national survival is less threatened, and we can devote greater attention and resources to secure our economic growth, regional stability, and vigorous alliances. Nowhere is that change more important than in the Pacific region, the market for nearly one-third of our exports, the source of over 35 percent of our international trade and the stimulus for millions of American jobs. All of this is dependent upon our continued access to markets and resources across vulnerable sea and air lines of communication.

The second reality is the geography of the region—from Arctic seas and tundra to tropical islands and inland deserts separated by vast expanses of ocean. The sheer size, about 105 million square miles, creates some critical time/distance factors.

Many Pacific nations annually feel the wrath of nature as typhoons and hurricanes traverse the region. Add to this the so-called “rim of volcanic fire” around the Pacific and you have a near certainty for frequent natural disasters of potentially great magnitude.

The diversity among Pacific nations is often mirrored by diversity within the nations. Many have populations with varied ethnic, religious, and cultural backgrounds and relations among the factions are often tense.

There are, likewise, territorial disputes, boundary disputes, and historic animosities between nations, religious, ethnic, and culture groups. Historically, these tensions have served as flashpoints for conflict—some occurring now. While we are in a period of relative peace, these tensions create a vulnerability to instability which is manifested today in low-level but active conflict.

Related to these historic tensions and animosities is the diversity of national security concerns among individual Pacific nations. Concerns about internal order and uneasiness about the intentions of neighboring states are not uncommon among these countries.

The production, trafficking and use of illegal drugs, particularly in the Golden Triangle Region of Burma, Laos and Thailand, ranks as an enduring reality that remains a grave concern, threatening the very fabric of societies worldwide.

While the possibility of conflict with the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) is at a historic low, residual Soviet military capability cannot be ignored. We still see force modernization and remain concerned about the security of nuclear weapons as the CIS continues to evolve.

Paralleling and strengthening forces for change is a continuing revolution in communications. This explosion of information access and availability, which can reach virtually every spot on the globe, has speeded the processes of democratization and political change. As more people become aware of conditions elsewhere, the inevitable comparisons they make often result in challenges to the existing order. This revolution in access to information will continue to grow.

U.S. domestic concerns and global responsibilities are mutually compatible. The future of a prominent America and a stable and prosperous world are inseparable.

## FAVORABLE TRENDS

Impacting these enduring and emerging realities are some very important and positive trends.

The first is phenomenal economic growth of many Pacific nations. The so-called “Four Tigers” of Korea, Taiwan, Hong Kong, and Singapore and now Malaysia, Thailand, and Indonesia are all sustaining economic expansion in excess of 6 percent per year. That growth has been spurred and sustained by free market economics, trade, and international investment. The encouraging result is growing economic interdependence among the nations of the region.

We are a beneficiary of this interdependence, exporting about \$130 billion to this region last year, sustaining an estimated 2.5 million jobs for Americans. Conversely, we are in the midst of a long-term period of trade imbalance that continues to tug at the threads of a strongly woven fabric of bilateral relations.



We also see a trend toward democratic forms of government, and greater freedom to express dissenting opinions. The rise of this democratic pluralism in the Republic of Korea, the Philippines, and Taiwan is encouraging.

At the same time, we continue to see a decline in communism and its continued failure in countries that cling to this bankrupt ideology. The former Soviet Union and Mongolia have succumbed to reform pressures, Vietnam is adopting more liberal policies, and even the proponents of the Maoist version of communism in the PRC are attempting economic reform while yielding slowly to pressures for greater freedom.

As long as we remain engaged, the likelihood of a global conflict emerging in the Pacific is at a historic low and still diminishing. The PRC and the CIS have great internal incentive to avoid conflict. Even in the regional hot spot, the Korean Peninsula, we see a somewhat stalemated North-South dialog but a desire among major powers to avoid conflict and to press for greater contact and reconciliation between the Koreans.

The success of the U.N. actions in the Persian Gulf has had an important impact in building support for coalition action. Japan, and, to a lesser extent, Korea played important supporting roles in that action. Many Southeast Asian nations with sizable Muslim populations were caught in a delicate political situation. By and large, they were supportive of the U.N. actions. The lesson that a U.N.-sponsored coalition came to the aid and rescue of a small country brutally victimized by a powerful neighbor has not been lost on many Pacific nations. Additionally, the success of highly trained U.S. military personnel and their high technology weapons in the Gulf War has highlighted our successful strategy of maintaining technological superiority.

These positive accomplishments and favorable trends are remarkable when placed in a historical context which highlights the poverty, turbulence, and conflict so evident in the region 20 to 40 years ago. There is clearly cause for cautious optimism. At the same time, there are some disturbing trends which could upset the relative stability and growing prosperity of the region.

#### DISTURBING TRENDS

While economic growth, spurred by free market economies and trade is the success story, the distribution of that new-found wealth, both within the nations of the region and among them, is troubling. Individual prosperity and conspicuous consumption often dwell side by side with absolute poverty. Many South Pacific nations, lacking natural resources, seem condemned to nearly a single product or subsistence agrarian economy.

A by-product of the cold war era and the spread of technology is the increasing availability of sophisticated weapons. Longer range delivery systems, precision guidance mechanisms, and more lethal munitions are readily available on the world market. Of grave concern is the proliferation of chemical—and possibly nuclear—weapons which could do great harm if they came into the wrong hands. North Korea and China have been major suppliers of arms to Third World countries for years, although we welcome the PRC's recent acceptance of the Missile Control Technology Regime.

Population growth, urbanization, aging populations, and disease cut many different ways among the Pacific nations. But the increasing demands for resources, be it shelter, food, or medical and health care, will be an increasing drain on national resources. Of particular concern is the potential impact of the spread of the AIDS virus. Rising infection rates portend enormous impact on international travel and commerce.

Finally, environmental degradation threatens the future of many resources. The pollution from rapid industrialization threatens water supplies, air quality, and coastal waters. Poorly managed resource extraction, be it timber cutting, mining or fishing, could threaten the future of important industries and economies.

#### REGIONAL FOCUS

With these realities and trends in mind, let me talk about specific nations.

#### JAPAN

The U.S.-Japan bilateral relationship is the single most important in the Pacific Command. The recently signed Tokyo Declaration outlined a global partnership. The U.S.-Japanese security relationship is the stable foundation from which that global partnership can be launched. The linchpins of our alliance are the Mutual Security Treaty and excellent military-to-military relationships. U.S. force presence in Japan provides a visible demonstration of our commitment to the peace and stability of the

entire Asia-Pacific Region. Japan is the largest single U.S. trading partner and the largest U.S. customer of foreign military sales in Asia or Europe. The Japanese Self-Defense Force use of U.S. weapon systems provides economic benefits and promotes interoperability among our forces while joint exercises continue to encourage professional interaction between our militaries.

Under a new host-nation support agreement which took effect in fiscal year 1992, Japan will provide \$3.8 billion annually by fiscal year 1995. Over the next 5 years, host-nation support contributions could exceed \$17 billion. A constructive dialog must be maintained if we are to continue our long-term relationship which looks to the future and the full range of U.S. interests, not just the old Soviet threat. We must resolve trade and economic issues and promote Pacific prosperity. Future U.S. economic growth is tied to the Pacific Basin, and the U.S.-Japan relationship is key in the region.

#### KOREA

Our security relationship with the Republic of Korea (ROK) continues to transition from a leading to a supporting role. We have already replaced the United Nations Military Armistice commission senior member with a ROK officer and have relinquished responsibility for the DMZ to the ROK Military. This year, an ROK Army general will become the Ground Component Commander of the Combined Forces Command.

We remain troubled over North Korea's nuclear weapons program. Secretary Cheney's announcement suspending East Asia Security Initiative (EASI) Phase II force reductions in Korea sent the right message at the right time. While the Governments of South and North Korea have signed an agreement on non-aggression, cooperation, and exchange, we must remain firm on a verification process through inspections to ensure the North's implementation of the non-nuclear declarations.

The ROK Government acknowledges the importance of our forward-deployed forces through its commitment to a growing cost-sharing program, contributing \$150 million in 1991. An agreement has been reached for a \$180 million contribution for 1992, and a pledge to increase to a level of one-third the Won-based stationing costs of U.S. forces by 1995 (about \$300 million). Our ultimate goal is to establish a realistic base figure and index annual contributions according to ROK economic/budget indicators.

#### ASEAN

Throughout ASEAN, I have pursued military-to-military contact to foster regional security. Each country is a separate, bilateral partner. Accordingly, the scope and character of the many exercises and exchanges we conduct vary among the ASEAN members. In all cases the interaction is productive. I am keenly interested in continuing these programs, because participants, without exception, believe they are mutually beneficial. In concert with our departure from the Philippines, we plan to continue exploring bilateral opportunities for training and logistics support. We are not looking for "bases." However, we will seek training opportunities throughout the region as appropriate in order to maintain a balanced military approach to the ASEAN nations. Our progress with Singapore in this regard is a good example. We recently completed a survey of ranges in the Western and South Pacific, and the results were quite positive. While each opportunity for access and training has its own drawbacks, I am confident we will be able to develop an approach that is agreeable with each country and beneficial to U.S. interests.

#### PHILIPPINES

The Philippine Government's decision to terminate our stationing agreement has changed the situation there and in the Western Pacific. We are fully engaged in complying with the requirements of departure and relocation. We will continue an appropriate military-to-military relationship with the Armed Forces of the Philippines in accordance with our treaty obligations. As such, I still co-chair the U.S.-Philippine Mutual Defense Board with the Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces of the Philippines. That body manages military aspects of the Mutual Defense Treaty, which is the bedrock of our allied relationship. How that relationship is maintained depends in large part on the future actions of the Philippine Government.

#### VIETNAM/CAMBODIA/LAOS

The United States has recently embarked on two major new diplomatic initiatives in Southeast Asia. In Cambodia, support of the comprehensive settlement embedded in the Paris Accords which includes the United Nations peacekeeping operations. In



Vietnam, pursuit of our Government's "Road Map" for normalizing relations which includes an acceleration in resolving the POW/MIA issue.

The recent establishment of the POW/MIA Joint Task Force (JTF) "Full Accounting" under my command presents great opportunities for the resolution of this highly sensitive issue. Our intent is to execute a comprehensive casualty resolution campaign to determine whether any unaccounted-for Americans are still alive. Headquartered in Hawaii, we have JTF field offices in Hanoi, Vientiane, Phnom Penh, and Bangkok where we are presently working in a favorable climate of cooperation with local officials. Our proposed operations tempo in Vietnam, is five investigation and two excavation teams in-country at any one time, up from the current two and one, respectively. The U.S. military will continue to support diplomatic objectives in an effort to bring about a long-sought era of peace and stability in Vietnam, Cambodia, and Laos.

#### GOLDEN TRIANGLE

More than 75 percent of the world's estimated opium production is located in the Golden Triangle of Burma, Thailand, and Laos. Over 56 percent of the heroin seized in the United States originates in the Pacific. Viewed from the national level, cocaine is the primary drug threat. However, heroin, hashish, and "ice" pose a considerable growing threat and cannot be ignored. We must continue to enhance our detection and monitoring capabilities and assist in programs which encourage Pacific nations to take the necessary actions to stem the flow of drugs.

#### INDIA AND THE INDIAN OCEAN

By any measure of economic, political, or military power, India dominates the strategically important Asian subcontinent and the Indian Ocean. Currently, ethnic, religious, and national friction between India and Pakistan and less powerful neighbors complicate U.S. relations in the region and could potentially threaten U.S. interests. We have encouraged a program of service component initiatives with India to expand our military-to-military relationship carefully and constructively. We realize, too, that an improving relationship between India and the United States cannot be at the expense of our other friends in the region.

#### AUSTRALIA AND THE SOUTH PACIFIC

Our bilateral relationship with Australia under the ANZUS Treaty is the basis of stability and peace in the South Pacific and Southeast Asia. The strong partnership will continue, based on shared goals and interests. Australia remains committed to deterrence and regional stability through participation in joint exercises, the sharing of facilities, and the granting of access to U.S. ships and aircraft.

Regrettably, New Zealand's nuclear policy caused the U.S. to suspend its security obligation with them under the ANZUS Treaty. Therefore, our regional interests reside in the strong bilateral security relationship between the United States and Australia.

The United States is responsible for the security and defense of the Federated States of Micronesia and the Republic of the Marshall Islands under the Compacts of Free Association. Their diplomatic ties and participation in regional affairs and global organizations are increasing. The President's summit meeting in October 1990 and complementary U.S. efforts to reverse the post-World War II perception of benign neglect and to replenish the pool of goodwill have been successful. Additionally, World War II commemorations offer a unique opportunity to further this initiative during the coming 4 years. We also plan to continue our training and security assistance programs, ship visits, and humanitarian activities in the South Pacific.

#### CHINA, MONGOLIA, RUSSIA

Our military relationship with China has not progressed since military contacts still remain under Presidential sanction. Our principal concern is China's potential for missile proliferation and the export of technology for weapons of mass destruction. While we are closely monitoring developments in China, their formal agreement to abide by the Missile Technology Control Regime is a step in the right direction. We are hopeful there will be continued progress that will allow renewed military interaction with China.

Mongolia continues to show promise as it strives for democracy and an open economy in the face of monumental economic challenges and a harsh climate. In an effort to assist, we provided much-needed medical and other humanitarian supplies to them during the past year. We look forward to increased contact in the years



ahead to support the Mongolian military's development as a professional, apolitical, nation-building institution.

Russia remains an area of potentially serious instability, due in large part to the turbulence within its still eminently capable military machine. Of equal importance is the obvious opportunity for improved relations. I strongly urge closer contacts and more frequent interaction with Russia. Last September I hosted my counterpart, Colonel General Kovtunov, Commander of the Far East Military Theater of Operations. We shared an extremely beneficial and productive week visiting the Pacific Command. People-to-people contacts like this are invaluable—they break down barriers, promote understanding between our military forces, and produce tangible peace dividends. We are currently working to support the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff in developing initiatives to expand these contacts to mid-level and more junior officers.

#### STRATEGY FOR STABILITY

Our strategy for this varied and dynamic region is focused on securing and advancing America's enduring interests—not just countering narrow, specific threats which are constantly changing. Twice in the past 18 months President Bush has clearly articulated our Nation's defense policy for this new era—once on 2 August, 1990, at the Aspen Institute, and again on 27 September, 1991, in a nationally televised address. In these speeches he identified four foundations for our defense:

- Strategic Deterrence;
- Forward Presence;
- Crisis Response; and
- Force Reconstitution.

As a Unified CINC, I regard forward presence and crisis response to be a critical part of my primary mission. They require a different, more regional approach, unlike the old cold war strategy which revolved around deterring global war. Today our strategic focus is on regional issues—especially military activities for engagement in peace and flexibility for deterring or defeating regional instability in crisis.

Secretary of State Baker reinforced this approach last fall when he identified three pillars for foreign policy in Asia. The first two, encouraging economic integration and fostering democratization, are certainly important to our long-term security and prosperity in Asia, but they cannot stand alone. They derive their strength from the third pillar: a defense structure for diverse security concerns.

In building this network of bilateral security systems, we apply the six principles of security policy laid out by Secretary of Defense Cheney late last year:

- Continued American engagement in the Pacific region;
- Strong bilateral security arrangements;
- Modest but capable forward-deployed U.S. forces;
- A sufficient overseas support structure;
- Greater responsibility sharing by our partners; and
- deliberate policies of defense cooperation.

In synthesizing this guidance from the President, the Secretary of State, and the Secretary of Defense, we developed a strategy for the U.S. Pacific Command based on forward presence and robust military relationships with friends and allies. But the cornerstone of our successful strategy for regional peace and prosperity is a continued credible military presence. As we draw down our military forces in this new and more competitive world, it is imperative that we, as Secretary Cheney says, "get it right."

The East Asia Strategy Initiative which guides our ongoing reductions is a solid plan based on a sound strategic analysis of the future security environment. Its planned reductions are in keeping with the "base force" philosophy. That base force of highly trained and responsive soldiers, sailors, airmen, and marines must remain responsive to the regional threats. This force must be well equipped, mobile, reliable, and flexible.

But we do not "go it alone" in the Pacific. Our many friends and allies contribute to regional peace and stability. Together these bilateral security relationships provide a framework for Pacific stability with the United States as the common glue holding that framework together.

Our strategy of regional stability through multiple bilateral relationships depends heavily on a robust program of Security Assistance. It is vital to maintaining our regional leadership role. No other program has had, or promises to have, a greater impact on our mediating role in Pacific affairs or our ability to mount credible responses to crises. No other foreign assistance program is making greater contribu-

tions to conflict deterrence or sustained access to resources and facilities of the Asia-Pacific region.

One Security Assistance program which has proven especially beneficial to the region is International Military Education and Training (IMET). IMET is designed to facilitate cooperative military relations with nations that cannot afford education and training purchases. It impacts directly on the future leaders of countries involved. It successfully promotes important U.S. values and professional skills while enhancing interoperability between defense partners. Our continued participation in this program, our expansion of burdensharing programs, and bilateral agreements result in mutually beneficial relations with allies and friends.

We must continue to sustain active foreign military programs in-theater which will serve to enhance defense responsibility/sharing, force interoperability, collective/coalition defense capabilities, and U.S. system acquisition.

Security assistance is integral to our long-term ability to safeguard U.S. interests with fewer defense resources. These programs allow us to sustain the U.S. regional leadership role.

#### SUMMATION

My goal is to have a U.S. Pacific Command capable of executing our strategy and managing the challenge of change well into the 21st century. Our aim is to encourage regional stability, the advancement of democracy and human rights, and free and open trade. In so doing, we will discourage regional hegemonies, deter conflict, and contribute to maintaining an environment conducive to economic growth and the development of future trading partners.

The U.S. military in the Pacific may be called upon to play new roles. We cannot and will not be the regional peacekeeper, but we will be called upon as a guarantor, as leader of a coalition and, through military-to-military contacts, as an "honest broker" in times of tension. Of course our priority missions of deterrence and defense will not diminish as we face this future of reduced stability and increased uncertainty. As the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff stated recently: "In a very real sense, the primary threat to our security is . . . being unprepared to handle a crisis or war that no one expected or predicted."

To meet any certain challenge in an uncertain future we have fully participated in the development of the Chairman's "base force." In the Pacific, my portion of the "base force" will provide the correct combination of capabilities and resources to deter aggression, provide forward presence and respond to crisis. It will be large enough to remain engaged with friends and allies, and do the training and maintenance necessary for combat readiness. It will permit a tempo of operations that sustains morale and unit cohesiveness. I want to be clear, however, the "base force" will only be adequate if properly trained, sustained, and if they retain the technological edge. To go below that base force places greater strains on the forces. If we fail to protect our interests, to meet our commitments, to maintain our readiness, or to take care of our people and their families, support to our national security strategy will suffer. In short, we will lose day-to-day influence in peacetime and that critical fighting edge necessary to respond rapidly and effectively when our interests are threatened.

Within the region we have achieved success by tailoring our approach to each country. We have successfully established a network of unique, yet compatible bilateral relations. The result is a complementary system contributing to the stability of the entire region. The firm foundation for the fragile stability of this region is the presence of U.S. forces. We need your support to ensure a winning combination of personnel and equipment as we work to secure our Nation's interests for today and tomorrow.

Before I close, I wish to recognize the men and women of the All-Volunteer Force who represent America in the Pacific theater. Every one of these soldiers, sailors, airmen, and marines is an American ambassador. Their dedication and impressive duty performance bear the mark of true professionalism. I am proud of them. I believe we owe them our full support. These are the individuals who will protect America's interests in peacetime and crisis. With your continued support, we will maintain stability in the Pacific and provide a firm foundation for America's security and prosperity in the years to come.

Chairman Aspin, your support and the support of the distinguished members of your committee, have demonstrated a strong resolve to protect America's vital security interests. I wish to thank you for your stalwart support of the men and women of the Pacific Command.



The CHAIRMAN. Let me ask just one question and turn it over to Bill.

You talked about the power centers and the danger that something might happen in these power centers if we had no U.S. presence. Elaborate a little. Give me the worst case scenario. Suppose we withdrew from the region and withdrew forces on the day-to-day presence from the region. Play out these power centers. What is the worst case scenario? How does it develop? In what ways is it dangerous?

Admiral LARSON. Starting with Russia, let me say among these power centers, among the nations of ASEAN, and other nations of the region there are widely diverse perceptions of the threat. As I travel around I ask people who are you concerned about. I hear everything from Russia to China to India.

There is no clear perception out there. There is a clear concern that some nation will try to achieve hegemony, both in a military and political sense. They trust the United States not to use its power in a way that would take territory or the rights of other nations. They are concerned another power center will emerge.

In the Russian case, after some level of economic development, that they might go backwards to a more repressive government or once again decide to be more of an expansionist power in the region.

Of course, there is considerable concern on the Korean Peninsula on either way it may develop and its impact on the stability of the region. With peaceful unification, they are very interested in having them integrate within the security and political apparatus of the region in a peaceful way.

Japan would have to make some difficult choices. Our security relationship with Japan is the foundation of stability in Northeast Asia and perhaps the whole region. If that security relationship would change dramatically, then Japan would have difficult choices to make as to how they secure their future. Now they secure it in conjunction with the United States, which is a very stabilizing way for them to defend their interests and their sea lanes of communication.

China I call the wild card. Nations of the area worry about China in two different directions. Some are concerned that if they are successful with economic reform, they are going the opposite way of the former Soviet Union, economic reform without political reform. The former Soviet Union tried political reform without economic reform.

Some nations are concerned that if they achieve this economic reform but still maintain an authoritarian repressive government, they may become expansionist. Other nations are concerned that they may fail and that internal chaos may occur and that they may have an implosion and refugees spilling across borders, things like that.

China has set four modernization priorities. They have set for themselves science and technology, agriculture, industry and the military, in that order. That is their professed modernization order. Yet their new budget that just came in has a 13.5-percent increase in military spending. This is the largest increase in any of those four areas. So there is some uncertainty.



India, on the subcontinent, is a very large nation with a very large military which is primarily focused internally on three major insurgencies: Kashmir, Punjab and, in the northeast, Assam. But also poised along the line of control are two nations with nuclear programs and ballistic missile programs pretty far down the pike that could be brought to fruition. They are engaged in a very tense situation where conflict there may not involve us militarily. However, the nuclear and ballistic missile implications could have major regional and substantial global impacts.

So people are concerned about how those power centers will develop and tip the balance in the area. In my view, we must maintain a leadership role with our friends, allies and coalition partners to sustain a balance as they develop so that none of those centers feel compelled to achieve hegemony.

The CHAIRMAN. Bill Dickinson.

Mr. DICKINSON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Admiral, you mentioned Korea. I think the panel understands the situation about as well as we can as to the threat, the tensions, the signing of a nuclear inspection agreement they are not honoring; we have had testimony on that. I understand that our relationship with Japan is more or less the centerpiece of stability in that area.

In this era of Japan-bashing, I think one message that really does not come clear that I would like you to comment on is that Japan contributes more in budget sharing than any other ally or nation with whom we have any such arrangement or troops stationed. Could you comment on that briefly, please?

Admiral LARSON. Yes, Mr. Dickinson, I sure could. I think this is a story that deserves telling. It has not gotten its proper hearing in public.

The Japanese have made a major contribution in burdensharing and a commitment between now and 1995 to significantly increase that contribution. If I start with the last year, 1991, for example, they paid \$2.28 billion in direct costs for the stationing of U.S. forces in Japan. That was about 61 percent of the total costs.

They have made a commitment between now and 1995 to pick up 100 percent of labor cost sharing and 100 percent of utilities cost sharing for our people, both on and off base. That will bring them up to about \$3.8 billion by 1995. That will be 73 percent of my costs for stationing forces in Japan. That is a commitment, a total commitment between 1991 and 1995 of about \$17 billion.

Part of that money also goes for facilities there, for family housing, and for quality of life. I recently visited there and toured some of the facilities. While I was getting military briefings, my wife went to the schools, the family centers, things like that. She came back and said, it is amazing. She visited some of the most beautiful facilities for our people she had ever seen.

Essentially the forces—take my carrier battle group in Japan for example. By 1995, only 27 percent of the cost of that forward-based carrier group will be out of pocket. To maintain that same presence from the continental United States would take me three battle groups. So it would take me three times as many people and 12 times the costs to have the same forward presence that I have by having a battle group based in Japan.

Although I am not there for economic reasons, but for strategic and treaty reasons, the economics are very compelling. It is now, with our resources going down, an extremely effective way for me to carry out both strategic and economic implications of my military strategy.

Mr. DICKINSON. The feeling that I get and I think it is shared by the other committee members, is that the other nations in that area want stability. They want our presence felt. They are very suspicious of Japan increasing its military capability. Their memories go back perhaps more vividly than ours, Korea having been occupied by Japan, China having been occupied in part by Japan, Malaysia, Indonesia. They recall all of Japan's military excursions and they do not want to see Japan rearmed and stronger militarily.

As long as Japan limits its efforts to 1 percent of GNP, has no offensive capability—particularly carriers, other things—that is what the community of nations in the area want, as I understand it. So if Japan should make an election, or if there is some rupture in our present relationship with Japan, this would really exacerbate a rather calm situation and cause a great deal of unease.

Would you comment on that briefly?

Admiral LARSON. Yes, Mr. Dickinson.

I think you are hearing the same reflections I hear as I travel around the regions. There are those historical concerns. The nations are very comfortable with the current situation. They are comfortable with our security arrangement with Japan, with the Japanese constitution and with the attitude and philosophy of the Japanese people. They would consider it destabilizing if we would abrogate our treaty responsibilities and withdraw. They are very comfortable with the status quo. There are different levels of comfort as you travel around the region depending upon some of the historical experiences.

I find, under the current security situation and with our relationship with Japan, most of those nations are becoming even more accepting of Japanese peacekeeping forces in the future as they are currently debating in the Diet. I think one of the foundations of that comfortable feeling is our relationship which is the source of stability in Northeast Asia and the region.

Mr. DICKINSON. If something happens to that, it would really create chaos and a very negative situation for the United States?

Admiral LARSON. I think it would definitely be very destabilizing.

Mr. DICKINSON. Before I consume too much time, would you comment on the status in the Philippines as we close down in 9 months. What do you see flowing from this now? What is our relationship? What are the changes with the other countries in that area and what might we expect now from the Philippines?

The Philippine senate voted not to extend our treaty. We got the impression that the businessmen around Subic were—well, maybe salivating is not the right word—but they were sort of licking their chops thinking that the ship repair facilities there would be a very lucrative source of income for business. I don't think they expected us to remove our dry docks which was the main function there, which we did. I am glad.

Could you tell us what we might expect as a result of our pulling out of Subic and in our relationship with the Philippines and the other countries?

Admiral LARSON. Mr. Dickinson, we will still have responsibilities under our mutual defense treaty with the Republic of the Philippines. We want to withdraw in a way that maintains good relations with their military, with the government and also with the Filipino people. We support the democratic transfer of power and also the economic advancement of the Philippine people and the modernization of their armed forces. We will continue to have an exercise program.

We will continue to have a Mutual Defense Board which I co-chair with the Chief of their Armed Services, General Abadia, where we oversee the military-to-military relationship. We will have a Security Assistance Program. We will drive for interoperability and the support of the IMET program where they send people for training to the United States.

Within that security relationship, without our bases there, we will still have a more modest but very solid friendship and relationship between our two militaries.

Mr. DICKINSON. Will we still be able to use the ranges that we have used to such a very beneficial extent? Has that been worked out yet?

Admiral LARSON. That will probably be a matter of future discussion at the Mutual Defense Board. I will be going there at the end of May to chair our annual meeting. We will be talking about our future relationship—our post-December 1992 relationship—to decide how that might develop.

We are not now asking for any access. We are not making future access any part of our withdrawal plans. In my view, that would be premature. It would inject us into the political process of how the Philippine Government is planning to convert or turn over those bases. At this point in time, it is not clear exactly who is going to take responsibility for each base or what their conversion plans are.

My policy is to complete the withdrawal we have been asked to do in a very professional and friendly way. Upon the completion of the withdrawal, we will reassess our future military-to-military relationships.

Mr. DICKINSON. Of course, we all recognize the importance of the training ranges that we have had access to.

Admiral LARSON. Yes, sir.

Mr. DICKINSON. When is the national election there?

Admiral LARSON. May 11th I believe, Mr. Dickinson.

Mr. DICKINSON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Let me follow up with a couple of questions on Bill Dickinson's questions.

What is the U.S. cost of basing in Japan? Are they now picking up 61 percent and this will increase to 73 percent by 1995?

Admiral LARSON. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. What is the comparable cost picked up by the host countries in other parts of the world? Do you know what those figures are?



Admiral LARSON. I am not familiar, Mr. Chairman, outside my area.

The Koreans are newcomers to burdensharing. They had to recover from a war that was at least a decade later than the Japanese. They started rebuilding and still faced a very serious threat. They had to build a large military and spend about 4 to 6 percent of their GNP over the years to support more than 640,000 troops in uniform. We didn't ask them to share until they got into a position where their economy recovered and they started to catch up.

In about 1988 we asked them to start a burdensharing program. It started out for about 3 years at \$45 million a year. That program has escalated now. They were now up to about \$70 million in 1990 and \$150 million in 1991. They have committed \$180 million in 1992 and said by 1995 they will try to pick up one-third of the based cost. That means they will be up to about 33 percent of our cost of stationing forces there.

The CHAIRMAN. By what year?

Admiral LARSON. 1995.

The CHAIRMAN. Where are they now?

Admiral LARSON. Right now their level is about 21 percent or about \$180 million in 1992.

The CHAIRMAN. Those are the only two you know about in your region?

Admiral LARSON. Those are the two that paid direct offsetting costs.

There are other levels of burdensharing. Singapore, certainly, made a significant commitment in refurbishing and paying for the costs of the housing and the facilities that our very modest forces occupy there under our memorandum of understanding.

Of course, we have a lot of joint agreements with Australia for shared facilities and things that are extremely important to us.

The CHAIRMAN. There was no burdensharing arrangement with the Philippines, I take it?

Admiral LARSON. No, sir. Their economy really has never been able to support that.

The CHAIRMAN. Yes.

Mr. DICKINSON. It all went to Switzerland.

The CHAIRMAN. Do you see what happened in the Philippines happening in other parts of the world—the Pacific—where the attitude changed or the attitude grew in favor of the removal of U.S. forces from the area? Is that likely to also be true in other parts of the Pacific region?

Admiral LARSON. Mr. Chairman, after what I have seen in the last 2 years, I wouldn't be absolutely predictive about anything. I don't think it is likely, but I don't think it is impossible that those kind of changes could occur.

You could develop scenarios in a unified Korea, for example. How long would a unified Korea want to maintain the U.S. presence there? The current leadership there believes some level of U.S. presence would be appropriate, would be welcome, and would be a stabilizing influence for the future. I don't think anything is cast in stone after the changes I have seen in the last 2 years.

The CHAIRMAN. Norm Sisisky.

Mr. SISISKY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

You talked about the base force, Admiral. You have already cut 18,000?

Admiral LARSON. Yes, sir.

Mr. SISISKY. Where is that basically coming from? Reduction in ships ashore? Coming out of Subic?

Admiral LARSON. Mr. Sisisky, most of that came out of Korea, Japan and Clark Air Force Base. We took about 7,000 out of Korea, about 5,000 out of Japan and about 6,000 out of the Philippines.

Mr. SISISKY. I assume you will be cutting around 10,000 a year for the next 3 years, is that correct? I think you said you would cut 32,000 more?

Admiral LARSON. Thirty-two thousand in total. That would be 18 plus a number to reach 32.

Mr. SISISKY. OK. So you have about four more thousand. What do you do? Does that come in land forces? Ships at sea? Less ships?

Admiral LARSON. That would be primarily ground troops from Korea and the closure of Cubi Point and Subic in the Philippines.

Mr. SISISKY. The reason I asked the question, we had the general here from South Korea. There it is going to be a debate here, I am afraid, of why we should keep the ground forces in Korea. What is your assessment of South Korea's ability to take on a leading role in its own defense with the U.S. moving to a supporting capacity?

Admiral LARSON. I believe the South Koreans will be able to take on a leading role. I think it is important we do it in a very professional way, utilizing the three-phased transition we currently have set up. We are certainly moving in that direction. We have taken some important steps and there are some important steps still to be taken.

The critical issue now that caused a pause in our troop withdrawals was the nuclear program in the north—and I was there with Secretary Cheney to attend the military and security consultative meetings. We announced the halt in our withdrawals because of their nuclear program.

Until that clarifies or stabilizes or is resolved, I think that pause is very appropriate. They have had a lot of meetings. I am sure General RisCassi explained this to you. There has been little progress. There has been a lot of stonewalling on the part of the north. There are a lot of demands. They have gone back to a lot of old issues.

I think there will be a critical month coming up in the May-June timeframe. It will show if they are really serious about meaningful inspections, serious dialog and fulfilling some of the things they put on paper. Meaningful bilateral inspections, on call, without the right of refusal, will be a key issue to test if they are serious or if they are just trying to buy time and get the world pressure off them.

If you had asked me how long would it take them to sign what they have signed already, I would have said another year. Yet they signed it in the January timeframe. Then once they signed there has been little to no progress at all.

Mr. SISISKY. Do you think it is extremely important to keep the Second Infantry Division?

Admiral LARSON. Yes, sir.

Mr. SISISKY. You think it is important to have American ground forces stay there? Are they a trip wire?

Admiral LARSON. I think it is important to have American ground troops there as a signal of our commitment. It is important to have a ground structure and infrastructure to receive reinforcements. That is part of our presence.

Mr. SISISKY. That is one of the arguments. Could you really reinforce that area very readily?

Admiral LARSON. It will be more challenging to reinforce than the Persian Gulf. We do not have the tremendous infrastructure we had there, both in port facilities, lay down facilities and air fields.

Mr. SISISKY. That is obviously one of the things that people who do not think we ought to have the ground forces there argue about. Could we really resupply? Aren't our troops just sitting up there in the open?

Admiral LARSON. The South Koreans have a capable force. In conjunction with our ground forces, they have the capability to defend until we could reinforce. What I would hope is that even with ambiguous warning, as deterrent options we would move some forces early.

Mr. SISISKY. Thank you.

The CHAIRMAN. Ike.

Mr. SKELTON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Admiral, let us speak about the IMET program briefly, if we may.

Admiral LARSON. Yes, sir.

Mr. SKELTON. Can you tell the panel, for those who are not fully aware of it, what the IMET program does for you as a commander in your area?

Admiral LARSON. What the IMET program allows me to do is take younger, more junior people, and send them to schools, war colleges, and more specific training in the United States. It exposes them to our people, to our leadership, to our democracy, to our values, to the values of our military, as a non-political organization supporting the Commander in Chief. It puts U.S. trained people back into those countries. The track record shows the kind of people they send to IMET rise in the future to leadership positions both in their militaries and in their governments. As you know, armies are very influential in certain civilian governments in Asia.

It gives us a source of friends; it gives us people who we can work with in the future as we work to our common goals. It is one of the lowest cost, highest payoff items that I have in the way of security assistance.

Mr. SKELTON. It is definitely, then, a tool for you as the Commander in Chief of the Pacific, is that correct?

Admiral LARSON. A very positive tool as part of my regional strategy.

Mr. SKELTON. Thank you.

Let us talk about China.

Before I leave IMET, what countries do not participate in the IMET program in your region?

Admiral LARSON. Let me see. I will provide you a list for the record, Mr. Skelton. I don't have that right at my fingertips.

Mr. SKELTON. How about China?



Admiral LARSON. It does not.

Mr. SKELTON. I would appreciate that list.

[The following information was received for the record:]

The following 21 countries within USPACOM region currently do not participate in the IMET program: Australia, Bhutan, Brunei, Burma, Cambodia, Federated States of Micronesia, Fiji, Japan, Kiribati, Laos, Malaysia, Marshall Islands, Nauru, New Zealand, North Korea, Peoples Republic of China, Taiwan, Thailand, Tuvalu, Vietnam, and Western Samoa. However, to put our overall USPACOM security assistance training effort in perspective, let me add a couple of comments. Australia, Japan, New Zealand, and Taiwan are not eligible for IMET, but purchase training under Foreign Military Sales (FMS) training cases averaging near \$55 million annually. Similarly, Brunei periodically purchases some FMS training, as did the PRC before we suspended security assistance. Although the Continuing Resolution Authority (CRA) in effect reinstated Malaysia's IMET program, State Department and Congress have not yet agreed to fund the Malaysia program until there is additional consultation with Congress. Coups in Burma, Fiji, and Thailand resulted in IMET program suspension. We expect Fiji and Thailand IMET programs to be back on line this year, but don't foresee a restart of the Burma program for some time. In fiscal year 1992 we started IMET programs with Mauritius and Mongolia, and we are hopeful that two additional programs—Laos and Western Samoa—will commence in fiscal year 1993.

Let us talk about China. You spoke a moment ago about it increasing its military budget dramatically. At the present time, what does the Chinese military consist of?

Admiral LARSON. The Chinese military consists of a very large army and a fairly large, medium-technology air force. The navy has some blue-water capability in nuclear-powered submarines, both attack and ballistic missile, frigates, destroyers and a large number of coastal craft that, of course, do not project power.

In my view, the army really is going through a debate right now. It is debating what is the highest priority: professional training or political indoctrination. Is the army being focused on external defense or internal suppression, or if you will, law and order within the country?

It is not clear to me that they have made a decision. I see some indications of the more junior officers working toward more of the professional training. The hierarchy is still interested in the political ideology, political purity and internal defense. They have a very large capability that, currently in my view, does not have a large external power projection capability across their borders. They do have the numbers and resources if they desire to change that.

This concerns some of the nations in the area.

Mr. SKELTON. That is not the case with the Air Force or Navy? They can project across borders into other areas?

Admiral LARSON. In a modest way. I think at this point in time, with their technology, their capabilities, it would be modest. Certainly, their nuclear submarines and their air force could project, but modestly.

Mr. SKELTON. What type of military-to-military discussions, arrangements do we have with them?

Admiral LARSON. Mr. Skelton, we have none from my point of view or the point of view of my command. We have limited contact by our attaches in Beijing with their military. All formal contacts with our military and with the Pacific Command have been cut off because of the sanctions imposed by our government-to-government relationship.

Mr. SKELTON. How about prior to that?

Admiral LARSON. Prior to that, we had a program that was showing a very promising start.

One of their fleet commanders came into Hawaii on a training ship. He conducted a port visit in Hawaii, then flew to Washington. I visited with him there. I hosted him for a day at the Naval Academy and took him to a number of things.

This was a mirror image of the visit our Pacific Fleet Commander made to China. He went to Beijing and was hosted in the capital. We kind of started a military-to-military exchange with them. I think it was starting to bear some fruit.

Mr. SKELTON. That has gone?

Admiral LARSON. That is gone away.

Mr. DICKINSON. Would you yield for a clarifying question?

Did you say that the PRC has nuclear submarines?

Admiral LARSON. Yes, sir, Mr. Dickinson.

Mr. DICKINSON. I am dependent upon my friend here to my left who is ranking on the Seapower Subcommittee. He didn't know that.

Admiral LARSON. They have a Han class SSN and a Xia class SSBN.

Mr. DICKINSON. How many?

Admiral LARSON. They have one Xia class and five Han class.

Mr. DICKINSON. Thank you.

Mr. SKELTON. Thank you, sir.

Mr. DICKINSON. Thank you.

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Bateman.

Mr. BATEMAN. Thank you Mr. Chairman and welcome Admiral Larson. I have enjoyed and benefited from the very excellent overview you have given us.

A couple of specific areas. Let's start off with the PRC nuclear submarines, the attack submarines. Are they highly capable, sophisticated or rudimentary in their capability?

Admiral LARSON. Mr. Bateman, the best information I have, says they are capable. Our CNO a few years ago during the exchange that we talked about actually got a chance to tour one. Certainly their technology is behind our technology, but any nuclear submarine with weapons that can stay submerged for a long period of time with weapons is a formidable adversary to any blue water Navy.

Mr. BATEMAN. One country that I haven't heard mention of in your discussion—unless you mentioned it and I can't remember—is what used to be called Burma.

Admiral LARSON. Yes, sir, Myanmar.

Mr. BATEMAN. What has gone on in Myanmar that is of any interest to the United States?

Admiral LARSON. Well, Myanmar still has the repressive government that did not respond to the free elections they had and continue their repression of the country. We have essentially cut them off as a policy matter and to put pressure on them. Some of the other nations of Southeast Asia are also trying to influence them.

The things that are going on in Myanmar right now, are distressing. They are having a battle with the army insurgents along the Thai border. There have been a number of incursions from

Myanmar into Thailand. There has also been some fighting between the Thais and the Myanmarese.

On the other side, there are over a hundred thousand refugees, Moslem refugees that have gone into Bangladesh. We have an insurgency problem, we have a skirmish problem with one of our allies, and then we have a big refugee problem in Bangladesh. Bangladesh is not equipped right now for more refugees.

It is an unstable area with an autocratic government with which we have no relations.

Mr. BATEMAN. If you would, let us have your further perspective on our relationship and where you see events taking us in Vietnam, Cambodia and Laos. You make reference to the drug problem, so much of which relates to that part of the world. I would be particularly interested in the traffic patterns. Where does all of the opium and other drugs move to from that area? What kind of things are we doing about it?

Admiral LARSON. Let me address that in two parts, if I may, Mr. Bateman. I will talk about Indochina and what I see as our relationship there and then the drug movements out of the Golden Triangle.

I have just formed, as I mentioned in my statement, a joint task force for Prisoners of War and Missing in Action, that operates directly for me. We have opened up detachments now in the three countries of Indochina, in Vietnam, Cambodia and Laos, in addition to a detachment in Bangkok, Thailand, which oversees the whole area. We have very active programs.

This month I will have teams in the field in all three of those countries actively involved in investigations, surveys and excavations. We are making good progress. I think the progress of the last 6 to 8 weeks has been very encouraging. We have given a number of areas to the Vietnamese where we expect to see progress. We have come up with some measures of effectiveness to gauge how well we are able to achieve our goals there. Thus far, it looks good.

I am starting to feel as if this will be not only encouraging in trying to resolve the POW-MIA issue, but will be very helpful as we proceed toward normalization with Vietnam and in our ability to help with the Cambodian solution. I think there are some encouraging signs in Indochina. In fact, it would not be out of the question that I may visit Vietnam by the end of this year in my official POW-MIA capacity.

Another uncertainty I wouldn't have predicted 2 years ago is the drug business coming out of the Golden Triangle. Much of that opium is processed into heroin, and much of it moves out by sea. It is transshipped, sometimes through Malaysia, Singapore, Hong Kong, and other places.

A lot of heroin is also carried by individuals, on airplanes. So it is very difficult to interdict. My big problems are hashish and heroin. Heroin, in my view, is becoming more of a problem in the United States.

We have just had a national estimate completed for the heroin threat. The key to the whole thing, in my view, is intelligence, fused intelligence, and in putting your resources where it really makes sense. We are starting to achieve some progress in regionalization, cooperation of intelligence, sharing of information, looking



for patterns, and then ways to position our resources. I think our system is maturing.

My Joint Task Force Five in Alameda that oversees this for me has come of age. We have intercepted about 2.2 billion dollars' worth of illegal drugs in the year that I have been CINCPAC. I don't like "body counts" as measures of effectiveness. But all the signs indicate the program is starting to mature. I think in the intelligence area we are also starting to make some good progress.

Mr. BATEMAN. If you would, Admiral, how about addressing where we are headed in the context of the U.N. peacekeeping effort in Cambodia. Do we have any forces on the ground as a part of that effort and have we chosen a path that is going to minimize and hopefully cause to disappear the Khmer Rouge influences.

Admiral LARSON. The Cambodia situation, as you may appreciate, is very fragile right now. There is still some fighting going on. There is a cease fire basically between the State of Cambodia and the Khmer Rouge.

General Sanderson, the head of the U.N. Military force, has started to deploy his forces to the field. He had to stop at one point, wait for a cease fire and then deploy again. He has been to the field and talked to all four of the factions. All four, at least at this time, have tentatively agreed to honor the cease fire.

The real challenge, in my view, is going to be the disarming of those four factions and then putting them in contonments, and so I am sure they will continue to be shuffling for territory as we head toward that disarming and putting them in contonments.

I think it is probably one of the biggest challenges we have ever taken on in peacekeeping. We are talking about large numbers of troops—maybe up to 20,000—and a couple billion dollars in an area that has been unstable for a long period of time. I think we are on a path that will give it the best possible opportunity and I think Prince Sihanouk is probably the catalyst around which this could form.

If it goes toward free elections, people having a choice, and with stability, the elections alone will minimize the influence of the Khmer Rouge. The Cambodian people have a tremendous amount of animosity and vivid memories about what happened when the Khmer Rouge ruled.

As far as our participation, we have a minimal presence on the ground. We are supporting the operation. In my view, this is proper. There are a lot of nations contributing. I think we should contribute what we do best; logistics, communications, leadership, coordination, planning, disaster relief-type things that we are familiar with. Also, I have a military force in the Pacific with the flexibility, the mobility and the power of those guys on the ground, men and women on the ground from over the horizon. It could, if necessary, help establish a sanctuary or a haven or conduct a rescue.

I can do that best from over the horizon. I am very comfortable with a large number of nations sharing the burden on the ground while we share in the burden of leadership.

Mr. BATEMAN. Thank you, Admiral.

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Spence.

Mr. SPENCE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Admiral, it is good to see you again.

Admiral LARSON. Thank you. Good to see you.

Mr. SPENCE. I was just wondering—with all the changes in the world, especially relative to the Soviet fleet and their activities—if you could give us an update on the state of the Soviet fleet in the Pacific area in terms of its operation and capabilities?

Admiral LARSON. Mr. Spence, I visited Vladivostok in September of 1990 and saw the Soviet fleet and, of course, hosted them for a visit in San Diego. I had an opportunity to tour their ships, talk to their people, and spend 10 days with their Pacific Fleet Commander. I got a pretty good feel for where they were. I formed a lot of impressions about their fleet.

They were, in my view, then and are now at least a generation behind us both in technology and in an operational sense because of the strength of our All-Volunteer Force and our petty officer cadre, which they do not have. But I saw in the Soviet fleet a tremendous offensive punch. They were built rugged and tough to really get weapons on target and were able to fight.

I look now and say to myself, what has happened to that fleet? First, if I just look at the hardware itself, anywhere I look in the Pacific I see Russia. When I looked in from the Pacific 2 years ago, I saw Russia. So not much has changed. I see the same fleet that I saw when I visited in September of 1990. They have continued to add new ships. They have added some new guided missile destroyers. They have added a couple more Oscar-type submarines. They have continued to modernize, although they have put out older-type things.

However, their level of operations have gone down considerably. When I testified before Chairman Nunn's committee, I was at a point in time where I had to admit we didn't have a single Soviet ship at sea in my area of operations. Then the deputy commander of the Pacific Fleet made the statement that we are just there for the winter cycle; we are in simulators now, and we will be back out there for spring training, watch for us.

They just completed an operation with about four nuclear submarines and about six surface ships and significant air. So they have started a spring training cycle in the Sea of Japan and they are back out again. I also hosted my new counterpart in September of this past year. The Colonel General that has the Far East theater of military operations, visited San Diego, Alaska and Hawaii about 2 weeks after the coup.

I can't help but believe a couple of things are bothering them. One, mission. What am I training for? What do you want me to do? What is the mission of my Navy? I know mission strategy and protected shores, but how do I focus that?

My new counterpart told me, "I don't know if I am going to command a republic, a state or what. I have made my recommendations to Shaposhnikov, and I will find out when I get back." The mission has to confuse them a little bit. Resources appear to be short, although they don't admit it yet. I think there are shortages of fuel, parts and other things. They certainly are having some shipyard repair problems.

If something happened today that the fleet level of readiness has probably got to be way down, but the hardware is still there, and the people are still there. The level that they are producing ships



is starting to show a decline. I think the jury is still out as to how that force will form in the future, how professional it will be and what their mission will be.

If I had to go to war today, we would be in great shape. How they go in the future and our relationships with them will be part of this new environment as we try and work together.

Mr. SPENCE. That is all.

The CHAIRMAN. Admiral, we are going to go over and vote, but people will be back shortly.

Admiral LARSON. OK. I will wait.

[Recess].

Mr. RAY [presiding]. The panel will reconvene.

Admiral Larson, I think we are going to be having a few more people come back; but nevertheless, I will proceed with some questions that I have here. I want to tell you how much we appreciate your coming today. I read your testimony and it looks very good.

Admiral LARSON. Thank you.

Mr. RAY. I would just like to explore a few things with you this morning. I am very impressed with the fact that you do cover coordination on half the globe, 20 percent of the U.S. Armed Forces. Back a few years ago when we visited one of your predecessors, Admiral Crowe, he mentioned that the 1980s and 1990s would be the decade of the Pacific. I feel that way, although I sometimes don't believe the Pacific is getting the priority and attention that it ought to.

I know you don't need to respond to some of this, but it is just a comment. Many of us on the committee have worked as hard as we could to focus on the Pacific. Could you talk a little bit about the Asian nations, Singapore? What is the status of the government there right now, for instance?

Admiral LARSON. Singapore has done some things that have been very, very useful and very helpful for us in our Pacific strategy. They made a very strong political statement that the forward presence of the United States was an imperative for the stability of the region. They feel we are the honest broker that can provide balance in that region and act as a counterbalance to some of the adverse trends they could see developing.

Then they took it a step further and offered us access to facilities, both at Paya Lebar Air Field where we deploy F-16s for training, at Sembawang Navy Base for some ship repair and also pier facilities for ship visits.

They have recently allowed us to relocate our logistics command from the Philippines. This involved a one-star Admiral from Subic with a little over a hundred people on his staff, all under a memorandum of understanding. Their government and their new prime minister, Prime Minister Goh, have been most supportive and very helpful both in the political sense, and in allowing us access and presence.

Mr. RAY. Prime Minister Yew, is he still in the picture or in the background?

Admiral LARSON. Lee Kuan Yew is a Senior Minister and is very much involved as a senior statesman and is still visible there. But I think Mr. Goh has stepped out and has become his own man and is doing a very effective job as Prime Minister.



Mr. RAY. Where did we disburse the Air Force from Clark to?

Admiral LARSON. We had an F-4 squadron there which we decommissioned, replaced with F-15s that moved to Alaska. Our special operations wing has been relocated to Okinawa. We had Military Airlift Command resources which have been disbursed at numerous bases throughout the theater. The 13th Air Force Headquarters relocated to Guam.

Mr. RAY. Is there a report written on the after effects of the withdraw from Clark, what has happened to that base? Is there any kind of a written report on the status of it at this point, how the Philippine Government accepted it, what has happened to it when they did accept it and so forth?

Admiral LARSON. I haven't seen a formal report. It was turned over to the armed forces of the Philippines and to the Philippine Air Force. They continue to guard it. I am not aware of any formal plans by their government for any type of conversion. They are still debating what future use they might make of Clark.

Mr. RAY. We have heard indirectly from people in the Philippines that the houses and the structures have just been riddled, and all kinds of the goods taken away. New houses with the sinks, stoves, everything ripped out. Is that true?

Admiral LARSON. There has been a significant amount of destruction, theft and looting. That is correct.

Mr. RAY. I see.

Admiral LARSON. To put that in proper context, though, I think the fact that it was so, so badly destroyed probably gives one more of a mind set that it is not of much value for future use.

Mr. RAY. Well, I am informed, though, that the new houses, something over 300 just recently completed, the committee here did its best to take the money out of the budget in 1986, but it got back in. I was there in mid-1989 when those houses looked beautiful. Beautiful town houses, very expensive, were being completed. I am told that the base commander's home plus many of those homes were not destroyed and in good shape, but have been now riddled.

Admiral LARSON. Sir, you are on the mark. I was there in May, 2 weeks before Mt. Pinatubo erupted. It almost made me cry to think of what the eruption did to those beautiful enlisted barracks and homes.

Mr. RAY. We have been able to salvage what we could salvage.

Admiral LARSON. Yes, sir. We salvaged the bulk of the removable equipment. Our first priority was to get all the household goods out of our member's home safely, which we did.

Mr. RAY. Congressman Dickinson mentioned Okinawa and Japan contributions. You reconfirmed my own feelings that I am one of those that talk whenever I can about the contribution that the Japanese are making. I spent 2 weeks in the Pacific dealing with environmental concerns and about a week in Japan and another week in Korea. I was very impressed with the contribution that is being made. Of course, we would not have been able to keep 40,000 marines on Okinawa and a big presence in Japan without that contribution at a time when it was very vital.

But I guess the point now is, do we still have about the same contingent of marines on Okinawa?

Admiral LARSON. The Marines have been drawn down somewhat. The bulk of the 5,000 people who were taken out of Japan during phase one of our East Asia Strategy Initiative were marines from Okinawa. We did take out several thousand, but the bulk remains. I think that will remain stable through the next several years.

Mr. RAY. There was some strong, strong resentment by the Okinawan people about the fact that they are still a part of Japan, and they were struggling to become an independent state. What is the status of that now?

Admiral LARSON. There has always been some give and take between Okinawa and the central government in Tokyo. Some of that resentment relates to historical animosities and all the way back to the war. I feel the relations are quite good between our people there and the local Okinawans.

The governor represents the opposition party, so there is some political rhetoric. Most of the polls show that a majority of the population at large accepts our presence there. They would like also to see it reduced when possible in the future.

Mr. RAY. Of course, the United States has made a tremendous contribution to Okinawa and Japan in that respect. The thing that disturbed me in my visits to the Pacific is the difficulty members of your staff—and the Army and Navy and Air Force—are having in getting around half the globe to look after the responsibilities. I have raised that question a number of times in committee among defense people testifying. We have always been told that the commercial traffic is good and so forth out there.

What kind of an aircraft do you have to take long trips and visits around your responsibility?

Admiral LARSON. I have a converted KC-135 aircraft (VC-135) that is based with the Pacific Air Force on Hickam Air Force Base.

Mr. RAY. Forty-plus years old?

Admiral LARSON. Yes, sir.

Mr. RAY. I understand. Has it been in corrosion control for about a year to be repaired?

Admiral LARSON. It went through that probably a couple of years ago. I would say it has not been in for major maintenance since I have been there.

Mr. RAY. I am very familiar with trying to get to the Philippines myself during the environmental trip and I didn't mind traveling commercial. I like to do that and do it always. But 7 hours commercial to Tokyo on a Sunday afternoon with not much traffic on a clear day, then 3 hours across Tokyo on a mild Sunday afternoon to the Air Force base there, then another small trip down to Okinawa and another trip to the Philippines made me wonder how we actually conduct business out there.

The nearest I could tell is that in the whole Pacific we have two C-21 Lear jets and a handful of C-12s and your aircraft. Correct me if I am wrong.

Admiral LARSON. That is about right. We do a lot of commercial travel.

Mr. RAY. We have 40 nations, one-half the globe, 20 percent of all U.S. troops, and plenty of aircraft and inventory, but hardly any out in the Pacific.



Now you don't have to get yourself in trouble here, but I want to tell you that this committee has done an awful lot to get aircraft assigned to the Pacific. As near as I can tell this committee and the House of Representatives have authorized appropriations—and the Senate—for three aircraft with long range. One dedicated—I hope it is not too small for you—to intercontinental travel; one dedicated to Japan, and one dedicated to the Pacific Theater, or any way it needs to be used out there.

But I want you to know there is nothing pork barrel in that. It is just simply the fact that my two trips out there convinced me that somebody had to go to bat for you. No comments necessary in that respect.

Admiral LARSON. I will just make one comment. This is kind of in parallel, not directly on that. I really appreciate your concerns. I have been airborne 850 hours and flown 335,000 miles in the last 2 years doing my job. The transportation is very important to me.

Mr. RAY. In the KC-135, do you have to carry a large contingency of people with you when you go?

Admiral LARSON. My normal staff when I travel is about 11 people. These include communicators, administrative support and staff support.

Mr. RAY. OK. What do you have, four engines?

Admiral LARSON. Yes, sir.

Mr. RAY. A big fuel tank? My guess is that the aircraft which we are designating to you will be faster, more efficient, not 40 years old and a lot safer. I hope that is going to help you, Admiral.

Let's see. Do the staff have any questions? Let me just screen my notes here to see if there is anything else. Well, I am not sure we are going to get anybody to come back. Do you have any wrap-up comments that you would like to make, sir?

Admiral LARSON. No, sir. I think I have had a very fair chance to give a good statement and answer some very perceptive questions and I appreciate the opportunity.

Mr. RAY. Thank you so much. Again, let me compliment you on your statement, very well done, very readable, very informative. The status of Guam. Tell me about Guam, Wake Island and Midway. What are we doing militarily with those islands?

Admiral LARSON. Guam has been very, very helpful. We have worked very closely with Representative Blaz and also with the Governor. Guam will be absorbing about 1,250 people that we are taking out of the Philippines. That has been a major contribution to my forward stationing strategy.

We have good relations with the people. It is very important for me to have people that far forward. We will be asking for some MilCon support to help put some infrastructure to support the people that are coming back.

If you look at the total economics of it, we will save more money by leaving the Philippines than it will cost us in the first 2 years to get the infrastructure put into Guam. I am very pleased that we are able to do that and that we had the capacity there to absorb those people.

Mr. RAY. Is the infrastructure in the form of housing?



Admiral LARSON. Yes, sir. It will be in the form of housing, additional enlisted barracks, day care centers and an expansion of other things that give people-type services.

Mr. RAY. Through the years there has been an environmental problem at Anderson Air Field?

Admiral LARSON. Anderson Air Force Base.

Mr. RAY. When we took Anderson back from the Japanese, we had a lot of wrecked airplanes—a lot of environmental situations—which in our anxiety to get back in operation, were pushed over the cliff. There are a lot of munitions and some old aircraft and a lot of growth that has gone on there.

I don't know the status of it, but just a few years ago there was some real concern for the people on Guam who owned some of the property there to correct that. Is anything happening? Are you familiar with that?

Admiral LARSON. I am not familiar with the specific area where we pushed things over the cliffs. I do know that we have made significant environmental progress in the last year.

For the first time we have come up with, and are about ready to publish, universally applicable DOD environmental standards for overseas facilities. All of my people will be required to meet those requirements. I have an environmental staff specialist that I hired in the last year. Although the services have responsibility for the environment, I oversee their compliance with these regulations.

For the first time this year my integrated priority list that I submitted to the chairman had environmental actions as one of my priority items.

Mr. RAY. Well, fine. Thank you. I appreciate that since I am involved in that area and am concerned about it.

The status of Midway and Wake? Of any vital use to us now?

Admiral LARSON. Midway is almost in caretaker status. We still have access there, but it is really bare bones, almost caretaker.

Wake is still useful. We still have port calls and the like. It is still operational.

Mr. RAY. Do we have any fuel supply or weather stations at Midway at all?

Admiral LARSON. We do have some limited fuel supply; I am not sure about the weather station. I can provide that for the record.

[The following information was received for the record:]

There is no longer a weather station at Midway. The Navy ceased weather operations on Midway several years ago. For the last few years the weather station functions on Midway were conducted by civilians under a Base Operations Support (BOS) contract. The BOS contract for weather station operations expired in the summer of 1991. There have been no weather station operations on Midway since then.

Mr. RAY. Mrs. Byron.

Mrs. BYRON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Let me touch on a couple of areas that I have been interested in for a long period of time. Sri Lanka is an area that I think has tremendous potential for basing or operational in the event of an emergency.

The other is the Pakistani issue, which you touched on very briefly in your testimony. Could you elaborate a little bit on those two areas as far as the stability and the relationships that we have

with both of those countries. I know we had problems with port calls in Pakistan for a while. There was a question in India, also, on port calls. Have those been resolved?

Admiral LARSON. Let me start with Sri Lanka, Mrs. Byron, if I may. Of course, our biggest concern there is stability. The Liberation Tamil Tigers of Eelam rebels are still a problem. There is still some fairly intense fighting that goes on occasionally. We do make port calls in Colombo, and they have been very cooperative. We continue to do that as a means of having some access and some influence.

I don't see us moving much closer in the military-to-military sense until there is a sense of stability in the country.

Mrs. BYRON. Did we use any of that area during Desert Storm?

Admiral LARSON. We did refuel there. We had ships make port calls and refuel there. As far as India and Pakistan. India is in my area; Pakistan is in the Central Command's area. General Hoar and I have agreed to a kind of parallel, two-pronged effort, that when I visit India, I will also visit Pakistan. When he visits Pakistan, he will also visit India. He was at my headquarters on Tuesday. We spent the whole day together, and then at 9 o'clock at night, I left for Washington, and he left for India.

Mrs. BYRON. I am not sure who has the better deal there.

Admiral LARSON. I got the cherry blossoms, anyway. But he is going to make that first trip to India and then Pakistan. Pakistan is looking for a closer military-to-military relationship. However, under the Pressler Amendment, there are certain limitations. We are certainly trying to keep our contacts and our lines of communications open with them to try and be a positive influence as they look at some of the tensions between them and India.

I work India pretty much in the same direction. We have had some pretty significant initiatives with India in the past year. We started out with some Army initiatives, then some areas where we could move closer, such as a people-to-people training exchange exercise-type thing. I made a visit there last October and gave them a straw man plan for extending that effort with the Air Force and the Navy, as well as the Army. All those programs are in effect now.

My Pacific Army and Air Force Commanders and the Commander of the Seventh Fleet all visited India and went over some of those details with the Indian Government and the military. I have a feeling that their military was a little bit out in front of their politicians in exploring how we might be able to move closer together and what our common interests might be. It is apparent to me now that we have the full support of their political people.

Their Defense Minister is here in town now. They have had a number of people visit, and I think we are certainly seeking out how we can cooperate pursuing our mutual interests in that very critical part of the world and in the Indian Ocean.

My primary interest on the subcontinent is really twofold. We are first trying to defuse and disengage the forces of India and Pakistan across the line of control in Kashmir, by openness or confidence-building measures or something that will allow that situation to defuse.

The second is weapons proliferation, to stop the proliferation, to try and convince them to join the NPT and the missile control technology regime and reduce that threat from the area.

Mrs. BYRON. The other area I will touch on briefly is North Korea. What is your plan for the North Korean ballistic missiles, the chemical weapons and their nuclear development program. Can you, in open session, give any more details on that?

Admiral LARSON. I will do the best I can, Mrs. Byron. Certainly the nuclear program is of great concern to me and to all of us, and certainly to our Government. They are proceeding down a path that is very disturbing from the standpoint of stability of the peninsula to stability of northeast Asia, and even to the proliferation question, since North Korea has been willing to sell anything that they can manufacture.

Mrs. BYRON. To anybody.

Admiral LARSON. To anybody, without any thought of what it does to the region. You can say it is encouraging that they have signed agreements on reconciliation nonaggression, cooperation and exchange, and in the nuclear subcommittee, since then there has been almost no progress. In the nuclear area they have not agreed to trial inspections and/or an inspection regime.

I am pessimistic about where this may lead. I think they will get their first test when there is a push in May and June timeframe for both IAEA and bilateral inspections.

I think we are going down the right path of international pressure. Japan has been very cooperative. The Japan, U.S., South Korean axis is working. We have had some level of cooperation from Russia and from the PRC, even if that level is kind of turning their back on them and not giving them some of the support they have in the past. But that is helpful, too. Probably the logical next step would be some sort of sanctions or U.N. action. Of course, sanctions would depend upon full cooperation of Russia and China, both in the Security Council, but also from the fact that they have common borders with them that would have to be sealed.

Mrs. BYRON. As we know, for a good period of time, the Chinese were rather "ballistic" over the concerns for the North Koreans. Now we are at a time where you are beginning to hear rumblings about Korea being reunited. This is the same world that we lived in 3 years ago when I made a statement at a German conference, after lunch when people were beginning to doze off, and I thought I would wake them up. I asked the Germans at the conference what their projection was for reunification of Germany and the Wall going down. Everybody leaped up out of their slumber and looked at me as if I had just escaped from the "booby hatch" and informed me that never in our lifetime would we ever see that happen.

So I look at Korea, maybe not with as much hope, but at least things are changing in that part of the world.

Admiral LARSON. Two jobs ago, I met with my German counterpart after some Navy-to-Navy talks. He told me at Wednesday lunch not in his lifetime, also. The Wall came down—

Mrs. BYRON. It must have been the same one I was talking to.

Admiral LARSON. The Wall came down Friday, 2 days later.

Mrs. BYRON. Mr. Chairman, I have no further questions.



Mr. RAY. Thank you, Mrs. Byron.

Admiral Larson, we thank you very, very much for coming today. We wish you well.

Admiral LARSON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I appreciate the efforts of the committee and it was a pleasure to be here.

Mr. RAY. Thank you, sir.

[Whereupon, at 11:40 a.m., the Defense Policy Panel was recessed, subject to the call of the Chair.]

## **WORLDWIDE THREATS TO UNITED STATES SECURITY, DIRECTOR OF THE CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY**

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HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,  
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES,  
DEFENSE POLICY PANEL,  
*Washington, DC, Friday, March 27, 1992.*

The panel met, pursuant to call, at 10 a.m., in room 2118, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Les Aspin (chairman of the panel) presiding.

### **STATEMENT OF HON. LES ASPIN, A REPRESENTATIVE FROM WISCONSIN, CHAIRMAN, DEFENSE POLICY PANEL**

The CHAIRMAN. The meeting will come to order.

This morning the Defense Policy Panel welcomes Robert Gates, the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency, as a witness. He will assess the threats to American interests posed by potential aggressors in Southwest Asia and the Korean peninsula; the regions where major military conflict is perhaps most likely. It is particular dangers like these that we must use as the basis for sizing and shaping post-Soviet American forces.

Events of the last 10 years have changed the military capabilities and possibly the intents of some Middle East nations. The Iran-Iraq war devastated Iran's war-fighting ability although Iran has been moving to rearm itself. The defeat of Iraq in Operation Desert Storm reduced its conventional and unconventional capabilities; but we are all well aware that Iraq is far from having destroyed its weapons of mass destruction as required by United Nations resolutions. The end of the cold war compelled Syria to join the alliance against Iraq and participate in the Middle East peace process.

The panel would like Mr. Gates to discuss the conventional and unconventional military capabilities of these and other potential aggressors in Southwest Asia. In particular, we would like a review of the sanctions' effectiveness in limiting Iraq's ability to reconstitute its military. A general overview of military, political and economic trends that bear on the potential for armed conflict in the region also would be useful.

As for Korea, we would like an assessment of the South Korean military's ability to defend against an attack from the north and the likelihood that such action would be required. If there are deficiencies in the South Korean military capability, we would like to know whether the United States could take any action now to help. Furthermore, we would like to know the status of North Korea's nuclear program.

Identifying situations in which the United States might need military forces to ward off threats to our interests is the only real-

istic basis for developing future forces. No other method begins to tell us how much is enough. Resources are scarce, and we owe the American taxpayer our best judgment of what we need to ensure our national security. Basically, what we are involved with is trying to calculate what kind of a defense we are looking for in the years ahead.

As part of that, we are trying to analyze what are the threats in the post-cold war, post-Soviet world. What kind of threats are they, how extensive are they and where does it come out? Our belief is that that is the basis for putting together a defense budget.

We are interested in the question of whether our essential first cut at this thing and Option C make sense. We are looking at your best judgment as to what the kinds of threats are and what you think we ought to be taking into account as we build our forces.

We are interested in Southwest Asia and Korea, but if you think there is something else that we ought to know about, we are interested.

The opening statement of Mr. Gates is in open session and then we will go into closed testimony for further questions.

Bill Dickinson.

**STATEMENT OF HON. WILLIAM L. DICKINSON, A REPRESENTATIVE FROM ALABAMA, RANKING MINORITY MEMBER, DEFENSE POLICY PANEL**

Mr. DICKINSON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Gates, it is always a pleasure to have you appear before the panel.

My staff tells me that the Dutch philosopher Spinoza once wrote that "Peace is not an absence of war. It is a state of mind."

The CHAIRMAN. Who over there reads Spinoza?

Mr. DICKINSON. I want to give credit where credit is due.

Before this Nation again convinces itself, as it has after every other conflict this century, that war will never come again, as we always thought in the past, but it has never been the case. We need to look hard at the world around us. That is why your testimony today is so important.

This policy panel is especially interested, as the chairman has said, in Korea and Southwest Asia. These are two areas of potential conflict for which candid threat assessments will hopefully help determine the future U.S. force structure requirements.

I would like you to address four areas:

First, we need to understand the relative strengths of both North and South Korean military forces as well as the status and future of the North Korean weapons program.

Second, as the chairman proposed, an "air power" only strategy in the United States is called upon to fight in Korea as a second contingency. Since North Korea has proved relatively invulnerable to sustained air assault in the past, we would like your analysis of the North Korean political and military vulnerability to air power today.

Third, we would like your assessment of the likely implications for deterrence and crisis management if North and South Korea understand that U.S. force structure could not support the commitment of significant U.S. ground forces in defense of South Korea.



Fourth, with regard to Southwest Asia, Iraq remains committed to developing a nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons capability. Iran is committed to reducing and modernizing its military. How soon can we expect each nation to be in a position to use a refurbished military capability against each other or other nations in the Gulf? What vulnerabilities might the United States exploit to retard both Iran's and Iraq's drive for the enhanced military power?

There are two ways to look toward the future military structure. Do we start with a money figure and say this is all we can spend and this is the amount that we are willing to spend? What does that buy us?

So we start with a dollar figure and say we can afford this or what will be contained in the mix if we spend this amount of money or do we see this is the threat that we see in order to meet the threat? This is where we would have to start building, build up what we see as a minimum capability and then look at the dollar mark, the price tag, and say this is the amount that we have to come out at.

Those are two approaches and it has been suggested by some on both sides of the equation. I don't know which is the proper way, but your testimony today is significant and will help us arrive at what we would propose and support as far as our military posture is concerned for the future.

Thank you for your presence today.

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Gates.

**STATEMENT OF ROBERT M. GATES, DIRECTOR OF THE CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY; ACCOMPANIED BY GORDON OEHLER, NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE OFFICER FOR SCIENCE, TECHNOLOGY, AND PROLIFERATION, CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY; ELLEN LAIPSON, NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE OFFICER FOR NEAR EAST AND SOUTH ASIA, CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY; DAVID ARMSTRONG, NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE OFFICER FOR GENERAL PURPOSE FORCES, CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY; KENT HARRINGTON, NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE OFFICER FOR EAST ASIA, CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY; LAWRENCE GERSHWIN, NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE OFFICER FOR STRATEGIC PROGRAMS, CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY; STANLEY M. MOSKOWITZ, DIRECTOR OF CONGRESSIONAL AFFAIRS, CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY; AND CHARLES CUNNINGHAM, OFFICE OF CONGRESSIONAL AFFAIRS, CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY**

Mr. GATES. Thank you, Mr. Chairman and Mr. Dickinson.

I am pleased to be here. I will try to answer as many of the questions that you have posed in open session, but some I will have to address in closed session.

I have to respond to the Spinoza quote because it reminded me of Ambrose Pearson's definition of peace as a period of cheating between two periods of fighting.

I am happy to come before you to discuss emerging trends in parts of the world where the United States has manifest and enduring security interests.

You have asked that I focus on the Middle East and Persian Gulf as well as on the Korean peninsula, and I will do so.

I would be remiss, however, if I did not first, at least, allude to other parts of the world where our interests are at stake and our military forces might be needed, though not necessarily to fight.

When I was here last December, I ended my statement with a caution about the unpredictability of the future. I suggested we think about how fast events are moving; the prospects for turbulence and instability in heavily armed Central Eurasia; the problematic disposition of the nearly 30,000 nuclear weapons of the former Soviet Union; the volatility of the Middle East and South Asia; the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, particularly the nuclear development programs in countries hostile to our interests; and the centrifugal forces of nationalist and ethnic hostility that threat instability, or even civil war, on several continents.

During the ensuing 3½ months some disquieting trends have been evident. Unrest is worse, for example, in parts of the former Soviet Union than when I was last here. Conflict is deepening between Soviet successor states such as Armenia and Azerbaijan.

While the CIS has helped cushion the collapse of the Soviet empire, it is facing increasing strains that it may not survive. It is not hard to find other disquieting news:

Ukraine has suspended the transfer of tactical nuclear weapons to Russia for dismantling; ratification and implementation of the CFE Treaty appears increasingly complex and problematic; arms races are heating up in the Middle East and Southeast Asia, among other regions; despite significant and costly counternarcotics achievements, narcotics trafficking shows no sign of abating; and the disastrous explosion in Buenos Aires shows that international terrorism is still of grave concern.

On the other hand, I can point to some positive developments as well: White citizens in South Africa voted strongly in favor of continuing political reforms. A cease-fire is in effect in El Salvador, and the prospects that the contending factions can work out their differences peacefully have improved. Democracy has begun to make progress even in Albania and Romania. The unrest in Yugoslavia has abated, if perhaps only temporarily.

Transforming centrally planned economies into market economies continues to be wrenching and destabilizing. But the worst predictions about massive starvation, hypothermia, and large-scale unrest in Russia, for example, have so far failed to materialize. Yeltsin is still holding firmly to the course of economic reform.

We may no longer need to fear a nuclear holocaust, but the famous Chinese curse appears to have come true. We are truly living in interesting times. With those thoughts in mind, I will devote the balance of my presentation to the regions you have asked me to cover.

First, the Middle East and Persian Gulf. If in the next few years it again becomes necessary to deploy United States combat power abroad, the strategically vital region encompassing the Middle East and Persian Gulf is at the top of the list of likely locales.

Among the several countries in this region that are hostile to United States interests; two, Iraq and Iran, continue trying to re-



build their military power to enhance their influence. Let me say a few words about each, starting with Iraq.

Operation Desert Storm greatly reduced Iraq's ability to conduct large-scale offensive military operations. The United Nation sanctions have impeded Saddam's efforts to re-equip his forces. Pre-occupied with defending the regime and putting down local insurgencies, the Iraqi military is currently capable of conducting only small-scale offensive operations with limited objectives. Nevertheless, the size and equipment of Iraq's military forces remain formidable, especially in comparison with those of most of its neighbors. Let me give you some figures:

Iraq's ground forces number about two dozen divisions, though they are on the whole smaller and much less capable than the pre-war divisions. The Army still has more than 3,000 armored personnel carriers; 2,000 tanks, and 1,000 artillery pieces. We believe Iraq also retains some mobile Scud missile launchers and as many as several hundred missiles. The Iraqi Air Force probably still has about 300 combat aircraft, though many are not operational. Because the Air Force has been grounded for over a year, it would need at least a month of intensive training and maintenance to become even minimally combat-ready.

Although a large quantity of Iraqi nuclear-related equipment has been identified and destroyed, we suspect Iraq has managed to hide some equipment from the United Nations inspectors. Of course, Iraq's nuclear scientists and engineers retain their expertise.

Baghdad surrendered thousands of chemical munitions, tons of chemical agents, and considerable production equipment. But we believe the regime still has more of everything, more precursor chemicals, more bulk agent, more munitions, more production equipment.

The regime never admitted having a biological weapons program and never surrendered any toxins or weapons. But we know the Iraqis had such a program and we are convinced they have been able to preserve some biological weapons and the means to make even more.

The restoration of Iraq's defense industries is one of Saddam's main post-war goals. Notwithstanding U.N.-imposed inspections and sanctions, Iraq claims to have partly repaired nearly 200 military-industrial buildings and to be in the process of repairing many others. We can confirm that significant reconstruction has been taking place in at least two dozen military-industrial sites.

Limited production of artillery and ammunition has resumed at some weapon production facilities damaged during the Gulf War. Despite these efforts, total arms production will remain significantly below pre-war levels as long as sanctions remain in force and inspections continue.

If the sanctions were removed, we estimate it would take Iraq at least 3 to 5 years to restore its pre-war conventional military inventories. Long before then, Iraq's forces could be strong enough to threaten its neighbors.

More important, however, is how fast we think Iraq could restore its special weapons capabilities. We believe Baghdad has been able to preserve significant elements of each of its special weapons pro-



grams. Once it is free to begin rebuilding them, its scientists and engineers will be able to hit the ground running.

The nuclear weapon development program would need the most time to recover, because much of the infrastructure for the production of fissile material would need to be reconstructed. This judgment would be reinforced if equipment at certain, only recently identified, nuclear research sites is destroyed, as United Nations inspection teams have demanded.

The time Iraq would need to rebuild its nuclear capability could be shortened dramatically if it could somehow procure fissile material from abroad.

Much of the chemical weapons production infrastructure would have to be rebuilt before the Iraqis could reestablish the pre-war level of production. However, we believe they could quickly resume limited production of such weapons using covert stocks of precursor chemicals, undeclared chemical process equipment, and unfilled munitions.

Because it doesn't take much equipment to make biological warfare agents, we estimate the Iraqis could resume production within weeks. They have retained microbial fermentation equipment and pathogenic cultures; we remain convinced they also have a stockpile of biological weapons.

Finally, we judge that the Iraqis could soon restore their capability to produce Scud-type missiles, though they might need some help from abroad.

How then might Iraq's internal politics and external behavior change if Saddam Hussein left the scene? As Saddam's decades of repressive rule demonstrate, he will do whatever it takes to cling to power.

I think one of the most effective cartoons that I saw during the period of the war and afterward was a cartoon showing Saddam Hussein at a window with all the ruins of Iraq behind him and the caption was "I regret that I have but one country to give for my life." I think that captures his nature.

No succession mechanism is in place, nor are there any obvious candidates to replace Saddam. Iraq is one of those countries where being the number two man is unnerving, not to say life-threatening.

Consequently, we judge that if Saddam left the scene, it would be because of a coup or other violent act. How likely this is to happen, I cannot say, though we have evidence that Saddam's power base is shrinking and that dissatisfaction with his leadership is growing even among his core supporters—chiefly among Iraq's Sunni Muslims.

A likely successor to Saddam would be someone from the current Sunni-Arab-dominated ruling circle. Someone who shares Saddam's perspectives, especially his belief in the political efficacy of ruthless violence. Such a successor might think pretty much like Saddam. Even so, whoever Saddam's successor was, he would lack a broad power base and could face immediate and serious challenges from other contenders.

A successor regime might be a little less hardnosed, both toward Iraqi Shi'ites and Kurds and toward Iraq's external adversaries. While it would continue efforts to restore Iraq's military capability,

it might shift some resources from military to civilian reconstruction.

The new regime could anticipate a quick end to the United Nations sanctions as well as recognition and support from the international community. In the short run then Iraq might present a lower threat to its neighbors.

Still, any successor to Saddam is likely to share his regional aspirations, and over the longer term we could expect Iraq to try to regain its position as the dominant Arab military power.

If a successor regime begins to have trouble maintaining Iraq's unity or territorial integrity, its immediate neighbors, particularly Iran, Turkey, and Syria, will be strongly tempted to intervene. They all fear that an unstable Iraq would threaten their own national interests and might lead to an undesirable shift in the regional balance of power. None wishes to see Iraq break apart into independent Kurdish, Shi'ite, and Sunni states.

White Iraq struggles to recover from the Gulf War, Iran is determined to regain its former stature as the preeminent power in the Persian Gulf. Tehran's reformulated national security policy has three main goals: One, guarantee the survival of the regime; two, project power throughout the region; and three, offset United States influence in the Middle East.

To achieve these goals, Iran has undertaken diplomatic measures to end its international isolation, is purchasing weapons from a variety of foreign suppliers, and is developing a capability to produce weapons of mass destruction.

During the period 1990 to 1994, Iran plans to spend \$2 billion in hard currency annually on foreign weapons. Tehran has already purchased significant numbers of advanced warplanes and anti-aircraft missiles from Russia and China. It has bought some extended-range Scud missiles from North Korea and is building a factory to manufacture its own. As part of its upgrade of naval forces, Iran has also contracted to buy at least two Kilo-class attack submarines from Russia.

Even after Operation Desert Storm, Iraq still has three times as many armored vehicles as Iran. To reduce that gap, Tehran is attempting to purchase hundreds of tanks from Russia and East European suppliers.

In the Iran-Iraq war, Iraq's chemical weapon were decisive factors in several important engagements, a lesson not lost on Iran.

We judge that Tehran is seeking to acquire a nuclear weapon capability. Barring significant technical input from abroad, however, the Iranians are not likely to achieve that goal before the year 2000.

Although extensive and improving, Iran's chemical weapon program remains relatively crude. Nevertheless, we expect Iran to develop chemical warheads for its Scud missiles within a few years. We also suspect that Iran is working toward a biological warfare capability.

Tehran is rebuilding its military strength not only to redress the military imbalance with Iraq, but also to increase its ability to influence and intimidate its Gulf neighbors. Though in the near term, Tehran's desire to reduce U.S. involvement in the region will probably lead it to court the Gulf states rather than bully them.



Tehran is also trying to improve its relations with Arab States outside the Gulf, stressing Muslim solidarity and Islamic principles. In countries with Islamic opposition movements, Iran hopes to increase its influence among local fundamentalists without damaging its relations with these governments.

For example, in Algeria, Tehran wants to maintain ties with the new regime, but continue its political and financial support for the Front for Islamic Salvation, which the Algerian Government is in the process of banning. Trying to have it both ways has been difficult. Algiers recently recalled its ambassador in Tehran to protect Iran's continued support for the front.

Iran's growing support of radical Palestinian groups may bring it closer to some Arab States, such as Libya. This support reflects Tehran's antipathy toward Israel, which it regards as both a U.S. ally and a strategic threat.

We expect Iran to continue to strongly oppose the peace process and probably to promote terrorism and other active measures aimed at undermining progress toward Israeli-Palestinian reconciliation.

Tehran's main surrogate in the Arab world will continue to be the radical Lebanese Shi'ite group Hizballah, which is the leading suspect in the recent horrific bombing of the Israeli Embassy in Argentina. To ensure that its links to Hizballah are preserved, Tehran will be careful to stay on the good side of the Syrian Government, which controls access to the territory occupied by Hizballah.

Tehran considers developments in the region to its north to be vital to its national interests. It wants both to fill the void caused by the collapse of the Soviet Union and to prevent the United States and regional rivals, especially Turkey, from gaining dominant influence there.

Tehran's diplomatic efforts to improve its own influence in the new Islamic states of the region have included sponsoring them for membership in various regional and international organizations.

In addition, Tehran is trying to forge cultural and religious ties to the new republics. It remains to be seen how successful Tehran will be, given that these peoples are mostly Turkic, not Persian and mostly Sunni Muslims, not Shi'ites.

We see no evidence of Iranian efforts to subvert the secular governments of the new states or to alienate them from Russia and the other non-Muslim members of the CIS. For now, at least, Iran seems to want to preserve amicable relations with Russia, which has become a major source of its arms.

Furthermore, Iran must be cautious about instigating instability along its northern border, lest nationalist sentiment be aroused among its own Zeri and Turkmen minorities. Indeed, with regard to the conflict between Azerbaijan and Armenia, Tehran has tried to exert a moderating influence on the Azerbaijani Government.

While pursuing military reconstruction, President Rafsanjani is trying to create an Iranian image of responsibility and respectability—both to reassure foreign investors and the Gulf Arab States and to maximize Iran's leverage in Afghanistan and the Central Asian Republics. Moreover, Tehran wants to avoid providing the United States with an excuse to extend its presence in the Gulf.



Tehran's current approach appears pragmatic and patient, but its clerical leadership has not abandoned the goal of one day leading the Islamic world and reversing the global dominance of Western culture and technology.

What about the impact of recent military, political, and economic trends in the region? Haven't these trends reduced the capability and inclination of Iran, Iraq, Libya and Syria for military conflicts and terrorism? It is true that these states have suffered some major setbacks:

Iraq's military forces were devastated during the Gulf War and are encountering difficulties in rebuilding because of international sanctions. The Iraqi regime is likely to find itself in nearly continuous military conflict, at least against Kurdish and Shi'ite dissident groups.

Iran still has not recovered from the destruction suffered during its long war with Iraq, and its military reconstruction is being hampered by the poor state of its economy.

Meanwhile, having seen its hope of achieving strategic parity with Israel dashed by the collapse of its Soviet sponsor, Syria may have difficulty finding a reliable source of advanced conventional weaponry. Damascus will find it even harder to pay for such weaponry.

The Libyan regime is currently preoccupied with the fear of United Nations sanctions and the possibility that the United States and Britain will launch military action in punishment for its bombing of Pan American Flight 103. As a consequence, its perpetual subversion machine is barely ticking.

Still, such developments have not led these governments to abandon their objectives—we see no evidence of that—only to alter their strategies and timetables. In particular, the escalating cost and difficulty of building first-rate conventional forces have increased the attractiveness of weapons of mass destruction.

The evident determination of all four states to acquire special weapons suggests that they view such weapons as force multipliers capable of compensating for inadequacies in conventional forces and perhaps deterring future Desert Shield/Desert Storm campaigns.

I will turn now to the second part of the world you asked me to focus on, namely the Korean Peninsula, the one place in the world where United States forces remain deployed opposite the forces of an avowed adversary.

Since initialing agreements on Nonaggression/Reconciliation and the denuclearization of the Korean peninsula last December, North and South Korea have engaged in a series of negotiations and discussions, some at very high levels, to implement the accords.

These discussions have achieved some concrete results, particularly the formation on 19 March of a Joint Nuclear Control commission with a mandate to set up bilateral inspections of nuclear facilities.

For the most part, however, the two sides have so far produced a framework for, but not the substance of, reconciliation. They remain far apart on critical issues, such as frequency, thoroughness, and basic ground rules for nuclear inspections. They also have major differences about the people-to-people exchanges and mili-

tary confidence-building measures called for in the reconciliation agreement.

Until they are much farther along in this process, we must continue to be wary and respectful of the military threat from North Korea. It is hard for me to say very much about this in open session, however. North Korea is the most secretive state on earth. Much of what we know about that country and the threat it poses to South Korea comes from sensitive sources, and I must wait until we get into closed session to go into some details.

I can say this much, however. The North maintains enormous ground forces just north of the Demilitarized Zone. They are in formations optimized for a sudden, massive strike southward toward Seoul. In recent years, these forces have increased their mobility and flexibility, improving their capability to threaten prepared defenses.

They considerably outnumber the opposing Southern forces in both men and weapons. Notwithstanding the recently signed Korean nonaggression pact, until these forces go away, the threat they present is real and serious.

It is not a question of fearing an attack from the South. The South Korean forces are deployed to defend Seoul. They present no countervailing threat to North Korea—and P'yongyang knows it.

I don't want to exaggerate this threat. North Korea's armed forces suffer from many deficiencies. Their training and, consequently, combat readiness are questionable. They have weaknesses in air defense and logistics. They could not count on much, if any, support from erstwhile allies.

Furthermore, as Operation Desert Storm demonstrated, U.S. air power is highly effective against massed ground forces. The prospect that South Korea would receive extensive combat air support as well as other support from United States forces is a potent deterrent, even to forces as strong as those North Korea has concentrated along the border.

P'yongyang has been building an infrastructure that, without input from abroad, will be able to produce weapons-grade fissile material from scratch. It has domestic uranium mines. At Yongbyon, it has constructed two nuclear reactors whose sole purpose appears to be to make plutonium. One of these reactors has been operating for 4 years. The second, much larger reactor, may start up this year. Nearly completed is another facility at Yongbyon that will be able to reprocess reactor fuel to recover the plutonium.

Last December, North and South Korea negotiated an agreement in principle for a nuclear-free peninsula. Each side has committed itself not to "test, manufacture, produce, receive, possess, store, deploy, or use" nuclear weapons.

Both sides also agreed not to have nuclear reprocessing or uranium enrichment facilities. There are grounds for questioning the North's intentions, given that it has not yet even admitted the existence of, much less declared, the plutonium production reactors and reprocessing facility at the Yongbyon Nuclear Research Center.

Moreover, verification procedures remain to be worked out. Agreement was reached only this month that a joint committee should be formed to do that. The validity of the North-South nu-



clear accord depends on the inspection regime P'yongyang ultimately accepts.

Historically, North Korea has not been forthcoming in this area. It signed the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty in December 1985, and was thereby obligated to declare and place all nuclear facilities under safeguards. We are still waiting for P'yongyang's promised ratification of a safeguards agreement.

Because some aspects of P'yongyang's behavior so far could be interpreted as an effort to continue nuclear weapon development, we wonder whether the North Koreans will accept meaningful on-site inspections that could allay our suspicions.

We believe P'yongyang is close, perhaps very close, to having a nuclear weapon capability. Where North Korea is concerned, moreover, we have to worry not only about the consequences for stability in Northeast Asia if it acquires nuclear weapons, but also about the possibility that P'yongyang might put nuclear materials and related technologies on the international market. In the past, the North Koreans have been willing to sell anything they could to earn hard currency.

The straitened economic circumstances in the North, coupled with uncertainties associated with the looming dynastic change of leadership in P'yongyang, have led the North Koreans to modify their confrontational strategy toward the South, as well as toward the United States, Japan, and the United Nations. Tensions between North and South have decreased somewhat; though the actual military threat to the South has not changed significantly.

We expect that many of the North's military advantages over the South will erode throughout this decade largely because of decreasing support from the North's traditional allies, coupled with its continuing economic problems. North Korea's large inventory of weapons is becoming obsolete. The North's defense industry is based on 1960s technology and beset by quality problems. P'yongyang lacks the hard currency to purchase more advanced technology.

We have seen no deliveries of major weapons from the Soviet Union or its successors since 1989. China cannot provide the types of weapons, such as modern aircraft or surface-to-air missile systems, that the Soviets supplied.

Fuel shortages, principally a result of drastically reduced imports from the former Soviet Union, are having a broad cumulative impact on all sectors, including the military.

Nevertheless, in the near term, we could be entering a more dangerous period. North Korean strategists could recommend an attack on the South while the North retains its substantial edge in numbers of men and weapons. Difficulties in maintaining and modernizing P'yongyang's conventional forces could reinforce the North's determination to develop nuclear weapons and ballistic missiles.

That concludes my remarks in open session.

I will elaborate on some of these matters in the closed session when we resume.

[The following questions were submitted for the record:]

1. How can the United States continue selling arms to the Middle East while asking NATO and former Eastern Bloc countries like Czechoslovakia and Russia (CIS) to stop doing so?



(This question deals with a matter of U.S. policy and should be directed to the Policy Community.)

2. What is the United States doing to prevent the proliferation of nonnuclear unconventional weapons and ballistic missiles from the Republics of the CIS to the Middle East?

While the U.S. Policy Community has engaged in discussions and other activity to prevent the proliferation of such weapons from the CIS to the Middle East, the Intelligence Community is monitoring the potential sellers and buyers of these weapons for evidence of any violation by those CIS governments who have indicated they would refrain from this activity.

3. Yesterday (Thursday, 26 March), the *New York Times* reported that Syria is negotiating a deal to allow Iraq to pump crude oil through Syria to the Mediterranean. The report also noted that Syria has already allowed direct trade between Syria and Iraq. Do these negotiations and standing trade practices violate the terms of the international sanctions against Iraq, and if so, what steps has the United States taken to prevent Syria's illegal activities?

Damascus may be rethinking its position vis-a-vis continued participation in the international sanctions against Iraq. The Syrians apparently believe that they have not received sufficient reward for participating in Operation Desert Storm and that support for additional anti-Saddam activities is no longer warranted. We cannot corroborate recent press reports that Syrian-Iraqi trade is resuming or that the oil pipeline from Iraq to Syria has reopened.

4. Why did Saudi Arabia refuse to allow the U.S. to preposition heavy equipment left over from "Desert Storm"? What is the current status of our prepositioning talks with Saudi Arabia?

The Saudis probably would prefer that all U.S. military forces and equipment be removed from the Kingdom. Nonetheless, Riyadh probably has developed a tiered structure of acceptability based on a principle of necessity for Saudi defense measured against the visibility of the U.S. presence. For example, a U.S. naval presence would be largely invisible to most Saudis and therefore probably would be tolerated. The U.S. Air Force and its F-15 fighters and Patriot missiles are considered necessary for Saudi defense from regional threats from the air and are welcomed for now, despite the fact that they are visible reminders of Saudi vulnerability. We believe the Saudis are particularly sensitive to the deployment of U.S. ground forces equipment and the large number of personnel required to service and maintain it. Efforts to agree upon a Status of Forces Agreement and to work out an acceptable system of payment for use of facilities are ongoing.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much.

We will have a temporary recess while we clear the room.

Thank you.

[Whereupon, at 10:44 a.m., the panel recessed, to reconvene at 10:45 a.m., in closed session.]

## **ANTI-CHAOS AID TO THE FORMER SOVIET UNION AND NUCLEAR PROLIFERATION ISSUES**

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HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,  
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES,  
DEFENSE POLICY PANEL,  
*Washington, DC, Thursday, March 26, 1992.*

The panel met, pursuant to call, at 2 p.m. in room 2118, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Les Aspin (chairman of the panel) presiding.

### **STATEMENT OF HON. LES ASPIN, A REPRESENTATIVE FROM WISCONSIN, CHAIRMAN, DEFENSE POLICY PANEL**

The CHAIRMAN. One of last fall's most heated defense debates centered on a proposal developed by Senate Armed Services Committee Chairman, Mr. Sam Nunn and myself, to provide aid to the former Soviet Union. We argued that it was in our national security interests to spend \$1 billion out of the defense budget to prevent chaos in a country with nearly 30,000 nuclear weapons. Congress eventually made \$500 million available; \$100 million for humanitarian aid and \$400 million to begin dismantling nuclear weapons in the former Soviet Union.

The Defense Policy Panel meets today to review the status of the anti-chaos aid program and to consider other ways to advance our interests in stabilizing and democratizing the successor states of the Soviet Union. We welcome the three witnesses that we have here today: Ambassador Richard Armitage, the Coordinator for Assistance to the New Independent States; Robert Gallucci, who will be here in a second, the Senior Coordinator for Nuclear Proliferation issues at the State Department; and Maj. Gen. Bill Burns, the Coordinator for Nuclear Dismantlement, at the State Department.

Today we would like an update on how much of the \$500 million has been spent and for what. We understand that some transportation funds have been used, but not any of the nuclear dismantlement moneys. We would like to ask why the process is moving so slowly and what further action the administration or Congress can take to help. Promoting our own national security by aiding Russia and the other newly independent states continues to be a very difficult issue.

Former President Richard Nixon recently revived the debate when he called the administration's efforts at assistance "pathetically inadequate." The panel is interested in learning any new ideas the administration may have to take advantage of the opportunity we have been afforded.

Before we begin, gentlemen, let me see if Dave Martin would like to add anything to the comments.

**STATEMENT OF HON. DAVID O'B. MARTIN, A REPRESENTATIVE  
FROM NEW YORK**

Mr. MARTIN. Just briefly, Mr. Chairman, because I am looking forward to hearing the testimony both of General Burns and Ambassador Armitage. To the Ambassador, I just want to say that during your illustrious career, you have had a chance to do some very interesting things. Of course, the most recent tasks assigned to you were the negotiations in the base agreements and the types of things in the Philippines. I really appreciate the job you did.

I hope all Americans appreciate the job you did, and I also appreciate the way you continually keep us informed as to what you are doing. I have had the opportunity to discuss personally with you what you are up to now, and I hope there will be more members here. I am sure there will. We have a couple other things going on on Capitol Hill, you might have noted in the papers, but having this good job that the President has asked you to do and the prior one, God only knows what he is going to ask you and your I.M. Force to do once you complete this task.

I know it is a Herculean effort, and there is nobody that has been appointed by the administration that I have more respect for than yourself. I look forward to the testimony, and I thank you, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you. We begin. Rich Armitage, do you want to start?

**STATEMENT OF AMBASSADOR RICHARD ARMITAGE, COORDINATOR FOR ASSISTANCE TO THE NEW INDEPENDENT STATES, DEPARTMENT OF STATE**

Ambassador ARMITAGE. That is great. Mr. Chairman, members, good afternoon. Congressman Martin, thank you very much for those special words. Let me briefly bring you up to date on my activities and then we can move to Major General Burns.

I reported to you, Mr. Chairman, the day I was asked to take this assignment, that I viewed my job as spending the \$100 million as rapidly, yet responsibly as possible. I think you will see we have moved out to try to make that vow to you a reality.

Secretary Baker, out of the Washington conference in January, announced an operation called Provide Hope. We flew 65 aircraft missions—using C-5s and C-141s—into 11 republics and 24 different cities. No one was trying to pull the wool over anyone's eyes suggest that flying in 30, 40, 50, or 60 aircraft was going to make much of a difference for the problems of the former Soviet Union. But Secretary Baker had in his mind at the time to try to jump start the provision of international assistance. I think the fact that 20 other countries played "pile on" and followed the lead of the United States is indicative that Secretary Baker's judgment was pretty good on this issue.

We wanted to demonstrate something else other than international interest to the problem. As I said, the United States flew to 11 of the 12 republics—absent only Georgia because of the security situation—and into 24 different cities. We were trying to demonstratively make the point that there was more to Russia than just Moscow and St. Petersburg, and there was more to the former



Soviet Union than just the Russian Federation. I think we succeeded in making that point.

We delivered 2,200 tons of food and medicines and medical consumables on those 65 flights. The operation culminated with two Soviet Antonovs flying from Rhein-Main to Moscow and St. Petersburg with the remainder of the food that was dedicated to that proposition. The cost to the U.S. taxpayer for flying those airplanes was about \$6.9 million. That is down, I might add, from the first estimate which TRANSCOM gave us of \$13 million. We are contemporaneously with Operation Provide Hope now planning for Provide Hope 2, which is the movement of 15,000 tons of excess foods and several hundred tons of medicines and medical supplies from three locations in Germany to all 12 republics. We have, of course, recognized Georgia now. We have established diplomatic relations and we are planning to start delivering humanitarian assistance to Georgia.

This movement of food, bulk food, mainly delivered by ship and by railway will be completed by mid-June. Additionally, we are flying in for, some of your constituents today, Mr. Chairman, high value quantities, using U.S. military aircraft and Soviet aircraft to various locations in the former Soviet Union. Some of your constituents had some goods they wanted to deliver to Dubno and these are being delivered by C-5 aircraft even as we speak.

The follow-on, though it is not particularly under my cognizance, is of interest to you. Two months ago we had an Agriculture Department which had \$165 million of grants to let for the former Soviet Union; they have let \$144.1 million. The remainder will go in a signed agreement, the details of which are being worked out with Russian counterparts in Washington here today. This aid will be in the form of butter and it will be delivered and then monetized to get a double bang for the buck. I think that is in line with what many of the members up here have suggested to the administration.

In addition to humanitarian assistance, I have responsibility for brain drain and defense conversion. Mr. Gallucci will speak specifically about the Science Center. Let me inform you that on the brain drain situation we are working with the Department of Commerce. We have approached U.S. industries and U.S. institutes of higher learning to try to develop a program where we will sponsor Soviet scientists here for 3 and 6 months periods of time. The U.S. Government would pay their travel and give them a small stipend, because we don't want to have a situation where U.S. employees find themselves losing a job to a Soviet citizen. We want the Soviet scientists to be here and be exposed to both our academic curriculums and our business management techniques.

We are additionally interested in seeing how they do business in the former Soviet Union. On Monday, we will be announcing a project which will initially have 150 Soviet scientists arriving here in the United States; and hopefully when our university program kicks in we will have another 250 to 300. So there are many aspects to the brain drain situation in addition to those that Mr. Gallucci will be speaking about.

Finally, a word on defense conversion and technical assistance. I think we have gotten ourselves in a bit of a rhetorical trap, Mr.

Chairman, talking about defense conversions. Perhaps I was on delegations several years ago to the then Soviet Union and might have contributed to that rhetorical trap. Somehow, we allowed the thought to exist in the minds of people that defense conversion was simply a matter of having a plant which went from making tanks to making sewing machines. That is just not so. It is not the way things work.

I prefer to look at defense conversion as having several other definitions. One of them would be employment or private investment from the United States or the West. Or perhaps the best single word definition of defense conversion is deals—Western deals which employ Soviet scientists or Soviet technicians who are presently involved in defensive efforts.

On Monday, Mr. Chairman, the congressional notification waiting time for \$85 million in technical assistance expired. We are in the process this week of signing different technical assistance cooperative programs covering the gamut from American business initiatives to energy conversion to medicine and the delivery of public health. We can discuss those at any length you wish, so I will content myself with that much and look forward to your questioning, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you, Rich. Mr. Gallucci, are you next?

Ambassador ARMITAGE. Take it next.

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Gallucci, you go ahead, sir.

#### **STATEMENT OF ROBERT L. GALLUCCI, SENIOR COORDINATOR IN THE OFFICE OF THE DEPUTY SECRETARY, DEPARTMENT OF STATE**

Mr. GALLUCCI. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. First, Mr. Chairman, let me begin by apologizing to you and to the committee for being late.

The CHAIRMAN. There were members here who were later, so don't feel bad.

Mr. GALLUCCI. I appreciate the opportunity to discuss our efforts to provide an appropriate nonmilitary research opportunity for weapons scientists and engineers of the former Soviet Union. I can report today that we have made some good, tangible progress toward accomplishing this goal. Specifically, we have been working to create an International Science and Technology Center that would help reduce the incentives for these weapons scientists and engineers of the former Soviet Union to engage in activities that could encourage proliferation of weapons of mass destruction.

Two weeks ago, Secretary of State Baker, foreign ministers of the Russian Federation and Japan and the Vice President of the European Community issued a joint statement in Brussels announcing a commitment to establish such a center. The purpose of the center is to serve as a clearinghouse for developing, approving, financing, and monitoring proposals that will engage these weapons scientists and engineers in productive civilian science and technology projects. The scientists and engineers we are particularly concerned about are those that have been working with nuclear weapons, biological and chemical weapons, ballistic missiles, and advanced conventional weapons technologies.



Over the last few weeks we have negotiated an international agreement with the other founding members in addition to ourselves—the EC, Japan, and Russia—and that agreement outlines, among other things, the structure of the center, the governing board, and the project approval process. I will be traveling to Moscow next week. Along with my counterparts from these other governments and collections of governments, the EC, we hope to accomplish at least three things.

We will be initialing and referendum the international agreement establishing the center. We will be meeting with weapons scientists and engineers to discuss specific project proposals that the center can fund. We will be visiting potential sites for the location of the center in or near Moscow. Our expectation is that the center will be up and running within the coming months.

To fund the center's operation, the U.S. Government, as I am sure you know, has already pledged to provide \$25 million from the existing Department of Defense appropriations. The European Community has pledged a similar amount and the Japanese have indicated that they, too, will make a significant contribution to the center. The Russian Federation has agreed to provide in-kind contributions to underwriting the center's administrative operational costs. We will also be pursuing broad international participation in the center beyond this founding membership as a means of increasing the center's effectiveness.

We hope that additional participants in the center will accede to the agreement in the first instance. We hope that others will increase the funds available by making financial contributions and, in some cases, joining as members of the governing board. The Canadians have already indicated an interest in participating in the center and in joining the board, and have indicated that they will make an important financial contribution. We have discussed the idea of expanding board membership and additional contributions with other governments and will be continuing to do so in the coming weeks.

After our meetings in Moscow, I will go to Kiev to discuss with Ukrainian officials and scientists opportunities for international cooperation to develop, approve, finance and monitor similar programs for weapons scientists and engineers in the Ukraine. Ukrainian officials have already expressed an interest in these discussions.

A word about the process associated with the center, if I could. Once the center becomes operational, these project proposals will be reviewed by an international body of experts that will be supporting the center. We will create and call upon it to provide professional judgment and assessments of technical merit and feasibility. Projects then would be recommended as appropriate to the governing board. The board would determine whether the projects meet the center's overall criteria, including an assessment about the extent to which weapons scientists would be genuinely engaged in civilian projects which provide value to the states of the former Soviet Union and possibly to the larger international community.

In addition, individual countries and groups of countries on the board would have an opportunity to judge whether the projects are consistent with their own objectives before deciding on whether to



approve the projects and, ultimately, whether to participate in funding them. As a member of the governing board, the United States will be in a position to ensure that a substantial portion of the project sponsored by the center do, indeed, engage scientists and engineers—the kinds I have discussed earlier—that are targeted for the program and also that the programs, the projects themselves, provide the necessary degree of transparency and access to facilities, personnel, and records and equipment, that is to say, the financial and programmatic monitoring, that is necessary to make sure that the scientists and engineers are doing what they say they are doing.

All parties to the agreement, including the Russians, have agreed that the center and contributing countries must have that right to inspect and monitor the projects that are accepted and funded. We not only want the board to have international participation by governments, but also by others, including the private sector and non-profit entities that may provide personnel, as well as project proposals to the center for funding.

The center should not and will not stand in the way of private companies that wish to pursue joint ventures independently. The center does not intend, and should not be intended to be, a surrogate or interlocutor for all U.S. private sector initiatives that involve scientists and engineers from the former Soviet Union. However, we do hope the center will receive project proposals involving private, nonprofit, public sector entities. These entities are welcome and encouraged to use the professional staff and resources of the center to facilitate contacts within the former Soviet Union, whenever appropriate.

In conclusion, we hope and expect the center to address concern over the potential for proliferation that would be created by the emigration of scientists and engineers with expertise in these special weapons technologies. The center should provide a unique opportunity to bring a number of scientists and engineers of the former Soviet Union into the broader, wider international science technology community. The center should serve as an important component in furthering our broad national goal of promoting peaceful, democratic and stable institutions in the states of the former Soviet Union.

I would be pleased to answer any questions that you may have about the center and our efforts.

The CHAIRMAN. General Burns.

#### **STATEMENT OF MAJ. GEN. WILLIAM F. BURNS, USA RET., CO-ORDINATOR FOR NUCLEAR DISMANTLEMENT, DEPARTMENT OF STATE**

General BURNS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. It is a pleasure to be here today, Mr. Chairman. I would like to discuss the administration's efforts in another area, and that is the safe and secure dismantlement of nuclear weapons in the former Soviet Union, and to provide you and the public with some of the facts and figures we have developed. I have a prepared statement I would like to submit that for the record.

The CHAIRMAN. Without objection.

General BURNS. Thank you, sir. First, let me just make a personal note. I came out of retirement to do this job for one very simple reason: I felt that this was probably the most important cluster of foreign policy issues that we are going to deal with in this decade. Over three decades ago I commanded one of the first 8-inch Howitzer nuclear-capable units in Europe. Over my military career I was involved in offensive use of nuclear weapons, even the negotiation of the INF Treaty. I think my sentiments, my concerns about finally dismantling the big threat that has been erased against the United States is shared not only by my American colleagues, but by my Russian colleagues also.

It was heartening to discuss in this vein these matters in Russia. As you know, in the last several months, the United States has been involved in discussing at high levels ways in which the dismantlement of the former Soviet nuclear arsenal can take place. I think the congressional action, which authorized up to \$400 million in the defense budget on these matters was a catalyst, which not only energized our side, but demonstrated to the Russian side that we were quite serious. So I applaud that action.

In February, Secretary Baker discussed with the Soviet Foreign Minister seven areas in which the United States felt we should proceed. These areas were accepted by the Russian side and as a result, we had a delegation in Moscow the first 2 weeks of this month discussing in great technical detail each of these areas.

What I would like to do now is summarize the progress we made in each of those areas. I believe we made significant progress. First of all, the problem of fissile material containers. These are the containers that one uses to store nuclear material, whether it be weaponized material or processed uranium, plutonium, and so forth.

The Russian side indicated that they need 45,000 containers, and this is probably a fairly accurate requirement. They need these for the transportation and storage of fissile materials, both weapons and material after it is processed. We discussed with them the best way we could help in providing these containers. We sent a U.S. designed and produced container over to see if we could just use these containers and found out we could not. The containers don't meet Russian specs for a number of reasons.

For Russian purposes, Russian containers are better. However, they were intrigued by some of the materials which we used in our containers. We are now considering the best ways to proceed. One option is to support the manufacture of containers in Russia with some parts produced in the United States. The other would be to produce a quantity of these 45,000 in the United States. The Russians are providing us with the design for their containers next week. I believe in a short time we can analyze those plans and determine what the best course of action would be.

Mr. DICKINSON. Mr. Chairman, at this point, I wondered, General, if you would explain why our containers were not suitable to their needs.

General BURNS. The Russian containers are smaller. When you are considering storing 45,000 containers, the size of the container is important. This has to do with weapons design basically in terms of being able to put their weapons in a smaller container. The other



problem that we ran into was that our containers, because they are used in the United States and designed in accordance with our requirements, were never tested against IAEA standards. The Russians tested theirs against IAEA standards, and there is a possibility this material will be shipped over international borders. Therefore, if we used our containers, not only would they take up more space, but there would have to be a testing process which would take time. So those are the considerations that we looked at.

There is another container we discussed, the so-called super container. This is a larger container, a shipping container in which you put the smaller containers for shipping purposes. We did not discuss this in any detail because the United Kingdom has already indicated publicly that they will provide 250 containers to Russia. We did discuss, however, providing Kevlar blankets. These are the flexible flak jacket material blankets which would be used as an interim stop gap measure until the British containers were available. The whole idea of this container is to provide ballistic protection—a certain amount of fire retardation in case of an accident. The ballistic protection provided by the Kevlar blankets would be significant.

In that regard, we are preparing a blanket now which could be used over one of their containers. We are going to test it next month with them to make sure it meets the ballistic protection standards and then it seems we should be able to go into procurement on those immediately.

The railcar issue. You might recall that we considered 25 U.S. railcars which are used for, or were used for the shipment of nuclear weapons and considered shipping them to Russia after modifying them to fit the Russian broad gauge track. We brought experts to Moscow, we looked at their railcar, we looked at the specs for the railcars, and we found out that there were more differences than just the width of the gauge. In fact, we found that the cost and the time it would take to modify the railcars, plus the inspection procedures they would have to go through to meet Russian railroad standards would be prohibitive in terms of making them available in a reasonable time.

We did find, however, that the Russian railcars could be improved in safe and secure areas by an add-on package. The Russians next week are providing us with the specifications for this package. This would be a package which would enhance the security and the safety of the cars, and it would be presumably made in the United States and shipped to Russia.

We discussed nuclear materials storage facilities. The Russian side indicated a desire to build a fixed, permanent storage facility for their nuclear materials. Their concept is a facility which is modular in nature, so it could be expanded as required.

It would be a high-tech automated facility that uses robotics and so forth. They indicated that their estimate was that this would cost \$150 million, and they would like us to finance it. We have been looking at this particular requirement in the broadest terms—both political and economic—and the Russians are providing us again, by the 31st of March, a feasibility study which they have just completed on this facility. Based on the feasibility study we will determine what parts of this facility we can support, and again



it will be an attempt to accelerate dismantlement and make sure the facility is safe and secure.

We discussed accident response. The Russian side was quite interested in our technology in dealing with nuclear accidents or incidents, particularly those involving nuclear weapons. We will have a Russian team here next month to look at our equipment. They have given us a list of items that they would like to have based on what we discussed with them. We will set up a training program for their use, and then presumably provide the equipment.

Another area of interest was a system of accounting and control. Now, we are satisfied that they can account for their nuclear weapons. But they are moving into a new era with a tremendous amount of reprocessed uranium and plutonium which is not weaponized, which is not in discrete little containers, but is processed as fuel.

We offered them the technical basis for setting up an automated system. They seemed quite interested and those discussions continue. This would be a system which would not just deal with weaponized uranium and plutonium, but all uranium and plutonium. We also began discussion on the ultimate disposition of uranium and plutonium. You may recall that President Yeltsin raised this particular question in February at Camp David.

The question of how one disposes of nuclear material now processed as nuclear fuel is important. The market would be absolutely destroyed if this were all dumped on the market in a very short period of time. At the same time, if it is stored for an indefinite period, the safety and security of that could be in question over time. This is an issue that is currently under discussion between the sides. We left the Russian side with a series of questions on their approach to the disposition and a proposed agenda for follow-on discussions.

These issues, I believe, are progressing well, and I was pleased with the amount of work which was accomplished in Moscow. I had seven working groups, 67 people involved. The Russian side was cooperative. I believe they want to cooperate in the dismantling of their nuclear weapons. As for next steps, I see some very short timelines. We have meetings scheduled in April, we have decisions on how we can help in these areas that I hope we can take in the next few weeks. I believe that we have a very high-level Russian commitment to provide those items and information, those studies, those reports that the technical level agree to.

I had the opportunity to talk to the first Deputy Foreign Minister a week ago last Monday and he assured me that these items would be provided. Now, as a final point, let me say that on my way back I stopped and chaired the U.S. delegation to the so-called NATO ad hoc group on this subject. We are carefully coordinating with our allies on this. We are exchanging information as to what kinds of support we are considering to make sure there is no duplication and also to encourage other allies to offer the kinds of support that the U.S. Government is currently willing to offer.

I can't answer the question right now as to how quickly we can spend \$400 million or what is left after the science center, \$25 million. I never thought I would be in a position to explain why we were not spending money quickly. I think we are spending money

adequately and I think we will have a good plan in the next few weeks. I think we will be able to apportion the money and move forward very quickly in ensuring that the dismantlement effort is accomplished in a safe and secure way. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

PREPARED STATEMENT OF MAJ. GEN. WILLIAM F. BURNS

Mr. Chairman, it is a pleasure to appear before this committee today to discuss the administration's efforts to facilitate the safe, secure dismantlement of nuclear weapons in the former Soviet Union.

As you are well aware, the breakup of the Soviet Union has posed new challenges and opportunities in the area of national security. President Bush responded to these challenges and opportunities beginning with his September 27 initiative. As part of that initiative, the President proposed discussions to explore cooperation on the safety and security of nuclear weapons and on their safe and environmentally responsible storage, transportation and destruction.

Our objective is to enhance the security of nuclear weapons in the former Soviet Union, particularly those tactical nuclear weapons slated for elimination under commitments made by Gorbachev and Yeltsin. These weapons, in particular, because of their relatively small size and transportability pose the greatest risk of loss of control or seizure by third parties. We wanted to take steps to ensure that these weapons were quickly disabled and consolidated at sites where they could be securely controlled. In addition, we wanted to put into motion a process for quickly dismantling them.

I agreed to come out of retirement to lead the U.S. delegation on Safety, Security and Dismantlement (SSD) because these goals and objectives are extremely important ones. As you know, we have been engaged with officials of the Russian Government since last November in an attempt to formulate a specific package of assistance. This effort has been aided by Congress which provided the President discretionary authority to spend up to \$400 million for this purpose.

Let me bring you up to date on the current status of our talks with the Russians. Following discussions between the U.S. and Russian SSD Delegations in Moscow in January, Secretary Baker on February 18 presented Foreign Minister Kozyrev with papers on seven topics that appeared to be promising areas where assistance could accelerate the process of dismantling nuclear weapons of the former Soviet Union and enhance their safety and security. These papers summed up our views on the current state of play and made specific proposals for discussion at a next round of SSD meetings in Moscow. In a number of areas, we proposed meetings of technical experts to try to reach closure on specific areas of assistance.

These meetings took place in Moscow over the period of March 5-13 during which each of the seven topics proposed by the United States was discussed. I am pleased with the overall progress we made. Let me review each of the specific areas we discussed:

*Fissile Material Containers.* The Russians have stated a requirement for 45,000 containers for the transportation/storage of fissile material and weapons components from dismantled nuclear weapons. Based on our previous discussions, we believed that U.S.-designed containers could meet this requirement. After discussions between U.S. and Russian experts, however, we have now concluded that production of Russian-designed containers would be optimal for their requirements.

This conclusion is based, inter alia, on the smaller size of Russian containers which minimizes required storage space, their belief that their containers will meet all IAEA test standards, and the presence of ballistic protection and other additional security features in their design. A decision is still required on where such containers will be produced. Three options are under consideration: production in the United States, production in Russia with U.S. financial assistance, or assembly of the container in Russia using at least some components or materials that have been manufactured in the United States. The Russians have committed to providing us detailed production drawings for their container by March 31. Based on this information, a decision on assistance can be made.

*Weapons Supercontainers/Kevlar Blankets.* The Russians have stated a requirement for 250 supercontainers for the transportation of nuclear weapons and fissile material. Because the United Kingdom has publicly stated its intention to fulfill this requirement, it was not a focus of our discussions.

The Russians, however, would like 250 Kevlar blankets to protect their existing nuclear weapon containers until more capable supercontainers can be constructed. Our discussions in this area proved to be very promising. We have agreed to provide



several prototype Kevlar blankets by May 1 and to test them jointly with the Russian side. Based on this information, a decision on the form of assistance to provide can be made.

*Safe, Secure Railcars.* The Russians have stated a requirement for 100 railcars to provide for the safe and secure transport of nuclear weapons. Going into our recent discussions with the Russians, we felt that the provision of 25 existing U.S. railcars that we had previously used for the transport of nuclear weapons was a promising area of assistance. As is so often the case, however, the "devil was in the detail." Based on information provided to us by the Russian side, U.S. and Russian experts concluded that the modification and testing of U.S. railcars to make them compatible with the Russian rail system would take an extended period of time, thus minimizing their value in the current Russian weapon dismantlement process.

We have agreed to consider a Russian request for technical assistance in the modification of existing Russian railcars to include additional safety and security features. They are to provide us with specific proposals by March 31.

*Nuclear Materials Storage Facility.* The Russians have indicated that the lack of a long-term storage facility for the fissile material removed from dismantled weapons is a significant bottleneck in their dismantlement process. We are committed to effective assistance to Russia that would provide for safe and secure storage of uranium and plutonium from dismantled weapons. However, assistance in the construction of a new, long-term storage facility will have to be resolved in the context of decisions on the ultimate disposition of fissile material removed from nuclear weapons, i.e., whether it should be placed in long-term storage or possibly converted for peaceful purposes and sold in the relatively near future.

As a next step, the Russians are to provide us with the feasibility study for their planned long-term storage facility by the end of the month. This study should allow us to assess in detail all major aspects of their proposed design including cost, physical structures and security.

*Accident Response.* In January, the Russians indicated a strong interest in discussing nuclear weapon accident response, particularly incidents which could result in the release of significant radiation. In our latest round of meetings, we provided detailed briefings by our experts. The Russians indicated a strong interest in acquiring U.S. equipment, e.g., diagnostic equipment to assess the condition of weapons involved in an accident, and in training in its use.

We agreed that further meetings on accident response would be necessary. As a next step, we will invite Russian experts to the United States next month to witness the demonstration of U.S. accident response equipment and to determine the utility of such equipment for use in Russia.

*State System of Accounting and Control for Nuclear Material.* It is clear that the dismantlement of nuclear weapons will present new challenges for Russia. In the past they have been concerned largely with item, i.e., weapon, inventory. Now they are faced with the prospect of controlling bulk nuclear material. We provided a briefing on the U.S. national system for accounting and control of fissile material, but we still need a better grasp of Russian facilities and systems in order to understand their problems and assess potential areas of specific U.S. assistance.

We left the Russians with a series of proposals for next steps including a follow-up briefing on physical protection of nuclear material and reciprocal visits to U.S. and Russian fuel fabrication facilities which we believe can be accomplished over the next several months. Following these steps, we hope to schedule follow-up discussions on possible cooperative arrangements.

*The Disposition of Highly Enriched Uranium and Plutonium.* In early February at Camp David, President Yeltsin proposed discussions on the conversion of excess fissile material from dismantled weapons of the former Soviet Union into fuel for power reactors. This issue raises important economic and non-proliferation issues and our preliminary discussions in Moscow only scratched the surface on these questions. In addition, this issue is connected to the question of the requirement for a long-term storage facility for fissile material. We left the Russians with a series of questions on their approach to the disposition of highly enriched uranium and plutonium, and a proposed agenda for follow-on discussions.

We are not yet in a position to make specific decisions committing part of the \$400 million appropriated by Congress. Our recent discussions in Moscow, however, have moved the ball forward to a significant degree. As I have noted, we have also agreed with the Russians on specific next steps with short-fuse timelines, particularly with regard to potential areas of assistance in the safety, security and dismantlement of nuclear weapons. Despite some fits and starts at the working level, I believe we have high-level Russian commitment to moving the SSD process forward expeditiously. Their ability to meet their self-imposed deadlines, however, will be an important test of their resolve in this regard.



As a final point, I would also note that NATO has now established an ad hoc group to discuss assistance in the safety, security and dismantlement of nuclear weapons in the former Soviet Union. This group will help to ensure that our efforts in this area do not conflict or overlap. We had a successful first meeting of this group on March 18.

The CHAIRMAN. General Burns thank you and thank all of you. Just for the division of responsibility. Rich, you are the one who is really doing the \$100 million worth of humanitarian aid. I guess Mr. Gallucci is doing the \$25 million worth of anti-brain drain activity and General Burns is in charge of the American part of the \$400 million for the dismantlement of nuclear weapons.

Mr. Gallucci's \$25 million comes out of your \$400 million?

General BURNS. That is right.

The CHAIRMAN. Let me ask each of you to give us a little more specifics on the progress here. Rich, when did you assume this office?

Ambassador ARMITAGE. About a month and a half ago, maybe almost 2 months ago.

The CHAIRMAN. In that time, how much money of the \$100 million has been spent?

Ambassador ARMITAGE. Probably closing in on \$20 million I have spent over the last month and a half or so.

The CHAIRMAN. It is one operation—

Ambassador ARMITAGE. The accounting lags a little bit, as you would understand. I have got things at sea, I have got them in airplanes and the bills come later.

The CHAIRMAN. Sure. But so far we have made one delivery, the Project Hope delivery. That was one of them. How much was delivered?

Ambassador ARMITAGE. About 2,200 tons of both food, medicines, and medical consumables.

The CHAIRMAN. That was essentially, as I understand it, aimed at the most needy part of the population. Is that not correct?

Ambassador ARMITAGE. It was aimed at what we could identify as the most needy. I wouldn't want to define them as such, but they were people who were primarily institutionalized. We did that so we could be assured of being able to monitor the delivery. It would have been a disaster if the American public had seen a delivery of American foodstuffs which was then diverted to the black market. Confidence would have been undermined severely, we thought, and further we wouldn't be able to encourage what we think is ultimately the answer, and that is humanitarian shipments from private donors.

The CHAIRMAN. As it says here, Operation Project Hope airlifted 67 planeloads of food and medical supplies to 22 cities, concluded on February 26th. Does that sound right to you?

Ambassador ARMITAGE. That is about right, yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Then it is essentially pretty small, of course, against the total population, but that was the first shot at it.

Ambassador ARMITAGE. But I think you ought to give us a little credit for what I tried to speak to, which was the geographic distribution. Very deliberate, very difficult, in places where no other countries have made any deliveries ever. There was a very big political component to that delivery and I can't put a dollar or cents leverage against it. I can't tell you how much it was worth than

to repeat to you what local authorities told us in each of these places.

The CHAIRMAN. Good P.R.. Let me ask where you see the program playing out? I mean, in terms of where we are now at this point. We are now in the middle of March. What kind of a timetable are we talking about for the project—the future distribution of humanitarian food? We are just talking food—

Ambassador ARMITAGE. We are talking food and medicines, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. I want to concentrate just on the food. The food needs to come during its most needy period. That would be the winter, or early spring, maybe even up until middle spring because of the lag in the growing season. Is that right?

Ambassador ARMITAGE. Well, it is right. But the food that we are delivering is food that when it goes to institutions, it stays, has good, long, shelf lives. We look at this as an investment toward next winter. They are basically through this winter. God helped us all with a mild winter, but our deliveries of food right now are focused toward needy populations that exist now and toward next winter.

I believe that my own deliveries of food are going to shift a bit more to the delivery of seeds and things of that nature. This is going to be essential as we approach the planting season to get them in a situation where they will be able to face next winter with some confidence, so that is the direction of the program. We are initially finding that because of our assessments and now our wide-ranging travels throughout the whole former Soviet Union that hunger, widespread hunger is not the problem.

There has been a general drop in caloric intake, certainly in nutrition, but this is not the catastrophe. With a good seed distribution system and a good harvest they will be all right, I think, in terms of food. The price of food now has come down a bit. It went up, as you know, in some products as much as 350 percent. It appears to be dropping a little bit. The real problem that we are finding, Mr. Chairman, had to do with the medical area. This is where you would have a systemic collapse if ever there was one in the former Soviet Union.

The CHAIRMAN. So your thinking now in the light of your experience is that the food situation—given the fact that it was a relatively mild winter—looks like it is a serious problem but not as critical as we had maybe thought originally?

Ambassador ARMITAGE. Well, I think that is perfectly fair. Their own statements basically make that point, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. But we have also got to be concerned about what is going to happen next winter in the food side. The medicine side, you are saying that the medicine side is more critical?

Ambassador ARMITAGE. It is very tragic. It is the one completely consistent item we have found from east to west in the former Soviet Union and in all of the republics. There is a lapse of such basic medicines as insulin, antibiotics and heart medicine. There is a great lack of all vaccines and one of our initial efforts has been in the delivery of vaccines. You will find that in the technical assistance area our efforts out of this first \$85 million which were avail-

able, \$15 million are devoted to getting the pharmaceutical industry back on its feet.

You will note that the former Soviet Union used to get its medicines from East Germany, Poland, Hungary and India. They don't have the same barter arrangements or trade deals that they used to have, so that is a very serious, serious problem.

The CHAIRMAN. This one you would characterize as more time urgent than the food problem?

Ambassador ARMITAGE. Oh, yes. The food problem, given the fact that it is a very agrarian society and that you can make relatively rapid improvements in production if you have some chemicals which protect the crops and things of that nature, you can radically increase the yield. I am not so concerned about that. It is the medical area which has bothered me the most and continues to bother me.

The CHAIRMAN. Look ahead, then. When this legislation was passed, these numbers were essentially grabbed out of the air—the billion dollars was grabbed out of the air. The \$500 million was grabbed out of the air, the \$100 million, \$400 million split was grabbed out of the air. What are we going to need to deal with the problem as you see it, the food and the medicine problem, what are we talking about?

Ambassador ARMITAGE. Well, I have just put a grade on myself. I told you I was going to spend that money as rapidly and responsibly as possible. I am looking to spend it responsibly within about 6 months. I would consider that just about right. I am looking to only spend it where I can leverage whatever I deliver to be sort of high value. I think that I will not consider our efforts a success if by, say, roughly this time next year our technical assistance in the international donor communities hasn't kicked in and gotten some of the pharmaceutical plants on their feet. That is the answer. The answer is not the delivery over the long run of these type materials.

I think if we continue to be in this situation where we need to make these deliveries, we are dramatically eating away at the fiber and the spirit of the citizenry of the former Soviet Union. So this is not a smart thing for a bureaucrat to say—that he doesn't think he is going to want a lot more money next year—but if we are back with another request for \$100 million to transport humanitarian assistance, we are not doing the technical assistance job correctly, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. So you anticipate no more request for more money?

Ambassador ARMITAGE. No, we have a bill standing in the 1993 foreign ops bill and other things which contain quite a bit of money. Some of it will clearly have to go for some emergency deliveries and things we don't anticipate. But I think if we are looking in the neighborhood of a repeat of \$100 million for transport, we will have failed in the technical assistance side. Whether you asked me would I like to have \$10 million or \$20 million for transport, of course. But right now I am telling you, if we think this way we aren't doing them any favors and I don't think we are putting the proper urgency into the technical assistance side of our own efforts.



The CHAIRMAN. Let me ask you this and maybe you want to answer this after further reflection. Is there anything in the language of the legislation that you think ought to be changed to help what you are doing?

In other words, let me just explain the question a little. We put this in the defense authorization bill last year and the defense authorization bill has to go through the cycle again. The question is, is there some change in the wording of the law that you might recommend that would—is there something in the way the law is worded now that prohibits you from doing the job as you think it ought to be done?

Ambassador ARMITAGE. No, and as a matter of fact much to my surprise the Congress in their wisdom, when you put this law forward, put a provision of notwithstanding any other provision of law, which cleared the decks for me. Now I am able to do everything I need to do with the transportation and the storage under the present language.

The CHAIRMAN. General Burns, let me ask you essentially the same questions, and then yield to my colleagues here. How long have you been doing what you are doing and how much progress have you made?

General BURNS. Well, I became involved 3 weeks ago and I really can't take personal credit for what has happened in the last 3 weeks since I had no direct control over it except to execute the policies. I think, however, the meeting in Moscow that was just concluded was a catalyst. I think we have moved well down the road to achieving our goals of allocating a good part of the \$375 million.

The CHAIRMAN. Can you say at this point how many nuclear weapons have been dismantled because of our aid?

General BURNS. No, it would be impossible to even guess right now. We are reasonably sure that the dismantlement process is progressing. We know that while we have had some hiccups with the Ukraine in recent weeks, they still assert that they will meet the 1 July tactical nuclear weapons deadline. There is no reason why we will not meet the 1994 deadline and there is no reason why—presuming ratification of the START treaty or perhaps even without ratification of the START treaty—we can't meet the START levels by the year 2000, which is a President Yeltsin commitment. It would be difficult at this point to suggest that any acceleration in dismantlement has taken place.

I think the sum total of the initiatives that are under way right now will bring about a safer and more secure dismantlement process, first of all, and second could bring about an acceleration. One of the difficulties, of course, is that we are dealing with a Russian federation that is brand new—brand new in government, brand new in learning or relearning how to work the levers of government, and every once in awhile you run into a little "old think" and then the next day you run into "new think." At the most senior level there is a definite and specific commitment to dismantlement and to do dismantlement as quickly as possible.

The CHAIRMAN. Senior level, civilian or military?

General BURNS. I am talking about senior level across the board—at the very lowest levels, at the level of technical experts—

there is a commitment to work mostly with the United States for a number of reasons. You still see pockets of resistance, though, at the middle level. Now, I don't think these pockets of resistance are necessarily throw backs. It is simply that when you have done business one way for a long time, it is very difficult to change your ways, and this, though, is a break on the process.

One of the things that I think is extremely important is that throughout this process we have to build in transparency, and I think our Russian colleagues understand that. Transparency is a new word in verification. We don't verify. This is not an arms control agreement, we are past that. But we are at a point where we have to be able to see, one, where our money is spent, and they understand that, and, two, we have to be able to gauge things like the rate of dismantlement.

We also have to ensure that commitments made within CIS are met because, as you well know, this legislation applies not just to Russia but to other republics also.

The CHAIRMAN. You mentioned the Ukraine. I think the experience with the Ukraine is what worries all of us about making sure that we move quickly. What we are concerned about is it could be a fast moving scene, and that at any given time, and, indeed, when we started out everybody sounded like they were perfectly willing to give up nuclear weapons.

Now, we see people are beginning to have second thoughts. People are going to use nuclear weapons to get into the business of bargaining about this or that, and all of a sudden they get geared up. So what is going on in the Ukraine that causes us to worry is that this may be symptomatic of what we will face—that people at the beginning are willing to say they don't need nuclear weapons but all of a sudden the politics of the thing change.

General BURNS. That is right.

The CHAIRMAN. So you want to strike while the iron is hot. You want to get the program going. You want to dismantle as many nuclear weapons or disable as many nuclear weapons as you can before somebody changes their mind. I want to urge all speed again on this front.

It is a different timetable than the one that Rich Armitage has. He ought to go faster, depending upon the need. But the need here, I think, is to move as quickly as possible.

General BURNS. That is right.

The CHAIRMAN. One final question. Let me ask you the money question that I asked Rich Armitage. If you were talking now about what we know in the way of the help that we need to provide to the Russian Republic, which we hope will be the depository of all nuclear weapons, and you multiply that out, going beyond the START agreement, which is what they have agreed to, what are we talking about for total costs there?

We are providing some help with storage with transportation, and some help in the technical, actual disabling and then dismantling. Given the experience we have in terms of the cost to the United States to get where we are going now, do you have any idea of the total cost of dismantling the Soviet nuclear arsenal down to the 2,500 that Yeltsin is talking about in the strategic area, or whatever other number?



General BURNS. Mr. Chairman, I don't think we have any concept of what it will cost. I don't think they have any concept of what it will cost.

I can say if you cost out all the initiatives that I described, it comes to more than \$400 million. Now, some of those initiatives, I am sure, will not cost nearly as much as our worst case costing.

As an example, if we built a permanent storage facility, as they have requested, from the ground up, the cost would be between \$150 million and \$200 million, which is half the money right there.

I think in the next few weeks, however, we will be in a better position to make judgments about what future costs might be.

The CHAIRMAN. Future U.S. costs?

General BURNS. Future U.S. costs.

Now, the question that we have to address is to what extent will we know their costs and will their costs be particularly meaningful. As an example, we talked to them about their estimate of \$150 million, and we found out that that was taking rubles and converting them into dollars; but rubles don't convert into dollars.

So if we intend to assist them in that facility, we have to do recosting in terms of what it would cost us to provide the assistance, not what it would cost them in rubles converted to dollars. So those kinds of problems still exist, and we are going to have to work through them.

The CHAIRMAN. You have not yet worked through all those numbers.

General BURNS. No.

The CHAIRMAN. So eventually you hope to have a total cost that would be for both the United States and the Soviet Union, and then proceed to figure what we might actually have to pay as part of that. Is that what you are trying to calculate?

General BURNS. What we are primarily concerned about, of course, is what it will cost us. But in determining the accuracy of that cost, I think we have to have some clear idea of what the total project is going to cost; that is correct.

The CHAIRMAN. Bill Dickinson.

Mr. DICKINSON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you for appearing here today, all you gentlemen, and Ambassador Armitage. This is the first chance I have had to speak to you, I think, since I visited—with other members of the committee—the Pacific Basin countries, the ASEAN countries, where we also visited the Philippines.

I want to publicly congratulate you on doing a great job as our principal negotiator in trying to extend our treaty there. I confess I was very surprised. We were there in November and we were talking to Mrs. Aquino about 3 years, possibly. She offered hope that perhaps the new elections in the Senate this spring would maybe extend that, and then the next thing we read in the paper is 3 years has shrunk to 1 year, and it was a fait accompli.

You had told them exactly what to expect and they went into it with their eyes open. Just as we visited Singapore recently, have photographs there of them towing the large dry-docks over to Guam, to the consternation of many of the Filipinos, I am sure, but we overthrew Clark at the time they were looting it, which was 2 days after we turned over the keys and it wound up in shambles.



They went into the black-market business selling roofing shingles, windows, window casings, doorframes, toilets. Everything was looted off that base and I don't know what will happen when Subic is turned over to them. But I think you did a good job and I think we made the correct decision, all facts being considered.

I want to ask you about our situation now in dealing with the former Soviet Union and the Russian Republics because it is sort of a mish-mash.

The Chairman led a delegation of this committee to the Soviet Union almost 2 years ago and I was very impressed. As we traveled through the countryside, you could just see fields that could and had been cultivated. I asked our translator, who was a young fella who talked to me privately as we were on the bus, I said, I don't understand why the Soviet Union has trouble feeding itself when prior to World War II you were an exporter of foodstuffs, grains, et cetera. You have the land, you have the peasants, the farmers, the know-how.

He said, well, the thing is, that under our system, when you harvest the wheat you can follow the wagons and trucks on the way to the storage silos and to the ultimate recipients of the grain by looking at the grain spilled on the side of the road. It just piles up as it pours out of the vehicles in which they are transporting. I said, why don't they get out and plug the hole. He said, well, you don't understand. The fella driving the truck, he doesn't care whether he gets there half-full or half-empty. His job is to drive the truck, it is not to plug the holes. He said over half of our produce here, whatever we are growing, doesn't reach the consumer.

Then while we were there, it was announced that the Soviets were going into the world market, buying \$12 billion worth of consumables. We could understand the need for it because we saw them standing in lines, full of empty shelves. When we got back to this country, we read where thousands of pounds of meat and other perishables that had been bought were rotting in the rail yards because they didn't have a distribution system to get it out.

So this is before we undertook to assist in this endeavor. So I can't help but appreciate the problem that all of you face in trying to get assistance to the people when they themselves were incapable, if they had the goods, of even distributing it where it was needed. You, in turn, have to go into this archaic, antiquated system and try to put something together to get what we need to get to the people.

Secretary Yeutter testified about one of the Iron Curtain countries. He said they didn't need money, they needed technology—they needed the know-how. They didn't have banks. Half of them didn't have telephones out in the country, so just throwing money at the problem is not the answer.

I guess what I am asking you is, do you agree that sending money isn't the answer? We have to be able to put something in place and to get things transported where they are needed and get something going in the form of technology that they have not been able to do before.

I wonder—I know it is sort of a broad-rambling statement, but I wonder if you could comment on it?

Ambassador ARMITAGE. I was interested in your anecdote about your discussion with the interpreter. A good way to put that probably is they are good farmers in a bad system. Unlike your own constituents, who are good farmers in a good system. I would say that 70 years of virtual economic and political bankruptcy has led them to that state of affairs.

Mr. Yeutter's comments, and others, are dead on when they talk about technology and technical assistance. But, technical assistance is a word we all throw around a lot. It means a lot of things to a lot of people. To some people it means debt forgiveness, credits. To others it means advisers on the ground helping increase efficiencies. To others it means schooling and things of that nature. To some others it means access to technology.

There is no question that, in terms of the agricultural system, the basics are certainly there. You have to increase the yield and then develop the political will to bring that produce to the citizenry and get the distribution systems fixed.

The infrastructure exists. There are roads, there are wagons, even though they may have holes. There are ways to do this, but there is no real political will to make it happen. It is changing and I am sure it has changed a good bit since you were there 2 years ago in that regard, but it needs to change even more.

We found even in Operation Provide Hope, when our aircraft flew in, no matter the need they found on the ground, they were met with a pretty consistent statement from local officials—and this is from Alma-Ata to Ashkhabad to Dushanbe to Moscow—it was no matter how hungry they were for the food or thirsty they were for the medicines, there was a real appetite for technical assistance to fix the systems.

They don't like to be on the receiving end. It is not the way they view their countries, it is not the way they view themselves. Technical assistance is going to bring them out of it, dead right.

Mr. DICKINSON. One final question before I yield.

You said that what we need to do is to help them help themselves. In terms of pharmaceuticals, their plants need to start reproducing or producing where they have not in the past. In a system that has been state run in the past and when perhaps they didn't have the technology or the plants and the information on how to do these things and were importing it, how do we, the United States, now go in and put them in a capitalistic system, or whatever we are doing, to restore their industry to do these things?

Ambassador ARMITAGE. Well, there are several different aspects to it. For instance, in the provision of vaccines, this is a relatively simple process. They just have to be provided with the start-up products. In one case—I can't remember which particular disease—it was the provision of monkeys and we are literally going to be providing monkeys which are necessary for the development of this whooping cough or one of those.

The basics are there. They need—

Mr. DICKINSON. Don't export any of our animal activists over there, will you?

Ambassador ARMITAGE. I will be very alert to that.

On the larger question of the more specific and, if you will, sexy, pharmaceutical drugs, this is a much longer-term process because



of the need for absolute purity and absolute quality control, et cetera. Those are the aspects where the United States and other Western donors can be of assistance. Because without the purity, the quality control, and some of those techniques, we are not going to be successful.

Personally, I don't believe that to get the pharmaceutical industry back on its feet we are talking about major investments of capital. I think we are talking about specific and targeted investments of some limited capital. A lot of money from the United States in terms of technical assistance and experts who are willing to stay on the ground with their colleagues in the Soviet Union long enough to make a difference.

I think they have about had it up to here with visitors who will come in for a month or 2 months and have a lot of advice, and, when it comes to picking up a rake or a hoe, they suddenly find they have duties elsewhere.

Mr. DICKINSON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Skelton.

Mr. SKELTON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I might share with the Chairman, members of this panel and our witnesses today, that I recently sent out a questionnaire answered by literally thousands in my district. Though this is not a scientific answer, it does give you a pretty good idea so you will know, gentlemen, that you are on the right track.

On this question of Russia, do you favor or oppose each of the following forms of U.S. aid to the Soviet Union? A. Emergency food and assistance, 84 percent favor, 16 percent oppose; B. Technical assistance, 61 percent in favor, 39 percent oppose; loans, 30 percent in favor, 70 percent opposed; direct financial assistance through grants, 11 percent favor and 83 percent opposed.

So you will notice in the first two—emergency food assistance and the technical assistance—that is exactly what we are speaking of today.

Let me ask General Burns with what degree of certainty are you discovering or finding all of the nuclear weapons systems in what used to be the Soviet Union, particularly the smaller artillery type?

General BURNS. First of all, the information we have is that the weapons are accounted for. Second, that they are in the process of being moved out of the locations outside of Russia and back to Russia. We have no indication that that process is not moving smoothly in accordance with their schedule.

Two weeks ago, while I was in Moscow, there were reports in the Russian press that there were two or three nuclear weapons that had been in Kazakhstan that had been moved out across the border into Iran or Iraq or some other place. We raised this immediately with the Russian Government. It is my professional opinion that the Russian Government did not lose three weapons, could account for them, and are very concerned about this accountability. So I have no information right now that would indicate that that is a problem.

First of all, where the problem could come is between now and the first of July as weapons are moved. Second, if we do not move quickly to ensure that the Russian Government has safe and secure storage facilities for the weapons until they are completely



dismantled and the nuclear material is rendered into slugs, slags or pellets or whatever.

Mr. SKELTON. Thank you, sir. I suppose this question goes to you, Ambassador Armitage. If not, pass it on.

Is any consideration being given to using the Army Corps of Engineers or the Navy Seabees to help build a permanent facility for the former Soviet military? As you know, thousands of them are living in tent cities now, is that correct? Do you care to answer that, sir?

Ambassador ARMITAGE. I have had preliminary discussions with some reps of the Corps of Engineers, not specifically about their involvement with demobilized or transient military, but specifically about taking part in some projects in the former Soviet Union.

We have also had some discussions with other elements of the Armed Forces, civil affairs personnel, for instance, about the possibility of their doing some TDY in the former Soviet Union.

Mr. SKELTON. I have a last question. I will ask the panel in general, and whoever wishes to answer it may offer the answer.

The Department of Defense is resisting buying Soviet high technology at bargain-rate prices. Is this the right thing to do?

Ambassador ARMITAGE. I think you are going to be pleased, if the thrust of your question is the Department of Defense should engage in some buying of technology. Mr. Atwood, prior to his departure on a trip, had been consulting with certain Members of the Congress about some of these matters. I think it is moving in the direction that you would like. There are things we want and my understanding is the department is about to move out on that.

The CHAIRMAN. Dave Martin.

Mr. MARTIN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Ambassador, I appreciate your testimony and in particular, I appreciate the idea being brought home that what we are trying to do is not just constantly prop them up with foodstuffs, but to try to get them the opportunity to grow their own.

The Chairman accurately stated it when he said that last year the figure was literally pulled out of the sky. It was most interesting for me to see criticism in the press as to not having gotten rid of that money and having spent it already. I think perhaps somewhere in there is a message that the former Soviet Union, as they merge to democracy, could come to understand that sometimes in America, unfortunately, we measure how well we are doing with a problem by looking at how much money we can spend on it.

When I hear people criticizing that you have not spent the money yet, I think it is time that you had the opportunity to come here and explain the situation. I applaud you for your efforts.

Now, we have heard rumors that the aid has in some instances been sold and that the money—the proceeds from those sales—has been donated to the needy. Can you comment on that situation, if that is indeed the case?

Ambassador ARMITAGE. Yes, sir, Mr. Martin. We are negotiating even today with Mr. Zhitnikov and his colleagues about the monetization of butter.

We have 20,000 metric tons of butter under the Food for Progress Grant from the Department of Agriculture. We want to monetize this, sell it in certain stores in the former Soviet Union,

in certain different areas. Then we want to provide the proceeds to people on fixed stipends—pensioners and students, who, by the way, also have the same problem as pensioners—and get what I call a “twofer,” double bang for our buck. You sell a reduced price product and then use the proceeds to help pensioners, et cetera.

This is very much in line with the desires of the Humanitarian Commission of Russia. So those are not rumors. We are moving exactly in that direction, but I must say these are very tightly controlled sales and they are matters of government-to-government agreements not lightly broken.

Mr. MARTIN. At the outset, it was pretty much focused here that the investment America was going to make in the former Soviet Union was that we are going to provide them, get them through the winter and do the other type of brain drain things and do the demilitarization and the like. The perception that abounded within the Beltway is it is our responsibility and we had better get at it and we didn't seem to pay much attention to what the other countries are doing.

What are they doing? Are they pulling their own weight, as far as Europe is concerned. How is all of this coordinated? We are not exactly dealing with an island nation in the Caribbean. We are dealing with a diverse group of people, different states, different cultures. How do you coordinate all that?

Ambassador ARMITAGE. First of all, I can't resist the opportunity to speak to the first proposition concerning if everyone is doing what they should do, et cetera. It seems to put a burden on us, or other Western nations, that it is up to us to win or lose Russia. I believe that is an unfair burden for you to assume, or for me, or for any one of us to assume.

In the first instance, we have a role to play, a helpful role, to stem a hemorrhage and help a nation come back to robust health and take its rightful place on the world stage. But to put on your shoulders or mine, or British or German shoulders winning or losing Russia is unfair, and it will be won or lost by the people of the former Soviet Union. They have ample reserves of courage and brainpower and patience, et cetera. But we should not assume that burden on our own shoulders.

No. 2, the problem of coordination was exactly what Mr. Baker had in mind by hosting the Washington Conference in January. We will have a follow-on conference in May in Lisbon to see how we are all doing. The purpose was, obviously, to stir other nations to take a greater part in the effort. But it was equally to make sure that each of us are not duplicating efforts, or that each nation is not solely concentrating, for instance, on Moscow or St. Petersburg.

I believe that through the series of working groups, which are internationally chaired, shelter, energy, food, medicines, technical assistance, we are able to disburse and maximize, if you will, our individual countries' abilities to provide assistance, be it actual goods or services or, in the case of the European Community, ECU money.

There has been a bit of a battle. I don't want to, it is not a diplomatic con, but I think many of our friends in Europe were, the original concept was to concentrate on what I referred to as the



Slavic nations—Ukraine, Moldova, Russia—and not spend as much attention or give much thought to the central Asian republics.

Mr. Baker sought to correct this—what he considered to be wrong thinking—by making visits early on to those nations and to establish very quickly—in fact, we were the first to establish diplomatic presences in those central Asian republics.

That situation has righted itself. The EC is saying that we were right to be spending attention on the central Asian republics so as to dampen the influence of radicalism, ala Iran, and try to increase the influence of moderate and responsible nations, ala Turkey.

So these coordination problems are somewhat cumbersome. But I believe that we are heading pretty much in the right direction. The conference in Lisbon in May will give us a channel to grade ourselves and, indeed, the world can grade us on how we coordinate it.

Mr. MARTIN. Fuel, energy, resources and distribution of production is a big problem, notwithstanding that they have their own capacity.

Is that something they are coming along with or is that going to be a long drawn-out problem as well?

Ambassador ARMITAGE. I wouldn't say they are coming along. It is energy efficiency. There is plenty of product. The problem is how to efficiently get it out of the ground in a way that conserves their resources and maximizes their investment.

Energy efficiency and market reform is about one-fifth of our focus in the technical assistance moneys. Literally this Monday we got the ability to spend that money after the congressional notification period was finished.

The CHAIRMAN. We will be right back, don't go away.

[Recess.].

The CHAIRMAN. Let me, before others come back, follow up with a couple questions.

Rich, you were talking about monetizing butter. Is there any other monetization program that you are thinking about doing?

Ambassador ARMITAGE. No, not with the amount of money we have available to us now. Depending on what happens with the CR in the 1993 Foreign Ops request, we certainly are keen to do this.

The CHAIRMAN. What are the advantages of doing it? Do you get a double hit with this idea?

Ambassador ARMITAGE. You have a product that is necessarily needed in the marketplace—butter, for instance—you sell it slightly below the market price, or you auction it off. You take the proceeds in rubles, in this case, and then you apply that to pensioners on fixed stipends.

So people who need butter get it at a somewhat reduced price. You then take the proceeds and increase the general public good for institutionalized people. Europe does this quite a bit.

The CHAIRMAN. Do you have a society or an infrastructure that can do this kind of thing? It requires a certain amount of ability on behalf of a bureaucratic structure. Is that there to do this?

Ambassador ARMITAGE. Sure, it is fair. You have to have monitors. People have to monitor it.

The Europeans, for instance, hire college students to go down and monitor and report, and that is how they follow up on how the



sales are going. Then there is a whole bureaucratic structure, for instance, in our program on how to monitor how much money is received and where it actually goes.

It is actually easy when you are dealing with pensioners to follow up and see if they got  $x$  number of rubles, did they get such-and-such an increase to their stipend. The real trick is to ensure the state stores who are selling the butter are doing it in the quantities and amounts that is appropriate. That is just a matter of labor. Labor by monitors.

The CHAIRMAN. You are paying these people for—

Ambassador ARMITAGE. Yes, you do pay them.

The CHAIRMAN. What is the overhead cost of doing it this way versus just distributing the food free of charge?

Ambassador ARMITAGE. Gee, I don't know the specific answer, but let me calm any fears you may have. We are talking about hiring the monitors. If you hired a monitor at 100 rubles a day, which is fine, we are talking a dollar. So it is a very cost-effective program from that point of view.

Twenty thousand metric tons of butter, I don't know what it costs. It goes obviously by sea and there is a cost to that. But the administration of the program is done by Russians in the Humanitarian Commission, and so our overhead costs are quite small, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. In terms of the distribution of the food, how is that done? What do you use as distribution centers?

Ambassador ARMITAGE. The Department of Agriculture now, as I indicated, is negotiating just which areas would best be served by the butter. We have our own views on where butter is in short supply. They try to be close to the views of the Russian Humanitarian Commission, who are now visiting in Washington, and I believe trying to come up for a breakfast with you perhaps tomorrow, or at least with some members.

Once they decide what areas would be served, it is a matter of deciding how often to monitor it and what sort of institutions will get the proceeds.

The CHAIRMAN. When I say how do you distribute it, not so much the city, but what is the mechanism? What do you distribute it through?

Ambassador ARMITAGE. In this case, I am quite sure it will go to state stores for sale.

The CHAIRMAN. State stores. In the butter case, when you are monetizing it, it goes through state stores for sale. If you are giving something away, what do you use for distribution points?

Ambassador ARMITAGE. Well, let us take a specific case. For instance, Provide Hope Two. Food which is bulk DOD excess food, leaving Pisa, Italy, and let us say it is going to Perm City in the former Soviet Union. I will make the arrangements, primarily by rail, to ship this to Perm City. At that city, the Russian Humanitarian Commission representatives sign a receipt for the food, they will be accompanied in this case by CARE representatives. CARE is under contract to AID, to assist us in monitoring the food.

CARE and the Humanitarian Commission will make the actual distribution from the dockside or from the rail side to the institutions to be serviced. CARE will then follow up periodically to as-

sure the usage rate—that food is being used for the reason it was intended.

It is quite a simple procedure. It is not difficult. I believe it is difficult if you do it the way the Europeans do it. That is, to put all their food and assistance into Moscow or St. Petersburg and then somehow trust that things will get distributed. We, in our provision of assistance, work a little more closely with the Humanitarian Commission to make sure it not only goes to Moscow but to areas far away from Moscow.

The CHAIRMAN. Tell me, General Burns, when you were talking about dismantling nuclear weapons as being your charter there. Does your charter also include dismantling nuclear propulsion systems, for example submarines? Is that part of the charter?

General BURNS. No, sir, it is not.

The CHAIRMAN. Would it be helpful it were part of the charter?

General BURNS. I am not sure it would be helpful or not. It seems to me that the project of helping the Russians move along quickly in the dismantlement process is a discreet process. I would not bet money, but I would guess that in the next 6 to 9 months that will be accomplished.

In other words, the allocations will be made, the materials will be under contract or already provided. If we are going to provide containers, they are going to be delivered in accordance with the delivery schedule and so forth.

The problem in dismantling nuclear propulsion systems—the problem in dealing with Russian or other republics' nuclear power plants—is a much different problem and a much broader problem. It is probably going to go on for a much longer time. So I don't see a direct connection.

The CHAIRMAN. How are those going to be dismantled? Is that a difficulty? Are the Soviets bringing down the number of nuclear-powered submarines or ships or something?

General BURNS. The Russians have not raised it with us as a problem but that does not mean it is not a problem. The Russians asserted, for instance, that they never had a nuclear weapons accident or incident.

The CHAIRMAN. Very unlikely.

General BURNS. Very unlikely, particularly when they ask for assistance and certain kinds of accident response equipment and so forth. So I think this is an area in which, as confidence builds, we may become more involved, but it is not in my charter right now.

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Gallucci, what percentage of the problem are we dealing with—this \$25 million to the institute?

How many people will that be dealing with?

Mr. GALLUCCI. Mr. Chairman, first, I hope the pile of money we are dealing with is maybe three times that. So between \$70 million and \$100 million, I think, is what we can reasonably expect to be dealing with.

The CHAIRMAN. You mean in the United States?

Mr. GALLUCCI. No no.

The CHAIRMAN. From all sources?

Mr. GALLUCCI. All sources.

The CHAIRMAN. Twenty-five million from the U.S.?



Mr. GALLUCCI. Exactly. Then, the question of what portion of the problem. If the problem is defined as scientists and engineers with this expertise across all the weapon systems—the special weapons I described, the nuclear weapons, biological weapons, and ballistic missile technology—that is a lot of folks, however you count them.

So we are going to try to focus, certainly, on those areas of most concern. In the first instance, that will be those with special knowledge in the nuclear weapons area. Not to ignore the others, but especially there.

Having said that, the question is how many of those are there. One has to carefully craft the answer to that question depending upon whom you wish to count. One answer is there are probably a couple hundred Russian scientists who are capable of really directing full programs, including the development of the special nuclear material, the design manufacture of the triggering mechanisms, propulsion package and the full system, and then, ultimately, deployment. Only a few hundred of those are really fully capable of directing a program.

Then, there are probably thousands of scientists and engineers who have hands-on experience in the design, development, and manufacturing of actual components of a nuclear explosive device who are at a few of those special cities like Arzamas and Chelyabinsk that we have already heard about.

Then, if you take scientists and engineers who are directly associated, in a hands-on way, with the production of the special fissile material of plutonium from the chemical separation, or the uranium from gas centrifuge plants, that number grows into the tens of thousands. If you take those who are in support roles to those people, then the number can get larger than that.

By laying this out, Mr. Chairman, all I want to say is we are going to have to focus our efforts down to the upper end of this pyramid. The scientists and engineers we are most concerned about, at least in the first instance, and try to make sure that these people who would be of most concern if they were to emigrate to other countries, that these folks have good opportunities for research in the civil area.

The way to measure success, is not really so much on the input side—how many have we employed—but on the output side, to make sure we don't find any of the people we are concerned about actually moving to countries of concern.

The CHAIRMAN. What are the total number of people you think that would be covered by this \$70 million to \$80 million program? How many scientists and engineers would we employ?

Mr. GALLUCCI. I am reluctant to pick a number, Mr. Chairman. I will tell you the calculation would begin with how much it costs to employ a Russian or CIS scientist, and that number we are going to investigate very carefully before we pick it. But it will be between \$1,000 per year and \$10,000 per year, probably closer to the first side of that range. Then we will be thinking, of course, not only of supporting them for a year but for 2 to 3 years, a transitional period, presumably in order for these laboratories to get into peaceful research.

It is very difficult at this point, not knowing what the breakout is between actual support for scientists and equipment that we



may have to purchase with this money for the projects we are talking about. We don't envision the projects to be heavily in the direction of equipment purchase. The purpose here is to support scientists of concern through scientific projects.

There is still a question about how that breakout would occur. Mr. Chairman, I have not done an analysis to calculate how many of these scientists or engineers we will be able to employ. Certainly, we are talking in terms of thousands rather than hundreds, but I really am not able to be more specific at this point.

The CHAIRMAN. Is the money that we are talking about just a 1-year deal? Or are you going to need \$25 million next year and the year after, if you have a 3-year program?

Mr. GALLUCCI. What we have told our allies, the Japanese, the European Community and the Russians, is that the \$25 million which we are bringing to the table was an appropriation with no commitment for an annual appropriation. Therefore, as governing board members, all of us must consider the initial contributions we make as the money available to us and we must plan to use those funds over the 2 or 3 years and spread that out for projects. That does not mean—if it turns out we have put together a fine center that attracts a lot of projects and it works efficiently, and we all believe ought to be funded by additional contributions from additional nations—that we would not seek that at some point. But our planning right now is based on the money that is made available from the start, which, as I said, we hope will be in the \$75 million to \$80 million range.

The CHAIRMAN. Let me ask any of you or all of you to comment on the speech that former President Nixon made and his general criticisms of our efforts. I think, "pathetically inadequate," was the phrase.

Ambassador ARMITAGE. Well, I will take a run at it, Mr. Chairman. It seems to me that on the one hand it was a helpful sort of reminder, a helpful statement which drew a lot of attention at one time to the problem. I thought some of the elements were not exactly accurate. The illusion or analogy to a Marshall Plan, for instance, I don't think is particularly helpful. I don't think it is particularly correct in this case. The Marshall Plan was a project that basically redeveloped, remade infrastructure in industrialized societies, societies which had been devastated from war.

The situation in the Soviet Union is completely the reverse. It has infrastructure, roads and railways and things of that nature, but it has no basis for industrialization. It is a nation which went from feudalism to communism and, as such, is totally *sui generis*.

None of us: You, any of us, has any experience dealing with it or applying any sort of conventional wisdom to it. What is in the Nixon statement, "pathetically inadequate" would have been terribly wasteful, like pouring water on sand, if you had not prepared properly with the Russians and with the other states of the CIS to be in such a situation to accept different types of aid. It would be very much like water into sand.

So I didn't think it was helpful because it put so much focus just on money as an answer. I tell you my strongest personal belief is that money is not an answer. Money can be helpful in stemming

a hemorrhage, but the answer is in the sort of longer-term and more rigorous involvement and the technical level.

General BURNS. Mr. Chairman, let me associate my remarks with the Ambassador's first so I won't repeat those. But I think it is important to recognize the psychological impact of what we are doing in Russia and the other republics. Here we are from their point of view the victors in the cold war and we are reaching out our hand to help them.

Now, this reach sometimes misses a hand clasp, sometimes there is a misunderstanding here and there. But, on the whole, in my short 3 weeks, I found them very receptive, very receptive psychologically to help. I think the closer we can get to them now in terms of understanding, in terms of cooperative efforts on almost anything, the better the chance that their experiment in democracy is going to work. That is what it is. Right now the vote is out, in my mind.

I think they are genuinely interested in dismantling their nuclear weapons. I think they are genuinely interested in reducing their armed forces. I think they are genuinely interested in doing something to stabilize the economy. They have some very vague ideas as to how that is to be accomplished and I think they are looking to us to give them the ideas, not just the money.

I think the money is earnest money. The money is good because it shows that not only are we talking but we are doing. I think it is very important that this kind of process continue.

Three weeks ago, I was on the outside looking in and I was probably prepared to jump to conclusions. Now, after 3 weeks on the inside looking out, I think the administration is moving as quickly as possible in all these areas. I think moving much faster probably could very easily upset the apple cart. We are dealing not just with Russia, but with other republics. We are trying to make this CIS concept thing work to make sure there is centralized control over those nuclear weapons as they are dismantled.

I might make one other comment on dismantlement just to make sure we understand each other. We are not involved—the U.S. is not involved—in the dismantlement of any nuclear weapon. The Russians are doing that. For obvious reasons, we do not have access or want access to their nuclear weapons because of possible reciprocation. What we are interested in doing is to make sure that their process is operated fairly capably, is accelerated, and is done as safely and securely as possible.

The CHAIRMAN. Let me ask about some of the specific proposal that President Nixon is talking about that we have not yet done. First, is the amount of money available for the currency stabilization fund, and then an IMF fund. Would that be pouring water on sand?

Ambassador ARMITAGE. No, not once, the Russians in this case, come into compliance with the IMF standards, et cetera. But this is a matter that the Secretary, the President and Mr. Brady and others have been spending a good bit of their time on. This is really heavy lifting. They are doing it. I think their internal deliberations in the administration are quite set now.

Mr. Baker has informed me it is his intention to come up and begin the consultative process with the leadership of Congress on



these matters. So I don't think one can criticize the general thrust of Mr. Nixon's comments on the stabilization fund and IMF. I think there is a question of timing. I think he makes light of what I would consider the need for a lot of consultation. That is not just with the Congress, but with the international friends, the other donors, the G-7, et cetera, et cetera, et cetera.

The CHAIRMAN. Beverly Byron.

Mrs. BYRON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Let me follow up on some of the questions Mr. Dickinson asked and also on the thrust of the questions you just addressed.

General Burns, let me talk a bit about the time frame that you perceive for dismantling the nuclear weapons and also the cooperation from the former republics, now part of the Commonwealth, that have control of the facilities.

Do you foresee problems in getting into those facilities, especially in the more rural communities given the communication problem from Moscow down. To let them know that things have changed and the facilities are no longer in their jurisdiction and they are open to investigation?

General BURNS. You have touched on a number of questions that I think are—

Mrs. BYRON. I am just getting started.

General BURNS. —I think are very important. First of all, I think our approach has to be to encourage centralized control. It has to be to encourage, to demand the movement of nuclear weapons, as per agreement, out of the other republics into Russia. The dismantlement and the conversion of the nuclear material into fuel in Russia, not in the other republics.

We have agreement to do this. I think other policies and our actions have got to continuously support this effort. It is quite tempting, I am sure, in the other republics, to use nuclear weapons, their transportation, their movement, and their ultimate disposition as a bargaining tool with Russia. I think we have to resist that.

In the last couple of weeks, on several occasions, we have resisted that. When we have registered strong objection, the other republics have backed down. I think it is going to be a continuing process, first of all, between now and the first of July, when all the tactical weapons should be out of the other republics and into Russia. Then between now and 1994, when a commitment has been made to remove the other weapons that are being destroyed per the Gorbachev-Yeltsin pledges. Then between then and the year 2000, when the START reductions and other reductions will have been accomplished.

So it is going to be a continuing process for the next 8 years and it is going to be a bumpy road. Now, how do we address that? It seems to me that we address that by maintaining strong, close, and direct relations with the other republics, particularly the Ukraine.

I will be going to Kiev in the not too distant future to engage them in this particular process—the process of dismantlement, the process of safety and security—not from the point of view that they should dismantle, but to give them ways of dealing with their problems in terms of accident prevention and so forth.

In talking to the Russians, there seems to be no doubt in their minds this was the correct way to go. There was a certain frustra-



tion at the technical level in that some republics, one republic notably, seemed to be using this as a political tool.

Mrs. BYRON. You were looking specifically at nuclear weapons. I have great concern about the chemical and biological arsenal in the former Soviet Union. At what point will we start to look at that and develop a time frame for addressing those issues?

General BURNS. I am not involved in that directly. However, I understand that those discussions are imminent and we have a delegation prepared to go almost immediately to Russia to deal with those particular problems.

Mrs. BYRON. Mr. Ambassador, let me follow along Mr. Dickinson's questions. In legislation that I drafted and had a hearing before the Personnel Subcommittee this morning, one of the proposals that we looked at, is that as we draw down our military and many of our Active Duty personnel are coming out of the service with eminently qualified expertise, they can be enormously valuable in rebuilding infrastructure in the Soviet Union and the former Warsaw Pact nations.

For example, Mr. Dickinson mentioned a Corps of Engineers. I look at logisticals, communication, health care. Many of our military personnel are very experienced in this arena. We also find many of them living in adversity. It is not at all unusual for them to be deployed not just TDY for a month, but for a long period of time, not just an individual that would go and serve for 60 days and say thank you very much, I have got to go now, but somebody that would be there for a year or 2-year commitment.

The thrust of my legislation is to create a Veterans Volunteer Service Corps that would not be in the executive level, but at the individual, the worker bee level for those individuals with that kind of expertise. They cited the cart that had the hole in it, but this is somebody that knows logistic and how to move supplies. The administration started to look at it, but has no comment as of yet. But it seems to me that we have a golden opportunity for many of our military personnel that are coming out of the service, not willingly, but are used to serving their Nation. I think we have a nucleus that could be extremely beneficial and extremely valuable and not cost an enormous amount of money.

I look forward to working with you on that concept, because I think it is one that has a lot of merit.

Ambassador ARMITAGE. Thank you, Mrs. Byron.

Mr. LANCASTER. Are you presiding?

Mrs. BYRON [presiding]. I guess I am presiding.

Mr. LANCASTER. Gentlemen, thank you for being here today and for your patience with all of us. Ambassador Armitage, I am one of the observers to the chemical weapons talks. In that regard, I have been active in working not only with our negotiating team in Geneva, but with the former Soviet and now Russian delegation. I am very concerned about the lack of progress on the Russians' part to demilitarize their chemical stocks. So in light of that, I wrote to the Department of Defense to determine what, if any, efforts might be made to use some of the \$400 million to destroy their chemicals, as well as their nuclear capability. I was, to be honest, disappointed in the response. It basically said we aren't going to spend any of it, even though the congressional language clearly

said nuclear and chemical. The reason given was that the Russians had not asked for any assistance.

First of all, it is my understanding that either they have asked for that assistance very recently or DOD will be receiving such a request very soon. If such a request is forthcoming and since a little bit of money might be very helpful in their complying with the bilateral agreement already reached, what will be the position of the Department of Defense once they ask?

Ambassador ARMITAGE. I do not represent Defense. I have plenty of opinions, Congressman, and don't mind sharing those with you. You are right about the wording of the legislation and you certainly can use it for the destruction of chemical capability. My own efforts, which are confined in this instance to technical assistance, have abounded some of the things you are desiring.

We are targeting the pharmaceutical area facilities—a specific facility which I don't want to go into in open session—but we are looking at trying to get that converted rapidly to actual pharmaceutical use, in fact as well as in name, and in that way to try to make a difference in the capability. I can speak only as having an opinion about what the response of the Department of Defense should be. It ought to be that if they are really sincere about trying to eliminate, downgrade, lower the chemical threat, then the Department should be very alert and jump on it.

Mr. LANCASTER. Does anyone else on the panel wish to comment?

Mr. GALLUCCI. Mr. Lancaster, I am not from the Department of Defense, but I have a view on this and some information which I hope is accurate. My interest in this comes from the perspective of the possibility of projects that might involve scientists or engineers who would be involved in chemical weapons and the possibility that in the course of funding the centers these types of experts might be supported so that their expertise does not become available to countries we would rather not see it become available to.

In the course of trying to sort that out, I believe I understand correctly that during the month of April, we are going to discuss, with the authorities responsible for chemical weapons disposal, their commitment to undertake this under the bilateral chemical weapons discussions with the United States. We will discuss with the Russian federation authorities the desired modalities and the assistance that they might require in order to accomplish this. So I think this is under active review right now. That is my understanding, at least.

Mr. LANCASTER. I hope that each of you gentlemen might, with whatever influence you have over the Department of Defense, urge them to use some of this money. The Russian republic, where I think all of the chemicals are stored, simply does not have either the financial or technical means now to do what they have agreed to in the bilaterals.

General Burns, you mentioned with regard to nuclear destruction that there is a British donation. I wonder if there are other nations that are burden-sharing on either nuclear destruction or if there might be a role for European countries to play in chemical demilitarization. Of course, they are more significantly threatened by the chemicals that are in the Russian republic than we are and perhaps other countries.

General BURNS. I indicated that I was Chair of a delegation on the 18th of March at the first ad hoc group meeting in NATO to deal with this very problem. We had several nations report on what their contacts had been or what their plans were. As I recall, there were at least three other countries in addition to the United Kingdom who had indicated that they had made contact or offered assistance or had a plan for offering assistance.

The amount of assistance, I think, is still up in the air in all countries except the United Kingdom, but I was heartened by the fact that we and the United Kingdom are not alone in this.

Mr. LANCASTER. Do you see any potential—though I know chemicals are not in your portfolio—for burden-sharing on chemical demilitarization?

General BURNS. I see no reason why it shouldn't be possible. There is a concern among our European allies and the other countries of Western Europe about the continued existence of chemical weapons in what was the Soviet Union, what is now Russia. I think this probably would be a priority with them.

Mr. LANCASTER. Again, not knowing the appropriate person with whom to speak, I call on you to suggest to the Department of Defense, at the appropriate level, that such discussions might begin with regard to chemical demilitarization. Likewise, another potential use of the technology is that there are U.S. companies that have proven technology in the field of chemical demilitarization. There does not appear to be any help forthcoming from the Department of Defense to serve as any sort of intermediary between the Russian republic and these U.S. companies. I think that even if we are not willing to put our money into demilitarization, which I think we should, at least we could be cooperative with U.S. companies that seek opportunities to market their technologies and perhaps their contracting or engineering skills to the Russian republic.

Anybody care to comment on that or just—

Ambassador ARMITAGE. I think that is right. If you have a specific in mind, I will take that particular company or corporation back with me.

Mr. LANCASTER. We have a couple who have seen me because of my interest in chemicals. Perhaps if you would tell me the appropriate person in DOD to discuss that with, we would do so.

Ambassador ARMITAGE. OK.

Mr. LANCASTER. I don't see any other members, and I have no further questions. Clark, do you—

Mr. MURDOCK. I have nothing.

Mr. LANCASTER. Then being the only member left, I will adjourn the hearing.

[Whereupon, at 4:17 p.m., the panel was recessed, subject to the call of the Chair.]



## U.S. POST-COLD WAR SECURITY IN THE PACIFIC

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HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,  
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES,  
DEFENSE POLICY PANEL,  
*Washington, DC, Tuesday, March 31, 1992.*

The panel met, pursuant to call, at 1:40 p.m., in room 2118, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Les Aspin (chairman of the panel) presiding.

### STATEMENT OF HON. LES ASPIN, A REPRESENTATIVE FROM WISCONSIN, CHAIRMAN, DEFENSE POLICY PANEL

The CHAIRMAN. The meeting will come to order. The Defense Policy Panel today begins a detailed inquiry into America's security interests and requirements in the Pacific. In the post-cold war era, regional aggression will pose the principal challenge to the U.S. military. A thorough review of the Pacific forms a critical part of the panel's broader effort to determine the forces we need to meet the real threats of the new era.

The Defense Policy Panel hopes to think through our next steps in the Pacific by doing three things:

First, finding our interests in the region, particularly the application of economic and military concerns. Economic issues already play a bigger role in our relations with the Pacific. The balance between the American and Japanese contribution to the world's GNP has shifted dramatically.

The second thing is identifying the threats to our interests. There is at least one clear military danger now posed by North Korea. We would like to review this situation in some detail, especially the military balance between the two Koreas. We would also like to discuss any other regional conflicts that might involve U.S. forces.

A third item we would like to cover is the kind of forces we need to meet threats we have identified. Again, we would like to pay special attention to the forces required to stop a North Korean invasion and regain any lost territory. However, we would also like to discuss the role America's presence plays in promoting regional stability.

We welcome this afternoon four witnesses from institutions renowned for their work on Pacific security issues: Jonathan Pollack, Corporate Research Manager, International Policy Department at RAND; Alan Romberg, C.V. Starr Fellow for Asia Studies, Council on Foreign Relations; Casimir Yost, Director, Center for Asian and Pacific Affairs, Asian Foundation; and Paul Kreisberg, Senior Research Associate at the East-West Center.

Thank you for being here.

Herb, would you like to add a few words?

Mr. BATEMAN. No. Welcome.

I ask unanimous consent for Mr. Dickinson's statement to appear in the record.

PREPARED STATEMENT OF HON. WILLIAM L. DICKINSON, A REPRESENTATIVE FROM  
ALABAMA, RANKING MINORITY MEMBER, DEFENSE POLICY PANEL

The issue of Pacific security in this post-cold war era is a matter of great concern throughout the world. I have lead two delegations to the Far East within the last 5 months, and have visited with various heads of state, defense and foreign ministers, members of legislatures, and our ambassadors. All were concerned about the continued role of the United States in the Pacific, now that the Soviet Union has gone away.

Our withdrawal from Clark Air Force Base and Subic Bay Naval Station in the Philippines has made the Pacific Rim nations even more uneasy, because of the perceived power vacuum created in this ethnically and politically divided region.

Communism may have died in the former Soviet Union, but it is still alive and well in China and North Korea—both of which have, or will have, nuclear arsenals.

Economically, the Pacific region is extremely important for U.S. imports and exports. As Dr. Yost, one of our panelists, mentioned in his prepared remarks, "annual trade with the United States and the Pacific is roughly \$300 billion, nearly a third larger than U.S. trade across the Atlantic."

The question of what the U.S. role should be in the Pacific, coupled with what is the appropriated level of U.S. forward presence in the region is an important concern politically, economically and strategically. I look forward to hearing how our panelists would recommend we shape our posture in the Pacific.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. We will hear maybe Cas Yost first, Alan Romberg, Jonathan Pollack, and then Paul Kreisberg.

STATEMENT OF CASIMIR YOST, DIRECTOR, CENTER FOR  
ASIAN AND PACIFIC AFFAIRS, ASIAN FOUNDATION

Mr. YOST. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I ask that my full statement be placed in the record.

The CHAIRMAN. Without objection, any notes, statements, records of any of the witnesses will be put in the record.

Mr. YOST. My name is Casimir Yost. I am Executive Director of the Asia Foundation's Center for Asian and Pacific Affairs, based in San Francisco, CA.

The Asia Foundation is a private, nonprofit, grant-making organization. The Foundation uses public and private funds to support Asian initiatives in the broad areas of democratization and economic reform and to promote cooperative relations between Asian countries and the United States. These funds are disbursed primarily through the Foundation's 13 representative offices in the Asia-Pacific region.

However, I appear today before you in my private capacity to offer my personal observations on the important topic of this hearing. My remarks should not be taken as representing the views of The Asia Foundation or its board of directors.

Mr. Chairman, I have recently returned from more than a month of travel throughout the Asia-Pacific region, with stops in South Asia, Southeast Asia, and Northeast Asia. I will attempt to incorporate into my remarks observations and assessments made to me by Government officials and informed observers throughout the region.

If there is a central message in my comments to you today, arising out of my travels, it is that there is a widespread view through-

out Asia that the United States is opting out from engagement, responsibility, and leadership in the region. This view reflects judgments about our official interactions, the willingness of our business community to compete actively in Asia, and the treatment of the region in our press and our politics.

While Asians regret what they view as insufficient U.S. interest in the region, they genuinely desire and hope that we will not withdraw from Asia.

These remarks set a context for my specific focus on the three questions members of this panel have been asked to address by the committee: "How U.S. security interests should be defined in this strategically vital, but uncertain region; what role the United States should play; and what should be the appropriate U.S. security presence in the area?"

Turning to the first question, the definition of U.S. security interests in the Asia-Pacific region, the coherence provided by the cold war and by U.S. global economic predominance is gone in Asia, as elsewhere. Containment of Soviet power was the publicly stated rationale for the U.S. security presence in Asia throughout the cold war period, though, in fact, our forward-based presence in the region was always intended to serve other objectives as well.

We are now in a more complex era. In the future, the United States will have extensive interests beyond its shores, but potentially diminishing leverage to pursue them.

Mr. Chairman, I noted that in one of your recent speeches you quoted Harvard professor Samuel Huntington. One sentence bears repeating here: "All in all, the emerging world is likely to lack the clarity and stability of the cold war and to be a more jungle-like world of multiple dangers, hidden traps, unpleasant surprises, and moral ambiguities." I doubt that Asia will be exempt from this general observation.

Before focusing on the issue of U.S. security interests in Asia, let me make a few observations about what I see as significant changes in process in the region and about broader U.S. Asian interests.

(A) Changes in Process. Bilateral relationships in Asia have become fluid. The Soviet Union no longer supports India, Afghanistan, Vietnam, North Korea, and Mongolia with arms, aid, and influence. U.S. bilateral relations have worsened with Pakistan, the Philippines, Japan, and China. Other bilateral relations have gotten better—the United States with India, China with Vietnam and South Korea, and North Korea with South Korea.

Some of these changes in state-to-state relations have improved the prospects for settlement of difficult regional problems, such as in Cambodia and on the Korean Peninsula.

The economic strength of Asia has been increasing dramatically over the years, as is well known to members of this panel. Economic growth rates in Asia far outstrip those of any other region of the world. What is new is the tremendous increase in intraregional trade and investment. In 1991, for example, Japan traded more with Asia than with the United States, for the first time. New economic zones have been created that ignore national borders and, frequently, governmental animosities. One example is



Guangdong Province in Southern China, which has significant Hong Kong and Taiwanese investments.

Yet another important change in Asia is the degree to which Asian nations and peoples are grappling with difficult issues of governance. A number of countries are taking important steps toward the growth of more democratic processes and institutions in the region. However, there are also impending generational leadership changes in a number of Asian countries that could bring significant instability. Asia is also experiencing internal ethnic and religious differences similar to those now affecting other parts of the world.

(B) U.S. Interests in Asia. Clearly these developments have implications for broad U.S. interests in the region. We have reason to welcome and encourage Asian moves toward democracy, recognizing that the challenges to democratic governance remain significant in a region with its own special traditions and history.

The United States has vital economic links with Asian nations. Annual two-way trade across the Pacific is roughly \$300 billion, one-third larger than our trade across the Atlantic. We export almost as much to Japan as to the United Kingdom, Germany, and France combined. We export more to Indonesia than to all of Eastern Europe. We export more to Singapore than to Spain or Italy.

U.S. companies have made significant investments in Asia. The United States, in turn, relies heavily on Asian—particularly Japanese—investment and capital flows.

The U.S.-Japanese economic relationship is clearly our most important in the Asia-Pacific region. Japan produces roughly 65 percent of Asia's GNP. Japan is the largest U.S. overseas trading partner, taking roughly 20 percent of our agricultural exports and over \$48 billion in total U.S. exports last year.

While U.S. economic ties across the Pacific are significant, they are also an important source of friction. The largest U.S. trade deficits are essentially deficits with Asian countries. U.S. complaints about alleged closed Asian markets and unfair trade practices are well known. Asians, in turn, complain about what they say is endless U.S. hectoring on these issues and our refusal to ever be satisfied.

Partially lost in this debate is the degree to which the United States is not competing economically in Asia. For example, in 1980, direct investment by American companies in ASEAN nations was approximately \$5 billion, compared to Japan's \$7 billion. In 1989, the comparable figures were \$10 billion for the United States and \$23 billion for Japan. The United States is also far outstripped by Japan as a donor of foreign assistance in Asia.

There is at least the possibility of a potent Asian economic bloc developing over time that would exclude the United States, particularly as a reaction to "blocs" that might form or be forming in Europe and North America.

(C) U.S. Security Interests in Asia. Clearly there is much good news for the United States on this topic. The collapse of the Soviet Union has not only removed a serious competitive actor from the region, but has also made it highly unlikely that any regional conflict in Asia could escalate to global dimensions.

This said, the region poses a highly complex security environment for the United States in the post-cold war era.

Asia is a region of very uneasy neighbors. Six out of nine of the largest armies in the world are in Asia (China, India, Vietnam, North Korea, South Korea, and Pakistan). At least four countries in Asia have nuclear weapons and/or ballistic missile delivery systems, or are well on the way to acquiring them (China, India, Pakistan, and North Korea). There is a significant conventional weapons buildup in the process in a number of Asian nations. The potential for serious confrontation exists on the North-South Korean border, on the India-Pakistan border, and to a lesser extent, on the India-China border. There are potentially serious territorial disputes in the South China Sea. China is an imponderable as a nuclear armed state with regional aspirations and potentially serious differences with the people of Taiwan. Internal instability, as leadership changes occur, could spread from China, Burma, Indonesia, or North Korea.

The "Japan issue" is of concern to many Asian leaders. Japan has been limited by its constitution and by popular sentiment in its military buildup. Most countries in the region fear increased Japanese military capabilities and security reach. The U.S.-Japan security treaty has permitted Japan to limit its defense efforts. The treaty's durability is the focus of significant interest among Japan's neighbors.

The Japanese express concern about a possible withdrawal of the U.S. security umbrella and about the proliferation of ballistic missiles and nuclear weapons in Asia.

Mr. Chairman, against this background let me define what I think our security interests are in the Asia Pacific region.

I agree with Secretary of Defense Dick Cheney's statement in his annual report to the President and the Congress this year, "We want to ensure that other powers do not dominate critical regions of the world." The Asia-Pacific region is clearly such a region. I agree, provided we do not think that it is our mission to dominate these regions. In Asia we can serve a useful balancing role.

It is important, therefore, to prevent a power vacuum from developing that a regional power might be tempted or scared into filling, perhaps to the detriment of our interests.

We have an interest in limiting the growth of conventional military arsenals in Asia, together with stopping the expansion of states capable of producing nuclear weapons and long-range delivery systems.

We have an interest in the settlement of bilateral differences that could escalate into armed conflicts.

We have an interest in the smooth and unimpeded flow of commerce to and from Asia and within the region. The expansion of economic ties within the region makes conflict less likely.

Finally, but importantly, we have an interest in the continuing growth of democratic institutions and processes throughout Asia, both because we, as Americans, are committed to democracy and because the spread of democracy to more nations in Asia will help to reduce the likelihood of war.

These are our security interests in the Asia-Pacific region. It is, of course, clear that we can neither pursue nor achieve them, act-



ing alone. We must work cooperatively with our friends in the region.

Mr. Chairman, the committee next asked that the panel address the question of what role the United States should play in pursuing our Asian interests.

We should remain in Asia only as long as it is in our interest to do so. This is not a favor we are doing our Asian friends. We should stay because a precipitous departure would foster the very instabilities and rivalries that we hope to avoid. We should stay because the health of our economy depends on secure trade with Asia. Finally, we should stay because in Asia, as elsewhere, there is a real chance that the values of political pluralism, which we support, will take hold, and we should help them do so.

The place to begin in answering the panel's question is to listen to what Asian leaders and opinionmakers are saying. Asians express two broad concerns about the United States. The first is that as the world's only superpower, we will be arrogant and overbearing. They point to our approach to trade issues and the manner in which we sometimes press them on environmental, human rights, and democracy issues.

The second broad Asian concern is that with the cold war over, we will pack up and go home. Increasingly, the latter is the greater worry in many Asian capitals.

Asians are confused about U.S. policy intentions and goals. They are increasingly apprehensive about the U.S. ability and willingness to stay constructively engaged globally and in Asia. They believe our national attention is so focused on domestic concerns or on foreign policy priorities in Europe and the Middle East that we are letting important interests and relationships in Asia suffer. They are particularly concerned about the deterioration in the U.S.-Japan relationship. They increasingly believe that the United States offers a less attractive model, given our inability to solve our domestic economic, social, and governance problems.

Asians would like it otherwise. They want us to revive our economy and stay engaged internationally. They do not want us to leave Asia. They want our investments and security umbrella. They want us present as a hedge against Japan or China.

Mr. Chairman, if one takes these views seriously, and I do, then it seems to me, given our interests in the Asia-Pacific region, that it is vital that we continue to play a significant security role in Asia. I will come to the question of how much is enough in response to the panel's last question.

I do believe, however, that we must, for the present and foreseeable future, remain committed to a forward-based security presence in Asia, and that we must maintain, to the extent possible, the bilateral security and access arrangements we have developed in the region.

It is important that we do so not just because it is in our present interest, but also because it is difficult to go back to any place we have left. For example, it is doubtful we will ever re-create our significant military presence in the Philippines.

We must, as well, continue the excellent work underway to reduce sources of tension on the Korean Peninsula, in Cambodia, and between India and Pakistan. Mr. Chairman, ultimately the



strength of the U.S. force in Asia will be a function of many factors, including our budget constraints, alternative U.S. security priorities, and the continuing receptivity of Asian nations to our presence in the region.

The U.S. presence should not be a function of our trade frictions with individual Asian nations. Nor should our commitment be linked to the level of host country support for our presence, though it is reasonable for the United States to press for strong support.

Rather, to repeat my earlier comment, we should remain in Asia only as long as it is in our interest to do so.

How much is enough? The Bush administration submitted a report to Congress in February 1991 entitled "A Strategic Framework for the Asian Pacific Rim: Looking Toward the 21st Century," outlining the administration's East Asia Strategy Initiative (EASI). It identified cuts of from 10 to 12 percent of the total 135,000 U.S. forces forward deployed to foreign countries in Asia, to occur by December 1992. It pointed the way to additional cuts in future years as conditions warrant.

Former Assistant Secretary of Defense, Henry Rowen, has described EASI as a "decline path." The drawdown in U.S. force levels in Asia has begun. The impending closure of the last of our Philippines bases represents an important step in this process.

Clearly our presence in Asia is in transition, but transition to what? It is important to make a distinction between current uncertainties and potentially positive developments in the future.

A true reconciliation between North and South Korea would eliminate an important rationale for a continuing U.S. presence on the Korean Peninsula. Leadership changes in China will influence the need for a substantial U.S. military presence in Asia. These are but two evolving situations that bear watching.

While modest downward adjustments in our forward-based force presence in Asia are justified, significant drops, at this time, would be unwise. The administration appears to be on roughly the right "decline path."

We should, however, be candid about the dilemma the United States now faces. Given the closure of our Philippine bases, our declining relative economic strength, and limited aid disbursements, the United States faces the prospect of diminished leverage and influence in Asia. It is hard to persuade many Asians who listen to our domestic debates that there remains a genuine, long-term U.S. commitment to the security of our friends in Asia. This general Asian perception, as much as actual U.S. force levels, could adversely affect our interests in Asia in the future.

Ultimately, we will have to prepare for a different future. We are now asked to play an important balancing role in Asia that in time may no longer be appropriate. Given the resistance in the region to the major regional powers—China, Japan, and India—playing significant security roles beyond their borders, it is well for us to begin to look for possible alternatives.

Given Asia's vast size and heterogeneity and lack of any unified Asian view of a security threat, no NATO-like security structure has been possible in the region. Indeed, the United States and Japan have opposed multilateral approaches to meeting security challenges in Asia.

There are practical impediments to the use of the United Nations in the region. Though it is playing a constructive role in Cambodia, China's presence on the U.N. Security Council could inhibit effective action in a crisis if Beijing's interests were directly involved.

Further, Japan's hesitancy about joint peacekeeping operations could also affect the effectiveness of U.N. action in Asia.

However, given the existing and emerging security challenges in Asia, it appears timely to put aside these reservations. We should revisit our opposition to the creation of regional collective security arrangements. At a minimum, we should begin to promote a general Asian-American dialog on security challenges in the region, and on ways they might best be addressed.

In this way, it may be possible for the United States to assist in fostering healthy institutions and associations which may, in time, make our continuing sizeable military presence in Asia unnecessary to the security and stability of the region and to the pursuit of our interests.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you, Cas.

Let me next call on Mr. Romberg.

#### STATEMENT OF ALAN ROMBERG, C.V. STARR FELLOW FOR ASIA STUDIES, COUNCIL ON FOREIGN RELATIONS

Mr. ROMBERG. Mr. Chairman, Pat Buchanan tells us: "Our war, the cold war is over. Time for America to come home." He says: "Americans need to start asking basic questions before barging into other people's neighborhoods and involving ourselves in other people's quarrels. First among them: why is this our problem?"

He says America cannot dictate the shape of the world to come and calls not only for an end to all foreign aid, but an end to our alliances in Europe, Asia, and Latin America. He asks rhetorically why we are defending Germany and Japan while they steal our markets.

Pentagon planners, on the other hand, tell us: "While the United States cannot become the world's 'policeman,' by assuming responsibility for righting every wrong, we will retain the preeminent responsibility for addressing selectively those wrongs which threaten not only our interests, but those of our allies or friends, or which could seriously unsettle international relations."

They say we must prevent any other nation from challenging our leadership or seeking to overturn the established political and economic order. They see regional military threats as a primary American concern. They view the integration of Germany and Japan into a U.S.-led system of collective security and the creation of a democratic "zone of peace" as being among the most important post-war U.S. victories. This system, and those objectives, they argue, should be reinforced, not abandoned.

In important ways, these positions—including their corollaries in terms of America's international economic goals and style of interaction—frame the argument and represent salvos in the great national debate over America's role in a post-cold war world.

In practical terms, the outcome of the defense budget battles between you and your Senate colleagues, on the one hand, and the administration, on the other, will importantly influence the outcome of the larger debate. But we are truly at a moment of sea



change in the world, and the stakes deserve more considered deliberation than tugging and hauling over particular weapons systems or even regarding the overall defense budget. We need to examine in great depth our national interests and purposes and our role in the world. I therefore appreciate your having the vision to step back to consider our overall policy in Asia and the opportunity to participate in that discussion.

East Asia is, of course, a region of the highest priority for the United States. Not only have three major wars in this century started there, but our economic interests are enormous. Two-way trade, for example, was \$316 billion in 1991, exceeding two-way trade with Western Europe by \$95 billion, or over 40 percent. No one needs to be reminded that it is the economically most dynamic region in the world.

Even though our overall commercial investment in the region has remained rather flat in recent years, while that of Japan, Taiwan, South Korea, and others has been rising rapidly, the sheer volume of our interaction in East Asia gives us a great stake in developments there.

Our interests are, of course, not only commercial, but are deeply engaged in promoting cooperation in coping with such transnational issues as terrorism, drug trafficking, the environment, and nuclear and missile proliferation. We don't need to be zealots to believe that promotion of our values is important, or that containing regional tensions from developing into large-scale conflict is in our interest.

Some will object that these notions raise a straw man. While Pat Buchanan has obviously struck a responsive chord, it is very clear that his call to "Come home, America" is rejected in its extreme form by most Americans. The United States is not going to dismantle its Armed Forces or its alliances; we are only going to prune them to post-cold war, post-Evil Empire size.

No one could effectively—or for long—block our access through the critical maritime straits in Asia or pose any but the most fleeting challenge to our shipping. Most of the problems we will face are not susceptible of military solutions anyway. So why do we need to maintain forces in Asia? Who's the threat?

I think this is the wrong question. In East Asia, at least, and perhaps elsewhere, the issue is not a black and white question of "who's the threat," but a much more subtle one: "What are our interests and objectives and how can we best serve them?" My approach is based on the belief that we have a strong interest in maintaining peace and stability. While the Pentagon draft guidance was overdrawn, we do have a critical stabilizing or balancing role to play, not in the 19th century sense of aligning ourselves with one power to balance off another, but in working to prevent the creation of a situation in which any single national achieves—or seeks—dominance, thus setting off a chain reaction of responses by other nations who will not allow that to happen.

This American role can obviously be carried out with fewer forces than heretofore, over time with substantially fewer forces. But in my judgment it still requires a visible forward presence.

Outside of the Korean Peninsula, where the potential threat has been clearly identified, the issue is not which nation is our adver-



sary, but rather it is that a U.S. withdrawal—and at some point reductions equate in political terms to withdrawal—that a U.S. withdrawal could well lead one or more nations to determine there is either an opportunity or a need to fill the vacuum. Many nations worry it would be Japan. Others fear China. Korea is on someone's list. So is Indonesia. India. Vietnam. Still—Russia.

I am not naive enough to believe that by remaining a visible and engaged presence, we will stop others from strengthening their own military forces. But I do believe we can have some influence, first, in restraining that growth in both quantitative and qualitative terms, and, second, in maintaining a climate that persuades others they do not need to act preemptively to counter the presumed ambitions of someone else.

Only some 6 percent of U.S. forces have been deployed in East Asia and the Western Pacific in recent years, and only 17 percent “dedicated” to the region. Under DOD’s 1990 East Asia Strategy Initiative, 10 to 12 percent of the forces in the region are to be withdrawn by the end of 1992, and an unspecified but presumably substantial further number of those forces will be removed over the remainder of the decade. Mount Pinatubo and the Philippine Senate have already accelerated that pace of the drawdown. Even in Korea, if the North Korean nuclear issue is resolved (as I am stubbornly hopeful it will be), I believe one could remove half the ground forces and bring overall U.S. force levels down to 20,000 to 25,000—from 43,000 in 1990—within 5 years.

It is noteworthy that virtually all of the nations of the region—including, I would argue, even North Korea—see utility in a continuing U.S. military presence. This is not a defining reason to stay there, but it is a key factor in analyzing the environment and the potential for gaining cooperation from those nations which could facilitate maintaining a reduced presence at reduced cost.

What we would actually do in any given contingency, other than Korea, is not very clear. If there were serious fighting over the conflicting claims to atolls in the South China Sea, would we engage? Probably not, except to the extent we needed to protect innocent shipping or the fighting threatened to spill over to a general conflict affecting our friends and allies.

Would we intervene if the PRC applied military pressure against Taiwan, even short of an invasion? I don’t know. We would not want to get back into the middle of that relationship, but depending on the circumstances that gave rise to the crisis, we might well want to have some options that a forward presence would give us.

In my judgment, we would be remiss if we had not at least given a sense of how seriously we were committed to a peaceful environment in Asia by maintaining a visible capacity to back up our words. Our experience in the late 1940s and early 1950s should be instructive.

I am not advocating any particular course of action in these or other cases. All I am trying to do is to say that we have broad interests, some of them largely economic, others with a significant political or even direct security component, and that I believe we need to keep in mind that the end of the cold war has not made the world totally safe and secure. Indeed, what it may have done, as we have tragically seen in Europe and the Gulf, is make the

world safer for devastating conventional conflict in regions that were heretofore held in a disciplined peace by the East-West confrontation.

Japan is the most important and, in certain ways, most difficult case. Our alliance with Japan has been viewed by many people strictly as a military pact dedicated to containing Soviet expansionism. Some people believe we pulled our punches in economic negotiations with Tokyo over the years for the sake of the larger alliance relationship. Though I think this view is exaggerated, we have, in fact, conducted ourselves in a way that has sought to contain economic disputes rather than allowing them to breach a "firebreak" and to affect the political/security alliance ties.

But one ought to take note of the fact that many Japanese have the mirror-image complaint, that their government yielded too much in order to pacify their senior alliance partner in Washington.

In any case, while the U.S.-Japan alliance does have a security core, that core has relevance not only to offsetting Moscow's still sizeable force in Asia, but at least equally to giving substance to our defense commitment to South Korea and to the maintenance of a broader regional peace. Even more fundamental, the alliance, not anti-Sovietism, represents the political glue that binds our nations together. It reflects shared interests, shared goals, and all the rhetoric about differences notwithstanding, shared values. By its own terms, it is also the foundation of our extraordinary economic relationship.

Mr. Chairman, I can think of nothing—nothing—that would be more destabilizing to the situation throughout East Asia, or more inimical to U.S. interests there, than a rending or even serious weakening of the U.S.-Japan alliance.

Does that mean we need 55,000 or 50,000 or 45,000 forces there, especially when the crowding of so many of them onto Okinawa is the source of daily friction with local residents? No, of course not. But beyond the fact that it is less expensive to maintain those forces there than anywhere else in light of Japan's shouldering of a substantial part of the costs, a meaningful forward-deployed presence enables us to move quickly throughout the region, and even into the Indian Ocean and Persian Gulf, to deal with any contingency. It also makes clear to all concerned that the Japanese can make a substantial international contribution without anyone needing to question seriously that nation's ultimate military role.

The imagery of "keeping Japan down" or "keeping the cap on the bottle" is, I believe, quite wrong. We are allies, not adversaries. The point is that our alliance and force presence underpins Japan's own deep commitment to pursuing only a peaceful foreign policy, while it also encourages it to expand that role in our mutual interest and in the interest of others.

Though I believe we can learn much from the Japanese economic experience that would be useful here at home, surely Japan needs to open its markets further and to harmonize its economy with the rest of the world. But to go to the extreme of calling for a loosening of the alliance so that we can apply a full-court press on Tokyo in trade negotiations both seriously distorts the nature of our eco-



conomic problem and totally misses the point of the alliance and the benefits it brings to us as well as to the international community.

Mr. Chairman, over the next several months there will be major political developments in a number of Pacific nations. Taiwan has just emerged from important legislative elections that have eased the prospect of a near-term crisis with the PRC. South Korea has just held a National Assembly election whose implications are not fully clear, but which do not suggest a major break with the past in terms of foreign or security policy.

But, among others, the Philippines, Japan, South Korea, again, and the United States itself will be holding elections. The remaining Socialist states of the region will also likely face more definitively than before the harsh reality of the actuarial tables and, along with it, the uncertain viability of their systems.

So, as we move beyond the cusp of historical change into the hopeful yet uncertain future, when the structure of international relations will be fundamentally reshaped, the requirements for thoughtful and determined leadership will be especially high. Yet, those at the helm of many key countries may be inclined to follow political rather than policy imperatives.

Americans, and most particularly American leaders, need to reflect upon how we can undergird rather than undermine long-term American interests. We not only do not have the need, we do not even have the option of retreating from the world. On the contrary, our economic, political, and security interests all point us in the direction of ever-deeper engagement.

But that is not to say how we stay engaged—pursuing which policies, devoting which resources, employing which styles of interaction. I fear that without proper guidance from our leaders, there is a growing risk that emotional appeals by those who feel aggrieved by unfair treatment at the hands of others—whether in trade or more generally in terms of burdensharing—will overwhelm the interests of the nation at large.

In my judgment, there is still a role—and a call throughout the region—for American leadership. Yet, it needs to be exercised in a far more consensual way. We never could carry out our responsibilities without the participation and support of others. Today we need that help more than ever, we need more of it, and others are better able than ever before to give it.

But an important component of leadership is the wisdom and vision to look beyond simplistic notions of “who’s the threat” to see that, while fully accepting the need for substantial reductions, we nevertheless also need to remain engaged for the admittedly hard-to-grasp purposes of deterring instability and uncertainty and of promoting a climate of cooperation and community.

Mr. Chairman, I hope that through these hearings and the deliberations of your panel, you can contribute to that leadership, promoting a broader understanding of what America’s interests are and how we can best serve them.

Thank you.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you. Mr. Pollack.



**STATEMENT OF JONATHAN POLLACK, CORPORATE RESEARCH  
MANAGER, INTERNATIONAL POLICY DEPARTMENT, RAND  
CORPORATION**

Mr. POLLACK. Thank you. The views I will express today are my own and not those of the RAND Corporation.

The end of the cold war and the collapse of the Soviet Union as a unitary nation state have stimulated wide-ranging debate about America's global interests and the role of military power in securing these interests. My testimony today will focus on these issues in the context of American strategy in the Pacific. First, how do we define our long-term interests in the Pacific? Second, what role should America's military power play in pursuit of these interests? Third, what do the states of the region expect of us, and what do we expect of them?

In assessing the Pacific, I will focus predominantly on Northeast and Southeast Asia. These areas encompass a highly diverse array of states with whom our collective political, economic, and security stake is very great. But the region as a whole is characterized by exceptional complexity and uncertainty, and these factors will increasingly define our regional military requirements.

The Pacific includes Russia, our erstwhile global adversary; Japan, our leading overseas trading partner and the world's second largest economic power; China, North Korea, and Vietnam, our major regional adversaries of the 1950s and 1960s, all of whom still profess allegiance to Marxism-Leninism and whose present relations with the United States range between quite troubled to overtly adversarial; South Korea, where we have maintained a significant military presence and security commitment for more than four decades; Taiwan and Hong Kong, whose extraordinary economic growth has turned both into vital cogs in global trade and finance; and the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), whose aggregate economic power has grown very rapidly and whose longer term economic, political, and defense potential is very great.

It is important to remind ourselves that Asia is where the cold war turned hot. Our most trying and divisive military conflicts of the past four decades were both fought in East Asia. While the potential for a major military conflict that might directly engage the United States has diminished sharply in recent years, the after-effects of the cold war persist.

On the Korean Peninsula, North and South still confront one another on a major scale and at very close range. In Cambodia, an uneasy peace is in place, but few can be highly confident about the prospects for longer term stability. At the same time, although China and Taiwan have greatly enhanced their economic and semi-official contact in recent years, the longer term determination of their relationship remains highly unsettled. Finally, and by no means least, a truncated, unstable, but still powerful Russia sustains a major military presence in its Far Eastern provinces, even as it seeks a qualitatively different relationship with its Asian neighbors.

These considerations suggest some marked contrasts between East Asia and Europe. Unlike in Europe, the United States never succeeded in crafting viable multilateral security arrangements that could foster close institutional ties within the region and

across the Pacific. The states of the region, although drawn increasingly into collaboration with one another, are the products of highly divergent cultural, social, and political norms and experiences. Multilateralism has only begun to assume specific form and direction. Few states in the Pacific have had a long history of cooperative relations with one another, and a range of territorial disputes persist.

Perhaps most important, democracy is not yet deeply embedded in the region. With the exceptions of Australia and New Zealand, a stable democratic order exists only in Japan. There has been rapid and encouraging movement toward political accountability and a more open electoral process in a number of Asian states, but personalism and weakly institutionalized politics still dominate. For all of the Pacific's progress in the past four decades—most dramatically, long-term economic growth rates unmatched by any other area of the world—its political and institutional arrangements remain tentative and weakly developed.

In addition, the long-term political forecast for China, North Korea, and Vietnam remains highly unsettled. In all three systems, aged, revolutionary-era leaders are resisting the pressures for internal political change. Each insists that it will avoid the fate of socialist regimes in Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union. The pressures on Vietnam and North Korea seem particularly acute, since they have been almost totally exempted from the sustained economic boom enjoyed by most of their neighbors, and since neither any longer enjoy largesse from Moscow. But the leadership succession process in all three states remains highly problematic, leaving their political futures—and hence, the character of their future relations with their neighbors, as well as the United States—very uncertain.

North Korea's continued pursuit of a covert nuclear weapons capability lends an especially ominous quality to this forecast, even as many observers anticipate a rapid collapse of the North Korean system once Kim Il Sung has passed from the scene. But the reality is that we do not know and cannot determine with any degree of confidence North Korea's long-term political prospects.

In addition, the region as a whole operates in the shadow of Japanese power. This is not to pose needless, worst-case scenarios about Japanese ambitions, but to state an incontrovertible fact. Japan looms exceedingly large on Asia's emergent landscape. Its economic and technological reach in the region are unmatched by the power of any other state or combination of states. At the same time, America and Japan are increasingly at loggerheads with respect to market openness, technology transfer, and macroeconomic policy. It is only in the political and strategic area where Japanese leaders remain equivocal in the exercise of their power, but here, as well, leaders in Tokyo have grown more assertive in relation to the United States.

It is within the context of this diversity and uncertainty that the United States must assess its regional role and interests, including its future military presence. In the 1950s and 1960s, Asia was characterized by revolutionary upheaval, entailing a disproportionate commitment of American military and financial resources. During the 1970s and 1980s, the area experienced very rapid economic



growth and increasing political and social stability, and U.S.-Pacific relations moved toward greater mutuality and maturity. The challenge of the 1990s will be to further reconfigure these relations, but without calling into question an intrinsic, long-term American commitment to the region and to its well-being and security.

The United States seeks to ensure that the Pacific remains vibrant, open, and secure, both within the region and in relation to the United States. But no Asian state expects America to assume exclusive responsibility for future security. At the same time, America believes that its regional allies and friends are capable of assuming increased responsibility for their own defense. As the United States seeks to devise appropriate security arrangements for the post-cold war era, we will be asking regional states to do more. As a consequence, we must be prepared to share influence with them. But the region will be less pliant, and American power less decisive.

Although the political changes in Asia are not nearly as dramatic as those we have witnessed in Europe, there is a palpable sense of change and potential realignment. With the disintegration of the Soviet power, deeply embedded national power rivalries will increasingly dominate the dynamics of regional security. Without appropriate security arrangements to dampen and channel these rivalries, and without a higher degree of assurance about the long-term policy directions of numerous Asian states, the range of future possibilities is very wide.

Thus, very few regional states would wish the U.S. forward military presence to shrink abruptly or without compensatory policy actions that reconfirm America's commitment to regional stability and security. America should therefore seek to maintain a multifaceted, if reconfigured, political, economic, and security role. Indeed, America alone seems able to restrain any single state or coalition of states from exercising outright domination over others. It can balance, and hopefully inhibit, any tendencies toward uncontrolled arms rivalry that could make the Pacific more conflict-prone. It can reassure smaller nations that live in the shadow of much larger states that they have political and security options other than subordinating themselves to powerful neighbors.

Finally, it can work credibly with regional states to develop collaborative political, institutional, and security arrangements for the longer term. Thus, the United States remains a welcome force in an area where rivalry and competition seem likely to persist and perhaps assume new forms.

To those who would argue that the region can and should take care of itself, I would pose the following questions:

Would an independent, heavily armed Japan serve our long-term interests?

Would an even more militarized Korea, possibly armed with nuclear weapons, be a welcome prospect?

Would we feel more secure if China accelerated the projection of its military power into the Pacific?

Would we feel more confident about the future if an unconstrained arms rivalry developed with ASEAN?

These are not idle questions, nor am I telling ghost stories. It is within our capacity to make these possibilities far less likely, and



it is in our compelling national interest to do so. Thus, a sustained American military presence imparts to all that we are not prepared to let a political and security vacuum develop. Without our presence, American pledges of interest and commitment will simply not be credible, and regional states, including our allies, will weigh their own security needs and options accordingly. Under such circumstances, the Pacific will prove a far less hospitable environment for the United States.

If we place long-term value on the stability of the Pacific, including the central importance that regional leaders attach to relations with the United States, then there is a price that must be paid. I do not believe that the price is excessive. Our military presence is a visible, inescapable expression of our engagement with the region. In the eyes of regional leaders, it lends specificity and form to our commitments.

It does not have to be driven disproportionately by military threat, although we must retain sufficient flexibility should such threats develop. It shapes the larger political and strategic context within which all states will assess their policy choices and directions, since all will recognize that America's vital interests are engaged. Forward presence, therefore, is an unambiguous signal to friend and potential foe alike. Without it, the likelihood of sustained development and security will diminish, quite possibly triggering nationalistic responses whose longer term consequences cannot be predicted with certainty.

Thus, our military forces can help shape the future Asian-Pacific environment, often in ways that we cannot fully discern today. It does not assure tranquility, but it will help inhibit tendencies toward power rivalries that could emerge in the absence of our power. Many Americans, however, still regard Asia as unfathomable and mysterious, and we are still far more comfortable in dealing with Europe. But we do not have the luxury of choice; our long-term national interests are inescapably wedded to both areas.

The principal difference between our security roles in the two regions is that our presence in Europe is integrally tied to multilateral political and security institutions that have developed over the decades. There is no equivalent structure in Asia, and one of the central challenges for our long-term Pacific strategy will be to foster a climate within which such arrangements can develop.

In crafting a long-term policy, the United States must judiciously weigh the multiple roles of political balancer, security partner, and economic competitor. Given the singular attention paid to the Soviet global challenge during the cold war, we have little experience with integrating all three components into a composite, multifaceted national strategy. But we must avoid the easy route of sharply and rapidly cutting our forces, because this will very likely prove a false economy. Asian leaders are seeking to secure their interests and plan for the longer term, and they expect the same from us.

We cannot anticipate or predict all potential political, economic, and security alignments that could shape Asia's future, but we need to recognize how our policies will affect the choices of states with whom we deal. The United States must impart now that it is

prepared to commit resources for the longer term. This commitment should be based on an intrinsic stake in the region's future, and not one driven disproportionately by any present or prospective threat. Without such a commitment, regional leaders will draw their own conclusions about the United States, and their consideration of American interests will be far less certain or automatic in the future.

The United States knows that the Pacific matters deeply to our long-term interests, and that our military power will be part of this calculus. In the absence of a sharp reduction in regional rivalries and threat perceptions and without the development of multilateral security arrangements in which all relevant states participate, the U.S. forward military presence will remain vital to a stable, prosperous regional order.

Our long-term strategy, therefore, must convey to all that collaboration with the United States affords a better means to achieve national goals than going their own way or seeking to devise alternative political, economic, and security arrangements that would exclude the United States. This is especially important with respect to Japan. For all the differences and grievances between Washington and Tokyo, the United States remains to many Japanese their only friend in a world of hostile states. Thus, the United States must guard against the temptation to ply unduly on regional fears of Japan, even as it must remain attentive to these fears.

As we move beyond the cold war, the character of our relations with the states of the Pacific will undergo significant change. Once vulnerable nations are now robust economic competitors of the United States. Countries that were long willing to accept a subordinate position to the United States and to accommodate American regional goals have grown more capable and assertive, and their policy options have become far more diversified. Regional states are coming of age, and many will want to refashion the political and strategic bargains struck with the United States when they were highly dependent on external support.

The challenge for our future strategy will be to define a continued role for our military power in a period of diminished threat and far greater political-military diversity and uncertainty. But our strategy must also enable us to respond in timely fashion should new threats to regional stability emerge.

Even if no central, compelling security problem challenges the interests of the United States and its regional partners, our stake in Asia's future must be imparted unambiguously by our policies and by our presence. Recognizing this central fact will be crucial in helping shape the future of the Pacific and our role in it.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you, Mr. Pollack.

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Kreisberg, we will be back. There may be two votes.

Mr. DICKINSON. Mr. Chairman, let me ask one short question before we leave. I will ask this of the panel, and anyone can jump in if he is so inclined.

Do you feel that we are viewed by the countries in this area of the world as a dependable force? I won't say "partner," but we are partners with some and not with others. Do you think we are



viewed as being dependable? Can they have confidence that we will do what we say? Or are we suspect, and they have no confidence?

What would you say? Who will volunteer to answer that?

Mr. YOST. I indicated in my statement that the voices one hears around Asia now are voices of concern about the United States. In part, this is inevitable. We are in an era of transition, but in part, it reflects the close reading that Asian leaders give of our political debate in this country and give to what they see as uncertainty among the American people about what our role in the world should be.

Necessarily, they ask questions as to whether, in extremis in the case of an upheaval, whether we would be there in the rough times.

Mr. DICKINSON. I understand that. Pat Buchanan doesn't exactly help the situation, either.

We have one example, our withdrawal from Vietnam, which was really not necessarily of our doing. Then, on the other hand, we have the Philippines where we wanted to stay and we were ejected. I have had two swings through there recently, and talked with various people. They seem to be more concerned about China's attitude, what they are going to do with Hong Kong; and Taiwan was looking to see the outcome of that.

I wonder if we are viewed as a reliable trading partner or other partner, or if we are suspect. We have been there for the long haul. We have vicissitudes. Do you think that will be the consensus?

Mr. KREISBERG. I am afraid I don't think that we have a terribly high standing as a reliable partner in the area as a whole. I also don't think that most of the countries in the region are that concerned about our reliability as a military partner except Korea, and I think the Koreans do see us as being reliable. The others don't see a threat to themselves, and frankly, I don't think they see the United States coming to aid them.

They have seen a whole series of clashes between states in the region, and we have not been involved in any of them. During the Vietnamese occupation of Cambodia, the Southeast Asians were responsible for that, along with the Chinese, and they put the pressure on in Cambodia.

When there were skirmishes between Indonesia and the Philippines, India and Burma, Thailand and Burma, Papua New Guinea and the Solomons, we were not involved, and quite rightly so.

So, as they look at the immediate threats that they have before them, they correctly see us as not engaging in them, probably without an interest in them, and probably not going to be engaged in these sorts of problems in the future.

Mr. DICKINSON. I will have to apologize and leave, too.

Mr. MURDOCK. I wonder if I could ask you to address one question for the record one member had put to the panel.

What would you see as the future role of Guam and the security policy of the United States as it relates to this area of the Pacific?

Mr. KREISBERG. Anyone who has flown through Guam recently, has been struck by the fact that it is very hard to hear English spoken at the airport. For all intents and purposes, except for the U.S. military bases there, of course, it is a Japanese tourist base, largely owned by the Japanese and largely patronized by the Japanese.



The economy, other than military expenditures, is largely dependent on Japan.

I don't have a judgment on how indispensable Guam is militarily, but the Japanese see it as one of the great pleasure spots of the Central Pacific.

Mr. MURDOCK. I am not sure that is completely responsive to the member's question. Perhaps one would want to talk on the military and strategic presence of Guam and the U.S. presence in the region.

Mr. ROMBERG. Let me take a cut at part of that.

I don't feel qualified to say that we can put  $x$  forces there to substitute for this or that other thing in terms of fighting capability. But I don't think that a presence in Guam politically substitutes for a forward presence in the region; that is, in the far Western Pacific and based in Japan for whatever period, and Korea. Of course, a question has been raised regarding the U.S. force presence in Korea, and whether it might go beyond unification; so that is another issue.

Part of what I was trying to say is, pulling back to U.S. bases—assuming you are not eliminating forces, but simply removing them from the region—that equates to withdrawal and leads to the consensus that I think some of us have talked about here, before you get anywhere near total withdrawal.

I consider Guam part of the United States, not only in legal terms, but in these kinds of political terms for this purpose. It is not a substitute. It is a useful, important base for all sorts of military units—particularly air, presumably. But it does not do the job.

Putting forces there does not tell Asians that we are staying around and does not inhibit them, in my judgment, from considering whether or not there is a vacuum which they either, as I put it, can or need to fill.

Mr. POLLACK. I agree generally with what Alan Romberg said, but there are questions about the feasibility of redeploying large amounts of our presence onto Guam. This relates not only to Guam, but a number of other microstates in the Pacific. The infrastructure of these states is highly undeveloped, so it would require significant investment. In addition, there are constraints placed upon the use of territory—environmental laws and other restrictions that make it very difficult in a direct operational sense of getting from here to there.

More to the point, though, is that it does not substitute for the kind of political presence that our military power underscores in bases we have maintained farther in the West Pacific. So to that extent, if it is looked upon as a convenient fallback, I don't think it can compensate for the loss of other bases that we have had.

Mr. MURDOCK. Thank you.

We will stand adjourned until the members return.

[Recess.]

The CHAIRMAN. We will go ahead now.

Mr. Kreisberg, why don't you proceed?

#### STATEMENT OF PAUL H. KREISBERG, SENIOR RESEARCH ASSOCIATE, EAST-WEST CENTER

Mr. KREISBERG. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

It is interesting to come at the end of a group of interesting panelists, because my inclination is to respond to what they have been saying. I leave that to you.

I will go over the conclusions of my paper that I sent for formal submission.

I argue that the United States has four sets of basic interests now in Asia and I don't see why we should change these.

We want to see a secure Pacific Ocean GLACIS between U.S. territory and Asia, free trade and investment access for the United States in Asia, the general spread of U.S. values, democracy and human rights, and we want to see strong individual national states secure from domination by a regional hegemonic power.

What is interesting, however, is that these American objectives increasingly have become consistent with those of the countries in the region. It is true that full democracy is still in the process of growing but it is spreading. None of the states in Asia want to see another single dominating power in the region.

The Japanese don't want the Chinese, the Chinese don't want the Japanese. The smaller states want neither China nor Japan to be a dominating power in the region. All states are independent and want to remain so.

Free trade is a strong unifying concept throughout the region. Not all nations see free trade in the same way that we do, but the desirability for all Asian states of maintaining vibrant economies, growing at rates similar to those they have enjoyed for the last 10 years, is, I think, probably the strongest guarantee against major military confrontation in the region. Given this view, it is not surprising that I see the threat level in Asia, other than from North Korea, as low, and unlikely to increase in ways that will threaten U.S. interests for the rest of this decade and into the early years of the 21st century.

I think we should plan for less likely security contingencies through rapid deployment capabilities, and maintaining fluidity and fungibility of American forces all around the world. We do not need to keep large numbers of carriers in the Pacific, as we have in the past. We can move carriers as we need to move them from region to region. A really dangerous crisis which blows out of nowhere would be a fundamental failure of intelligence, which suggests the need for even better intelligence capabilities in order to prevent that from happening.

A U.S. military presence in the area at some level nevertheless still remains important. For the smaller countries in Southeast Asia and Japan and South Korea, that is particularly true. A U.S. presence in Southeast Asia, while not absolutely preventing the spread of increasingly powerful conventional weapons, missiles, or nuclear weapons, may slow down the pace of such acquisitions.

U.S.-Japanese relations are unlikely to collapse nor is Japan likely to turn toward rearmament. One can always draw a worst case that this might happen, that Japan will begin to rearm, and that we will be faced with a Japan that looks like the one from the 1930s and 1940s. But I do not really believe that the U.S. Congress or the executive branch needs to devote serious resources at this point to such an eventuality. Japan will eventually agree to the use of its forces in some form for international peacekeeping, probably

this year. I think this is wise, but, not necessarily that such forces be used in Asia, or at least not in the beginning. I think it would not be a good idea for Japanese military forces not be sent to Cambodia. Most of the countries in Asia might say, "We don't mind if Japanese peacekeeping elements are sent as police units, relatively lightly armed. Nevertheless, I think most would prefer that a precedent not be set for Japanese troops to be sent in that area.

It is, however, not only inevitable but important that Japan gradually take on the role of greater leadership on issues of vial importance to the countries of the Pacific region. The maintenance of political stability, of economic prosperity, and the preservation of the national integrity of the countries of the region are of greater interest to the countries within the region, like Japan or China, than even to the United States.

That is why Asian regional cooperation is so extraordinarily important.

It is unfortunate that in the last 10 years, the United States, rather than taking the lead on this issue, has lagged behind. Leadership has come from Japan and Australia, and other smaller countries within the region and Washington has dragged its policy feet.

Former Secretary of State, George Shultz began to run with the issue at the end of his service in the Reagan administration but the Bush administration again moved into low gear on regional cooperation.

It was picked up again carefully and gingerly only in the last year by Secretary Baker. Of course it is not in U.S. interests, or that of the rest of Asia, for a Japanese military security role to grow substantially. We stopped pushing Japan to substantially increase its armed forces 3 or 4 years ago and that was a good decision, which it would make no sense for us to reverse.

China is unlikely to use force to challenge its neighbors or the U.S. in the 1990s. It may build its maritime capability as a contingency to deal with crises both in the Taiwan Straits and the South China Sea Atolls. But China understands that a conflict over Taiwan would pose a major challenge to their relations with the United States. It is not just because of a potential threat to one of our largest trading partners, but the language of the Taiwan Relations Act comes close to committing the United States to defend Taiwan against an adversary.

Representative Stephen J. Solarz had a hearing last year in which he raised this question with Deputy Assistant Secretary for Asia, Carl Ford, in the Department of Defense. Solarz said he thought it was inevitable that if China moved to blockade trade with Taiwan, the United States would have to stand up to it.

Would the Japanese under those circumstances permit us to use bases in Japan? In the absence of facilities in the Philippines could we sustain a viable challenge to China in the Taiwan Strait area? These are issues worth pursuing with Defense Department witnesses at some time.

Strong political and economic relationships with China remain an important U.S. strategic objective, no longer in the context of the U.S.-Soviet-China triangle, but in the context of maintaining stability, peace, tranquility and cooperation in dealing with political and economic problems throughout Asia. It is strongly in U.S.



strategic interest that we not irreparably damage trade and other economic relations with China which offer the opportunity to influence fundamental change in China. We should be frank in condemnation of human rights violations, but limit our reactions to political criticisms rather than economic sanctions.

Russians military forces continue to exist in substantial strength in Northeast Asia, but are unlikely to be used in threatening ways in the Asian Pacific region. Academic studies of Soviet military literature, public and internal, have revealed Soviet military planning for the use of military forces in the Pacific. There is no evidence that the Soviet Union had planned a military attack against Japan at any time in the last 20 years. Privately Japanese scholars and the Japanese Defense Agency acknowledge that today, despite the major resources committed in past years to defense against such a threat.

Korea is, of course, quite different and until there is an important, stable and secure political understanding on the Korean peninsula, U.S. capability for rapid reinforcement of forces in place on the peninsula should continue.

All contingencies in the Asia-Pacific region rely on forces based in CONUS, Hawaii and mid-Pacific bases and on the logistic and communications facilities provided by our relationship with Japan which remains absolutely vital to U.S. implementation of any contingent strategic role in Asia and the Indian Ocean.

To respond to one question you raised earlier, Mr. Chairman, it is hard to see why it would be necessary for us, given the size of the South Korean military forces and their increasing capabilities, for us to provide large numbers of U.S. ground forces to defend South Korea in the event South Korea was attacked from the North.

It is questionable whether there would be time to do this, and the sophistication of high-technology air and naval weapons should be adequate to contain and defeat a North Korean attack on the South.

The U.S. should maintain active engagement, but a low level of forces in the Southeast Asian areas. That means regular, but small-scale air and ship visits, service-to-service training exercise relationships, military sales programs at a modest level. We should from time to time demonstrate the capacity to move a larger force in to the Indian Ocean, but we have no need to have it there all the time. A carrier visit every 12 or 18 months, as a demonstration of U.S. power and contingent presence might well be what the countries of Southeast Asia would find adequate once they became used to this pattern.

We don't really know what level of military forces is sufficient to maintain the degree of political confidence in the United States that Asians say they want to have. We drew forces down after the war in Vietnam and countries in Southeast Asia were not particularly concerned about that drawdown. We reduced forces in Japan and the Japanese were not concerned. We pulled our fighter bombers out of the Misawa Airbase in northern Honshu and nobody blinked. We put them back again in the 1980s and nobody blinked again.

Credibility is psychological and does not depend on having X, Y, or Z number or typed ships or aircraft in the region. It is as much a matter of the U.S. economic presence, the number of U.S. visitors and tourists. Asians today see far less of the latter than they do from Japan. U.S. technology and investments are proportionately less visible than they once were.

What is even more important than a military presence is the active presence of the U.S. private sector, the continued role the U.S. dollar as a primary monetary instrument throughout the region, the willingness of the countries to send their sons and daughters and that means the continued availability of grants and scholarships for Asian students to come to the United States at a time when Asians are growing in presence.

If those decline or disappear, then Asian confidence in a U.S. presence will drop like a stone, regardless of whether we have a few more ships or aircraft or marines in the region.

Finally, Mr. Chairman, I think participation in broad regional forums by countries which may be seen within the region as potential security threats is important in reducing regional concern about security. The Japanese participate in the ASEAN post-ministerial meetings. The Chinese are members of APEC, the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation group. The Russians should also be involved in APEC along with Vietnam, and eventually the North Koreans as well.

The countries that generate security concern, whose potential aggression is a danger, should be engaged so they can hear the concerns of their neighbors, so they can become more familiar with the most important issues on regional agendas, and so that they can gradually be "civilized" to regional concerns. They may then become less threatening.

Regional organizations do not exclude the possibility of political/military tensions among members, it is rare that one finds open conflict erupting between members of such regional groupings around the world. It may be a coincidence, but it is worth seeing whether in Asia the establishment of strong regional associations might become a major contribution to deterring the outbreak of conflicts.

Thank you, sir.

#### PREPARED STATEMENT OF PAUL H. KREISBERG

Since the beginning of this century the fundamental U.S. national interest in the Asia-Pacific region has been to prevent domination of the region by another power. The concerns underlying this fundamental interest have been (a) to ensure that the Pacific remains a secure *glacis* between Asia and the continental United States and U.S. territories (and now the state of Hawaii) and by maintaining naval predominance in the Pacific, (b) to maintain access to markets for American products and investments in Asia, and to Asian manufactures and raw materials for the American market, and (c) to deter, politically or militarily, threats by larger states to smaller states which might jeopardize U.S. economic or security interests. Concern over "moral justice" in Asia—often expressed in religious terms in the early years of the century, but in more recent decades as democracy and human rights—has also been a persistent background theme in American policy.

In pursuing these interests, the United States followed both George Washington and Lord Palmerston: have neither permanent enemies or allies. How U.S. interests are pursued, and who are our friends and enemies, have changed repeatedly over the last years and will continue to evolve.

The main threat to the fundamental interests described above for most of the first half of the century was from Japan. The "open door" policy toward China was not



designed to help China but to prevent imperialist powers from excluding the United States from trade opportunities in China: concern over potential German, as well as Japanese. Imperial expansion into the Philippines was an important factor in the U.S. decision to hold onto those islands after the Spanish-American war.

By the late 1930s efforts to confine Japanese naval and territorial ambitions led us to identify our interests with China and then, during World War II, with those of other major powers allied against Japan. After the war threats to U.S. interests shifted to our former allies—China (with a new Communist government) and the Soviet Union. To these were added their presumed political ideological, and military surrogates for expansion and influence in the region, North Korea and North Vietnam. These states individually and collectively seemed to pose an all-inclusive threat to U.S. interests in the region—political military, economic, and moral. The security in all these respects of all non-Communist countries in the Asia-Pacific region constituted a seamless web for U.S. policy.

Over 3 decades we fought two major wars, including a limited one with China, marshalled enormous strategic deterrent forces in the Pacific to counter the military power of Communist states, contributed billions of dollars toward the economic development and military security of new states in the region, and accepted treaty commitments to protect virtually all the major countries of East Asia (Japan, South Korea, Taiwan, and the Philippines) and half of those in southeastern Asia (Thailand, Australia, New Zealand, and South Vietnam) against any Communist attack. Even countries such as Singapore, Malaysia, and the Pacific Island states with no direct security agreement with the United States, but defense relationships with other states (Australia, New Zealand, the UK) to whose security the United States was committed came indirectly under this American umbrella.

By the end of the 1970s and through the 1980s military threats to the United States and to the security of other Asian countries from Communist states, except North Korea, began to disappear. The rationale for American security commitments and major force deployments during the era of the cold war steadily weakened. U.S. commitments remained formally in place but with little national consensus within the United States to back them up.

This was evident by the early 1970s when President Nixon's "Guam doctrine" cautioned Asian allies U.S. policy would increasingly look to Asian capabilities to defend themselves. As threats to U.S. security interests in the Asia-Pacific region declined and economic tensions over trade and investment issues grew, the clarity of U.S. strategy in the region became increasingly blurred.

The Russian military threat to Japan, scarcely a serious one in Soviet military planning for decades, has now virtually dropped off the screen. Russian naval, air and ground forces remain in the region but with few resources for training and operations. By 1991 Japan reduced its annual defense budget increases in half and found difficulty in providing domestic political rationales for the expenditures being made.

By the end of the 1980s the United States no longer wanted Japan to expand its forces and assume a greater share of actual defense responsibility in East Asia. Instead it argued Japan should pay more of the costs of U.S. defense expenditures relating to Japan and East Asia as a whole. After the Iraq conflict in 1991 U.S. policymakers, and those elsewhere in Asia, increasingly debated whether Japanese forces should be used for peacekeeping purposes authorized by the United Nations outside of Japan. The Iraq war did not allay Asian fears that the United States might "withdraw" from that region: it intensified them.

Asians insist they are concerned about potential threats but like most American officials and scholars have difficulty in identifying potential regional conflicts that would either seriously threaten their security or engage U.S. national interests. Judging pragmatically by events in the region over the last year, regional clashes between Burma and Bangladesh, India, or Thailand, between Thailand and Laos, between the Solomon Islands and Papua New Guinea, or between Vietnam and probably other ASEAN countries and China over the Spratley Islands in the South China Sea (so long as the latter are limited to the territory of the islands) are not the kinds of regional threats anyone is talking about.

Threats to the lives of U.S. citizens or direct interference with U.S. ships or aircraft either by a regional state or which regional states were unable to deal with on their own certainly directly affect U.S. interests but probably not on a scale requiring large-scale military intervention. Internal political destabilization issues—civil wars or revolutions, gross violations of human rights or ethnic conflicts in specific countries—are unlikely to be grounds for use of U.S. military forces although they may be of strong political or economic concern to many Americans and lead to political or economic countermeasures.



The United States stayed out of the "confrontation" between Malaysia and Indonesia in the 1960s and out of the Indo-Pakistani conflicts of 1965 and 1971, although a quiet U.S. intermediary role was taken during a rise in Indo-Pakistani tensions in 1990, particularly because of a potential threat of use of nuclear weapons. It is conceivable the United States might attempt, or offer, to interpose its own forces in the region as part of a peaceful effort to avert escalation of a crisis between U.S. friends in Asia. It is hard, however, to define U.S. interests that would require major military intervention in such a dispute.

There may be only two grave contingencies which might engage U.S. military forces in a major regional conflict in East Asia and the Pacific in the next decade. (I intentionally do not address potential conflicts in West Asia for which some forces based in the Pacific might be used.)

There is a broad consensus among regional experts that the least likely of these would be a Chinese military challenge to Taiwan in the event of declaration of independence by an elected government. Should this occur, it would be even more fundamentally destabilizing for the region than war on the Korean peninsula. It could force other countries in Asia to take a stand between the United States and China in circumstances where their support for the United States cannot be assumed and thus undermine the broad front of U.S. political-security-economic relations in the region. Moreover, although the Taiwan Relations Act which defines U.S. relations with Taiwan does not contain an explicit commitment to defend Taiwan, it comes close. Representative Stephen J. Solarz told a Defense Department witness before his Foreign Affairs Subcommittee on East Asia and the Pacific a little over a year ago that the United States would probably have little alternative but to confront any Chinese blockade of Taiwan.

Could military deterrence of a Chinese blockade or attack be credibly implemented without basing facilities in the Philippines? Would the political climate in Japan permit the United States to use bases in Japan against China? How would North Korea act toward the South in such circumstances, and could the United States rely on using South Korean military facilities to counter China?

The United States and Japan have substantial leverage in averting a Taiwanese declaration of independence and to mediate another "Taiwan Strait crisis" before it developed. Most important, however, as a deterrent is the rapid development in the economies of the China coastal provinces, of trade and investment between Taiwan and the PRC, and the broad risks conflict would pose to economic development in China and to the confidence it has been fostering in its policies elsewhere in Asia. This is a central factor underscoring the strategic importance for not only the other Asian states but for the United States in continuing to draw China into as many economic, political, and other interactions as possible and in encouraging dialog and not confrontation over human rights and economic disputes.

The most immediate security threat is on the Korean peninsula. Elsewhere in Asia the answer to the question, "What do we want U.S. military forces to be able to do in Asia?" is unclear, but in Korea the United States has a specific treaty commitment, forces on the bound, and a carefully designed defense strategy with the Government of the Republic of Korea on how to confront a probable military threat.

Responsibility for Korean defense is gradually passing to the South Koreans themselves but U.S. air and naval, and limited ground involvement in any major north-south conflict is certain.

A new factor is the North's development of nuclear weapons, a major concern for both the United States and Japan as well as South Korea. A North-South conflict, however, is far less likely to engage either China or Russia and spread into a larger war than at any time in the last 40 years. The only serious question is whether North Korea, in a desperate effort to throw the region and U.S. planning into turmoil, implied the use of nuclear weapons against Japan if bases on Japan were used to support U.S. defense efforts in Korea.

Any serious agreement on Korean reunification is unlikely to require the gradual but ultimately probably the complete withdrawal of U.S. forces from the peninsula. The question would be over what period of time and with what residual assurances and international guarantees this would take place.

"Worst case" scenarios for other regional crises can be hypothesized and this is a game which is easily and frequently played both in Asia and the United States:

- *What if Japanese-U.S. relations collapsed?* Japan broke its treaty ties with the United States, turned its Constitution on its head, used its enormous technological and manufacturing capacity to swiftly rearm (including major naval and nuclear forces), and sought military predominance in East Asia;
- *What if a unified Korea threatened Japan?*

- *What if* China, under some new charismatic and intensely nationalistic and expansionist leader, tried to restore Chinese control over parts of Vietnam or Mongolia or India or drive other Asians from their positions on tiny atolls in the South China Sea or intervened in pan-turkic conflicts in Central Asia should these overlap into Sinkiang?
- *What if* terrorists used nuclear weapons against one or another state within the region?

The military and political implications of each of these for the United States and its probable response, as with many other scenarios that could be imagined elsewhere in the world, will be different depending on circumstances and time. Some might warrant military response, bilateral or multilateral, perhaps to the point of major U.S. mobilization, others surely not. What does seem clear is that the necessary connection between most potential regional conflicts in Asia, other than those propelled by fundamental shifts in global power relationships, and U.S. national interests, and consequently the forward presence of large numbers of U.S. forces has become very uncertain.

The United States has strong reasons for wanting to halt narcotics production and trafficking and for limiting the spread of nuclear weapons and missiles from countries like China, North Korea, Taiwan, and potentially South Korea, India, and Japan. But other than by attempts to halt ships carrying such weapons clearly a violation of international law unless there are specific U.N. Security Council sanctions to back the action (as the Defense and State Departments accepted in early March 1992 in connection with North Korean ships carrying weapons to Iran), the requirement for substantial military force is minimal.

The most important deterrent to military conflict in the region is political and economic cooperation: the growth of mutual trade and investment and consequent mutual economic interdependence in the region, rising prosperity that increases reluctance to risk conflict that would damage economic interests, and the growth of democratic pressures that limit the ability of small elite coups to take such risks contrary to broad popular interests. The steady growth of regional forums through which all countries—market-oriented and democratically governed (in the varying ways one finds in the region), and those with different political and economic systems can also progressively increase the opportunity ability to communicate and negotiate on sensitive issues.

Sad for American leadership in Asia, recognition of the importance of this came first from Japan and Australia, not Washington. As the regional climate began to be propitious in the mid-1980s it began to be recognized in the last year months of George Shultz's tenure as Secretary of State. It was again put on the shelf by the State Department until the collapse of Soviet power seemed certain although some mid-level officials urged a more imaginative policy earlier.

Finding common denominators of national interest has been more difficult in Asia than in Europe for decades. Regional cooperation has been weak and this has been widely commented on. But it is also true that the United States found substantial advantages in negotiating with Asian states primarily on a bilateral rather than multilateral basis particularly in the security area. Moreover the fact that the Soviet Union for nearly 30 years argued for multilateral forums through which it could play more effectively in a region where U.S. influence was predominant was also a factor inducing U.S. reluctance to even talk about regionalization.

The United States has adjusted its position slightly. Security relationships in Asia are being described as a "fan" with "bilateral spokes" coming together in Washington. The fabric between these spokes is the multilateral consultation that links all these spokes into a single consultative effort at intervals, such as the ASEAN post-ministerial conferences each year. Japan too has now accepted this concept, so long as it is limited to "like-minded" nations but excludes the Communist states.

This is an important step forward in facilitating the ability of over a dozen countries to exchange views, at least at a broad level of generalization about security concerns in the Asia-Pacific region. But it will be inadequate in the longer term unless other countries which represent potential "threats" are also engaged. Nor does it recognize that the "spokes" do not always come together in the United States, but sometimes elsewhere, as during the Cambodian conflict in ASEAN and Chinese cooperation. U.S. "leadership" at times can, and must, mean U.S. initiatives. But "leadership" can also mean knowing when to support and back initiatives and proposals by others, and U.S. administrations have often been weaker at that.

Asian countries themselves are uneasy about including "threatening" states. But they are anxious to include Japan, which is invariably one of the two states (the other being China) which Asian countries worry about the most.

The Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) grouping should become a forum which eventually includes *all* Asian actors. In recent months Taiwan and Hong



Kong have joined and the sooner Vietnam, Russia, and even North Korea are considered for membership the better. APEC can provide an umbrella under which a wide range of economic and related issues, some of which clearly have security implications (from narcotics trafficking to questions of illegal immigration development of disputed territorial areas) might be discussed in special committees.

The more potential "dangerous" countries are brought into regular, systematic, frank, and ultimately cooperative exchanges about issues and areas that could create conflicts, the more likely it is that ways may be found to avert crises before they occur. The greater the economic and social benefit such countries find from peaceful interaction the less likely it is that they will accept the costs of interrupting these by creating tension and conflict. If the United States is to exert leadership it is toward creating opportunities for such interaction and encouraging other Asians to move in this direction, not blocking or delaying it.

This does not suggest there should be no U.S. military forces in the region, nor that bilateral or subregional security forums are not useful and even vital. But the precise levels of U.S. forces associated with U.S. bilateral relationships are probably less important—except in the context of Korea—than at any point since World War II. Soviet strategic forces in northeast Asia require some U.S. strategic counterbalance, and so do those which China maintains. A U.S. base presence in Japan is vital not only because of the Korean contingency but the importance of preserving a strong base for logistic support for other military or humanitarian contingencies in the region (as noted earlier with regard to Taiwan, however, there are contingencies where the use of such facilities in Japan may not always be safely assumed).

The years when *major* contingent military capabilities could be maintained in being in widely dispersed areas of the world, however, are probably over. U.S. planning must be based on maintaining modest forces forward in Asia with a primary emphasis on *access* to base facilities for use in times of crisis, and regional stockpiles (as we maintain on Diego Garcia, in Saudi Arabia, in Japan, in Korea, and as we have until now maintained in the Philippines). United States use of military forces in crisis situations which involve either access to such base facilities or transit through them will be more dependent in the future on the political support of other Asian states than in the past. This factor by itself is likely to reduce the circumstances in which U.S. military force will be "usable" in the region without broad regional consensus. It underscores again the importance of regional institutions and consensus building within these on security issues.

The political importance of regional perception of U.S.-Japanese cooperation in the security arena for stability throughout the Asia-Pacific area cannot be overstated. No specific level of forces in Japan is sacred for this purpose so long as the United States-Japan Security Treaty remains intact and Japanese cooperation in maintaining U.S. forces in Japan continues. The United States withdrew two squadrons of aircraft from Misawa in northwestern Japan in the 1970s without much concern about the North Korean contingency, and then replaced them a few years later. Located elsewhere they might provide greater flexibility for U.S. global deployment of airpower. The basing of a U.S. carrier in Japan, however, carries symbolism of U.S. political and military engagement in Asia that goes far beyond the mere military convenience of such basing.

So long as the United States has some occasional presence and it is seen by the countries of East and southeastern Asia that U.S. interests other than purely security ones are also deeply engaged in the region, the specific level of U.S. forces may not be that relevant. That means continued high-level attendance at ASEAN PMC and APEC ministerial meetings, evidence that other U.S. Cabinet officials and the President himself are interested in the region and not just to lobby for greater U.S. exports and serious consultation on both regional and international issues.

Regular naval visits to show the flag or conduct limited exercises, exchanges of consultations by military planners to discuss doctrine and general strategy maintenance of a healthy IMET program, and willingness to help regional states appropriately modernize their own defensive capabilities would evince that U.S. "interest" in the security of the area remains strong. Experience is likely to show what "reasonable" level of military presence is politically reassuring within the region. There is not a country in Asia that does not understand why the United States will reduce its military presence in the region with the reduced threat from component states of the former U.S.S.R. What is critical is less numbers but the political, economic, and psychological perception (which cannot be communicated merely by speeches and occasional high-level visits) that the United States is genuinely *engaged* in the region.

The United States is not feared, offers no *military* or territorial threat to any country in the region, and remains a powerful force in international political and economic institutions capable of supporting or obstructing the interests of regional



states. For all the smaller countries of the Asia-Pacific region some American presence acts as an "insurance" policy against unspecified and probably unspecifiable changes in the geopolitical environment—the wilder scenarios noted earlier in this statement that Asians think of as the consequences of a "vacuum" of power.

What Asians want most, however, is a sense of clear policy direction from the United States, a conviction that U.S. policy reflects a national consensus joined in by Congress, not simply a set of decisions by individual executive branch leaders. This is what is lacking at present on economic, security and political issues and the President's recent trip to Asia simply underscores this. Respect for American policy in Asia has diminished even as Asian leaders continue to plead for a continuing American presence.

The deterioration of a national U.S. consensus on Asian policy which began in the 1970s over Indochina and grew during the 1980s, paralleling the weakening of the U.S. economy, mounting frustration with foreign economic competition, the end of the cold war, and the growth of American domestic social and political malaise. The five culminating symbols were China, Japan, troop and base withdrawals, increasing focus on domestic U.S. concerns to the point of damaging indifference to foreign policy concerns, and rising trade tensions with other Asian countries.

- Good Sino-U.S. relations, like good U.S.-Japanese relations, are seen throughout Asia as a vital constituent in a stable regional environment. The willingness of the United States, particularly on the part of the Congress, to accept the sharp deterioration in relations with China after Tiananmen was shared and echoed by no other Asian state.

- Most dramatic has been the rapid deterioration of the fabled "most important American foreign policy relationship in the world," that with Japan, and one with even stronger domestic political roots in America, that with Israel. If relationships as important as these are in jeopardy, small wonder other Asians worry about the depth of American staying power and interest in *their* countries. The United States in theory could "withdraw" from Asia. Japan is in Asia, is already by far the most powerful economic presence by any standard in the region, and without some American balancing presence, becomes the "superpower" of the region, potentially balanced only by China or India, and all of these options are fundamentally worrisome to other Asian states. The Chinese and Koreans both northern and southern seriously worry that in such circumstances Japan would become a military power with real force projection capabilities, including even nuclear weapons, which each (or both together) would have to counterbalance. With nuclear powers to their west, north, and east, how confident could anyone be that one or another state in southeast Asia would not feel the need to develop nuclear weapons of its own?

- The U.S. decision in 1990–1991 gradually to reduce American military forces over the next 3–4 years and prospectively continue to do so for most of the remainder of the 1990s was taken with little prior consultation with any of the Asian states. Despite the Secretary of Defense's careful qualifications about such withdrawals and reiteration of the continuing U.S. concern for the stability and security of the region, this raised questions about ultimate American intentions which were further intensified last year by the breakdown of U.S.-Philippine negotiations over Philippine bases, and the beginning of U.S. withdrawal this year. Most Asian states hoped we and the Philippines would agree to reductions and perhaps an ultimate withdrawal 5–10 years later but not a pull-out in 1 year.

- The intense U.S. political and intellectual focus in the last year, coming to a head during the political campaigns in 1992, on domestic U.S. problems is partially welcomed by sophisticated Asians who have been publicly and privately urging more attention in the United States to strengthening the roots of the American economy and society. But the implications of domestic priorities, including reluctance to contribute large amounts to reconstruction and stability in the former U.S.S.R., to pay the costs of peacekeeping in Cambodia, to follow through on commitments to new funding for international financial institutions, and the signs of "no-nothing" political rhetoric in the press and on political platforms are more worrisome to them all.

- U.S. negotiations with every Asian state on a broad range of issues from the environment to GATT intellectual property to agriculture, narcotics to fishing practices have become increasingly testy over the last 5 years. We have become tougher negotiators on these issues, often with good reason, but more inclined to paraphrase a famous inaugural speech, to "ask not what we can do for Asian states but what they can do for us."

Asians have urged Americans to invest in their countries but have seen the relative role of U.S. investment steadily give way to that of Japan, and even other Asian capital exporting states like Taiwan and South Korea. The relative importance of American banks, of American tourism, and above all of American trade with the region has declined. Only the influence of American culture—for better or worse—remains unrivalled.

Official U.S. policy rhetoric about the importance of U.S. trade and investment with Asia, of Asian financial markets, of the academic, scientific, and business achievements of Asian-Americans in communities throughout America, of the consistent record of American national interests in the region over the last century has not been totally effective, in the face of the above developments, in persuading Asians that the United States will not “turn its back” on Asia.

#### *Conclusions:*

- Basic U.S. interests in Asia—no dominating regional power, free trade, support for U.S. values, strong individual national states—remain the same today as in the past. The strongest defense for a forward U.S. political policy, and at least a limited military presence, in Asia is that the best defense of the U.S. starts at the other side of the Pacific, not on the American doorstep, and that the flexibility and costs of that defense are enormously enhanced if we have a foothold, in cooperation with regional states, on the western edge of that ocean.

- The threat level in Asia, other than in Korea, is low and unlikely to endanger U.S. interests for the rest of this decade. Less-likely security contingencies other than Korea, should be planned for through rapid-deployment logistic capabilities. A U.S. military presence helps to deter the spread of nuclear weapons or the threat of their use in the region for the smaller countries of southeast Asia as well as for Japan and South Korea. A U.S. presence will not by itself prevent the spread of high-tech conventional weapons; it may slow down the pace of such acquisition by some countries but this is far from certain.

- U.S.-Japanese relations are unlikely to collapse and Japan is unlikely to turn toward rearmament or alter its constitution. It is not only inevitable but important that Japan gradually take on a role of greater leadership on issues of vital importance to the countries of the Asian-Pacific region. The challenge for U.S. and Japanese diplomacy will be to ensure that in the process new wedges are not driven between our two countries. Japan will eventually agree to use of its forces, in some form, for international peace-keeping although perhaps—and wisely—not in Asia. At the same time, it is in neither U.S. interests nor those of the rest of Asia, regardless of the political complexion of individual states, for Japan's military-security role in the region to grow substantially. Nor so long as U.S.-Japanese political relationships remain on a steady keel will Japan feel there a requirement for this.

- China is unlikely to use force to challenge its neighbors or the United States in the 1990s. Chinese economic development will be a strong disincentive for it to use force to change the political *status quo*. China may continue to build its maritime capabilities as a contingency with regard to both Taiwan and the South China Sea atoll chains, however, and conflict over Taiwan would pose a major security issue for American policy, and for the policies of all other East Asian states. Strong political and economic U.S. relationships with China remain an important strategic U.S. objective, even after the collapse of the 1970–1980s “strategic triangle” concept for the relationship, and one intensely supported by other Asian states, in our overall pursuit of stability and peace and in averting the growth of an unfriendly military power.

- Russian forces are unlikely to threaten security in the region although sale of sophisticated Russian military equipment, and modernization by other Asian states, may progressively increase the risks and costs of intervention or conflict for any country in the area.

- Until there is a more stable and secure political understanding on the Korean peninsula, U.S. capability to provide air, naval, and logistic support for South Korean forces in the event of an attack from the North should continue. Other contingencies should rely on forces based primarily in the CONUS, Hawaii and other mid-Pacific bases, and the availability of contingency base access within the region. In this latter context the U.S. security relationship with Japan remains a vital asset to U.S. strategic interests throughout Asia.

- The U.S. should maintain military engagement at a low force level in the Indian Ocean and Southeast Asian areas. This would include regular command



and ship and air visits and exercises, a strong IMET program to build service-to-service relationships and understanding with all countries in the region with which we have diplomatic relations, and military sales programs at a reasonable support level. The United States should demonstrate a capacity to move a larger force into the Indian Ocean and southeastern Asia at periodic intervals.

- Active U.S. economic policies and private sector involvement will continue to be central to maintaining and building strong U.S. relationships with the countries of the region, a view which is heard so universally it hardly needs repetition. When Asians think of a U.S. "withdrawal" from Asia it is as much in terms of our economic presence—investments and trade, U.S. products in the market place, visitors and tourists, technology—as of a military withdrawal from the region.

- Participation in broad regional forums by countries seen within the region as potential security threats is important in building collective pressure against the development of such threats. The gradual expansion of APEC to include China and Taiwan is a step in the right direction. Vietnam and Russia should be included as well, and the option of membership for North Korea held open as well. At an appropriate time Vietnam and China might also be included in the ASEAN PMC.

It is no accident that, with a few exceptions in the weakest of the regional organizations, the Organization of African States, it is rare that open conflict erupts between members of such groupings.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you.

Thanks to all of you for your very, very interesting and very comprehensive statements.

Let me begin the questions and ask Clark if he has questions.

Regarding the issue of the need for U.S. troop presence in the region, it appears that all of you support that notion. A few of you have touched upon other contingencies that would require American forces; for example, North Korea attacking South Korea is the one we all think about.

Some of you mentioned the possibility of China putting pressure on Taiwan. Are there any other kinds of contingencies in that part of the world that might require American military forces?

Mr. ROMBERG. I would like to go back to the notion we discussed with Mr. Murdock during the break. It is hard to put out a very simple explanation to people, but that is not what we are trying to do here.

I think what a number of us have said, in a way perhaps all of us have said, is that the presence is a deterrent. It is not that there is "X" threat and we must position ourselves in a way to deal with that threat.

Instability is the threat, uncertainty is the threat. A potential vacuum is the threat.

I mentioned the South China Sea and some others. It is not likely we would or should get involved if Vietnam and China had another dust-up over their conflicting claims.

If there were somehow a total breakdown—there are many countries that have conflicting claims there—if somehow the general system of stability in the South China Sea—broke down and you might get something with perhaps—attacks on countries—(I don't foresee that, but if that were to happen) it seems to me our interests would be engaged.

If shipping—innocent shipping—were to be threatened, it seems to me we have an interest in making sure people take that seriously. You don't do this simply through diplomatic representation.

I think it is going to be hard to identify threats as the Soviet threat was "the threat" or North Korea was "the threat." It doesn't



seem to me, however; that that therefore argues that you don't need a forward presence.

The CHAIRMAN. Let's take that up. In order to convince the American public that this is in our interest, words like instability don't convey much.

I am looking for an argument that would carry some kind of political support. What kind of argument could you make to the American public for why you need forward presence?

I can make a fairly convincing case based upon North Korea. Once you get to something like instability I am a little worried about how credible a case that is.

What I detect is a concern of the American public that that sounds a little vague and that maybe we are going to get involved in something that they don't think we ought to.

So making arguments like instability or vacuums or things—

Mr. ROMBERG. Let me try one more time. Let's assume the Korean problem as we know it goes away, that is, through reconciliation.

The CHAIRMAN. Right. That might happen.

Mr. ROMBERG. We have heard coming out of the various quarters in South Korea the notion that it would be pretty useful to have the United States still there militarily. Why? Because of concerns about its neighbors—primarily Japan, but China and Russia are thrown into the equation.

Assume there is meaning to that. Assume the United States pulls out of Korea after unification. The Koreans look around and say: "We are pretty worried about being vulnerable." They continue to modernize their forces.

In the course of this, it seems to me, the argument would be made on the American side that: "We don't need the forces we have in Japan. It is 'only' instability, so we can pull them out."

The Japanese begin to wonder how their security is going to be protected, particularly if Korea is going to be modernizing. They have territorial disputes over an island.

China looks at this and says: "Where are we going with this?" This is not a hard threat but it is a situation where you get potentially an acceleration of arms buildup among countries which otherwise would not need to do that.

Our presence could have a calming effect and prevent it from happening and we could stem the potential for war which in the end we could get drawn to because we have ties to other parties. That would be something that in the end I think would not be understandable to Americans. They would ask: "Why did we let that happen?"

Mr. YOST. Mr. Chairman, Senator Baker used to have a saying that he used periodically when he did not want to get involved in an argument. He would say "I don't have a dog in that fight."

The dilemma is that the American people are not certain why they should feel that they have a dog in the Asian fight, if you will. They have not internalized the economic ties that we have with the region.

Alan referred to our trade, but some of the comparative figures are interesting that we export more to Indonesia than we do to all

of Eastern Europe and more to Japan than we do Germany, France and the United Kingdom combined.

Clark reminded me that in talking about the Gulf War you used three words, nukes, aggression and oil. It seems to me, in thinking about Asia, you can certainly refer to nukes, not only does China have them but there is the risk that they are sharing technology and exporting ballistic missile capabilities.

But there is the prospect that Pakistan and India will be nuclear-armed states in the not too distant future and the possibility that North Korea will as well. So you are talking about a region where nukes are very much the order of the day.

Aggression, we have talked about one possibility, North-South Korea. We have talked about Taiwan.

We have talked about differences over islands in the South China Sea. But there are other contingencies where a President of the United States could well have to make a decision whether or not to become involved.

Two or 3 years ago we were never contemplating becoming involved in Kuwait and then for reasons that we are familiar with we changed our minds. So nukes, aggression, economics, I think you can come up with the words.

The real question is whether the American people are persuaded that they potentially have a dog in that fight and want to stay engaged in the event that it becomes necessary to protect U.S. national interests.

Mr. POLLACK. If I might make a few observations, Mr. Chairman, it seems to me, if we are looking down the road to possible threats that could justify certain kinds of forces, then the horse is already out of the barn. In some sense, we need to conceive of the role of our forces as playing a long-term role in shaping the kind of regional environment that we are operating in.

To make a parallel to our experience in Desert Shield and Desert Storm, there is an argument which you have made, that Saddam was undeterrable. Perhaps so, but he was undeterrable in the context that he had not seen indications of our own behavior and security commitment in advance that would caution him from acting militarily.

It is an argument that goes beyond deterrence. It is on a higher plain.

The utilization and involvement of our forces in a way that underscores commitment, not necessarily specific to very precise contingencies, needs to be weighed increasingly, because future security trends are much too problematic for us to be sure about those judgments.

But none of us is going to argue about the question of Korea. That is the easy case.

Beyond that, it gets much tougher if you are arguing solely in the realm of threat assessment. That is why I think in different ways all of us on the panel are speaking to how we impart the degree of our interests being involved and engaged and how we send signals in the long-term sense, because I think Asian elites respond to such signals of our behavior and interest.

Our deployments don't always have to be pegged very precisely or specifically to some threat that may not be that likely today. But

the possibility that the environment becomes much more disordered is why we need to be present in the region, even if there is less certainty about the operation of our forces.

In that context, I don't want to say all bets are off or be ominous about it, but to the extent that we don't take seriously our involvements in Asian states, these states will make their own choices and decisions and they will operate more independently of us. That is a fact.

Mr. KREISBERG. If I could make one comment to add to that, I think a lot depends on what case you are making for what kinds of forces. You can make the case that since the beginning of this century, certainly since Teddy Roosevelt, the United States has seen the far ends of the Pacific as part of our backyard.

You may not want to use the phrase "backyard" today, but I think there are very few Americans who would not respond to the thought that the other end of the Pacific Ocean, when it only takes 12 hours to cross it, is of security interest to the Western Coast of the United States.

The importance of our having a friendly security perimeter around our ocean borders, is not difficult to see. The problem is how much do you want to pay for the security of that perimeter. That was the reason I argue that you don't need to have large numbers; if you have access, if you have stockpiles, if you have the capability of returning in time of need and if you have a trip wire of forces that are visible in the area, for example, visible in Japan and Singapore, then the United States is sufficiently secure. This need not cost us that much because we are going to exercise these troops and ships under any circumstances, and in Japan our local costs continue to be paid by the Japanese.

The CHAIRMAN. If you have said that some kind of U.S. presence is desirable, then I guess you are asking what kind of presence. Is a continuous presence better than a presence that might be resurged and retreated?

One of the issues is that if your troops are there as a permanent part of the equation, they become part of the permanent landscape and you are not sending any particular signal. But if you have a few troops there, then you increase the number, and that does send a signal.

Signals are changed by departures from the status quo rather than by a robust deployment as part of the status quo.

I am raising the question of what kind of signals you might want to send.

Mr. KREISBERG. One commander of the U.S. Pacific Fleet said to me a couple of years ago he thought we ought to deploy ships for port visits and patrols in smaller units—a frigate and a cruiser or a couple of destroyers, but make such visits even more frequently than we had been. We don't need to send aircraft carrier battle groups or a dozen ships at a time. If the political environment changes, then you might send out four ships, or that is the occasion when you might decide to send an aircraft carrier.

But should probably have a carrier float through often enough so that people are not suddenly alarmed when for the first time in 5 years you do it. The same thing is true for the small presences we are setting up in places like Singapore. It doesn't make a difference



if it is a squadron or a half squadron we have there. Most important, however, is to have prepositioned equipment near where you might want to junction and a friendly place to land or call.

When you arrive, there is ammunition, accommodations or food if you need it. In Saudi Arabia, as you know better than I, sir, we had overbuilt facilities, and stockpiles were there already. That enormously facilitated our ability to move in with large numbers.

Mr. MURDOCK. There is also the failure of deterrence in South-west Asia.

Mr. KREISBERG. I agree with what was said earlier, maybe Saddam Hussein could not be deterred. At this point, I don't see any Saddam Husseins around Asia.

Mr. MURDOCK. Isn't there a "chicken and egg" problem? The chairman asked what is the policy rationale of overseas presence that can be sold to the American people.

One of the answers in response to that testimony was that we need to articulate a broader policy and a vision for the area that will explain how American presence contributes to that broader policy. It is also true from some of the former statements made here that people decry the fact that we have no overall articulated policy or vision for the area and, therefore, that makes the American overseas presence even more critical because that presence is the visible statement of our engagement there.

If our words were credible, perhaps less attention would be paid to the policy, but it is the lack of credibility in the area that makes our Asian neighbors look so closely at the statements themselves.

Mr. ROMBERG. I don't agree that we should try to substitute presence for policy. That is not an adequate substitute.

It seems to me that we are talking about Asia as if we are present there with the same number of forces that we have in Europe. Obviously, that is not the case.

Obviously, I forget the word that Casimir cited on the 1991 report, but anyway it is going down and it will continue to go down for some time. At the end of the three-phase program, I don't know what the Pentagon has in mind, but if it is going down 12 percent in the first phase, I guess it will go down at least equally in the subsequent phases.

So you are going to end up with a fairly small number of forces compared with now and they will be largely Naval and Air Forces, particularly if the Korean situation winds down. Unless you want to disband them anyway, they are less expensive to maintain and serve in a more useful purpose in terms of U.S. policy by being in the region rather than being somewhere over the horizon where they don't have the same effect that they can have by being a visible sign.

The figure I used before was 6 percent of U.S. forces had been on station in the region. Even if they were drawn down proportionately and still remained 6 percent, or if they were not drawn down proportionately, you are still talking, roughly, 10 percent or less.

I think your point, Mr. Chairman, about whether they should all be there or should they be coming through, obviously you don't need to have everybody there that you would want in a given contingency.

I think that Casimir Yost made a point before that once you have left a facility in a full sense, despite access arrangements, et cetera, one cannot count on getting back in.

One person's crisis—which would welcome somebody in—may be somebody else's dilemma—where they really don't want you around, thank you very much. Particularly, when we are talking about Korea, one can argue that is a special case and we can look beyond the unification issue to consider how to deter another conflict.

But with Japan, it seems to me, a continued presence is both an earnest of the U.S.-Japan alliance, which I believe is critical, and is an earnest of the U.S. role in the region. This need not be at 55,000, but essentially it should be some stable number.

I think it serves the U.S. interests to articulate vision and policy which makes clear what we are about. There I think we can use some further work.

The CHAIRMAN. Do you anticipate problems in using forces that are already there which are then deployed in some contingency outside?

How many are we defending, if we are deploying these troops on a permanent basis, on the chance that any of these crises might occur between us and the host-government?

Is that likely to be a problem?

Mr. ROMBERG. If you are talking about Korea, I don't think so. The United States, Japan and Korea, all have the same interests.

A Taiwan Strait crisis could be a different story. I think there all sorts of things are up in the air. That is: What precipitated it? What is the nature of the crisis? There could be a problem potentially, but I don't think necessarily there would be.

It is one of these "it all depends" kinds of things. But I don't rule out cooperation depending on the nature of the crisis.

Mr. POLLACK. The question, I suppose, Mr. Chairman, is how much specificity do we need. Americans come out of a tradition that is highly legalistic. We like to see bottom lines and we like to see them made very explicit.

It may be in some instances that an ambiguous posture buys us a great deal. That is what we need to aim for. We need to leave enough uncertainty in the mind of leaders thinking about a particular action that they could not plan without seriously considering the possibility that we would get involved.

Even if we were to make very binding assurances and commitments and statements, that is no guarantee that in every circumstance we will do what we said we would do. That gets into the credibility of our policy.

But we are moving into a very fluid environment. If we want to reach for contingencies, our list is pretty short, but there are a lot of things that could happen in a less-ordered regional setting, even though it is difficult to specify them now.

You want to buy some insurance. You don't want to play the fireman getting the hose out after the house is already burning down. You want to do things in advance so you won't have to face that burning house. That is a tough argument to sell. I recognize that.

But if there is going to be the kind of informed public debate about this, that is what we will have to aim for, even if it is a

tougher sell, because it requires a more sophisticated argument in a realm that is often oversimplified.

The CHAIRMAN. Is there any role that any combination of military forces in the region could play? Where do you anticipate Japan's military going and what could it be used for, for example?

Mr. POLLACK. The bulk of what the Japanese have been building for and acquiring reflects a set of roles and missions that we configured with them.

The CHAIRMAN. A different threat, of course, .

Mr. POLLACK. That is right, but a lot of it was to have Japan assume the responsibility for defense of Japanese waters and air space. It is not a power-protection mission.

It seems to me that there is such acute sensitivity in the region about any kind of Japanese role that goes beyond the defense of Japan that it will have to imbed anything the Japanese do in a multinational framework.

Although there were clear anxieties in certain areas about Japanese minesweepers going to the gulf, the fact that they were doing it in the context of the larger arrangements and understanding with other powers diminished the anxiety about that.

I don't think it is in anyone's interest to encourage Japan into any power projection role. That would be the wrong signal to send.

Mr. MURDOCK. One of the things referred to in your testimony concerned the need to look into any creative regional collective security institutions. Americans might ask what kind of regional collective security do we want?

Do we want another NATO? We don't have the threat NATO had. Do we need something that deals with CSCE terms of arrangements?

You create this regional collective security institution in which the United States presumably participates because it exercises the leadership Mr. Rombert called for in terms of defining.

Then we have a contingency like Yugoslavia that requires peace-keeping forces. Suddenly the Americans are saying our participation in a regional security mechanism and they don't see any involvement to their interests being involved.

Is this the way out to create a different demand for a security presence for the United States in the area. What do you have in mind?

Mr. KREISBERG. I was not thinking about an organization that will organize forces cooperatively, collectively to deal with crisis in the region. I think there is a great deal to be said for continuing to use the United Nations because in part that enables us——

Mr. MURDOCK. Then you don't need the collective security organization?

Mr. KREISBERG. I don't mean a collective security organization like NATO. What I mean is a grouping through which crisis and conflicts and tensions and disagreements can be aired and by airing them prevent them from growing up into crisis.

If they blow up and explode into crises and I were the Secretary of State responsible at the time, I would go straight to the Security Council. Along with other things, that would enable me to draw on a far wider range of international economic, and political pressures,



and on manpower from outside the region, which I think has clearly been useful in Cambodia.

I don't think you will get the Asian countries sitting around in a group to agree that we will now put a total of 20,000 men into place x or y or z, in order to hold off this country or that country or the other country. I just don't think they will agree to that.

I think you might not get to the point where you need to do that if you have this kind of continuous ongoing consultative process.

Mr. MURDOCK. So you are talking about a forum for consultations on regional security issues before you plug the different issues into the Security Council.

Mr. KREISBERG. Before we talk about the military security issues, let us start by talking about narcotics, smuggling, terrorism—things that could well be rationalized as having an economic flavor to them. If you blow up a plane in the process of a terrorist attack, that is clearly threatening international air traffic in the area. That is an issue, it seems to me, that you could get a subgroup of APEC involved in.

All the countries could say: Doing something about this is in our interest; this is going to hurt us all.

Mr. MURDOCK. This is the kind of organization, Mr. Yost, that you are thinking of as well?

Mr. YOST. No. I agree with Paul Kreisberg.

Let me back up a little bit and pick up a couple of issues discussed here and see if I can add to the discussion.

Mr. Chairman, you said signals are sent by departures from the status quo. What many Asians see is that, in part by intention and in part by accident, we are sending signals.

Alan Romberg noted that we have an agreement internally on a declining path. We have gotten out of the Philippines. Asians don't know what the bottom line is.

All they see is that there is a pattern of activity of the United States backing off. Are we going to stop at 100,000, at 50,000 or 25,000?

Are existing agreements in jeopardy or will they endure?

This adds to the uncertainty in the region. We are in effect sending signals whether we like to or not.

We are, as I suggested in my testimony, in a period of transition. If the North-South Korean peninsula stabilizes that may remove an element of threat.

Mr. YOST. China is an enormous uncertainty. Paul Kreisberg said that he didn't view it as a threat to its neighbors. That is a legitimate point of view. There is another point of view that if there is terrific instability within China that, as other leaders have done in other circumstances, there will be an effort to look for foreign adventures that will take the Chinese into their neighborhood. On the other hand if the Chinese situation stabilizes, that will be a factor that should influence our presence in the region.

The third factor is the one that Paul Kreisberg has just been talking about. We have resisted discussions of regional arrangements and dialog with respect to security in Asia. We have done it in part because we have a sizable Naval presence in the Pacific area, and traditionally it has been the Soviets who have said let's

talk about a Naval arms control, and so we have said, oh, no, let's not talk about these issues.

We have continued those habits in the post Soviet era, and I think what Paul and I are both saying is that this is an appropriate time to begin to change those habits of mind and to encourage dialog among countries in the region about potential threats. It is not just the United States that is worried about nuclear proliferation in the region. It is not just the United States that is worried about missile proliferation, but everyone is seized with the dilemmas that incur from discussing these issues.

I mentioned that the Chinese presence on the Security Council is a dilemma. There may be a contingency in the region in which China is directly engaged which could make it very difficult for the U.N. to play a useful role. These are issues that should be brought out on the table, engage countries in the region, and hope that out of such a dialog begins to come patterns of interaction that will be stabilizing rather than destabilizing.

Mr. POLLACK. I think it is also fair to note that what might be feasible is not some kind of a comprehensive Asia-wide forum. That becomes very unwieldy and not terribly practical with respect to what one wishes to address, but that there are building blocks that emerge in some context, maybe in a subregional context.

For example, within ASEAN a certain amount of bilateral and trilateral defense cooperation has begun to emerge—intelligence sharing, joint exercises, and so forth. It is a basis on which military institutions are dealing with one another in a collaborative context, and though I don't wish to make too much of it, it does seem to me it is the longer term direction in which regional States will be headed.

Similarly, in Korea we have tended to treat the problems here very much in a bilateral context. The South Koreans, our allies, object to any kind of notion that we move toward any kind of two plus four arrangement on the peninsula, and yet there is much that may only be addressable in the context of something that has that sort of a flavor. So it is not to say that on every potential Asian security question you wish to have membership, universal membership, if you will, among the Pacific Rim States, because that even begins to beg the issue of who is in the Pacific Rim.

If you take a very expansive concept of it, you are going to have a lot of States in the rim. It is really to look in specific cases of circumstances on how to devise a means of association that already may be emergent and may emerge even more fully in the future. I think in this respect our perceptions of the Pacific have always lagged behind what were the regional realities. Much of that is in the economic dimension, but I think over a period of time we could be greatly surprised that Asian leaderships may begin to understand their own incentives for cooperating with one another in a way that would really enable us to begin in a step-by-step process to build some kind of a framework beginning with particular issues, but perhaps expandable in different contexts.

Mr. ROMBERG. May I try a quick cut at a couple of these issues? The term "regional collective security institutions" was in your question. I don't think that is the issue, at least that is not the issue in my mind. I think that is what my colleagues have all said,



too, that is not what we are talking about or what we think may work. Dialog may be useful, but what kind of dialog? Between whom?

I think what is happening in Southeast Asia, the military co-operation between the ASEAN states on a bilateral, trilateral basis is not going to be repeated in Northeast Asia. But I do think that the kind of dialog that goes along with that could well be repeated in Northeast Asia.

Maybe there should be some umbrella discussion about East Asia and everybody should sit down at the table. My sense is, though, that the subregional context, which has been raised, is probably more likely to work. Maybe "two plus four" is premature in Korea. But at some point I agree there has got to be—and there has been a call from both Korean parties, at the appropriate stage, to have some sort of guarantees. They want to work it out between themselves first, but they want some sort of guarantees.

Mr. Chairman, you raised the issue of the Japanese role, of what is going to happen with it. I guess I disagree with my colleague, Paul Kreisberg, on Japan's Self Defense Force participation in Cambodia. I would actually, in a noncombat peacekeeping role, think it might be a useful thing.

The Cambodians are certainly pressing for it. There are all sorts of nervous reactions, however, particularly from China and Korea about it. But one thing that would facilitate such a role, whether it is in Cambodia or in some future situation, would be a dialog which involved the Japanese, together with other Asians, either in the ASEAN context or in some Northeast Asian context or perhaps in some spinoff from APEC, I don't know. But I think a dialog would be very useful, very helpful. But an institution that goes to the nature of NATO, I don't think so.

Mr. MURDOCK. One final question at the risk of sounding even more provincial than I have already sounded in this area of Asian experts. We have been talking primarily about security issues and political security issues and trying to make a case and to understand why Americans remain involved. Americans, however, with regard to Asia and particularly with Japan, perceive the situation primarily in economic terms, and their perception is that of an economic relationship operating to American disadvantage.

Now, clearly some kind of linkage has to be made so that Americans understand that they remain involved in the area for economic security reasons, that they are linked, that what we do in one sphere has some impact on what is happening in the other sphere. How do you make that connection? What is the connection? Should it be made or should we try to keep the spheres separate and have each stand on its own?

Mr. ROMBERG. You could make the case, and I think I mentioned this at my opening remarks, that while some Americans think we have given up too much in trade negotiations in order to protect the alliance in the cold war era, some Japanese make the opposite case, that they have given up things in economic negotiations simply to pacify their American alliance partner. I don't think we should dismiss that perspective.

My own judgment is that probably on balance the Japanese proved to be more cooperative on this, helping us. But as we look



to the future, we are not going to have a Soviet case to deal with. It seems to me that the approach to the issue has to start from the top. That is where I go to my call for leadership. It seems to me that the alliance with Japan is the underpinning not just of American security policy in Asia, but of American political and economic policy as well. If that alliance falls apart, all sorts of ramifications fall with it.

Others here have talked about the attitudes of Asians, worrying about the state of U.S.-Japan relations. That is very real, and the reason they worry about it is because if there is no longer an alliance, the fallout affects everything—it includes security and also includes economic and political relations. The sense of Japan on its own worries other countries. I am not trying to articulate a view that only I am worried about it. It worries other countries. That is very real and will have very real implications.

I think that if you look at the state of U.S.-Japan economic relations, while there is a lot of emotion, in fact, an awful lot of problems have been solved. Others are being addressed, and they have got to be addressed, but the biggest part of our problem is not with Japan. The biggest part of our problem is with ourselves. That is where, again, I go back to leadership. Somebody at the top has to say that and has to say: "Yes, we are going to deal with the problems we have got with Japan. We are not going to have unfair trade." Or, "We are not going to have unequal access," and things of that sort. But that is not where we need to start to address our economic problems. We are addressing the problem wrongly if we simply say: "Well, we've got all these economic problems, now how do we relate that to our alliances? What do we get out of our alliances that compensates for that, or that offsets that?" I just think that is the wrong framework.

Mr. MURDOCK. All right. Well, thank you very much.

[Whereupon, at 3:58 p.m., the panel was recessed, subject to the call of the Chair.]

## FUTURE NUCLEAR WEAPONS REQUIREMENTS

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HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES, DEFENSE POLICY PANEL AND DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY DEFENSE NUCLEAR FACILITIES PANEL, *Washington, DC, Wednesday, April 8, 1992.*

The panels met, pursuant to notice, at 2 p.m., in room 2118, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. John M. Spratt, Jr., (chairman of the Department of Energy Defense Nuclear Facilities Panel) presiding.

### STATEMENT OF HON. JOHN M. SPRATT, JR., A REPRESENTATIVE FROM SOUTH CAROLINA, CHAIRMAN, DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY DEFENSE NUCLEAR FACILITIES PANEL

Mr. SPRATT. Chairman Aspin asked me to call the hearing to order and welcome our two witnesses, Former Secretary of the Air Force, Thomas Reed and Former Director of the Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory, Michael May. We welcome both of you.

The focus of our hearing today is on the requirements in the future for nuclear weapons. Mr. May is the author, under the auspices of the National Academy of Sciences, of a pamphlet entitled "The Future of the U.S.-Soviet Nuclear Relationship" which illustrates the problem that we are addressing today, in that the title is already out of date. The world is moving faster than the policy-makers can keep pace with.

That is one of the questions that we have before us. What do the changes in the world today imply, in particular for the nuclear arsenal that we maintain?

Mr. May suggests that as few as a thousand nuclear weapons may be adequate for our security, and an adequate deterrent, and adequate to maintain stability in the world. Secretary Reed has suggested that we have many more targets than a thousand. In his study with Michael Wheeler, "The Role of Nuclear Weapons in the New World Order," a need for substantially more than that. I think 5,000 to 6,000 nuclear weapons is indicated.

So we have different viewpoints presented here today, and we want to explore with our witnesses the rewards of this New World Order and the risks that come along with it—the problems of proliferation, of counting, and of breakout that accompany a world in which there are fewer nuclear weapons—as well as the possibilities for systems such as ballistic missile defense or SDI in a world where defenses may make more sense than they did with 20,000 to 25,000 nuclear arms on each side.

So we welcome both of you to the hearing today, and we look forward to your testimony. But before giving you the floor, let me ask

Mr. Kyl, who is the substitute ranking member, if he has any comments that he would like to make.

**STATEMENT OF HON. JON KYL, A REPRESENTATIVE FROM ARIZONA, RANKING MINORITY MEMBER, DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY DEFENSE NUCLEAR FACILITIES PANEL**

Mr. KYL. Thank you. I join you in welcoming this afternoon's witnesses. This morning, the panel heard General Butler, the Commander-in-Chief of the Strategic Air Command, eloquently make the case for maintaining modern effective strategic forces, even as those forces are coming down in number. We would be wise, in my judgment, to heed his counsel.

This afternoon, I am interested in receiving your views in the same areas about which General Butler testified. First, can we safely reduce our reliance on strategic offensive nuclear weapons beyond the level suggested by President Bush? In this regard, how should the United States respond to President Yeltsin's call for reducing between 2,000 and 2,500 strategic weapons?

Second, beyond simply describing the number of weapons that we need, how should these forces be postured? Are there further changes in our force posture that can be made safely beyond just taking the bombers off alert?

Third, to what extent can modern effective conventional munitions replace nuclear weapons in our force planning? Fourth, how will the introduction of missile defenses of both the United States and Russia affect the strategic balance and relationship? Should we be looking forward to an area in which missile defenses become predominant over offensive forces?

I know that you bring unique and insightful perspectives to bear on these and related questions, and I look forward to hearing your testimony. Thank you.

Mr. SPRATT. I understand that both of you have already presented prepared testimony. As a matter of procedure, if there is no objection, I will make each of your testimonies a part of the record in its entirety, and you can summarize as you see fit.

Now in your case, Mr. Reed, I think that this is the testimony that we are referring to. We will make it part of the record.

Mr. REED. That is the report, Mr. Chairman. Then I submitted a statement as well, a shorter version.

Mr. SPRATT. If there is no objection, we will make both part of the record.

Mr. May, we will make your testimony part of the record.

Mr. Reed, the floor is yours. We will hear testimony from both of you, and then put questions to you as a panel.

Thank you very much for coming.

**STATEMENT OF THOMAS REED, FORMER SECRETARY, U.S. AIR FORCE**

Mr. REED. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I very much appreciate the opportunity to be here, because this winter has provided an opportunity for all of us to look at a whole new landscape and explore totally new ideas as to where this country ought to go.



You and your Chairman, Mr. Aspin, have displayed some real leadership, and I am certainly honored to be here to be asked my views on this subject.

Last year, my associates and I tried to think about and address the role of nuclear weapons in the New World Order. The result was a report that we have furnished you that Mike Wheeler and I authored. I had a couple of dozen colleagues in this enterprise, and their names are listed in the back of the report. But of course, any errors of omission or commission that I make today are my own.

I thought that we would talk about the report, very briefly. I thought that I would try this afternoon to touch briefly on four things. One is just the highlights of the report, to review what they were. Second, to illuminate a couple of areas of the report, where the findings do not enjoy universal agreement, and show you where they are.

Third, to talk about future scenarios, or more accurately what I think to be the futility of trying to define them. Then lastly, to end up with a one page one chart answer to the question of what is the role of nuclear weapons in the New World Order.

What did the report say? First of all, it talked about the landscape. It said that nuclear weapons exist, that they cannot be "uninvented." They have characteristics desired by some, who therefore want to acquire them. Nuclear weapons are in copious supply as the detritus of the Soviet Union.

I think that is an important concept. It means that the disappearing empire has left behind a vast nuclear arsenal, huge military forces, and an enormous though crippled military industrial complex. That the nuclear debris or detritus really constitutes a threat, not the current Government of Russia.

The landscape also includes Third World states, who are antagonistic to the United States, and its friends and allies, with the resources to give substance to that hatred, and who are trying to acquire weapons of mass destruction and the means of delivery.

Now I think that those qualifiers are important. Because simply to talk about Third World powers gives a bum rap to some very nice friendly countries. Liberia, Chile, Malaysia do not wish the United States ill.

The expression "The Cold War is Over" means that there is little threat of a massive conventional invasion of Western Europe, at least for now. It also means that the American and the Russian people are beginning to focus on mutual interests and friendships, so far devoid of recrimination and bitterness.

We cannot avoid the Soviet nuclear legacy when we think about the New World Order. But amongst the things that we concluded is that we do not really have to foresee the outcome of the current turmoil over there to reach some conclusions about our own security.

The future is not certain, and it never is. We have not reached the end of history, only a fortunate floodtide that can lead on to good fortune if we are wise.

So why do nations want nuclear weapons? Well, I think you have to answer that in categories. First of all, the United States wishes to deter aggression that threatens our survival. We want to protect

our allies with a nuclear umbrella, therefore dissuading them from going nuclear. If we wish to provide leadership in the world where others have nuclear weapons, we had best maintain a safe and secure inventory of our own.

Second, other nuclear weapons states, for example everybody from the U.K. and France to Israel and India, probably wish to deter aggression, especially by long-time local rivals. To varying degrees, they enjoy the status of being nuclear club members. A nuclear umbrella for their allies probably is not as important to them as it is to us.

Antagonistic and resourceful Third World powers want weapons of mass destruction to terrorize and coerce as a status symbol and to deter. But to deter whom? They wish to deter the United States from intervening in their local affairs, which we may not consider to be local, and which is a very new concept in this world.

Last, fragments of the Soviet Union have simply inherited the nuclear legacy. Weapons are there under dubious control. They are seen by some republic leaders as insurance against future inter-republic aggressions. But revolutions break old bonds of discipline, and they unleash passions to settle old scores. The poverty of the republics shifts loyalties. All in all, therefore, there is an enormous opportunity for disaster in these "loose nukes."

On the other hand the industrial heavyweights—most of Europe, Japan, South Korea, Taiwan, Argentina, and Brazil among others—have foresworn nuclear weapons so far because they feel comfortable without them. They could produce them if they wanted to. Dissuading them from that option is an important American challenge.

So how many weapons? That is the subject of discussion this morning. If we talk about strategic nuclear weapons, we have to start with our current inventory, and think about the reasons for reducing nuclear weapons in the U.S. inventory. There are several reasons that we would want to do that.

First of all, the present large inventory simply is not needed to cover any reasonable set of targets in the New World Order, and most people agree that we should get rid of things that we do not need. This is especially true if some of these things are dangerous. Some nuclear weapons are old, while some are inherently safe. Some are quite secure like warheads in silos, and some are not, like artillery shells deployed in foreign countries. It is important to focus on the problem weapons when we invoke this criteria.

Third, defense expenditures must be cut, and it is assumed that weapons on hand drive the budget. While this is true when building and deploying new systems, it may not be true on the margin, since reducing existing force structure may do little to reduce infrastructure costs. When reducing forces in a START environment, if the treaty is truly complex, the treaty constraints may be even increase costs.

Some will argue that lower force sizes discourage proliferation. We think that this is at best a third order reason. While Third World representatives may point with alarm at the superpowers' arms inventories, we thought it unlikely that Saddam Hussein would have been seriously influenced by any U.S. arms reductions.



To be fair, however, a general downward trend may be helpful to the leaders of a fragile democracy in forgoing a weapons program.

In fact, lower force sizes may encourage proliferation. Because if the United States moves from being a superpower to being an equal, other states may wish to be equals as well.

Last, force reductions are certainly worth it if we get something of value in return, and that is really the bottom line. Do we get the removal of Soviet weapons that threaten us, especially those threatening us in an unstable and hair-trigger way?

Any proposed course of action reducing the numbers of weapons must therefore draw its legitimacy from one or more of these considerations. Some minimum force structure is in order. A strategic weapons inventory of 5,000 plus or minus 20 percent seems a reasonable objective today, that is to say, this week. As I hope that we will explore this afternoon, that may not be the case next week or next month. Hopefully, these numbers are but way-stations on the journey to a safer and more secure world, for there is not any end game in military balance, just as there is no end of history.

When you talk about nuclear weapons and the inventory, we need to talk about flexibility. Given the Soviet situation, the possible instabilities associated with the remaining Marxist powers, and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, new attention has to be given to adding some flexibility to U.S. weapons employment planning. But since flexibility can become chaos during a crisis, and since any changes to the SIOP can add to that problem, changes to the SIOP have got to be very carefully thought through from the start.

There are several compelling reasons for retaining an orderly process to construct pre-planned options for the use of nuclear weapons. First of all, the threat of the SS-18s for instance in silos, and we know where they are. The threat is not the current government. The silos are fixed, and we can plan to deal with them.

But by far, the most important reason for sticking with pre-planned options is that nuclear weapons cannot be treated casually. The decision to release them for whatever purpose must remain very structured, with every effort being made to stop the errors of exhaustion and the fog of war from creeping in.

Studies of the nuclear forces then get down to the specifics, of what to do about the forces. We concluded that a concept of a triad of strategic forces tied together into the national command authorities by a robust and survivable C<sup>3</sup>I systems continues to make sense. This concept remains even more valid in the New World Order as we put fewer eggs into smaller baskets.

ICBMs are the most cost effect leg of the triad, and some should be retained as single R/V missiles. We simply cannot afford mobility.

There appears to be no ASW threat to our Trident fleet of SSBNs. Thus, we should continue to rely on those planned eighteen boats with their current alert rates. There is little inherent safety increase, stability improvement, or cost reduction to be gained by de-MIRVing, or even downloading R/Vs, on Trident missiles except one, to get the Soviets to do something on land that we want them to do; or second, to simplify targeting, to increase range, and/or to accommodate heavier warheads.



Given those possibilities, it certainly seems that downloading from eight R/Vs to at least five or six R/Vs per missiles seems a reasonable thing to do and could be helpful.

Bombers will play an ever-important role in the New World Order, because they are not destabilizing, and they can carry large payloads, and they are very flexible. They can be safely reassigned from a SIOP role to other theaters, so long as confidence remains high in the survivability and reliability of the two missile legs of the triad. What that means is that should one family of missiles develop temporary technical problems, such as aging, we may be tempted to temporarily, or we should temporarily put bombers back on alert.

Stealth is already enormously important and cost-effective in a bomber. The benefits of the technology were amply demonstrated in the Gulf, where there were no losses on the most difficult missions into severe defense environments by F-117 aircraft. The B-2 payload is very large, perhaps allowing one aircraft to accomplish an entire contingency mission. The continued procurement of the B-2, unfortunately expensive as it is, seems like the prudent thing to do.

Given those forces, of course, we then have to talk about having sound nuclear weapons in them. The four major issues now impacting the Department of Energy complex are safety, which means the resistance to dropping, explosion, fire and so forth; security, making weapons theft-proof; the environmental status of the production complex; and the ongoing debate on whether the United States should cease nuclear testing as part of a comprehensive test ban.

The United States will continue to need a nuclear weapons complex to support the forces that we have just talked about, with even higher levels of safety and security, as well as to disassemble retired weapons rapidly and safely. At a minimum, that means design laboratories, tritium production and plutonium fabrication facilities, and some degree of nuclear testing.

Now with the last, let me focus very briefly on what was contentious in the report. There were two topics which certainly enjoyed the uniform agreement of our group but that are the subject of public debate and correctly so. One is the matter of no first use.

Some people have argued that the United States can discourage nuclear proliferation by confirming a highly visible declaratory policy that American nuclear weapons serve no purpose other than to deter other nuclear weapons.

We as a group are not comfortable with the implications of that argument, that a nation can engage in any level of chemical or especially biological aggression and be shielded by an American non-nuclear pledge. We doubt that Saddam Hussein's decisions on pursuing nuclear weapons, or the decisions of future like minded aggressors, would be influenced even marginally by such a CTB U.S. policy.

The chance that the United States would use nuclear weapons in a regional conflict is remote. But a policy of last resort is appropriate here as in Europe. Our declaratory policy should be deliberately ambiguous. (When I referred to CTB, above I meant the "no first use" issue.

The second issue that is contentious is the matter of a comprehensive test ban. Some feel that continued testing of nuclear weapons by the major powers may encourage proliferation. Continued underground testing, even if focused on weapon safety and security, may produce political heat. But it is not clear that a CTB would have any influence or effect on possible real world proliferants such as Iraq, or Iran, or Libya, or North Korea, or Algeria.

We concluded that it is not in the U.S. interest to negotiate a Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, nor to agree to a moratorium that would become a de facto treaty. To ensure a safe and secure nuclear posture, to hedge against the uncertainties associated with new nuclear technologies including the disablement of terrorist bombs, to retain the ability to respond to a radical reversal in world politics, to assure the reliability of existing weapons, and to do all of this in an environmentally acceptable production complex, some degree of nuclear testing is advisable so long as the United States has nuclear weapons.

With that summary of the report, let me just talk about two aspects of all of this that have become clear to me as I have talked about this over the past few months. The first is the issue of uncertainty, or what could be called the "Seven Scenario" flap, the problems that arise when people try to write down where are we going from here.

The expression "The Cold War is Over" tempts one to carelessness, I think. Because since the end of World War II, our national leadership has never perceived what each coming decade really held. Consider the credibility of a speaker standing up on January 1st of each decade forecasting as follows:

Supposing on January 1st in 1950, the speaker said that within 8 months we would nearly lose a land war in Korea, or who would forecast that by the end of the decade in 1959 the winning candidate for president would decry the loss of American nuclear superiority, using the expression "the missile gap." That would not have been very credible in 1950.

Supposing in 1960, at the end of the Eisenhower "golden years," that a speaker had predicted another Asian land war, one that we would lose with 50,000 dead. Supposing that that speaker would predict in 1969 at the end of the decade that Washington, DC; itself would be a battleground in that war. It wouldn't have been very credible.

Supposing on January 1, 1970, that a speaker forecast that OPEC would seize control of the petroleum market, embargoes and all. In the middle of all of that, that the President would resign.

Supposing the forecast at the end of the decade of 1979 was that the Shah of Iran would actually flee Iran and that oil would be \$40 a barrel. In the golden plenty of 1970 with gasoline at 25 cents a gallon, not many people would have believed that.

Suppose in January of 1980, when President Carter and General-Secretary Brezhnev squared off as a result of the invasion of Afghanistan, that the speaker had predicted the collapse of world communism, and that in 1989 the Berlin Wall would be swept away bloodlessly. Would we really have believed that?

Supposing on January 1, 1990, which is only a couple of years ago, that a speaker had forecast that the United States would lead a brilliant military rescue of occupied Kuwait?

Or if they forecast something in 1999. What? Jean LaPen as president of France; or Hong Kong as the manager of China's business finances; or North Korea deploying a nuclear weapon or exploding a nuclear weapon on some Japanese asset? We do not know. Any of those forecasts would sound absurd, even the correct one.

The point of all of this, and the point that I think is terribly important for you ladies and gentlemen, is that history is full of twists and turns. It is best to be prepared for the worst, or at least not be surprised by it, and to be postured to enjoy or even to exploit the best. But we should never extrapolate a single straight line from here to a happy tomorrow just because "The Cold War is Over." Life simply does not work that way.

So let me close with a conclusion. What is the answer to the question "What is the role of nuclear weapons in the New World Order?" Well, I think that the threats to our security that require U.S. ownership of nuclear weapons really can be condensed down into three threats and three reasons.

The first threat is the Soviet nuclear detritus. For example, the weapons, and the forces and the military industry left behind by the Soviet empire.

What is the role of nuclear weapons, U.S. nuclear weapons? It is to deter those who control or who could control the Soviet legacy until it is gone. In the process, to act as bargaining chips in bringing that dissolution about.

The second threat is those who would aggravate our industrial allies. That is not the same thing as "attack" or "irritate." By aggravate, I am talking about aggressors such as China or North Korea in the Orient, or a revisionist republic in Europe. Or I am talking about competitors, who would challenge the status, the respect of these major industrial powers who will growingly want seats on the Security Council. The role of U.S. weapons, I think, is to provide the assurance of a nuclear umbrella, thus to dissuade our industrial allies from going nuclear.

The third threat are these Third World antagonistic resourceful states, which are currently Iraq, Iran, North Korea, Libya, and Algeria. That list can lengthen or shorten with history.

The role of U.S. nuclear weapons is to deter, as a last resort, the use of weapons of mass destruction or other unconscionable acts in ways that we now only dimly perceive. We cannot know how these threats will play themselves out. I think that it is best to prepare for difficult possibilities, while trying to entice history into civilized channels.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. SPRATT. Mr. May.

#### STATEMENT OF MICHAEL MAY, FORMER DIRECTOR, LAWRENCE LIVERMORE NATIONAL LABORATORY

Mr. MAY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

In my testimony today, I would like to do four things. First, I would like briefly to summarize the conclusions reached by the Na-



tional Academy of Sciences study about the U.S.-Soviet nuclear relationship, which you have with you, and the title of which, as you point out, needs to be changed.

Second, I would like to review and comment briefly on the nuclear weapons situation these days in the former Soviet Union, the Commonwealth of Independent States.

Third, I would like to discuss a factor that may drive nuclear proliferation today.

Fourth, I will discuss approaches to some of the problems of nuclear proliferation and in particular, talk about the question of a more cooperative world security order, which is very much on the minds of people these days, and which is being studied and discussed.

So I will be going off in a somewhat different direction from the direction of Mr. Reed, at least in my latter comments. The latter comments in this testimony are my own views, and not the views of the National Academy or anyone else.

In my prepared statement, I will not be addressing two of the four questions that were listed by yourself and Mr. Kyl, namely the conventional forces and the defenses, but I would be happy to talk about those two topics following my statement.

On the first topic, the National Academy study, the study was carried out by a committee of the Academy, the Committee on International Security and Arms Control, a standing committee, which has been in existence for about 9 or 10 years, and which meets regularly with equivalent groups of people from the Soviet Union, Russia now, and occasionally from China and other countries.

The committee is composed of scientists, political scientists, retired military officers and retired government officials with experience in nuclear weapons and arms control.

The study itself was started in early 1990 and ended in early September 1991, just before the President made his historic proposal for deep cuts and for pull-backs in nuclear weapons, and just before President Gorbachev's positive response in October.

Briefly speaking, the study foreshadowed what has been happening since. It recommended bilateral cuts in nuclear weapons, strategic nuclear weapons, predicated on a success at START, to about half of the START level, that is, about 3,000 or 4,000 weapons.

It recommended similar bilateral cuts in tactical nuclear weapons to an unspecified level, but a lower one, in concert with our NATO allies. It emphasized that these actions should be taken in concert with our allies, as of course they have been.

It recommended that we eliminate tactical nuclear weapons from surface ships, again in concurrence with the allies, and also eliminate all ground based tactical nuclear weapons outside of the United States. All of this should be done in negotiation with Russia.

It also recommended some specific improvements in command and control of nuclear weapons, which I would be glad to go into in the question period.

For some years, a number of studies had come to the conclusion that the numbers of nuclear weapons on both sides exceeded targeting requirements. In fact, the numbers on all sides—on our side, at least—was really based on a fundamental level of deploy-

ment that had been decided upon in the Eisenhower administration. Since that time, technological improvements and the political dynamics have led to ever larger numbers of weapons in excess of those that had seen us through the worst days of the cold war.

With President Gorbachev's initiatives, particularly the withdrawal of Soviet forces from Central Europe, it became possible politically and strategically to reduce these numbers to a much more economical level.

I might comment that the number which the Academy study suggested as a result of bilateral actions are not all that different from the numbers which Mr. Reed's committee suggested. We came up with 3,000 to 4,000 strategic and a small number of tactical weapons. Mr. Reed's committee came up with about 5,000 strategic weapons, I believe. Those are the numbers that we believe could be reached in bilateral discussions and negotiations with Russia, without bringing in the rest of the world.

This is now well-accepted by the civilian and military leadership in both the United States and Russia, and so what I will do is make three additional points that were made in the study and that may be useful at this point.

First of all, even deep cuts do not mean the end of the need for modernization. In particular, nuclear weapons systems must remain invulnerable to attack in whatever state of alert they happen to be: alert or non-alert. If they are not invulnerable to attack to a large degree, they are not going to constitute a deterrent to future aggressive action. In fact, the lower the numbers go, the more important this invulnerability is. Modernization is also needed to maintain and improve standards of safety and security as Mr. Reed noted.

Of course, we do not anticipate that the present Russian leadership is going to take any aggressive action, although they do have the nuclear weapons. But the nuclear force policy that we lay down now in these years is likely to govern decisions for sometime to come. Nuclear deterrence is aimed down the line at preventing, deterring, discouraging aggressive actions. It may play a political role in preventing potentially dangerous demagogues from coming to power in the first place. If nuclear forces are to play this role, no matter how small, they have to meet a standard of invulnerability, operability, safety and security required of any deterrent force.

Now this being said, it is clear that for some time to come, we can rely on existing systems. We can select for elimination the more obsolete and vulnerable amongst them, and the rate and the cost of modernization can certainly go down considerably and in fact has gone down.

In addition, as you noted, Mr. Chairman, the numbers given in the study are not the lowest possible numbers. They were chosen as numbers that could be reached by bilateral agreements. The study also pointed out that, if you could get reliable security cooperation and arms control agreements amongst all of the world's nuclear powers and potential nuclear powers, you could go down to levels of 1,000 or fewer. The study noted that that's not the world as it is today, but it may well be the world some years from now.

I want to emphasize that what is needed to reach that goal is not just formal agreements on numbers, but also an overall pattern



of security cooperation. A decision about nuclear weapons either in this country or in other countries cannot be divorced from overall security considerations. In everybody's mind, our minds and the minds of other countries, they are tied together with overall security. That matters for deep cuts and it matters for nuclear proliferation.

The second point is that, as a nuclear weapons systems go off alert on both sides, as has been noted by members of the committee, and as Russia evolves from an enemy to a nation that we have more normal relations with, target selection and targeting doctrine do not play the key roles that they used to play when the systems were ready to go at a few minutes' notice and when their purpose was well defined.

As the systems go off alert and as they fulfill a more general deterrent purpose, the size of the force will be set by factors such as the need to retain leverage with the world's nuclear powers and deterring other potential threats to the United States. The weapons themselves rather than being targeted against specific objectives will be held in reserve, much as other elements of our forces are.

The third point I would like to make is that, again, from the National Academy study, in the view of the committee, the U.S. security would be best served if nuclear weapons came to serve no other purpose than to deter the use or threat of nuclear weapons by others.

Now that is not entirely up to us. If some very major, but non-nuclear threat were to arise again, such as the threat that Stalin posed in Europe, nuclear weapons would presumably again play a deterrent role whether that was planned or not. But we believe it is not in the U.S. interest to keep nuclear weapons in the forefront of our deterrent posture or military plans. This is in agreement with statements which the President has made and Mr. Reed also.

The existence of nuclear weapons, although we are stuck with them, does not fundamentally help the United States. On the contrary, it makes the United States much more vulnerable than it would otherwise be. That is true, as well, of other rich and developed countries and so, there is a consensus among these countries that nuclear weapons should be deterrents of last resort. We believe that strengthening this consensus is a major national interest of the United States, not to be sacrificed lightly. A little later in the talk, I will talk about ways in which this consensus can be strengthened.

Now my second topic is the status of nuclear weapons in the CIS, in the former Soviet Union. As members of this committee know, the United States and Russia are now engaged in an unprecedented cooperative effort to retrieve nuclear weapons from the other CIS republics where they remain, namely, Ukraine, Belarus and Kazakhstan.

The nuclear weapons in the other parts of the former Soviet Union and Eastern Europe, the Baltic Republics, the Transcaucases have already been returned to Russia, according to Russian authorities and Commonwealth authorities.

The agreement is that all remaining tactical nuclear weapons are to be returned by July 1 of this year and all remaining strategic weapons outside of Russia by 1994. The republics, except



Kazakhstan, have agreed to this in principle, although President Kravchuk of Ukraine has said in March that he was holding up the transfer in order to insure that the weapons were destroyed and, of course, more recently President Kravchuk and President Yeltsin are having difficulties over the Navy in the Black Sea.

Now, the National Academy Committee did not foresee the breakup of the Soviet Union in detail. It did foresee, however, that if the breakup occurred, a successor government of the Soviet Union might well wish to do exactly what it has done, namely, continue reductions and seek cooperative arrangements with the U.S. and European states.

Let me comment briefly on two aspects of this complicated process which is unfolding before our eyes and which I think none of us can quite see to the end of.

The first comment I will make is that the agreements between the United States and Russia beyond START so far consist of speeches are now informal. It seems to me that both ratification of START and clearly codified agreements beyond START are needed if we are to proceed without the doubts and questions on both sides that could eventually poison the relationship.

We do not know who the future leaders of Russia will be and we do not know what pressure they are going to be working under. It is true that is fundamentally in the interest of both the United States and Russia to reduce these weapons and limit their danger. Neither the United States nor Russia needs nuclear weapons to be powerful. Both are vulnerable to them so there is a strong lasting basis for cooperation on this subject. But this strong lasting basis might be overlooked at times of stress, particularly as future Russian leaders deal with nationalist pressures and possibly with resentment over Russia's slide from its earlier status. So I believe it is to our advantage to nail agreements down as clearly as possible and to develop a constituency within the military and civilian establishment for working out modes of cooperation in nuclear matters.

The second aspect of the process that I will comment on is the bargaining over nuclear weapons that is now going on among the republics: Russia, Ukraine, Kazakhstan, Belarus to a lesser extent, and the United States.

Now the motives on the republics' side probably include domestic political appeal in certain parts of their constituency. It probably includes also the desire for money. The United States, itself, has put some money on the table, as you know. It probably includes an element of security, since Russia under different circumstances might become a more threatening neighbor to some of these republics.

Our motive, of course, is to preserve the non-proliferation regime and to have just Russia as the successor state. Russia's motive is in part the same as ours and also in part a desire to keep control over weapons which it views as its own.

A number of members of the committee made a recent visit to Moscow—two weeks ago, in fact—and based on that visit, during which we spoke with several senior defense people in Moscow, the situation is still very complicated, with differences of views, and the detailed outcome is uncertain.

We clearly have incentives to see those questions settled amicably. For one thing, we have incentives to retain amicable relations with Ukraine, Kazakhstan and Belarus. They are sizeable countries on the borders of a very large country and even in the new cooperative world order, it is not a bad idea to keep balance-of-power notions in mind and to have friendly relations with countries on the boundaries of a very large state.

For another, the arrangement that was agreed to at Minsk last December whereby the former Soviet nuclear weapons would be managed by a single military organization—which is currently headed by Marshall Shoposhnikov—would report to a political structure made up of the four republics. That arrangement is not a bad idea from our standpoint. Structures like that which in some ways are reminiscent of NATO can be a very strong deterrent and a very strong defense force, but they are not likely to be swayed into hasty or ill-considered offensive action if political agreement is needed from four separate capitals.

If the continued turnover of nuclear weapons from Ukraine, Kazakhstan and Belarus becomes deadlocked and if it becomes clear that there are motives of money and equity involved in the minds of the republics, we might consider an arrangement whereby the states which turn in enough nuclear material like plutonium and uranium for one weapon would be compensated, for instance, by World Bank credits. The World Bank would then—this is my own notion, not that of the Academy—the World Bank might then acquire title to the nuclear material and the nuclear material might be stored in some agreed safeguarded site in a non-nuclear country, for instance, Canada. The weapons could be disassembled and stripped of everything but the nuclear material by Russia, thereby eliminating the classified components. The nuclear material in the course of time could be used as fuel in nuclear reactors. Given present market conditions for these fuels and the present lack of facilities for transforming the metallic plutonium and uranium into reactor fuel, this is a long-term prospect and long-term storage is needed. A decade or more has to be envisaged. Any payment by the World Bank for this material would probably be in excess of the discounted value of the material at present market prices. However, it might not be in excess of this value if you consider that we are heading into a long-term energy shortage and the price of nuclear fuel is to go up in the next century. In any case, the rationale would not be economic so much as security.

As an added twist, the United States and Russia might themselves avail themselves of this agreement, in addition to the other republics. The United States, for instance, if it turned in to this World Bank depository some of its own material, would be reimbursed for some of its contribution to the Bank which is an attractive notion. Russia would be helped in its conversion effort. The mechanism would serve to spread the cost of nuclear weapons reduction more evenly over all the wealthy nations which presumably would profit from a diminution of the nuclear threat. Again, I want to emphasize that that notion, whether it is reasonable or hair-brained, is my own.

Let me now turn briefly in the rest of my time to the demand for nuclear weapons and arrangements for dealing with nuclear



proliferation. In many people's view, nuclear proliferation is the most important security problem that faces us. I am going to summarize my statement, now, in the interest of time. Even though it is a dangerous and in our view unnecessary step, the acquisition of nuclear weapons is surely going to be governed by the laws of supply and demand as is the acquisition of other goods. To date we have been fairly successful in restricting supply of nuclear weapons, but two things have changed. For one thing, supply restriction will now involve the cooperation of more different countries. The technological tools needed to make nuclear weapons systems have become more widely available. The other thing that has changed is that the demand has changed.

Mr. Reed has noted what makes for nuclear weapons demand and I generally agree with him. There are, of course, internal factors that differ in each country, but three things generally seem to be decisive, at least historically. One is the fear that nuclear weapons may be used against one's own country. I think that fear was probably decisive for President Roosevelt who was facing a race with Hitler to an unknown technology. It was probably decisive for Mao Tse-tung in China, who was facing both overt and covert threats from the super powers. It may have been decisive for Joseph Stalin.

A second motivation is a desire to influence decisions regarding nuclear weapons and that desire was probably decisive for Great Britain and France, possibly for India and it played a role, I am sure, in Stalin's decision.

The third motivation is the fear of a superior or eventually superior hostile conventional force. That fear was probably decisive for Israel and Pakistan, although not the sole factor. Recent and fairly interesting research indicates that it may also have motivated Mao Tse-tung, who initiated the nuclear program as he contemplated very heavy Chinese manpower losses in the wake of the Korean War, even though he won his part of it. He is reputed to have noted that, with nuclear weapons, that would not be necessary anymore.

Throughout the cold war, most countries which had some of these fears were securely lined up on one side or the other and with some considerable urging, sometimes, our clients and allies could be urged into the non-proliferation treaty regime. This happened with our principal allies, Germany and Japan. We had considerable discussion about that in the 1960s and with other European countries, and eventually with South Korea and with Taiwan.

During the cold war, believable security guarantees could be given by the United States and the Soviet Union because each had an enemy and other countries perceived that there were good reasons to give the security guarantees. But now things have become much more uncertain and complicated. There are no longer only two centers of power. The European Community, China, and Japan are becoming more autonomous and powerful. The reactions to this new situation as regards nuclear weapons have varied. Some have been quite favorable. China quite recently acceded to the Non-Proliferation Treaty as a Nuclear State and France has stated that it was going to, itself. South Africa has acceded as a non-nuclear state and Argentina and Brazil have decided to end their nuclear



rivalry and accept full-scope safeguards even though they are not formally acceding. But other nations, as we know, are going the other way, and Iraq is only one example.

An important factor in determining which way nations are going to go with respect to nuclear weapons is whether they perceive that war is likely for them. Mature nations, the United States, Western Europe, and Japan have given up war as a way to augment their territory or build their nations, but all nations were shaped by war and we have new nations with popular and nationalistic passions and with boundaries that are highly unpopular. It is I think unrealistic to expect that war is going to be ruled out of the world. If war threatens, the last 47 years have demonstrated that nuclear weapons are very good deterrents. I believe that the deterrent value of nuclear weapons is going to constitute the bulk of the demand for them amongst some of these countries.

We have not seen all the dimensions of nuclear deterrence during the cold war. We had nuclear deterrence between the United States and the Soviet Union which were stable, large nations, far away from each other, and which were deterred from taking direct action against each other anyway. But now we are going to see nuclear deterrence possibly exercised in very different situations involving unequal nations, sometimes unstable governments, trying to maintain local freedom of action, as Mr. Reed pointed out, and viewing nuclear weapons as an equalizer.

I think we have to address this demand. I think it will not be enough to address supply measures and in order to address demand, we are going to have to go to the root of the security problems for the nations involved, which is a difficult political thing to do.

In closing, I will say a word about the cooperative world orders which are being studied and discussed by a number of groups and people around the country. Some important studies have come from the House Armed Services Committee and its chairman. Foundations and academic researchers are looking at the question as are, of course, agencies of the Government.

There are a lot of detailed questions that are being studied, but in addition to the detailed questions, there is a question of what kind of cooperative world agreement might work to try to address both supply and the demand for nuclear weapons. Of course, I do not know the answer to that question, but I think it is fair to say that we have not faced up to some of the key issues yet. I will mention a couple of them. One is that, if there is to be lasting collaboration on the goal of nuclear non-proliferation and the security that goes with it, if we agree, for instance, to restrict trade in nuclear materials, advanced weapons, components, technologies to nations that abide by a strengthened respected regime, that abide by regional arms limitation, that maintain a register of trade in all relevant goods, nuclear weapons and others—that is a good idea, but a proposal like this would have to have priority over other political objectives if it is going to work.

For instance, if China were a member of this arrangement, and it would have to be, then China or any other cooperating nation would have to have the equivalent of most favored nation treatment in some key areas of technology and trade involving security,

even though they might do things like Tiananmen Square which we did not approve of.

If Iran or Vietnam or North Korea were part of the agreement, and we would want them to be, again they would have to participate in the benefits of the agreement as applied to security and trade in important goods.

Japan, of course, has been a leader in restricting arms trade and would be a necessary part of any arrangement to restrict arms trade and arms technology trade in the future. But then, the benefits of the arrangement as regards Japan would have to take priority over any future sectoral trade retaliation in these areas.

In other words, a universal arrangement governing nuclear security would be essentially a policy declaration that we are going to treat nuclear proliferation and security the same way that we treat such things as communicable disease, control, international crime, air traffic, and the rest as a priority item on which nations cooperate and get the benefits from cooperation regardless of other differences. I am not sure we are ready to do this and I am not sure other participants that would be needed in the arrangements are ready to do this.

Another unresolved issue concerns the use of force to support this regime and there I only have questions, I do not really have any answer. Namely, whose force would it be? Under what criteria would it be used? Under whose political authority? So forth.

Clearly, if there is going to be a cooperative international regime to prevent nuclear proliferation as best we can and to contain wars, these questions have to be answered. So defining a process for reaching agreed answers is the next pressing task. While I believe that Russia and China must be involved and will be an important part of the arrangement, I think that we are going to have to continue to rely mostly on our democratic allies. I think that democracy and a rational approach to economic welfare have been the major driving forces for peace all over the world. They are likely to continue to be. It is a very uneven process, but we have seen it work in regions as diverse as Spain, Central Europe, South Africa to a degree and South Korea in the last 10 or 20 years.

So in conclusion, I will mention three brief points. One is that we are going to see some wars and probably some nuclear proliferation. They cannot all be prevented. Two, we can limit the danger from these developments by means of security and economic incentives, by means of deterrence and by means of containment. But these all require cooperation among the major world powers such as we have not seen to date. Working out the terms of this cooperation is a very important task and the next task. Third, I believe that demonstration of the workings of democracy and economic health are going to be the main tools in the long term for turning nations away from war as a nation-building tool and turning former enemies into allies and customers and probably competitors, too, but we can probably deal with that.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. SPRATT. Thank you very much, Mr. May.

Mr. Kyl.

Mr. KYL. Mr. Chairman, I appreciate your yielding. I have a 3 p.m. meeting and I would like to make a couple of very brief comments here. I have just a couple of brief questions.

First of all, I really appreciate the testimony of both witnesses. I think it is very helpful and I appreciate it. In the book, "The Future of U.S.-Soviet Nuclear Relationships," on page 39 there is a reference to something that I hear a little bit here on the Hill, a concern that when the future duration of the NPT is addressed at the 25th Anniversary Review Conference in 1995, lack of progress on a test ban could jeopardize extension of the treaty. It is then said in the book, "In the final analysis most countries will make their decisions about the utility of the NPT regime or their maintenance of a nuclear option on the basis of their perceptions of their own security interests, not on the actions of the United States and the Soviet Union or other nuclear weapons states on testing."

Mr. May, does that reflect your personal views as well?

Mr. MAY. Yes, it does.

Mr. KYL. Mr. Reed.

Mr. MAY. I personally believe that. That last paragraph I wrote myself and reflects my views.

Mr. KYL. Mr. Reed.

Mr. REED. I was not a member of Dr. May's panel, but I very much concur with that. That those decisions, what is done about the NPT, will be done by each country's perceptions of their best interest.

Mr. KYL. You may both be aware that close to 200 Members of Congress have signed on to a bill which would provide for a 1-year moratorium on U.S. nuclear testing. I gather from your comments that both of you would find that troubling and would agree that we do need some level of testing as long as we have a nuclear deterrent. Is that correct?

Mr. MAY. Yes, I would subscribe to that personally, now. Opinions were divided on the committee about the nuclear testing. The committee is composed of people ranging from former Deputy Head of the Arms Control Agency under President Carter, to former Under Secretary of the Air Force and a former Chairman of the Joint Chiefs. We had a variety of views and on this particular issue, views were divided, although on the main conclusions, the committee was unanimous.

Mr. KYL. Mr. Reed.

Mr. MAY. My view is that as long as we have these gadgets we are occasionally going to need to test them. I mean, they are pieces of hardware like other pieces of hardware, and you cannot avoid that.

Mr. REED. Mr. Kyl, my views were that a moratorium—I did nuclear weapons design once. I was there during the moratoria of 1958 to 1960, that is the same thing as a test ban in terms of its impact on the systems, and I think that would be very counter-productive.

Mr. KYL. I appreciate that.

A final comment. Dr. May, one of the things you have said is in fact the deeper we cut nuclear weapons the more we need to be concerned about modernization and invulnerability. It seems to me that it follows—both of you said you would or I think you said you



would address this later if we got into it. It follows that strategic defenses can play an ever more important role the deeper you go in cuts on offensive nuclear weapons. Is that generally an accurate statement in your view?

Mr. MAY. My own view is that we do not have a strategic defense system that I would care to see deployed. That is my own technical assessment of the situation.

I could go into some detail about that. Basically I think that for the purposes that we are thinking of, unauthorized launches, accidents, or Third World threats against domestic targets here, it seems to me that a defensive system is not going to be effective or any defensive system I have seen at any reasonable cost. This is a technical appraisal, not a policy appraisal.

I feel differently about tactical defenses, defenses of fleet units, of air bases in force projection areas, but strategic defenses, I do not think we are there, yet, although I have always supported research in the area.

Mr. KYL. Mr. Reed.

Mr. REED. I think that defenses very much complicate the matter of when you talk about large strategic forces. I agree that tactical defenses are important. I guess my technical assessment of the progress of defenses against Third World threats in particular is different than Dr. May's. I think that a space-based limited defense to deal with the Third World problem will work. It is a difficult technical challenge, but so are a lot of other things and it is terribly important to deal with the Third World threat.

Mr. KYL. I really appreciate both of your views on these important subjects and I think you have added a lot to my understanding and I apologize for having to leave.

Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman, for your indulgence.

Mr. SPRATT. Mr. Bennett, do you have any questions, sir?

Mr. BENNETT. I do not.

Mr. SPRATT. Secretary Reed, you said in your testimony, the core of it, that you saw a need for approximately 5,000 nuclear weapons, plus or minus 20 percent, but you also said that you looked upon this as sort of an interim number in the sense that you said you hoped this would be a way station on the way to a safer and more secure world.

I take that to mean that intrinsically you think 5,000 nuclear weapons is too many. All things being equal, if we live in a safe and more secure world, if we were certain about the course of the CIS or Russia that we might opt for fewer than 5,000 weapons and feel safer and more secure if we did. In any event, I seem to sense a caveat after the prescription of 5,000 in your testimony.

Mr. REED. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I most certainly would like to see reduced numbers. The caveat was that the purpose, current purpose of large numbers of U.S. nuclear weapons are to deter those who control or could come to control the Soviet, the debris from the Soviet empire. Currently, given what is there, given lack of any substantial evidence of massive dismantling of those things, today, that seems a reasonable number.

I would hope very much that, in fact, the second role of what I see as the major role of weapons is to act as bargaining chips is

that we can agree with the Russian Government to begin to back off from those numbers and to downsize the forces in some reasonable way. I have no problems with the numbers that Dr. May gave as goals as to where we might go in the world. I suppose our disagreements, if any, is that I see history as tides, tides in the affairs of men. Currently, the tide runs in the direction we want and we should take advantage of it. But there is no end game in arms control.

Mr. SPRATT. But if the tide continues from the Soviet Union, excuse me, the Commonwealth of Independent States, and if Russia, in particular, consolidates all of the nuclear weapons from Kazakhstan and Ukraine, and then begins to systematically retire these so that the number there steadily diminishes and the political situation stabilizes, then you see the driver for the 5,000-plus or minus 20 percent prescription driving in the other direction. You see that number reducing possible to the level of a thousand or 2,000, as the NAS recommended?

Mr. REED. Given in your list of caveats, the important one is that there is some tangible agreement and advice to commence disassembly of forces, removing SS-18s from silos, for instance, I clearly would like to see us drop to lower numbers.

Mr. SPRATT. Now, let me ask you both, in terms of disassembly, particularly on their side, but I think there will be some reciprocity expected on our side, what should we be seeking in the way of dismantlement and disassembly and destruction or transmutation of the fissile materials in these warheads?

Dr. May.

Mr. MAY. That is a subject on which there is a lot of detailed study now going on, and I am not up to date on all of it, so I would suggest that some laboratory witnesses would give you important added details which I cannot give you.

Clearly, you are dealing with a couple of contending factors. On the one hand, both we and Russia want to retain secret knowledge to ourselves which might lead to a larger vulnerability of these things. That has to do with the electronic package, that has to do with the way the high explosive is wrapped around there, and it has to do with detailed shapes.

So there is probably going to be part of the dismantlement on both sides where the states involved themselves would be doing the job the way they think best. There will be some units coming in from the field at one end, and that could be monitored under U.N. auspices. I do not see any problem with that, and that would be, in fact, to our advantage to do that because then we would know what the other side is doing.

Then at the other end, you get a certain quantity of plutonium and uranium. We do not have, to my mind, to give away the exact number of kilograms of each per weapon. We can just strike some rough average which you can do on the basis of general physics and say, well, we expect  $x$  kilograms of plutonium and  $x$  kilograms of highly enriched uranium to come out of this factory, and plus or minus 10 or 20 percent. There is enough weapons so it does not matter. You can verify then the output.

Then the material can be safeguarded as agreed between the two countries. Either you can have separate storage. You surely will



have some separate storage, that is for sure. In addition, you might have some arrangement whereby some of the material, including perhaps the material from the republics if it comes to that, safeguarded under some international auspices. In other words, the material could then be kept some by the United States and by Russia, and some under some international arrangement.

The material does not have in it any information, and it is the key to reconstitution. It is what we want to keep track of.

Mr. SPRATT. One of your colleagues, perhaps your predecessor or successor—I do not know where Johnny Foster came in line of succession to you at Livermore, but he has emphasized to us that we should have a very reliable method of counting, first of all, the existing end units, the completed and usable military nuclear systems, and then, second, the components that come out of them, so we have got an extremely good inventory, especially if we are looking toward a world where we get to fewer and fewer warheads, perhaps as low as a thousand to 2,000, as the NAS study has recommended.

The reason is, of course, breakout, concealment, the possibility that one side might be cheating, holding some in reserve so that if there were a political reversal they might suddenly surge ahead with a cache of nuclear materials or nuclear components that would give them an advantage.

Part of this would involve going back to the fundamentals, and establishing a database on each side of fissile materials and tritium and production sources. I think the Russians probably know a great deal more than we do about our production sources. I think they can obtain it simply by checking with the Public Information Office of the Department of Energy.

On the other hand, I have seen the intelligence reports and I think there is a lot that we do not know and that we think we know by inference based on what their production sources are and on their quantities of HEU plutonium and tritium that have accumulated over the years and that are either stockpiled in weapons or stored and unutilized as yet.

Do you either of you see any advantage to increasing transparency here, to establishing a method for a databank of fissile materials on both side?

Mr. MAY. Well, I think that it would be good to do what Johnny Foster suggests. However, I think we do not want to give up one good in order to get another good.

There are two problems here. One, is the problem of diminishing the threat in such a way that the United States and Russia are confident that they are not hiding anything, and we are going down more or less in phase. That problem can be solved with a fairly rough count of what is going on. Ten percent is plenty, plus or minus 10 percent. Plus or minus 20 percent is acceptable. Nothing hinges on those percentages. That would serve the purpose of the bilateral security. That is a first purpose which I would not give up while waiting for something better.

The other purpose has to do with proliferation outside Russia and outside the United States. That is a much more difficult problem. There are thousands of kilograms of material floating around the world, some of which is not under either country's control. I



think to attack that problem we want to take a look at the overall world situation with respect to these materials and try to see what makes sense to do in the way of tighter accounting overall, taking into account Russian source, but also the other sources. I do not think the homework has all been done on that yet. It needs to be done. You need a plan, in other words.

But the point I would try to make in this testimony that we do have two goals. One is a reduction goal for security reasons, which is very important by itself. I would not give up on that just to get the other. The other is important also.

Mr. SPRATT. Mr. Dornan.

Mr. DORNAN. Mr. Chairman, I do not want to break the flow of your questioning, but the Republicans of Armed Services are caucusing upstairs, and it is a command performance.

Mr. SPRATT. I beg your pardon, and I overlooked you a minute ago, so go ahead. You have the floor.

Mr. DORNAN. No, you did not. I had run upstairs. That is why you did not see me. I was not here.

I just want to ask about the B-2, a couple of follow-up questions, and first, to tell both the gentlemen their testimony is some of the best I have heard in this hearing room on a very, very fast historical track.

Could I ask you a personal question, Mr. Reed? Do you not have a Navy ship of the line, a warship named after you?

Mr. REED. No, sir, I do not. I have the honor of having a former speaker of this august body share the same name, but for better or for worse he is——

Mr. DORNAN. That is what it is. I saw a frigate, the Tom Reed, and I thought, can this be? Because the other two exceptions we made, they were almost in their walkers. you are looking pretty healthy today.

Mr. REED. I feel terrific, and it is not named after me. It was Thomas Reed, the Speaker of the House.

Mr. DORNAN. I thought, boy, the Navy must have wanted something out of the Air Force, I thought, to do that to a former secretary.

I particularly like, and I would like your permission to steal this and I do not want to be Neil-Kinnoaked, so I am asking for permission. I am going to not attribute it to you, but your page on uncertainty, same paragraph, and I know you probably did not work on it too long but the examples you picked out are about as stunning as any you could get. I bet you could have turned each one into a paragraph of a hundred items during each decade that would have been dismissed as absurd science fiction. Your closing line is that life does not work that way, to think there is a straight line from here to some utopia that involves 15 very happy former Soviets so-called republics, throw in Mongolia, which was always number 16, not to mention all the East European states. Nobody can predict what type of chaos is going to take place.

So here is my question to you. It is specifically on the B-2. I was just out at one of the four B-1 bases, McConnell, last weekend. They started training conventionally at Ellsworth in September, McConnell started in December and when they are all through and trained up conventionally, this much maligned B-1 weapon system

is going to be so far superior to the former queen of the skies, the B-52, that they are just in a different area of comparison.

Following up on your remarks that the payload is very large and that it allows one aircraft to accomplish an entire contingency mission and you mentioned the important factors involving Stealth in the Desert Storm, would you say that the B-2 is unique and so is SDI, for that matter, because they are not only a nuclear deterrence but also involve a conventional deterrence out of all the systems we have discussed here today?

Mr. REED. That is an enormous list, Mr. Dornan. I will try to deal with it. First of all, let me back up to your kind references to my last two pages of my statements.

I am very honored for you to say those things because I spent a long time thinking about those two pages; what are the threats as a result of a year of arguing about this subject. The conclusion that we never know what is going to happen really dawned on me as I tried to think through the scenarios. Life is such that you do not know, and therefore your responsibility in the House and in the Senate to try to posture the country to deal with whatever can happen.

As far as the aircraft are concerned, I think the B-1 and B-2 are very different aircraft. The important thing about the B-2 is that I think we have gotten it right in terms of the sort of weapon system that will be needed in these third world contingencies. It may not be a nuclear mission. You do not know.

One of the things I learned in my close up exposure to the procurement of aircraft is you want to buy aircraft that are sturdy, that have a lot of payload, that are very flexible, because they will be used for missions that you do not even think of on your watch. This was certainly true of the B-52. It will be true of the B-1.

I think, that in the case of the B-2, it is terribly important to be able to take a very large payload some place where we are not welcome in one sortie and deal with that Third World threat, which may or may not be a nuclear problem.

I think that they are important aircraft. The B-1 is going to be a very important conventional as well as nuclear aircraft. B-2 is different. But I just think we need to buy some.

Mr. DORNAN. Well, I had a second question, Mr. Secretary, but you answered it in your remarks there about flexibility.

So, the only other thing I would have to ask Dr. May is there is some discussion now about severely phasing back. Since you gave a big chunk of your professional career to that unique facility that has helped with the cold war, Livermore Labs, what would you like to see, again understanding the dangers of using a crystal ball, what would you like to see Lawrence Livermore Lab doing throughout the rest of this decade?

Mr. MAY. Well, it is a subject to which I give a lot of thing. Actually, I am advising the director along with some other gentlemen as to what should be done next.

The lab at present is about a billion dollar a year enterprise, of which 30 percent is nuclear weapons R&D, that is, \$300 million, and the rest is other R&D. I suspect the nuclear weapon R&D is going to go down a little more, and that will be OK. I think in view of the program we could go down somewhat more, not a lot more;

maybe—well, I do not want to give a figure but somewhat more in the course of time if things—if the workload goes down.

However, it cannot go down much more, because we do have to help with the safety and security of the weapons and with the improvement of the complex.

The other programs, I would like to see the lab continue to contribute to programs in the other defense activities, in energy and in environment which are several years further out than industry can undertake and with more uncertainty, and which are pretty large, in the few million dollars, tens of million a year. Such things as fusion energy, better coal energy, we have done work on that, and a lot of important environment work.

I think that these are the areas where major infrastructure improvements are going to have to be made in the next few decades all over the world. I think the lab can help the country in doing the advanced R&D work, applied R&D work in these areas where these major infrastructure commitments are going to be made all around the world. It will help the United States and it will help also in the eventual U.S. export of these technologies.

I do not think the labs are too well suited to helping industry in detail on a month-by-month basis. They are not really organized for that. They do not have the right people, but there is plenty of long-term projects that I would like to see continue to be funded that will leave us in a healthy position with respect to energy, non-nuclear defense and environment, in addition to the nuclear project at the lab. That would be the general answer I would give.

Mr. DORNAN. Thank you very much.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. SPRATT. Mr. Miller.

Mr. MILLER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I just have a couple of questions.

Dr. May, you talked a little bit about alert rates and I wonder if I could ask both of the witnesses to address the question of strategic force posture.

President Yeltsin has talked about no targeting, having the forces on a day-to-day basis, they were not targeted. Russian Foreign Minister Kozyrev has talked about the possibility of taking all missiles, along with the bombers, off alert and demitting the warheads. Obviously, there is the idea that there would be some political benefit and perhaps a reduced risk of accidental or unauthorized launch. I wondered if each of you would comment on those two ideas.

Mr. MAY. Do you want to go first?

Mr. REED. Yes. I would like to because I would like to go back to have a chance to answer the question that the Chairman asked 15 minutes ago—the question about Johnny Foster. The question was how do you secure nuclear weapons.

I am a believer of the school that the longest journey beings with one step. So my answer to that would be, number one, count them. Before you worry about destruction, let us count them, the Soviet weapons, or get the Russians to count them; at least know where they are for sure.

Second, to then set about to secure them, to either get them into very secure storage within the republics, or hopefully get them all



into Russia. Then you can begin to worry about the disassembly of the electronics and the high explosives that make them at least not usable to terrorists and remove some problems with accidents. Then you get on to the disassembly of the nuclear package, and finally doing the sorts of the things such as disposing of the plutonium and the highly enriched uranium that Dr. May talked about.

But it is a large problem. Whenever I am faced with one like that, I find it best to start chewing at the upper left-hand corner, and it is absolutely imperative to get them inventoried, know where they are, and get a serial number on all of them.

On the next subject, I certainly agree with Dr. May's observations about the problems of developing a database, how many Soviet weapons are there. That is pretty tough. What really counts is to know how many SS-18s are in silos that would threaten us in a very near-term way. Dealing with the Russian database is interesting, but if you are right within 10 or 20 percent, that is probably close enough. I think his observations on that subject were correct.

As to the matter of alert rates and Mr. Yeltsin saying things are not targeted, you have to really study what he said to figure out what he means, but I am absolutely opposed to being casual about targeting. We have a lot of weapons because the Soviets left behind a lot of weapons that threaten us. We know where they are, we know where the submarine bases are, and we should not be casual. Any getting casual with nuclear weapons really worries me a lot.

If you want to talk about flexibility, then you set aside 10 weapons in some sort of special pocket that maybe are dealt with in real time when there is a crisis, but we should not for one moment get casual about large numbers of weapons.

Alert rates: I think you want to do what you can to stand down the hair trigger. This has been done by pulling bombers off alert. If you talk about pulling missiles off alert, you start getting into some real world problems of what does that mean? If you are going to take the warheads off the missiles, where are you going to put them?

It turns out that being in a silo under some careful watch is a pretty secure place for them, and there are limits as to how many warheads you can store at Ellsworth Air Force Base. There are limits as to where you're going to put all these things. There are limits on moving them around the highways, and so all I could advise is that it is very complicated. It is a very desirable thing, but you have really got to think through all the issues.

Mr. MAY. I would agree with that. I am not an expert on the details of how you de-alert forces. You heard from General Butler, who is the right man on the subject. I think that basically, given the policy directive that we want the forces to be as safe as possible and yet invulnerable, there is going to be a plan that will be evolved, or a set of plans that will be evolved with full knowledge of the detailed situation by the strategic command, and I would want to look at that plan and see what it is.

It is not a simple matter. As Mr. Reed said, it is not something to be casual about.

If you want to talk about historic trends, the historic trend, I think, if relations continue to get less tense, it is going to be that

you are going to have nuclear weapon as a reserve component of force with a multitude of missions assigned to them but no single one per weapon. But we are not there yet. There are still forces on alert on the other side.

But the trend is right, we should get forces down from alert so long as it is consistent with survivability. How you do it in detail is pretty complicated. I could not address that.

Mr. MILLER. Thank you.

Let me ask a question on a different subject, and that is with respect to the role of nuclear weapons and the third world.

What role, if any, do you believe that U.S. nuclear weapons—do you believe that U.S. nuclear weapons played in deterring Saddam Hussein from the use of either chemical or biological weapons during the Gulf War?

Mr. MAY. Obviously, I have no way of knowing. They may well have played some role. The chemical weapons are very different in kind from nuclear weapons. They are not decisive like nuclear weapons. They have not been used successfully in warfare. They are terror weapons mostly against civilian population. They are not particularly effective against a prepared military force, whereas, of course, nuclear weapons are very effective against any concentration of force.

They may have played some role. It is very hard to tell. I cannot be inside his mind.

In a more general way, I think that U.S. nuclear weapons tend to be a force for the status quo, but they are not the front line deterrent for what we call Third World states. It is hard to draw general conclusions because as you well know, Mr. Miller, there is no Third World. There is a whole bunch of very different countries, and the consideration that would affect North Korea, which is bordered by China, Russia and South Korea and, of course, Japan is a very different environment from the Mid East. They are going to be quite different from the considerations that affect Iran. Kazakhstan is part of the former Soviet Union, so probably the Russian nuclear weapons matter more to them. So it is a little hard to say.

I believe that, as I made it clear, we should keep reserve nuclear weapons, keep them in the back as a deterrent of last resort, attempt to work cooperatively to contain dangers, and I cannot give you a better general answer.

Mr. MILLER. Thank you.

Secretary Reed.

Mr. REED. I would like to answer the question a little bit broadly and discuss what was the role of nuclear weapons in general, because I think Israeli nuclear capability played a very significant role. I think Saddam's decision to not use chemical weapons is a branch point. I am very strongly of the view that Saddam Hussein clearly understood that the use of chemical weapons against Tel Aviv would have brought an immediate massive nuclear strike without a whole lot of consultation with the United States, and I think that was a very substantial deterrent.

As far as the U.S.'s role, I agree with what Dr. May said, that it is very gray. George Bundy has written a very scholarly paper concluding that nuclear weapons did not play a role. My feelings

are that they probably did, in dissuading a lot of further irrational activity, but you will never really know.

Perhaps that gets back to the bottom line. The role of nuclear weapons, our policy should be to be ambiguous, but they are simply there as a presence.

Mr. MILLER. Thank you.

Mr. SPRATT. Mr. DeGrasse.

Mr. DEGRASSE. Mr. Reed, I'd like to follow up on what Mr. Miller just asked you in regard to the question of the role of nuclear weapons in deterring third world nations.

Dr. May has indicated that U.S. nuclear weapons tend to emphasize sort of the status quo situation. I am thinking the difference between Israeli nuclear weapons used against Saddam Hussein and U.S. nuclear weapons used against Saddam Hussein would be fairly substantial, and the decision-making process would be very different.

Do you see cases in which sort of a status quo use of nuclear weapons is likely, or a status quo decision-making process, making the decision as to whether the use of nuclear weapons would actually successfully deter third world nations?

Mr. REED. Well, I think the examples you use is that nuclear weapons, the status quo, is that nuclear weapons are important in preserving the national security and survival of a nation, and the United States survival probably would not be impacted by a chemical attack on Riyadh.

Mr. DEGRASSE. Right.

Mr. REED. Israel's survival would be involved with a chemical attack on Tel Aviv, and therefore their standards are different. I think that the fundamental underlying issue is nuclear weapons are the sort of thing you think about when a nation's survival is at stake.

Mr. DEGRASSE. Following up on the question of counting nuclear weapons, can either of you gentlemen discuss the question of whether or not we would compromise U.S. security by making such an exercise, counting U.S. and Soviet weapons a reciprocal effort on both sides?

Mr. MAY. In my opinion, no. In my opinion, we will have to make it reciprocal if it is going to happen. I do not want to quote any individual sources in Russia, but certainly the gist of the feeling I got from talking to quite senior people over there in the military and defense areas is that they intend to have everything reciprocal, just like it has always been. The fact that they are an economic basket case does not cut any ice so far as these things are concerned in their minds.

So, I think we will have to count if they are going to count, and I think the benefits of counting vastly overweigh the cost of giving away a count. I mean, we are going down from numbers in excess of 20,000 to numbers vastly below that by anybody's count. So I think it is fine. Count the number destroyed, that is fine. You do not have to give an accurate count on the rest if you do not have an agreement to do so.

Mr. REED. I think any sort of mutual counting is in our best interests; that generally the United States is an open society. The Soviet society was not. The Russian society is becoming that way, but



I do not think anything that is reciprocal like that would not be in our best interest. I think we should.

Mr. DEGRASSE. One final question. This one to Dr. May and then following upon Mr. Kyl's question to you regarding SDI.

If you look at the ground base defenses that are being considered, the prospect of siting 100 interceptors at Grand Forks in North Dakota, is that what you were thinking of in terms of your response to his question? If it is, is it that you do not see an immediate threat that could be used or could be countered, or is it your view that the technical capabilities of such a system are deficient?

Mr. MAY. Both. In my own judgment, and notice I say judgment, no way you can tell for sure. If you look at both the threat and the cost effectiveness, I find, in my judgment, the system is not ready to be deployed bearing in mind the fact that there is not all the money in the world for defense these days, and so if we spent two or three billion on this, you have to not spend two or three billion elsewhere.

On the threat side of it, the threats that I have been mentioning have been Third World and accidents. Accidents are extremely difficult to defend against because you have absolutely no strategic warning. So you are talking about a system which has to be up, ready to go all the time, and ready to go against an accident or a malfunction of which you will have no warning, no strategic warning.

If you look at that kind of system, you are stuck with very high false alarm rates or else a very high probability of an initial failure. So that does not seem to me like the right way to meet the kind of accidents that might occur.

Bringing weapon systems off alert is going to drastically reduce the probability of accidents which has already been—knock on wood—very low.

If you talk about threats like, for instance, from some future Iraq against U.S. targets, strategic threats against some U.S. city, I think that someone like Saddam Hussein would have to be insane to first go ahead and build some ICBM installation which we and all the rest of the world could see out there in the desert, very hard to hide, that could reach the United States, 6,000 or 8,000 miles away, and then start a war with us or one of our allies. If he is going to threaten Washington or New York, there are a hundred ways to deliver the weapons. There is no rush. Washington and New York are going to be there. You can buy a boat, buy a civilian plane. You do not even have to get them in the country, as you well know.

So for a strategic retaliation of a small power, strategic deterrence of a small power against U.S. cities, I do not think that the ballistic missile defense would give us much comfort.

For countering tactical situations, that is an entirely different ball of wax. I think that the Third World country, or I do not like that expression, some country like Iraq or some future country who wants us out of their area may well have nuclear weapons and pose a threat against, for instance, elements of the U.S. Navy or air bases, and those would be very effective threats, which might or might not be counterable by tactical ballistic missile defenses. You have to look at that.

But my overall judgment on the strategic system is that the threat is not really convincing to me and the effectiveness is not going to be there, I think, but you have to keep looking.

Mr. DEGRASSE. Dr. Reed, did you have a comment on that?

Mr. REED. I think a lot of that makes sense, but my view of the threat, is the Third World threat, not just against Washington and New York. I agree there are lots of ways to do that, but that it also takes a long time and there is lots of chances of discovery, but the more immediate issue would be to look back to the Iraq-Kuwait episode. If Saddam had nuclear capability on the Scuds or slightly larger theatre ballistic missiles and was able to threaten Paris, London and so forth, would we have been able to put together a coalition? I do not think so. Therefore, a defense system really ought to be deployed in conjunction with the Russians and to deal with the whole spectrum of threats around the globe, which is why I like a space-deployed system.

Mr. DEGRASSE. Thank you both.

Mr. SPRATT. Dr. May, Mr. Reed, thank you very much for your testimony and for taking the time to come in and present it today. We appreciate your presence.

Mr. MAY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. REED. Thank you.

[Whereupon, at 3:40 p.m., the panels were recessed.]

## **THE ARMY NATIONAL GUARD COMBAT ROLE AND CAPABILITIES**

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HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,  
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES,  
DEFENSE POLICY PANEL,  
*Washington, DC, Tuesday, May 5, 1992.*

The panel met, pursuant to notice, at 2:05 p.m., in room 2118, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Les Aspin (chairman of the panel) presiding.

### **STATEMENT OF HON. LES ASPIN, A REPRESENTATIVE FROM WISCONSIN, CHAIRMAN, DEFENSE POLICY PANEL**

The CHAIRMAN. The meeting will come to order.

Today, the Defense Policy Panel meets to consider a key question about our future defense. That question is what is the proper balance between our full-time professional military and our part-time citizen soldiers?

We must ask this question because our national security requirements have changed significantly with the collapse of the Warsaw Pact and the disintegration of the Soviet Union. Our experience in the Persian Gulf has given us some sense of the threats we are likely to face in the next century and what it will take to meet them.

In particular, Operation Desert Shield/Desert Storm demonstrated the effectiveness of the Reserve components in the combat service support. This is the logistics, administration and medical side of the war. Reserve components performing combat support in artillery, aviation and combat engineering also did well. As for the Reserve combat force component, three Army National Guard roundout brigades and three roundout battalions were called up in November of 1991. They had a lengthy period of post-mobilization training, and they never deployed to Southwest Asia.

Today, the Policy Panel will hear from the Army, the National Guard Association, the Adjutant Generals Association and the General Accounting Office. The witnesses will address the future roles of the Army National Guard combat forces and the changes we need to make so that they can perform well.

We welcome Lt. Gen. Ronald Griffith, the Army Inspector General, and Lt. Gen. J.H. Binford Peay, Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations as our first panel.

In our second panel, we will hear from Gen. Robert Ensslin, the President of the National Guard Association, and Gen. Ronald Edwards, the President of the Adjutant Generals Association.

In our third panel, we will hear from Richard Davis, the Director of Army Issues for the GAO.



Gentlemen, we welcome you. Before I turn the microphone over to you, let me see if Bill Dickinson has some comments to make.

**STATEMENT OF HON. WILLIAM L. DICKINSON, A REPRESENTATIVE FROM ALABAMA, RANKING MINORITY MEMBER, DEFENSE POLICY PANEL**

Mr. DICKINSON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Chairman, this hearing is long overdue, because in my opinion, too much of the debate about the National Guard combat forces has been focused on the wrong issues. Beginning with the fiscal year 1991 Defense Authorization Bill 2 years ago, two issues—end strength and costs—have occupied center stage of the debate. As a result, the issue of increased reliance on the National Guard has been narrowly defined as preserving or increasing Guard end strength relative to that of the Active Forces.

Many contend that these combat forces are cheaper to maintain than Active Forces, and no less capable. Today's hearing will attempt to go beyond these issues. We need to build on the lessons of Desert Storm and develop realistic expectations concerning Guard combat units, the time it takes to mobilize them, and how their capabilities fit into future U.S. force structures and so forth. Our witnesses today can help us begin down this road to narrow the issues.

Whether or not National Guard brigades and divisions can go to war in 30, 60, 90 or 360 days after being mobilized may seem to be an insignificant point to the uninitiated. However, I want to ask those individuals to consider the consequences if we guess wrong and build a force structure premised on the judgment that large Guard combat units need only a minimum of training because they are allegedly just as capable as Active units.

The country's history of first battles painfully illustrates the fact that rushing inadequately trained units—whether Active or Guard—into combat has one unavoidable result, and that is soldiers die when they and their leaders err until they learn their jobs.

Where are the savings in repeating that lesson?

I believe the total force worked well during Desert Storm. As a Congressional Research Service study concluded, the fact that a Guard roundout unit, a brigade, proved capable of being validated combat ready within 3 to 4 months after being activated was an unprecedented achievement when compared to the 12 to 15 months required by similar units in the past.

Our challenge in the years ahead is to find ways to make the total force work more efficiently and effectively so that we can prudently reduce Active Forces and prudently restructure our Nation's Active and Reserve component forces.

I might say that during the Desert Storm period I do not think my office had more than a couple of instances when some National Guard individual had been called up to say that they did not want to or were unable to respond and go for whatever reason. Now, I had a lot of families, wives and mothers, calling to say that they did not want their sons or husbands to go; but the men themselves were not reluctant. They did not call. As a matter of fact, I think they took a lot of pride in being called up and were anxious to go.

Those that ultimately went conducted themselves with honor and distinction.

My son was called up, trained for 6 months. When the war was terminated, I think he had mixed emotions. But one of his strongest emotions was disappointment because he was ready to go. I think that was the case with most that had been called up. They wanted to do their duty. They looked forward to proving to themselves and to all concerned that the Guard units were capable. They wanted to do their part and they wanted to do what their country called on them to do.

So it is a very important, very politically charged subject that we are dealing with today, Mr. Chairman, as you know. No State has more Guard units than my State, both per capita, I think, and in total numbers. I really hear from my people at home and they are proud to be in the Guard.

So whatever we do has a real effect on my constituents at home and we want to make sure that what we do is the best for them; but that whatever we do is not just a political decision. So thank you for your presence here, gentlemen, for all three panels.

Before we start, Mr. Chairman, I wonder if you would announce as a parliamentary procedure how you plan to proceed with three different panels. Do we question after each panel or would you wait until the end, and how do we handle this?

The CHAIRMAN. It is my intention, if it is OK with the members of the panel, that we would proceed from hearing from all witnesses and then go to questions.

Mr. DICKINSON. All right. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. General Griffith, sir, the floor is yours.

#### **STATEMENT OF LT. GEN. RONALD H. GRIFFITH, INSPECTOR GENERAL, DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY**

General GRIFFITH. Mr. Chairman, members of the panel, I am pleased to be here today with General Peay to address the results of the Department of the Army Inspector General's assessment of the mobilization and training of Army National Guard roundout brigades during Operations Desert Shield and Desert Storm. A detailed statement has been provided for insertion into the hearing record.

As in any complex operation, the process for preparation of the roundout units contained flaws. Problems surfaced that indicated shortfalls in unit personnel, logistics and training readiness. However, during the course of training, strengths were identified in each of the brigades. One brigade executed an extremely complex training program involving concurrent events at several installations. Some brigade units became highly proficient in counter-reconnaissance operations and some of the dismounted infantry units became highly skilled in clearing Iraqi-type trench systems.

Two brigades qualified all tank and Bradley crews and one qualified all platoons as well. One artillery battalion successfully completed a formal standardized external evaluation. A forward support battalion was consistently praised for its ability to support and sustain its parent brigade's operations.

The mobilization and training activities of the roundout brigades have unfortunately become the subject of emotional and not always



well-informed debate. This is particularly unfortunate in that debate overshadowed the outstanding contributions of hundreds of Reserve component units without whom the Active component forces could not have performed their missions.

My recent experiences both as a division commander in South-west Asia and as the Inspector General have reinforced my belief that we must have strong, well-equipped and well-trained Reserve component forces. Desert Shield and Desert Storm demonstrated the necessity of National Guard and Reserve units and confirmed our confidence in the one-army concept.

We must recognize, however, the limits inherent in Reserve component force capability given the time constraints for training; we must develop our plans accordingly. It is reasonable and prudent to expect that certain types of Reserve component units can be ready for deployment with only a relatively brief period of post-mobilization training.

Experience has shown that single function units—aviation, transportation, port operations, water purification, postal and medical units—can develop technical and tactical skills allowing early deployment. Some combat support and service support units, non-divisional artillery and engineers, for example, can train to levels which also permit a relatively short post-mobilization training period. However, the complexity in integrating all the elements brought into play by combat maneuver forces on the modern high-tech battlefield, dictate a larger post-mobilization training period prior to deployment.

Coordinating and integrating all the efforts of the assigned units—management of information from higher and lower headquarters, intelligence preparation of the battlefield and battle tracking, synchronization of indirect fire units, Army, Air Force and Navy aviation, air defense, engineers and the logistics to keep it all running—are extraordinarily complex activities which challenge the very best full-time practitioners of military art.

Accordingly, the Army has always planned on deploying Reserve component units—even such high priority units as the roundout brigades—after their Active Duty counterparts and after a significant post-mobilization training effort.

Though we thought we understood the magnitude of the challenge of mobilizing, training and deploying Reserve component forces, it had been many years prior to Desert Shield since we had done so.

We did know that in the intervening years our war fighting doctrine had become more complex. Weapon systems are far more sophisticated than in past conflicts and training challenges are greater.

Accordingly, in November 1990 as Reserve component roundout brigades were being mobilized, the Army Chief of Staff tasked the Inspector General to assess the level of effort, time and resources required to achieve levels of essential combat readiness prior to deploying these types of organizations to a war zone.

My predecessor at the Department of the Army, Inspector General Lt. Gen. Johnny Corns headed the team. His deputy was Maj. Gen. James Delk, a former Army National Guard Division Commander. Three subteams, each headed by a former brigade com-



mander, were dedicated to the individual roundout brigades during the mobilization, training and demobilization process. Data was collected, analyzed and periodically reported to the Army's senior leadership, Army staff and also to the State Adjutants General and the National Guard Bureau. The assessments teams were continuously with the brigades throughout the process.

The assessment determined that the process was valid, though resource intensive. It further determined that our initial expectations of the high level of unit and individual proficiency were too high and our estimates of the time needed to train to required standards were too low.

Problems took longer to correct than had been estimated based on the measures of readiness available at the start of the mobilization period. Difficulties were experienced with tactical and leadership skills throughout the chain of command. Non-commissioned officer leadership was a particular problem, as many non-commissioned officers did not have the opportunity to attend the appropriate leadership and skill schools. Even those who had attended were unable to practice their leadership skills on a day-to-day basis.

Pre-mobilization unit training—constrained by 39 days available during the Reserve component training year—should not be expected to produce proficiency at the company, battalion or higher unit levels. Though time is the most critical element, administrative requirements, non-battle related training, limited availability of ranges, a lack of simulation and training devices, and the inability to put officer and non-commissioned officer leaders through professional development schools during pre-mobilization periods contributed to the requirement for a lengthy post-mobilization training program.

Personnel readiness hindered training during the early stages following mobilization. Approximately one-third of the roundout brigade soldiers required significant dental work to reach medical deployability standards. The Reserve component units had difficulty adapting to Active component automated personnel systems and, as a result, had continuing problems with personnel accountability. A large number of personnel were not qualified in their military specialties and this was critical in some combat skills and in certain low-density MOSs or low-density positions.

Logistics remained a significant challenge. During peacetime, most roundout brigade equipment is maintained by civilian maintenance technicians. Consequently, unit maintenance personnel are not skilled at diagnosing and repairing faults. As with the automated personnel systems, automated logistics systems differ between the Reserve and Active components and Reserve units had difficulty with the transition.

The requirement for preventive maintenance and repair of equipment under field conditions were difficult adjustments which the units did not make easily. Throughout the training at the National Training Center, high percentages of combat equipment were not available for use in the battles with the opposing force due to maintenance difficulties. The difficulties stemmed from weak operator maintenance skills and a lack of training of maintenance personnel

to recover and repair fighting systems under field conditions which are frequently harsh.

The effectiveness of the roundout association between Active component and Reserve component units varied. This appears to have been based on the level of interest of both the Active component and Reserve component commanders and their personal commitment, or lack thereof, to the roundout concept. That relationship and the knowledge of each other's policies, procedures, strengths and weaknesses should have been stronger across the board and should have been reinforced by a more comprehensive policy.

The Inspector General made a total of 53 recommendations at the conclusion of the assessment. These included: revising readiness reports and Reserve component unit evaluations to improve their utility; strengthening the links between Reserve component roundout units and their associated Active component divisions; increasing the responsibility of the Active component division commander for readiness reporting for pre and post-mobilization Reserve component training as well as for personnel utilization; increasing the authorized strength of roundout units; developing special recruiting and retention incentives; examining Reserve component medical and dental readiness procedures; increasing the annual training time for roundout units beyond 39 days; increasing the required professional schooling for non-commissioned officers; developing and using in peacetime compatible automated systems for personnel and logistics management; involving both Active component and Reserve component commanders in post-mobilization training plan development; and focusing Reserve component training on individual, crew, squad, and platoon level tasks during peacetime. These recommendations have been and are being implemented by a variety of means.

A Department of the Army roundout brigade task force was initially formed and given the mission of refining the issues and developing an action approach to implement and monitor the corrections needed. Its work has been absorbed by several other forums: the Reserve Component Leadership Development Plan; the Reserve Component Training Development Action Plan; Forces Command Bold Shift Program; and the Reserve Component Coordination Council, which is a high level body chaired by the Army's Vice Chief of Staff.

The Inspector General's assessment determined that the Reserve component roundout brigade mobilization, and post-mobilization training and deployment process is sound. The length of time needed to prepare the brigades for deployment after mobilization is a variable, however, which is highly dependent on the level of proficiency attained and sustained during non-mobilization conditions.

Our Chief of Staff, General Sullivan, has charged the Reserve component commanders to train to platoon level proficiency in combat units and company level proficiency in combat support and service support units during peacetime.

We believe that if these levels of proficiency are achieved and sustained—and if the other recommendations made in the Inspector General's report are implemented—roundout brigades can be



available for deployment at about the 90-day mark after mobilization.

I must emphasize, however, that 90 training days is not a long period in which to become proficient in the highly complex skills of synchronizing and focusing the various elements of combat power inherent in our maneuver forces. The commander who does this best will win and will suffer the lowest casualties on the highly lethal battlefields of the future. We have a moral obligation to the young soldiers who will fight those battles, and to their families, to be absolutely certain that when we send them to war they not only have the best equipment, but they and their leaders are the best trained, most competent fighters on the field.

Sir, this concludes my prepared remarks. I will be happy to address any questions.

The CHAIRMAN. General Peay.

**STATEMENT OF LT. GEN. J.H. BINFORD PEAY III, DEPUTY CHIEF OF STAFF, OPERATIONS AND PLANS, UNITED STATES ARMY**

General PEAY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for the opportunity to appear before this panel of the House today.

As indicated in my statement prepared for the record, the base force Army will be a far different Army than that which won Just Cause, Desert Storm and the cold war. It will be leaner, more lethal and relevant for the times. It will be an Army which preserves those values which have endured for more than 216 years. Values which are the core ingredients of defining the Army as an institution: quality people; doctrine; force structure; training and leader development. But it is also an Army that has a vision for the 21st century. We have entered an era of a new style of warfare—fast-paced, lethal, high technology-intensive, incredibly complex, and requiring a military leadership with an unprecedented level of training and sophistication.

The base force Army is an Army that, fighting as a part of a joint or coalition force, will be capable of achieving quick, decisive victory in any contingency. With General Abrams's vision of a total force and succeeding chiefs of staffs' concentration on light forces, values, family and training as a backdrop, we have examined our force structure, Active and Reserve, combat and support, procurement items, modernization strategy and Army bases at home and abroad.

The 20-division base force Army encompasses the capabilities required for execution of the missions required by a new military strategy. It rests on the four pillars of strategic deterrence, forward presence, crisis response and reconstitution. It is a smaller force structure that is carefully crafted to blend the capabilities of all components to perform our forward presence in crisis response missions, while continuing to complement the Army's unique capabilities with the other services.

This smaller force accepts greater national risk and increases reliance on early political decisions to mobilize Reserve component units. It is worth noting that this force was sized and shaped to meet the exigencies of a world increasingly faced with regional crises and threats to our national interests. We decided which capa-



bilities would be required to respond to a wide range of threats to our national interests—potential threats which are observable and quantifiable.

What is not known in every instance is the will or the intent of those who would accumulate modern arsenals well beyond that required for legitimate defense purposes. We carefully analyzed each of our three components: Active, Army Reserve and the National Guard, to determine which capabilities to retain based on unit availability, readiness and strategic mobility assets. The force was then sized to meet the requirements of the strategy and the imperatives of our air-land battle doctrine. Where necessary, we reshaped elements of each component being retained in the force and eliminated those we did not need. The analytical process to determine the in-State force was rigorous, integrated and based on a series of measures of merits. All commands participated and it was fair.

An essential tenet of the National Military Strategy is the ability to rapidly assemble the forces needed to win; to quickly apply a decisive force to overwhelm our adversaries; and to win with minimum loss of life. We have defined our mobility requirement as one light and two heavy divisions in the first 30 days, with a full five-division contingency corps and all of its support elements in 75 days.

To that end, we have worked very hard to define the strategic lift—sea and air—that is required to meet those criteria. The mobility requirements study recently approved by the Secretary of Defense will ensure that the Army can fulfill its power projection role. We will acquire that strategic lift by buying 21, U.S. built, fast roll-on/roll-offs and by improving seven strategic seaports and the associated infrastructure here in the United States at the cost of approximately \$13 billion. The contracts for the first four roll-on/roll-off ships should be let this October.

The elements of the total force match their strategic purpose. We forward deploy a corps of two Active divisions in Europe, a division in Korea and a division in Hawaii for forward presence. The centerpiece of our power projection capability is the CONUS-based five-division corps of heavy, light, airborne and air assault divisions and special operating forces. For initial reinforcement, we have three rounded out mechanized divisions. Behind them in the force deployment scheme are six full and two cadre Guard divisions. Special operating force and support forces are integrated into the 20-division, four-corps force.

Just as important as combat forces, and perhaps more so, are our training institutions which set the standards and our research and development institutions which ensure the material requirements. A smaller total Army must be more ready and a more modern. We have placed increasing reliance on the Reserve components for selected missions commensurate with their availability. As a consequence, we rely exclusively on Active component combat forces for initial crisis response. However, depending upon the circumstances of the next crisis, some 5,000 to 10,000 reservists would be required, in the first 30 days, to deploy and support the lead elements of the contingency force. To deploy the full five-division contingency force with its associated command and control and

logistical support, over 103,000 reservists serving in support units will be needed.

Early reinforcing divisions will depend on their roundout brigades and our strategic Reserve is almost entirely based in the Reserve components. In short, our Reserve components must achieve a higher state of readiness than was required under our old strategy of containment.

We have taken the new National Military Strategy Imperatives, and the lessons of Just Cause and Desert Storm, and defined a broad range of policy, regulatory and resourcing initiatives to improve the readiness of our Reserve components. Readiness initiatives are directed at maximizing the value of pre and post-mobilization training time for combat and support units, improving military occupational skill qualifications, leader development, and training and modernization of the force. Initial reports indicate that, while the initiatives are demanding, they are embraced by all in the full recognition that failure to do so leads to greater risk in terms of increased casualties and ultimately our ability to execute the National Military Strategy.

What I have briefly described is the total force policy. It provides the capability to support the National Military Strategy with a common doctrine, standard for training and leader development, and an understanding about the complexities of warfare in the 21st century.

The base force Army also contains an Active component that is large enough to remain resilient, grow new leaders for the modern battlefield and regenerate itself. To reduce the Active component beyond that threshold will risk fracturing the institution.

Our Nation expects and requires that our smaller and reshaped total Army—Active and Reserve—be relevant to the strategic context, superbly trained, equipped with modern equipment and rapidly deployable to achieve victory. The base force Army provides the correct mix of Active and Reserve forces in support of our strategy with efficient and correct stewardship of resources.

If provided the necessary resources by Congress, we will be capable of supporting the Nation's national security interests, to deploy on short notice, to apply decisive force and win quickly. We will do it as a total Army, total team.

Thank you, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you, and thank you to both of you gentlemen.

We would now like to call up the second panel and then we will have a chance to question you at the end, if you would wait.

Our next panel is Gen. Robert Ensslin, the President of the National Guard Association, and Gen. Don Edwards, the President of the Adjutants General Association.

Gentlemen, welcome to our hearing this afternoon.

General ENSSLIN. Thank you, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. General Ensslin, the floor is yours, sir.

**STATEMENT OF MAJ. GEN. ROBERT F. ENSSLIN, JR., RET.,  
PRESIDENT, NATIONAL GUARD ASSOCIATION**

General ENSSLIN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.



In the interest of time, I have just a few remarks that I would like to make in addition to my prepared statement I submitted for the record.

The CHAIRMAN. Let me just get unanimous consent that all prepared statements, by all witnesses, will be put into the record, without objection.

General ENSSLIN. First, as you know, the National Guard Association and the Adjutants General Association have developed a joint alternative force structure proposal, primarily because of what we perceive as shortcomings in the Department of Defense base force plan.

Briefly, we believe the base force, as presented, does not: Fully capitalize on the decreased imminent military threat; does not recognize the increased economic threat and the severity of reduced future defense budgets; does not consider the success of the total force policy; does not take advantage of the cost differential between Active and National Guard units; does not fully consider lift limitations when determining the mix of Active Guard and Reserve forces; does not acknowledge the importance of and value added through the dual Federal-State role of the Guard; does not recognize the role of the Guard as a critical link between public support and the national defense; and does not maintain the historic reliance on a small Active and a large Guard and Reserve force in times of relative peace.

Our proposal does accept the four-corps, 20-division irreducible force level of the base force. Our plan would compensate for the shortcomings I just mentioned by providing a lower-cost defense force more in line with the reduced imminent threat. It would eliminate high-cost forces which cannot be moved within the first 60 days; provide 20 fully-resourced divisions without relying on hollow cadre forces; reduce the budget by more than \$1 billion per year in operating costs; strengthen public support for our national defense; and provide a greater base structure to start reconstitution if it becomes necessary in the future.

Mr. Chairman, the principal difference between the base force and our proposal is a change in the mix of Active and Guard forces.

There are a couple of additional comments that were provoked by the earlier testimony. General Griffith's report on the examination of the three Guard brigades—the three maneuver brigades—calls to mind the fact that no Active component brigade has ever been scrutinized in that same way.

The 39 days of collective training that are frequently referred to indicate that that is the total training Guardsmen receive during a year. The statistics of the National Guard Bureau show that the average National Guard enlisted member is paid for 50 days of duty every year. The average officer is paid for 80 days of duty. In addition, there are a lot of unpaid days.

The 39 days is 39 days of collective training and it is important. Collective training is the most important, the most rewarding training; but it is misleading to think that is all the training that a Guardsman receives in a year's time.

The reference to the difficulties in maintaining vehicles in those maneuver brigades does not mention the fact that a new maintenance system was put in place. Those Guard brigades had not been



equipped with laptop computers to access the Army's automated spare parts and maintenance system. I visited the 48th in the desert and the soldiers were learning how to use those laptop computers in the middle of their exercised.

All of the spare parts requisitions that had been in place when the unit was mobilized were automatically cancelled and they had to use the new system to rerequisition. This was a tremendous burden that impacted their ability to get the spare parts they needed to maintain the vehicles.

In addition, many of the vehicles issued at the National Training Center broke down before they ever reached the field positions for the initial training to begin. They were the oldest vehicles in the Army's inventory, maintained by contractors at NTC.

This does not say that maintenance would have been perfect if those things had been in place. But it is very easy to say, in general terms, that there is an inability to maintain the vehicles because the maintenance at home station is done by civilian employees. The civilian employees are military technicians who were civilian employees of the Army. They must be members of the National Guard to be hired as civilian technicians and work on those vehicles; they are mobilization assets who are mobilized along with Guard units.

I could go on at some length, but I think I had better say that this completes my remarks and I will await questions.

The CHAIRMAN. General Edwards.

#### **STATEMENT OF MAJ. GEN. DONALD F. EDWARDS, PRESIDENT, ADJUTANTS GENERAL ASSOCIATION**

General EDWARDS. Thank you, sir. I appreciate very much the opportunity to testify and represent the Adjutants General.

As you are probably aware, we are now in our annual meeting and I flew up this morning from Little Rock. I can assure you and the members of the committee that I carry with me the views of the Adjutants General.

As I am following my colleague, General Ensslin, who reported to you that we have an alternative force proposal, I will not go into great detail on that. I think he has covered that and I will wait for questions on that if any member of the committee desires later.

For the record, I should say to you that the Adjutant Generals do not support the base force. I would suspect that is obvious but let me be sure I say that. We eagerly await Congress' decisions concerning the establishment of the Army, what the force will look like this year, and in the out years as this debate continues.

We think that it is important that you look at and consider the facts. It is interesting to me, as a country boy from Vermont who does not work in Washington, to watch the spin that gets put on things and the evaluation on how the roundout brigades performed. I was delighted to hear General Griffith talk about the IG report today. As I am sure you are aware, that has not been released to the field. We eagerly look forward to the time when we have the report so that we can use it as a management document.

I think that we are indeed in very different times. The cold war-era, which was in reality a spike in the way this country organized its defense in terms of continuity, is, I think, admittedly behind us.

This country historically has organized its defense over a 200-year period with a small standing military and a large citizen soldiery. Clearly that was what the founding fathers had in mind. If one looks at the history of the country over those centuries, that is indeed what one sees.

Something else that one sees over the last century is mobilization for World War I, World War II, Korea, Vietnam, and Desert Shield/Desert Storm. I point out to you that in World War I, two of the first four divisions declared combat-ready by General Pershing were Guard divisions. Of the eight divisions that the German general staff rated as superior, six were Guard divisions.

I point out that in World War II, the first two divisions to go into combat were Guard divisions—in New Guinea and the Americal division, which was the third, was made up of three Guard regiments, again in the Pacific.

I also point out that we did not activate the Guard on a large scale in Vietnam. I served two tours in Vietnam and I vividly remember coming through San Francisco and having tomatoes thrown at me in 1969; I got the impression that the American public was not exactly in support of me.

You will remember, as I do, an Army Chief of Staff who came home from that same war—Gen. Creighton Abrams—with the determination that that was not going to happen again. He created the total force. I think that we just saw in Desert Storm the summation of what the total force is all about. We saw the Guard and the Reserve called up in large numbers and deployed with the regulars, with the Active all-volunteer force and all three components of the force did very well indeed. Clearly a military performance that all of us have admired and respected.

But now we—the Adjutants General—see in the base force a turning away from that very structure that General Abrams proposed. You heard General Peay testify that in the first deploying units, only 5,000 to 10,000 would be called. We think that we need to keep the total force doctrine clearly in mind and we need to shape the military, shape the Army—which is what this debate is about today—along the lines of what the total force is all about.

Now, let us get into what the combat units did in Desert Storm. Now, unfortunately, the testimony here today has continued to focus on the roundout brigades. I will talk a little bit about that but there were some other Guard combat units that went to Desert Storm, at least my friends in the artillery assure me that they still consider themselves to be a combat arm.

I think it is very interesting to take the record of the 48th Brigade, the Georgia Brigade, and to actually count the number of days that they trained before they were certified combat ready by General Berber, the FORSCOM Commander.

The director of the Army Guard testified last week that it was 59 days for that brigade—actual training days—for that brigade to get ready. I think that if you look at the facts of those 59 days, I think the 48th Brigade proves that the roundout concept works.

Clearly none of us ever thought that the 48th Brigade was going to mobilize, deploy and go to war in 24 hours or less. Clearly all of us in the Army thought there would be post-mobilization training. I think the debate over whether it is going to be 59 days or



90 days is pretty much a very fine debate, and I am not even sure that it is focused debate.

I find it very interesting to hear the 90 days thrown out when the brigade did it in less than 60 and proved that it could do it. I assume that General Berber certified it combat ready because it was combat ready. It went to the National Training Center, it did very well at the National Training Center despite all of the problems that you heard about.

That brigade went up against the OP-4 at the National Training Center, six engagements. I understand that the standard record of a brigade at the National Training Center is six engagements is two wins, two ties and two losses. That brigade with four battalions achieved four victories and two ties. That is a darn good record in 59 days.

Now, surely I will tell you that if we take a snapshot of any Guard or Reserve unit—let me speak for the Guard—on any given day you are going to find a certain number of soldiers in that unit who are not MOS qualified. I can guarantee you will find some if you come to the Vermont Brigade.

When John Jones comes home to Bradford, Vermont and he is a prior service soldier, sailor or airperson, and enlists in the A Company of the Second Tank in Bradford, and he was not a tanker, then we have to qualify him in armor. It will take a while. That goes on in all of the units but it does not take a huge amount of time. What I think is very interesting is to look at the number of people who were indeed declared deployable at the end as the units were certified and went off to war or were certified in the 48th Brigade.

Yes, there were some dental problems and we changed the rules of dental problems which made them worse. But the unit, the 48th Brigade did get declared combat ready and did it in 59 days.

Let us talk about two other combat units. Let us talk about the 142d Artillery out of Oklahoma and let us talk about the artillery brigade out of the Tennessee/West Virginia Guard. The 142d specifically was declared and validated in 21 days. They shipped their equipment, picked it up in Southwest Asia and got to the front line and fought in the war, as did the other brigade.

The 142d in one engagement destroyed 100 Iraqi artillery pieces with no loss to itself or friendly forces. It supported the British division, and I have a letter of appreciation from that division commander which, with your permission, sir, I would like to have included in the record.

It supported the Big Red One and has a letter of appreciation from that commander, which I would also like to have included in the record. It fought continuously throughout the war and was a very, very successful combat brigade.

The other artillery brigade did exactly the same thing. An engineer group—combat support—out of Georgia, deployed in 15 days and did an outstanding job, commanded three Active engineer battalions.

I think that the committee and the Congress needs to look at the entire record of all of the units that went to Desert Shield and Desert Storm.

In the interests of time, I will conclude my remarks on that note.



The CHAIRMAN. Thank you, General Edwards, and thank you, General Ensslin.

If you could stand by for some questions. Let me now turn to the third part of our presentation this afternoon; and Mr. Richard Davis, the Director of Army Issues for the GAO. Please come and talk to us a little bit.

Mr. Davis, the floor is yours, sir.

**STATEMENT OF RICHARD A. DAVIS, DIRECTOR, ARMY ISSUES,  
NATIONAL SECURITY AND INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS DIVI-  
SION, GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE**

Mr. DAVIS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Many of the comments you are going to hear from me today are in my prepared statement. I will probably echo many of things you heard General Griffith of the IG talk about, so I will keep my remarks short. I have about three or four observations that I would like to make.

One deals with the expectations of the role of combat Reserves. The Department of Defense never intended roundout brigades to be part of a rapid deployment force. They expected that there would be a period of mobilization and that, rather than being a part of a rapid deployment force, they would be part of an early reinforcing force—forces that would be expected to enter a theater somewhere in the neighborhood of 30 to 90 days after mobilization.

Unfortunately, the intentions of DOD are not consistent with what the expectations of many members of the roundout units, both the NCOs and the commanders, envisioned. I think it is also true to say many Members of Congress, and maybe this Defense Policy Panel itself, shared these expectations. Possibly the unreliable readiness information available to the units and the commanders at all levels reinforced the expectations of the roundout units and maybe even the Congress.

These readiness reports overstated the capabilities of the units and led them to believe that post-mobilization training could be accomplished much faster than it actually could be accomplished. For example, the three roundout brigades that we are going to talk about today, in part, were all reporting readiness ratings indicating that their post-mobilization time would be anywhere from 28 to 40 days. In actuality, after they were mobilized and after further assessment, the actual post-mobilization period turned out to be between 90 and 135 days.

Some of this can be explained. The Army never assumed that during the post-mobilization period they would have to spend the amount of time they found necessary to devote to basic individual and small unit training that they did in the three units that we are talking about today.

Another observation I would like to make is that the peacetime training did not adequately prepare the combat brigades to do their mission. As part of our review, we went and observed the units during their post-mobilization training. Not only at their home stations and where they did the training but also at the NTCs and, coming at Mr. Montgomery's request, we are currently looking at the units that went to the desert in place of the roundout brigades to see what the comparison will show.

I would like to make three points to demonstrate that the peacetime training did not adequately prepare these units.

First, basic job skills just had not been mastered. For example, one of the previous members talked about maintenance. Many members that were required to do maintenance just had not mastered that skill during peacetime. When they went to the NTC and further, and that was because civilians, State civilians, were doing this maintenance.

I think an even better example is gunnery skills. These skills are very important when we talk about combat maneuver units, armor units and so forth. In the National Guard, they are only required to have gunnery qualification testing once every 2 years. Now, that does not mean that they do not fire more often than once every 2 years. Rather, they qualify on their weapons once every 2 years. Many times when they even do the qualification testing, the master gunner will do the boresighting for the crew. So the crews are really not learning the skills that they need to learn.

Another critical point that we found out is that the NCO leadership skills were lacking post-mobilization. For example, in one of the roundout brigades, only 30 percent of the NCOs that were required to have the basic NCO course actually had that course at the time of post-mobilization. These would be the people in the E-5s, E-6s, E-7s. Commissioned officers, much the same story. They displayed systemic and recurring weaknesses in the synchronization of combat assets.

Again, in one of the roundout brigades—upon doing the post-mobilization—we found that only 27 percent of the officers required to have an advance officer course actually had taken one.

Although the audit that I mentioned that we are doing for Mr. Montgomery is not complete yet, we are far enough along to say that there are stark differences. These are major differences between those figures and the figures that we will report to you regarding the brigades, the units that went to the desert in place of these units.

Another observation is that the incompatible Active and Reserve system imposed difficulties for these brigades. Some of that was mentioned by earlier people. The Guard's personnel system is not compatible with that of the Active Force. The Guard system is a manual system and much of the information is 60 to 90 days old. That presents some problems, especially in some of the tasks that require post-mobilization and moving people from unit to unit and so forth.

Also, I will not belabor the point, but there is the issue of supply. The supply systems in the National Guard and the Active Army are just completely different and, again, the Guard people had to master that upon post-mobilization.

We believe that if the Army is to effectively use its Guard combat forces, it first needs to determine what changes are needed in its peacetime training to improve the readiness of these forces. Second, the Army needs to explore the feasibility of expanding its roundout concept at lower levels of organization as a means of retaining combat Reserves. Third, the Army needs to make Active and Reserve systems compatible to ease the integration of Reserves upon mobilization. Fourth, the Army needs to improve its readiness informa-

tion so that its leaders have reliable information on the units' proficiency.

The Army has ongoing efforts on many of the fronts, including the Bold Shift initiatives and actions to improve readiness information. We view these efforts as positive steps toward overcoming the problems that we have highlighted here today.

I would like to add that while much attention has been devoted to the National Guard combat brigades, some of the problems were not unique to combat brigades. While the above problems prevented the National Guard combat brigades from participating in the Persian Gulf War, many of the National Guard and Army Reserve support troops that served in the Gulf experienced many of the same problems. Problems such as non-deployable personnel, skill and position mismatches, inadequately trained leaders, incompatible systems, insufficient competence in survival skills, and medical and dental problems.

As the Army looks to address the problems that we have identified today, we believe that it should also examine the problems that these forces experienced.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Davis, thank you very much. All of the various panel members, thank you very much.

Could you gentlemen come on up to the table and we will proceed with some questions? Either way, it does not matter. Please sit in front of the right sign.

Let me begin by exploring the question that came up in practically everybody's testimony. That is the issue of the time it takes before we can deploy.

I think it was General Peay who talked about the plans under the base force which is the first units, that would be three divisions, the early deploying units would need 5,000 to 10,000 in the way of support. Is that right? Combat service support capability. Is that right?

General PEAY. That is right. Those first three Active, 5,000 to 10,000. That is something like a hospital, the port units, some of the early deploying CSS which we would package in high deploying, early CSS units as part of that three-division force.

The CHAIRMAN. This is lower—this number is coming down, is that right? Compared to what it was just previous to this?

General PEAY. Yes, sir. Let me take a second on that.

The CHAIRMAN. Please. What I am interested in is why you are reducing the number of support people that you need for these earliest deploying units.

General PEAY. We are doing that because it is one of availability, accessibility and readiness. So we tried to take advantage of coming out of Europe today and what many people now know as an 18,000 EC3 force structure. Actually, we ended up bringing only about 14K of that, putting 14K into that package. But the concept was to bring home that Active while we had it available. We thought that was good stewardship of resources coming out of Europe.

Next year, we will trade that force structure within the Active component. Trade that out so that we now have a more Active component part of that first 30-day deployment package.



The CHAIRMAN. Why did you think it was necessary to have a larger Active component?

General PEAY. Again, I think it is the reasons of accessibility, the mobilization part of all that, the readiness of that structure, to quickly get those early deploying troops out.

The CHAIRMAN. OK.

General PEAY. Then as I mentioned, when you get into the five-division—

The CHAIRMAN. Yes. I was going to raise that. All right. Now, you get to the five-division force.

General PEAY. You are at 103,000—

The CHAIRMAN. That is 103,000 and that is the 75-day deployment. Is that right?

General PEAY. That is right. That runs to about 40-some percent of the total contingency force—55 percent of the support forces in that contingency force. So there have been a lot of people concerned we are going to go to war without the Reserve components, it is not going to happen that way.

The CHAIRMAN. OK. Could you go to war without the Reserve components as long as you were under three divisions?

General PEAY. Well, I do not think you will ever thin that out that fine. You have port units, you have units that are too expensive to keep on the Active rolls right now for the very few times you are going to use it. So I do not see us doing that.

I think it is also unrealistic to think—with the exception of a couple of those that I have mentioned—that you can have those forces go on 18-hours notice, very much like we did with the 82d and the 101st in this last deployment. It is unrealistic to expect that our great Guardsmen and Reservists should be in that kind of a posture.

The CHAIRMAN. General Griffith, in terms of the IG's report on availability, what kind of availability do you give? The only one you talked about in specific time was the roundouts that you attributed a 90-day post-mobilization training to.

What did the IG's report—or what is your sense—of the amount of time it would take to get combat service support units ready to go?

For example, General Edwards and General Ensslin talked about the fine work of a couple of artillery brigades. What is your assessment of those units? General Sullivan testified to this committee—and this is not based upon Desert Storm experience because no Guard divisions were called up as such—but he testified that he would expect about 12 months before a Guard division was ready to commit to combat.

Can you give us some other numbers other than the 90 days that you gave us for the roundout units?

General GRIFFITH. Mr. Chairman, the assessment, of course, that was done only gives us quantifiable data about the roundout units. But I will now give you my own professional judgment.

The CHAIRMAN. All right.

General GRIFFITH. I would echo what General Edwards said with the Guard. I fought, sir, with the 142d Field Artillery Brigade. The brigade did a credible job out there. It is a good brigade.

In my opening statement, I said that we believe that there are service support and combat support. I agree that artillery is in fact combat, but we carry it as a combat support unit in the structure.

I said in my opening statement, and I believe it very firmly, that there are single function units that can be expected to go very early. We had service support units from the Reserve component structure that deployed prior to the Active forces, certainly out of Europe.

We were received—when my division deployed into Southwest Asia—and supported by outstanding Reserve component forces.

Sir, I would say that in my judgment, artillery brigade, and I will wing it, but I would say 45 days.

The CHAIRMAN. OK.

General GRIFFITH. You could expect 45 days of training and you could say let us put them on a ship and let us start moving them over.

Again, with respect to medical units, there are some units that you could probably move within 72 hours; I think it really depends. As indicated, in the Guard there are some maintenance technicians who are in fact very, very good and are assigned to maintenance units. The one support unit that excelled at the National Training Center was a maintenance unit that was made up in large part of these technicians. Now, in the other units, that is not where many of the maintenance technicians went to when they were mobilized.

The point I would like to make, however, is that there are some of these skills are transferrable; engineers, transportation. We had some superb Reserve component transportation units over there that moved us to the field—moved us from the ports out to the desert. Again, I listed medical units because I was concerned about the treatment my troops would receive if there were casualties. Absolutely superb, ready to go to war when they arrived.

So I think, the amount of post-mobilization training depends on large measure on the type of unit. But I will say unequivocally that by far the most complicated thing that we do, and requires the most post-mobilization training, is bringing together, and synchronizing and focusing the manpower units—the armor and infantry units—the combat power and combat systems.

The CHAIRMAN. That is helpful. Let me tell you what we are trying to do here. If we are putting a force structure together—as the panel is closing—something like Option C. What we need to know is what is a realistic post-mobilization training schedule for various kinds of Guard and Reserve units? In other words, what is a reasonable expectation?

You are saying that a reasonable expectation for a roundout unit would be 90 days.

General GRIFFITH. Sir, I would say it is a reasonable expectation and I want to underscore this, is if the pre-mobilization has been done to standard.

The CHAIRMAN. Right.

General GRIFFITH. If you come into the mobilization situation and you have to put tank crews and Bradley crews through qualification gunnery then it is going to be longer.

The CHAIRMAN. Yes.

General GRIFFITH. So the pre-mobilization condition has got to be the standard before you can say 90 days.

The CHAIRMAN. I understand, but this is what we have to do: It seems to me that the program that we are talking about is a program that would put into—and I want to talk to the members of the panel a little bit about what kind of reform or changes in the training might be appropriate—but what we need is reasonable expectations coupled with good training and good equipment. We still need to have some idea about what would be a reasonable expectation.

Now, if you take 90 days and we have—that is a debated point and I want to talk to the Guard members about that in a second. I want your views. You are saying a reasonable expectation, something that you could use as a planning factor, the roundout combat units, say, 90 days. The combat support may be 45 days.

What is a reasonable expectation for the service units? I recognize your point, that what we had in Desert Storm and what we presumably have now is an enormous range. Some of these units, because of the kind of the work they do in their civilian life or other things, are up and ready to go, others are less.

What is a reasonable expectation for a combat service support unit to be available?

General GRIFFITH. Sir, I am only reticent to answer you because we have not gone out and studied and I am giving you my own best—

The CHAIRMAN. Please, with that qualification General Griffith, I think if the pre-mobilization conditions are there—for example, medical units, transportation units, water purification units, postal units—I think those types of units if the personnel readiness is taken care of, if they are up to strength, if they have done their pre-mobilization training, I would say that we could expect to start to put those people on airplanes and ships within 30 to 45 days.

Would you say that a Guard division, a year does that sound long to you or does that sound reasonable to you?

General GRIFFITH. Sir, it sounds absolutely reasonable to me. I commanded a division and I must tell you—and I heard the discussions about the National Training Center. I have taken units to the National Training Center. I have taken units to the Combined Arms Maneuver Training Center in Germany. That is a very, very complex business. I do not demean what the National Guard units did there, but to orchestrate the combat power in a division and supporting a division, to bring that all together to ensure that you are proficient and to ensure that you are not going to unnecessarily lose lives on the battlefield, I would say a year is absolutely a reasonable expectation for a combat division.

The CHAIRMAN. What is your reaction to General Edwards' comment that General Burba certified the 48th and the actual training days were 59?

General GRIFFITH. Sir, we are not in agreement on the number of days. We show 91 training days in the assessment done by the—and I was not there, but the people that were there say it was about 91 training days.

Had the 48th been assigned to my division, I would have said I am glad to have you with me. But, sir, I will tell you they would



certainly not have been the lead brigade that I would put in my formation. I would have hoped to have had some additional training time with them and I believe if you read the details of General Burba's validation statement, he said additional training was needed.

For example, I must tell you that the crews—all the crews—in that brigade were not qualified at the time deployed. Conversely, forgive me for using personal vignettes but they help me to make a point. As we were deploying the 1st Armor Division out of Germany, during November and December, every Active tank crew in the 1st Armor Division—while we were loading ships, while we were loading equipment, while we were moving 1,000 mil vans of equipment from southern Germany, while we were moving 8,000 vehicles from southern Germany to the north seaports—we were also qualifying every tank and Bradley crew in that division. Even though those same crews had just been qualified in June, we felt like we had to qualify them again to ensure that, when our soldiers went into battle, their combat skills were honed, that they could shoot what they were aiming at, I think that they demonstrated their skills against the Republican Guards very well. But you do not do that by qualifying every 2 years, sir.

So, again, we certainly feel that those roundout brigades are viable or we would not have them in the force structure. We feel that there is a very important role they can play; but we would be irresponsible to put them in battle until they are sufficiently trained to go to battle.

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Davis, listening to the numbers in the presentation of General Griffith, where do you disagree with what he had to say?

Mr. DAVIS. I cannot think of anything he said that I disagree with. I think I might be able to provide some information that can help explain the difference.

I think the 59 days that General Edwards was talking about deals with the specific amount of time that was spent at the NTC. The 48th, before it went to the NTC, actually spent time at Fort Stewart. Then from Fort Stewart—and it was doing post-mobilization training there—it went to the NTC to continue the post-mobilization training. The total time is 90 days; 59 days I believe is that time at the NTC.

The CHAIRMAN. So you would agree—again, I am looking at the numbers. If the numbers are—let us say 30 to 45 days for a combat service support unit, 45 days for a combat support unit, and 90 days for a roundout combat unit and 1 year for a combat division, basically that makes sense to you?

Mr. DAVIS. Well, let me maybe back up a little bit in terms of the 90 days and the qualification. The validation made by General Burba—I want to echo again what General Griffith said—that when the 48th was qualified or validated, only about half of its tank and Bradley crews had qualified. So additional training was needed and I am not sure what the validation really meant.

The other problem we had in terms of the validation process was that there was no criteria set up to measure what we were really validating, what were we really saying and what did the validation really mean.

I really cannot comment about the 12 months for a division. Obviously, it is going—in my personal view—to take a long period of time.

I also believe, as General Griffith said, that it depends on—in terms of combat support, combat service support—the type of units you are talking about. We also did a review and looked at many of the combat service support units that were mobilized and deployed. We found a wide range of times in terms of when they were mobilized, the post-mobilization training that was required and when they were shipped out. In fact, many times when they were shipped out, they were shipped out and they still needed additional training. The training that took place a lot of times was driven by the transportation assets to get them over there because that was a limiting factor here.

But it clearly is going to be faster than, I think, the 90 days for a combat unit.

The CHAIRMAN. I want to give General Edwards and General Ensslin a chance to comment and then I will yield to others to ask questions.

Do either of you gentlemen want to comment on anything?

General EDWARDS. I would be absolutely delighted, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Go ahead.

General EDWARDS. It is interesting to listen to this and I will go back to what I said in the beginning. I am a great believer in facts. Frankly, I find the discussions to be confusing because I look at the facts, I listen to some of the things that were said and they do not rhyme.

First of all, let me say again that I do not think any of us ever thought that any of the roundout brigades were going to be the lead brigades. So let us be sure that everybody here at the table, unless they want to disagree with me, agrees with that. I do not think that is the debate.

I think the debate is how long—in this discussion anyway—does it take to train various types of units before they can deploy. I assume that if the Army validated units and they were deployed then they met the criteria that was discussed today in terms of being sure the soldiers would survive, et cetera.

I also am aware, although I was not there and I think almost everybody in the room is aware that read the newspaper and listened to the popular media, that the units in Saudi Arabia before the war started trained in Saudi Arabia.

I think we would also all agree that the units that were deployed from the United States of every category—Active, Guard or Reserve—trained in the United States before they were deployed. I would have assumed that if the 48th, or any other roundout brigade had been certified or validated or use whatever term one wants to use as General Burba did, that after they shipped their equipment, which would have taken some 30 days if history stands to reason based on what happened, that they would have had time to do gunnery.

I also thought that the corps from Germany that went to Desert Shield before Desert Storm asked for and got 30 additional days to do collective training in the field. At least one of the commanders

was quoted as having said that, I believe, in the *Army Times*, which admittedly is the popular media.

So when I hear such terms thrown out as we do not expect Reserve component and Guard units to go in 18 hours, I totally agree with that in terms of ground units. Bob Ensslin and I, although I am still Active and Bob is retired, are two purple suit guys sitting at this table because we commanded Air Guard and Army Guard units. I have a fighter squadron deployed right now and two alert detachments that will put four birds in the air for you in 5 minutes. I do not think the people who serve in the Air Guard are wonderfully superior to the people in the Army Guard. I think the question of accessibility comes into play here.

Those Air Guard units are available to the United States of America on 5 minutes notice because the Governors of the States involved have agreed and allow them to be accessible to the Air Force. The Adjutants General have said, and I will say it here publicly on the record, that that same arrangement can apply to Army Guard units.

Now, I do not think it can be done in hours and I will tell you that alert detachments are certainly resourced higher than platoons and roundout brigades. There is a ratio here between resourcing and time and I do not think any of us can reach a finite equation as to what it is. But certainly the full-time manning, the training and resources that one puts into a Reserve component unit affect how quickly it can be ready.

But we are not talking 18 hours in the early deploying divisions; we are talking 30 days. Now, one of the things that came up in prior hearings has been the question of the 18,000 soldiers that are being retained as Active Duty in combat service support and combat support roles and could they or could whether they should be in the Reserve components.

Now, I think one of the things that we very, very, very definitely proved beyond any question in Desert Shield/Desert Storm was that those are exactly the kind of units—I have never heard anybody say that this was not true—that can be available on very short notice, i.e., 30 days. So I do not understand why, in this rapid reaction force, we are not more closely looking and planning to put more Reserve component units in those roles. This will save the taxpayers some money, and, by the way, provide for the total force that Creighton Abrams had in mind which the country rallied behind the forces when they deployed.

Now, I trust General Berber to validate the 48th Brigade. I have a chart here, I would be happy to provide it to anybody, let them examine it. It shows the number of days that it took the 48th Brigade to accomplish various things. But it does not get up beyond 90 days no matter how you count the days, particularly when you realize they were given time off for Christmas.

If you look at when they were mobilized and you look at the day they were indeed certified or validated, it just does not add up beyond 90 days. You can stretch it and include all kinds of time for mobilization administration and make it go to 70. I really do think that we need to keep ourselves to the facts.

Now, I would have a recommendation for you, sir, on this area. You are hearing now from five people who did not command any



of those brigades. As a commander, I have always found that when I have interests and concerns about a unit it is a darn good idea to go look at the unit and talk to the people involved.

Now, I do not know whether you need to have a public hearing on it; but I think that if you or your staff met with the commanders of those brigades and talked to the people who actually went through it, you might find it very interesting.

The CHAIRMAN. We did indeed, General Edwards. But maybe we needed to go through this again in light of some of the things mentioned.

Bill Dickinson.

Mr. DICKINSON. General Ensslin, did you have any additional statements you wanted to make before we get to my questions?

General ENSSLIN. Yes, sir, if I could.

Our NATO war plans for a number of years called for National Guard divisions to be in Europe in 42 days. That was part of our basic plan to support NATO and that was a provision that the Army had in its war plans for years and years. We must have been way off base if those people would get there in 42 days and it would be 10 months before they were ready to fight.

My experience in mobilizing and deploying combat service support units to Saudi Arabia was that the post-mobilization training for those units was minimal. They received an intensive NTC train-up which was certainly well advised. They requalified with their personal weapons but by and large the post-mobilization training in their specific skills was minimal.

Some of the units had the opportunity for some mobile training teams to come and assist them. But by and large they were getting their equipment to port within 1 or 2 weeks after their arrival at the mob station. The focus was on the administrative matters that had to be addressed before those people left, not on their readiness.

The point is that they went and they did a good job with a minimum amount of post-mobilization training in the combat service support areas. We have addressed the combat support area and the success that was enjoyed there.

To talk about 12 months for a division. The guy with the real challenge is the brigade commander. He has to master the synchronization and he has to integrate all of his support functions. If, in 90 days those brigades are prepared to go—we are now saying that we are going to spend 9 months essentially training a division staff to get the division staff ready to manage those three brigades and manage the division's support elements, which are CS and CSS type units. I just cannot see how it is going to take 12 months to prepare a division if you can prepare a brigade in 90 days.

Mr. DICKINSON. Well, thank you. I thought that the Chairman mentioned that both of you would be given a chance to respond.

I am really trying to determine in my own mind—and I was just consulting with staff and with the Chairman earlier—what are we doing here today? What are we trying to establish and what decision are we trying to make? Evidently, we want to find out how many Guard and Reserve combat units we need and how long would we expect them to take to be combat ready, to be able to enter a battle.

We have two or three levels—with our Chairman's suggestion—of the number of units to be desired or required. You have the base force, which is 12 Active divisions, six Guard divisions, and two Guard cadres. Then you have the National Guard Association position of ten, ten, zero and then 15 Guard brigades. I am not sure what that really is.

Then the Chairman has suggested nine, six, zero and 12. So from your testimony and from what we also know, your support units require varying times depending on their technical skills. A medical unit, you could pick it up and put it most any place; they are ready to go. But your combat units are different. They have to coordinate with others and they are not a self-contained unit. It seems the more highly technical a unit is, probably the faster they are able to respond because they have to keep their technology up.

Aircraft, same thing. The pilots are flight qualified, that is what they do, most of them. They are just swapping one plane for another. It is the same type of planes—the airlines or wherever they are flying—but they fly the C-141s and C5s and it is just not much of a change for them.

But when you get into the ground combat maneuver units, you have a different thing. So we cannot come up with one criterion to say this thing would apply to all because it just is not applicable in the same manner to all. This is what we are grappling with in trying to decide whether Department of Defense has the right number. The National Guard and Reserve figures, are their number more reasonable? Or do we come out with some additional number?

We are doing the best we can to come with the right number. That gets us back to CBO because cost is what ultimately drives it. We are reducing costs. We are on a down slope with respect to what we can expect to spend in our defense budget this year, next year and every year into the foreseeable future. So we have to go to the CBO and ask what the relative costs are?

Now, I have a letter here written to me by Robert Reischauer, the Director of CBO. We asked him to analyze the various costs. Mr. Davis, are you prepared to comment on the letter that was written back?

Mr. DAVIS. I am not sure if I know about that specific letter or not. I know about some CBO stuff, but whether or not the particular one, I am not sure.

Mr. DICKINSON. Well, all right. I will not belabor that. But this is a part of the whole and I do not know that I can add much more to that.

So we have one of our personnel experts here, let me yield back and we can get to them.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Buddy Darden.

Mr. DARDEN. Mr. Chairman, at this time I am not prepared to go forward and I yield my time to Mr. Montgomery.

The CHAIRMAN. Sonny Montgomery.

Mr. MONTGOMERY. Thank you very much, Buddy. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Let me make some brief comments. I think we are missing that the Persian Gulf War was really the first time we could test the total force. We all agree that the Reserves and National Guard did



well. The mobilization was good, much better than we have had in prior wars. They reported on time. As far as I know, many of them did not try to get out on hardship discharges. Yes, there were many problems, but I think these problems are solvable. It seems that most of the problems that have been discussed today were in the roundout brigades.

Mr. Chairman, you have heard me say this before, the big mistake made with the roundout brigades was not the brigades themselves, but was the Defense Department itself. The Army left these brigades at home. When the Active units that they were assigned to moved out, the Guard units were not called out. For some reason the Defense Department did not—as far as the Army was concerned—call up any combat units. The other services called up Reserve combat units.

So the Army left the brigades home. They had been training with the 1st Cav and the 4th Infantry for 8 years and the morale did get bad in these brigades. They wanted to go and they were not called up. They were called up in the first part of December.

Now, training the National Guard brigades is the Army's responsibility. If the pre-mobilization training was not good, then the Army has got to take part of the blame for it. Now the Army has come in with what is called the Bold Shield; it is going to make training for the National Guard much better. Why did we not do that earlier?

We requested by law, Mr. Chairman—and you offered this amendment with me—that we have an independent study made of what the threat is out there, what mix do we need between National Guard, Reserve and the Active Forces and we are looking forward to the study because it would be an independent one. The advisory board on that, the Rand Corporation is impressive. So I am really looking forward to that Rand Corporation study. It will be independent and in my opinion, we can really go from there with that study.

General Peay, a question. In effect, General, the way I interpreted what you said about the contingency force, the combat units would really be made up of Active units and the National Guard would be left at home. What you are doing over at the Defense Department, I think that is right. You have given no money for military construction for the next year for the National Guard to build armies, to build ranges, to do anything else. I mean, we are out of business unless the Congress puts some funds back in there for construction.

Only 2 days ago you testified you wanted to decrease the size of the medical units of the Active Duty Army, and reduce the medical units of the National Guard and Reserve. My question is I guess you are going to leave the special forces on, you are really just kind of marking out the National Guard to be in a combat situation.

General PEAY. Well, thank you very much, sir.

Let me try and answer your question here by saying that I—again, I go back. I think you have to look at the strategy, you have to look at the known threats that we are facing today and the value of those forces we have forward deployed. Then you have to go into all the affordability things, the tough challenges that you gentlemen are trying to come to grips with.



Let me also say that my father is a Reserve officer. He spent 28 years in the business, some time in the Guard, some time in the Reserve, and some time in the Active. What I guess I got out of that as a youngster—and I have seen it now in my 30-some years of service—is I spent a lot of time with the Guard in terms of our training association, I have seen this factor of time.

Time eventually leads you to readiness. If I just may—some of this is close to classification—but you know we talk about these units today being available and I can take some of our great round-out brigades and our other divisions today and you just simply look at available strength. You look at available NQS or training standards—and they are basically subpar. They run in the 70s and 80 percent.

Those are the things you have to then do in the pre-mobilization period. That eventually runs you back to what kind of force you should structure because it is time. If we increase the training tempo—which we will have to do to keep youngsters alive in what I call this different kind of combat today—my experience is that recruiting invariably becomes a problem.

Every time I have been out there training with these youngsters on the weekend, we have had to back off; sometimes because husbands and wives must spend some time together from a family perspective. I come back to my own family. I can tell you that after 28 years, my father got out several years early because of the time in raising two youngsters.

I think we have to be realistic in the pressures we put on these great citizen soldiers and bang that back against this new strategy, this new kind of warfare. That eventually leads you into these options that we have been looking at, what is best for the country: the base force and the 12 divisions. In the Army we think that is important for the things I have mentioned on forward presence, that large part that goes for the contingency to the east. But I think, Mr. Chairman, we have not laid out the correct proportions in the Pacific. We have sort of said that this is an air campaign, perhaps I think drawing too much off Desert Shield and Desert Storm, we can learn the wrong lessons from the last war.

Mr. MONTGOMERY. General, I am not saying the citizen soldier is perfect but it certainly worked a long time. You and I have been in combat and you are just not going to put the perfect force out there; we have always depended on the citizen soldier. How many training days did Active combat units have in Saudi Arabia prior to the start of the ground war?

General PEAY. Well, let me answer that. I deployed—

Mr. MONTGOMERY. Did they go back to the tank firing? If you had had the brigades with you, they could have done that. Could they not have been just as proficient as the Active Forces if you had not left them at home?

General PEAY. No, that is not the question, sir.

Sir, the question is when we landed in Saudi Arabia from a go start of an 18-hour notification, were we ready to fight when we landed. The 101st Airborne Division, which I commanded, went into that particular conflict ready to fight upon arrival. They put us immediately into a covering force way to the north and every night we built up that combat power.

Mr. MONTGOMERY. I am not talking about the 101st. I am talking about the 1st Cav and the 4th Infantry. The 101st and 82d, we brought them back very quickly so they could move out again. They are supposed to be gone in 18 hours.

General PEAY. But, sir, in the contingency force package, there are also heavy divisions. So you have the 24th Infantry Division and you have the 1st Cavalry Division. Based on the commanders' estimate of the situation, those two heavy divisions could have gone before the 82d or the 101st based on the fight we were getting into.

So in fact the 24th Division moved the same time the 101st Airborne Division did in this last war.

General GRIFFITH. Sir, I would also like to address that from the 7th Corps' perspective, the forces that came out of Europe.

Sir, you are exactly right. We trained. My division trained for 6 weeks before the ground attack. We trained day and night for 6 weeks. But on the other hand, I was the first division in the desert from 7th Corps and there were 3d Armor Division units closing in hours, literally hours before we crossed into Iraq.

So obviously, any prudent commander will take advantage of every training second before he has to go to war. The other point is that when you go to war, it is not always decided by your commander. In fact, there was a concern around the 17th to the 23d or 24th of November that Saddam Hussein was about to launch a five-division armored attack down the Wadi al Batin toward Hafar al Batin and King Khalid Military City, where we had a lot of our logistics. We had less than one division—

Mr. MONTGOMERY. The Marines, General, carried their Reserve brigades and battalions from the Reserve Marines. They did not put them up in front, I will admit, but they had them in reserve as support and they did call them up.

I only have two more questions, Mr. Chairman.

How much preparation did the Active Army units go through prior to arrival at NTC? How much training were you doing then and what was the strength levels of these divisions? Not counting the 101st or the 82d, the 24th and the 1st Cav. What were their strength levels when they moved out?

General PEAY. I will have to provide you for the record the exact strength figures during that timeframe.

Mr. MONTGOMERY. Yes, but you had to bring some fellows in, I believe, on those Active units, too. So you have to do that for Active as well as the National Guard. You mentioned that was one of the problems, that the strength levels were not up. I believe the Actives have the same problem.

Let me ask this last question. How many of the Active units were formally validated for combat other than the 101st and the 82d that went over to the Persian Gulf for this quick move out? How many were actually validated for combat?

General PEAY. Well, sir, in the Active Army you do not go through a validation the way that you are talking about at the time that the whistle blows. You are validated every day that you live on Active Duty. You have a year-long training program that is very extensive. You go to the National Training Center.



Again, just before our division went to Saudi Arabia in August, we had been at the National Training Center in the March-April timeframe with the 24th Division. I might add again, trying to add some credence to the complexity of this business, we did not do well and we are on Active Duty around the clock. Because the sophistication of the warfare today from a leader perspective is a quantum jump in terms of the way we have had to fight before.

I think that is what all of us are saying. We are not denigrating the great people in uniform. What we are saying is there is a time factor difference in terms of their preparedness.

The leader part of our business has just jumped. Now, we are trying to put a lot of initiatives in that will take care of that; but that is going to take time. So you cannot size your forces unless you consider the time available in this new world order where containment is no longer the grand strategy.

Finally, I would just like to say—and I cautioned this the other day in a former testimony—that we may be making a little bit of an error here in thinking that you can be a truck driver, a hospital corpsman or something of that nature and that the skills are easily transferrable. But there are soldier skills and leader skills also associated with those particular MOSs that these youngsters are in. Again, in this tough war where it is day and night fighting, where fitness means an awful lot so that you can work around the clock, I would suggest that truck drivers have a different level of readiness that they have to maintain.

So, again, I think we are sensitive to the problem. It is a tough issue we are all dealing with here. We are trying to do what is right for the Nation and do a graduated kind of a thing that allows us to accomplish our strategy.

Mr. MONTGOMERY. My time is up but let me say I think we can work these problems out between the Guard and the Reserve; and I emphasize again it has mainly been the brigades. The other Reserve forces and the National Guard did very well. But I think that when the Army—and I believe Secretary Cheney is missing the point—called up all these Reserve units from these different communities—and Mr. Darden pointed it out this is his point—you neutralized people who wanted to get out and protest this war because they had cousins and brothers that marched off with the Reserves and it was not a Vietnam situation. This President let you fight the war and he was not worried about what was going to happen at home. I am afraid you all miss that a little; you want to close one out of every three armories in this country. What really helped you during the Persian Gulf War is that these protestors were not out there and in my opinion that was certainly a plus in carrying on this war.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Martin Lancaster.

Mr. LANCASTER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman and thank you, gentlemen.

It has been alluded to that Marines and combat air—both Air Guard and Air Force Reserves—were immediately deployed. I wonder if there is some unique service difference between Army, Marine and Air Force and Air Guard that explains why those units could immediately deploy and the Army units cannot.



Is it, a question of unit size? If so, do we simply need to look at a way Army Reserve and Guard forces are trained and deployed for the future? Or is it something deeper and more serious than that?

Any one of you.

General GRIFFITH. I will be happy to. Sir, I think the answer is yes, there are unique differences. Obviously with the Air Force—I am sure not all, but I do know that many of the Air Force pilots who went to the Gulf War—were the day before they were mobilized flying for Pan Am, TWA or one of the other airlines.

Mr. LANCASTER. But they were not shooting down enemy aircraft.

General GRIFFITH. No, sir, but they also fly a lot. Again, as I said earlier, we acknowledge that there are single-function-type units that can go earlier.

Mr. LANCASTER. Well, let us talk about the Marine Corps which deployed their combat units immediately and without the extended CONUS training that the Army required. What is the distinction there? Is it purely a question of unit size?

General EDWARDS. Sir, could I say something on this? I am not a Marine, but my son, William Edwards, was a lead platoon leader in the 3d Battalion, 3d Marines when they went into Kuwait two nights before the war started. He was the lead platoon leader in the Kuwait City airport as an infantry platoon leader. He fought with a Reserve tank company from the West Coast. It is a pretty famous story and you probably ought to get the Marines to talk about this and not a National Guard Army general. It is my understanding that that Marine company went through two conversions in the types of tanks that it had when they went to Desert Storm and in that one battle destroyed 60 tanks. That is a pretty good record. I do not think a Marine tank company is all that different than a Guard tank company.

Mr. LANCASTER. I do not, either. So General Peay or General Griffith tell us why they think there is a difference between Marine combat armed forces and Army combat forces that requires this difference in treatment in mobilization and training.

General PEAY. My view is that the Marine Corps is a much smaller organization.

Mr. LANCASTER. That is beside the point. I am trying to get at the distinction. They still carry rifles, they still use many of the same weapon systems. Tell me what is different beyond the fact that the Marine Corps is a smaller service than the Army.

General PEAY. Well, I think that you have to look at how it sizes down. Because, again, it eventually comes down to how you resource things and the priority that you give things. Today, in many of the Marine Reserve units, you will find Active Marine officers and Active Marine non-commissioned officers that fill a number of those particular positions.

The Guard has State missions. The Active Army does not fill those positions on the Guard side of the house.

Mr. LANCASTER. How about Army Reserve? They have no State functions.

General PEAY. Most of your Army Reserve—it is almost in the 90 percent category—are in with combat service support. So it is not the combat unit that you asked the question about.

Mr. LANCASTER. Is it really a—

Mr. DAVIS. Mr. Lancaster.

Mr. LANCASTER. Yes, Mr. Davis.

Mr. DAVIS. Could I just say something. I do not look at Marine Corps or Navy issues but I am familiar with the example that General Edwards just talked about. The difference there, as I understand the situation, is that the Marine Corps had a company. Here we are talking about roundout brigades, a quantum leap in size of organizations and so forth.

That is why in my prepared statement I said that one of the things that we need to look at are some alternatives; and I think maybe the Army may be beginning to do this. Maybe you have to look at rather than roundout brigades, maybe there are other options like roundout battalions or companies or something like that because it is my understanding, like yours and like General Edwards, that smaller-size units were able to do that and do it quite effectively, as I understand it.

Mr. LANCASTER. The whole reason for my question was to determine if there was an appropriate unit size which could be immediately deployed rather than—at what point do you develop a problem? Is it the individual soldier? Is it the squad? Is it the company? Is it the battalion? At what level do you have a problem in immediately integrating forces as opposed to this long extended training period that has been the bone of contention in Desert Shield/Desert Storm?

General PEAY. We have done work at the National Training Center at the battalion task force level with our Reserves. Again, the synchronization just at the battalion task force level was a very, very tough thing to do.

In the Army, because of the way we are structured under our land battle doctrine, we integrate the battalion task force into the brigade. It is done somewhat differently than the Marines because of the way we structure forces. So the Marine and the Army forces do fight differently. We have a different doctrine, come in from the sea versus the land base. So there is a difference there.

Mr. LANCASTER. Now, one of the factors that is often cited, not in official sources so you are probably not going to want to say it here either, but over the drinks in the bar and that sort of thing. You hear the real reason why the Army lacks confidence in the National Guard and Reserve, particularly in the National Guard. Many of their senior officers are political appointees and have not necessarily achieved the level of competence and professionalism that their Active Duty contemporaries—in terms of rank and service—have. The Army just does not trust those folks because they are really political, they are not really professional Army officers.

But, Mr. Davis, you mentioned in your comments that the leadership problem went much deeper than that, that non-commissioned officers did not have the training levels and that sort of thing. What is the situation there? Is this a leadership problem or is it a unit size problem?

Mr. DAVIS. Well, in the evaluation that we did with the three roundout brigades in the Army, we found that the leaders, both that the NCO and the officers, lacked the training that you would find in similar positions in the Active Army.

As I mentioned, we are now studying and comparing the actual capabilities and different measures of the roundout brigades with those in the units that actually deployed; it is almost like night and day.

Mr. LANCASTER. But of course some of those qualifications and schools may be checking blocks rather than actually adding to the leadership capability of those non-comms and officers. How important was that lack of training in terms of competence of leadership?

Mr. DAVIS. According to the people who we talked to who were responsible for the training, it was very significant. They lacked some of the—when an NCO does not have the capability to train their people, that is very, very significant. When an officer does not have the skills necessary to manage the synchronization of the combat assets that are available to him—General Peay and General Griffith testified that this is a very, very difficult task and very demanding—and unless you have the opportunities to do that on a repetitive type basis, you are not going to become good at it. That is why, for example, one of the elements of the Army's Bold Shift program, as I understand it, is to make sure that some of the training for these officers—they are developing simulations where these people can, on a more regular basis, avail themselves of the opportunity to practice the skills that are vitally important for carrying out their mission.

Mr. LANCASTER. Well, was the lack of these necessary qualifications the result of inaction or was it saying the Reserve and Guard forces were not taking advantage of training opportunities? Or were the training opportunities not made available by the Army, the organization that is responsible for ensuring that training level?

Mr. DAVIS. I think it is both. I think the Army has to share some of the blame here. I think, for example, the commander of a roundout unit needs to be responsible for that roundout unit. He has to be responsible for that roundout unit as much as he is responsible for the Active units under his command.

I think some of the difficulties are—and this is one of the impediments to making some of the changes as we see it—is the relationship between the Active Army and the National Guard.

Today, the Active Army does not dictate training to the National Guard. A commanding officer, for example, the 24th—or General Griffith for the 1st Armor Division—dictates the training and lays out his training plan for the three Active brigades in his division. The general in charge of the 24th Infantry, General McCaffrey, does that for his two Active brigades; he does not do that for the roundout brigade. I find that a difficult situation.

Mr. LANCASTER. Do General Griffith or General Peay care to comment about the politicalization of leadership, particularly in the Guard?

General GRIFFITH. Yes, sir, I would like to comment on it. I do not hear the same discussions around the bar that you are referring to, sir. It has nothing to do with politicalization, in my judgment, it has to do with confidence which is built on training.

Again, forgive me for using a personal experience, but I have been asked many times what was the greatest single factor to success of the forces in the desert. Other commanders may have a dif-



ferent view, but my assessment is that the single greatest contributor to success in the desert—the very, very great victory that was won out there over the Republican Guards—was attributable to the competence and professionalism of the non-commissioned officer corps. It was not generalship, it was not brigade commanders. It was the competence of non-commissioned officer leaders on those tanks and on those Bradleys who destroyed enemy forces at a greater rate than I believe they have ever been destroyed in a battle before. It has taken us a long time in the United States Army to rebuild a non-commissioned officer corps that was professional and competent. We have it today.

Unfortunately, we have not given—and, again, this is not National Guard bashing or Reserve component bashing—the same amount of attention to developing non-commissioned officer leaders in the Reserve forces. When they were mobilized, that lack of leadership skill, that lack of ability to step forward and take charge and to train their soldiers and their small units, was demonstrated.

Mr. LANCASTER. Is that the fault of the National Guard and Reserve or the Army?

General GRIFFITH. It is a shared fault, sir.

Mr. LANCASTER. It is what?

General GRIFFITH. It is a shared responsibility.

Mr. LANCASTER. Now, we have talked about training time and that time is the critical factor. I assume that there is no way that you could have a Guard and Reserve force that would ever have the level of training that would allow them to be immediately mobilized as Active forces are unless they were on Active Duty year-round. Is that correct?

General GRIFFITH. That is right.

Mr. LANCASTER. So the question is, at what point can they be deployed? Is that correct?

So no matter how well we do the training for Guard and Reserve forces, there will always be a period of training required after mobilization and before placement in the field. Is that correct?

General GRIFFITH. Yes, sir.

General PEAY. Yes, sir.

Mr. LANCASTER. I visited many of my Guard units that were deployed since they came back. I visited some while they were over there and I want to discuss with you some of the problems that they discussed with me.

One of the problems that they discussed was the churning of Active Duty leadership over them. They had majors, lieutenant colonels and colonels sort of floating in and out very frequently, getting their card punched, as it were, for career advancement. Oftentimes the people who came in did not have this competence that you have been talking about that is so critical to success.

Are there statistics that indicate the time spent by field commanders at various levels, major and up, who were in fact there for only a short time just to get their card punched? Is that a valid criticism?

General PEAY. May I ask you what level are you talking about? The commanders in a roundout relationship?

Mr. LANCASTER. I am talking about the Active Duty folks who were inserted into various positions of leadership with which the

Guard and Reserve had to relate. They found that they were often relating to different people on a weekly basis because these folks were being brought in and out to punch their card. That in itself was an impediment to their effective operation. This was generally in combat support.

General GRIFFITH. Sir, we can talk specifically about the round-out brigades. The leadership in a division normally stays for 2 years. For example, if we are talking about the 48th Brigade of Georgia, I believe General McCaffrey's been down there for more than 2 years.

If we are talking about the 155th Brigade out of Mississippi, General John Tullely who commanded that division of the 1st Cav Division has been there about 2 years.

The 256th Brigade, which rounds out the 5th Division of Louisiana at—

Mr. LANCASTER. I am not talking about the big guys, I am talking about the guys who were out in the field who were being moved around the desert in order to get them maximum exposure for their career development.

Are you saying that this did not happen. That the Guardsmen and Reservists who have spoke to me were simply mistaken in who they were relating to in their professional capacity in the desert?

General PEAY. Frankly, sir, I do not understand the movement of anyone in the covering force or in the main battle area prior to the fight that would be moving in and out. I am having a hard time visualizing how this would have taken place.

Obviously, there were some individuals during that war that were pushed into the organizations that were there to fill them out. But I do not see any relationship there in terms of training or guidance, or that kind of a thing, that was inapplicable.

Mr. LANCASTER. Well, of course, they did not see any relationship either. They were concerned that there were an awful lot of officers at major and above who were getting opportunities to come into the war for short periods of time really just for career advancement.

General PEAY. Sir, I frankly find that hard to believe and I was there from August on.

Mr. LANCASTER. OK. I have also heard repeatedly that guardsmen and reservists were discriminated against in the ordinary receipt of supplies and parts when they were dealing with Active Duty units. They ultimately learned that the only way they were going to get the same treatment was to simply lie when they went for supplies or parts of various kinds. They simply said that they were in an Active unit. Would you care to comment on that?

General PEAY. I have never heard that. I treated every Reserve unit—whether it be postal unit or combat unit—that was attached to our division as one of my own. In fact, if anything, I went out of the way to ensure that they got the special treatment in the other direction.

Mr. LANCASTER. Well, of course, I know because after the war was over I was in Saudi Arabia. There were Guard units still in jungle camis and all the Active forces had on their chocolate chip, so there was that.

General GRIFFITH. Sir, I would just tell you that is simply not true, not the case. My division—the 7th U.S. Corps forces was not



particularly concerned about what color uniforms we were fighting in. We did not get the desert BDUs issued until we were ready to load onto airplanes and deploy back to Germany. So that simply is not the case.

I think we all felt discriminated against when it came to parts. I will tell you that parts were a big problem. The lead combat units of the 7th Corps went into battle without their full complement of repair parts because we had shipped it out of Germany. The parts were sitting in the ports and we were not able to move it forward. The attack kicked off before we could move it forward.

I think everybody there felt that they did not have exactly everything they needed. But there was nobody discriminating against anybody because of what component they were in. It had to do with the fact that in a lot of cases there was not anything to issue or there was not enough to go around.

Mr. LANCASTER. Well, these units indicated that once they started lying they were able to get what they needed. It concerns me that one element of our force that was over there trying to fulfill the same mission as the Active force was treated differently than the Active force.

Perhaps what the Active Duty needs to do is go out and talk to some of the Guard and Reserve units because they still have a significant amount of resentment. In North Carolina, I cannot tell you about the rest of the world, where 20 percent between the Active Duty and Guard and Reserve forces came during the war, that in fact Guard and Reserve units were treated differently by the Active forces in that war and that it was a discrimination based on a lack of confidence in Guard and Reserve forces by the Active forces. Until you address that, I think you have a serious problem with truly integrating of the forces and getting a total force concept that works.

Thank you.

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Bateman.

Mr. BATEMAN. Well, gentlemen, thank you all. I do not know that anything has happened to shake my conviction. But common sense tells me that those who were serving full-time, on Active Duty, ought to be better trained and better ready in time of a conflict than those who train part-time and who are not fully engaged. It is not said in denigration of those who are not on full-time Active Duty. If they were, they would be super people, not normal people, because common sense says those who are on duty subject to training in whatever well-directed exercise from their commanders have got to be more prepared than those who do it as best they can when they can with whatever level of dedication they give to it. So frankly, I don't find much of this discussion today terribly helpful.

Having said that, I do not find anything that tells me a great deal about the decision we ought to be making here based upon the Vietnam experience. Heaven only knows, I do not want us to have learned how to maintain military forces to protect our national security interests a la the 1930s and into World War II. Certainly Korea is not a model where what we ultimately did was send totally unprepared Reservists and National Guardsmen. I do not find any good models in history.



What I also find a little alarming is if we are going to take the Persian Gulf War as a model—that is wonderful—if you could ever put it together again. But what we ended up with in the Persian Gulf War were resources which were much greater than this country will ever permit us to have again. The forces were originally put together for a mission that was incredibly more difficult than the one which they were ultimately called to go into combat for. So that is not model that is going to make any sense in terms of directing the future.

So I struggle to try and find a way that comports with the common sense. That if you are going to have a military requirement, you are going to get your most immediate, best trained, ready to go at a moment's notice, from those in your Active Duty forces. But I also know, and deeply respect the fact, that we will never maintain that size of force on a continuum and we have to have something that backs it up. Believe me, I want those who back it up to be well trained. I want them as well trained within the limitation of their time and capabilities and those obvious constraints as possible. I certainly do not want any conflict between those who are Active and those who are National Guard or Reserve. I respect them both, I want them both to earn and deserve the respect to which they are entitled.

I think we do have a systems problem as Mr. Davis pointed out. If we are going to follow rounding out concepts, there ought to be direction from the Army's Training and Doctrine Command and from the chief of staff relating to when, where and how training is going to be delivered to the National Guard roundout units. Whatever size is ultimately chosen and as Mr. Lancaster suggests—maybe the size that has been chosen for the roundout units is wrong.

But it seems to me we ought to be spending more time getting ourselves together around those kinds of decisions with those kind of recognitions of common sense than it is anecdotal stories that maybe some people in the Reserves or the National Guard were not as happy with something that happened to them in Saudi Arabia as people who were on Active Duty because I am sure I could find some anecdotes that go the other way. None of that helps me very much.

I would be happy to have any response and I frankly do not have any questions.

General PEAY. May I try and answer that, sir?

I think if we went to the Army's PASDESOPS and asked them how much time they spend on Reserve components, you will find that the proportion is tremendously different than what I do today. I spend 50 to 55 percent of my time today working Reserve component issues.

We have 150 initiatives out there that are working today and they are broad. Many of them are in the education arena. We work with some members here and they have been very helpful in terms of increased support for the Active component. We have lots of initiatives going that way.

We have the wide-ranging Bold Shift initiatives which are the cutting edge in readiness that General Burba is working out at Forces Command.

We are looking at overmanning certain units so that we can send youngsters to school. At the same time we want to be able to do collective training and recognize the horrible constraints of time that our citizen soldiers have on their plate so that we do not burn them out.

We are looking at major equipment change outs of our six Guard divisions and those earlier deploying CSSs. I would like to come back to that a little bit later.

We have reenergized the various leadership counsels. The Guard, the Reserve and Active Army are major players in that in terms of priorities and kinds of initiatives that are ongoing.

I think I could go on and on and on in terms of the kinds of initiatives to get at that problem. Having said that, I still think that we have to look at where the Reserve forces fit in the force generation model to accomplish the national strategy. Because we do not kill people unnecessarily. We want to have the right force for the decisive fight when we finally have to close on the enemy. I think we have tried to do that.

Now, I do not think we can do this in isolation. The cost to fix the six Guard divisions—as we now start through a modernization period from now to the turn of the century—is \$12 billion. Some have said let us go to an additional force structure of ten divisions; but that would cost \$9 billion more. To keep the force structure at 733,000 or somewhere around that \$7 billion over that period. I do not know where those moneys come from as we try to put an Army in balance that can then fight the National Strategy.

So as we looked at all of that and tried to come up with a realistic training plan. We came back to the Chairman's base force of 12, six and two. Some of that has ramifications and we tried to look at the total picture from a strategy perspective. So I think this is very complex. All of us are trying to come at these tough decisions. All of us are concerned about stewardship of resources and we are all on one team. But that is how I see the thing fitting together as we try to decide what is best.

The Army has said 12 Active, six Reserve, two cadre. We think we can train and modernize the six Reserve at some cost. To go over that, we are going to reduce the training dollars that we have to have for the total force to be trained. That is a very tough situation as we balance the requirements to get the right force to fight.

The CHAIRMAN. Let me just follow up a little bit on that because I think that you, General Peay and Herb Bateman have hit upon an important point.

We are interested in putting together a force structure. We are trying to determine the best judgment about the available units. We want to learn when they would be available so that we could put together a planning force structure that says this is a reasonable amount of time to expect various kinds of units would be available so that they could be committed into combat? That is one range of issues.

Mr. BATEMAN. Would the Chairman yield for just a moment on that?

The CHAIRMAN. Yes.

Mr. BATEMAN. The thing that I think we have to bear in mind as we go through this drill is that any time you give up more of

the Active Duty force than you would otherwise have, you are giving up something in some degree of the immediacy and power of what is always available on a continuum to react.

The CHAIRMAN. Sure, absolutely. Of course. Of course.

Mr. BATEMAN. It seems to me that we have just got to make sure we keep that in mind.

The CHAIRMAN. But there are certain tradeoffs. The first question is if you have various Guard units, what is their availability and what is reasonable to expect. Therefore what kind of units can we create in the Guard and Reserve and expect them to be available?

The second issue, which Martin Lancaster kind of hinted on and Herb Bateman and then General Peay—about what kind of reforms and what is reasonable. In that regard, Mr. Davis, I know that you recommended some reforms. General Griffith, the IG's report has recommended reforms, but is your report available to the public?

General GRIFFITH. Sir, that report has been available. It was turned over to the National Guard Bureau and it was turned over to members of the congressional committees. It has been available.

The CHAIRMAN. Well, we have it. It is marked for official use.

General GRIFFITH. Sir, it is available to anybody that asks for it.

The CHAIRMAN. So it is available to the National Guard?

General GRIFFITH. Yes, sir. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. OK. Well, anyway, what we need to do is to look at the recommendations. This is another issue and we can explore it a little bit. We need to look at the recommendations for strengthening the Guard, for strengthening the relationship between the Guard and the Active Forces. I would like the Guard to give us, for the record, your views on the recommendations in the IG's report and in Mr. Davis's GAO report. If you would, General Ensslin and General Edwards.

General ENSSLIN. OK, sir. If I could say, we requested a copy of the IG report and we were told that it had been embargoed and was not available to us.

General EDWARDS. We would be delighted to have that.

General ENSSLIN. We would be delighted to—

The CHAIRMAN. Well, we need to get your reaction. If you say, General Griffith, that it is all right for these guys to—now it is available, let us get some comments on the recommendations because this is going to be part of what we would like.

Let me ask about one other difference between the Guard, Reserve and the Active and then I will yield to my friend from South Carolina.

It seems to me, that there is a fundamental core difference about how we look at the Guard and Reserve and their availability in these kind of conflicts. My sense is that the Active Duty Army units are looking at a structure for the Guard which essentially relegates—and relegates is a pejorative term, so I should not use it—but which assigns the Guard to contingencies that will only evolve over an enormous amount of time. For example, the reconstitution role—if a threat were to reappear, another super power threat, that is part of the base force concept. The Guard and Reserve units have a role to play in the reconstitution role and I think they have a role to play in a scenario that looks over a long time, like the



seven scenarios—the one that involved Europe. But most of the scenarios that the Active units are looking at essentially leave the Guard out of play.

General PEAY. I do not agree with that. If you are looking at the major combat divisions, the six divisions, it is true that those come on late. The mobility requirements study will move all of the Active divisions to get your MERC East and your MERC West regional contingencies done and then the six Guard divisions come on. But, again, there are an enormous number; 103,000 in the contingency force alone of Reserve component—combat support and combat service support units.

The CHAIRMAN. I am talking about combat.

General PEAY. Yes. So——

The CHAIRMAN. Look, let us make sure we all understand what this hearing is about and where the rubber hits the road is with the combat units. We could agree on everything else if it were not for the combat units.

But I contend that as I look at the seven scenarios document that was leaked to the press, I don't see any role for the Guard; the Southwest Asia contingency is over in 80 days. The first Guard units, even the roundout units, are not ready until 90 days. The longest one, the European scenario, is over in 10 months but the Guard divisions are not ready until 12 months.

General PEAY. Again, sir, that is why we said our base force is six divisions because that gives us the hedge for future reconstitution; it is an insurance policy. It does not in any way denigrate the enormous fine service when you put the total force together.

The CHAIRMAN. Let me suggest, General Peay—and we could have another conversation some time—that there is a way, there is a middle ground here. There is a way to plan the force structure which has a bigger role for the combat Guard. Leave out service support and the combat support. There is a bigger role for the combat Guard wants to play and I think that there is a package to put together that combines a more Active participation by the combat Guard. In the post-cold war scenarios that we are looking at and that is consistent with your planning factors—that General Griffith ran through—and that would include a heavy dose of reform issues that would be important. We do need to get more use out of the Guard units and particularly—I am only talking combat here—if we are going to use everything else. But I think there is an important role to play that is consistent with your planning factors. We do not have to take General Ensslin's and General Edwards's planning factors, even with your planning factors of 30 to 45, 45, 90, 12 months, take those plans, just put it into the force structure and call on them to have a more active——

General PEAY. Well, certainly. We are one team and I would like to suggest that many of the initiatives that we have been working on now for 6 and 7 months are designed to do that. But I would say to you that this is a long process.

The CHAIRMAN. Somebody at some point ought to try and explain to me the history of how the relations got so bad.

General PEAY. Well, I think that the——

The CHAIRMAN. I take this little vignette on the IG's report just—I mean——

General EDWARDS. Absolutely.

The CHAIRMAN. The number of times we have run into things like this, where the communications are going by each other. Sometime—all of you—I would like to have a chance to talk to you and understand the history of this thing.

Mr. BATEMAN. Mr. Chairman, would you indulge me again on that?

The CHAIRMAN. Yes.

Mr. BATEMAN. Like you, I am mystified about this IG report thing. I think it would be useful to this committee to know who specifically asked for it and have more detailed information as to when and who asked whom with what response.

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Spratt.

Mr. SPRATT. Just to follow up on that. Was the IG report undertaken at the request of the Chief of Staff?

General GRIFFITH. Yes.

Mr. SPRATT. Is it not customary to have some sort of exit conference with the party that the IG, or an auditor, is examining to go over the findings, first before you do your report and then to do a follow-up?

I am a little mystified myself as to why the report has not been used as a teaching and reform tool.

General GRIFFITH. Sir, I think you are exactly right. I was not here so I cannot answer that question. But I will tell you that I think from what I have read, from what I understand about the process the dialog was continuous. In fact, generals were brought into the process: the Chief of the National Guard Bureau was brought in, the Chief of the Army National Guard, and the Deputy Commander, to General Corns, who ran this was a former National Guard division commander.

First of all, I will tell you that the report was heavily scrutinized by the Army Chief of Staff. He wanted to make sure that we were not publishing a document, or that my predecessors were not publishing a document, in which he was not fully aware of all the implications. So yes, there was a period in which it was reviewed by the Chief of Staff of the Army and the leadership before it was published.

Mr. SPRATT. Well, was it too harshly critical to be published and put on the street or distributed to the Guard? Would it be taken the wrong way?

General GRIFFITH. Sir, I will be candid and tell you that the Chief of Staff of the Army felt it was very important for him to ensure that—there was acrimony over the fact that those three brigades did not deploy. In my opening statement I made a remark that I believe very sincerely. That is we have lost sight of, in some quarters, the fact that the Army knows full well that we could not have fought the Gulf War without the full support of the Army Reserve and National Guard. That those units who came out there did a superb job and that a great portion of the success of that war belongs rightly to National Guard and Army Reserve soldiers. But there was, in fact, a great deal of anxiety and acrimony resulted from the decision to not send those National Guard brigades.

The Chief of Staff of the Army felt it was very important to make sure that everybody associated with the National Guard and Army

Reserve understood that he remained fully committed to the total force concept. He felt a great need to ensure that some team building was done before we started to wrestle with these very tough issues—the reforms that have been talked about by members of this panel—which we must address. We must make those corrections if we are going to be able to use the full capabilities of the Reserve components in the future.

Mr. SPRATT. Let me ask the two of you, General Peay and General Griffith, if you would agree with the Guard's contention that there are direct cost savings to be realized between an armor division, say, in the Guard or Reserves and an Active Duty division. They state the savings as \$800 million for Active armor division, \$210 million for an armor Guard division; with support it is \$1.8 billion for the Active unit and \$475 million for the armor unit. Do you accept that as an accurate cost differential between the two units?

General PEAY. No, I do not sir. I think I tried to imply that—some of those operating costs but when you look at modernization costs that we now have to go through, they are substantially different. I mentioned the \$12 billion for modernization of the six Guard divisions that are currently in the structure—the ones that we plan to keep—the additional \$9 billion to have four more divisions if we go to the so-called ten-division option. Then the \$7 billion to pay for the 733,000, or whatever, that in-State strength is there to man a ten-division Reserve component force.

Now, in addition to that, there are all these other costs that never get recorded. For instance, one of the major successes of our institution, I believe, is our Training and Doctrine Command and all of our branch schooling. Our branch schools, the Leavenworth course, the War College course have instructors that teach about the entire force. There are mobile training teams that go out across our country that try to teach the entire course. So those are hidden costs.

Now, when we look at just continuous training, week to week at the cutting edge of the units involved in directed training relationships, those are man hours that are not accumulated in any way from soldier to soldier in terms of transferred skills.

Incidentally, those billions of dollars that I mentioned are for main items. They do not include the generic equipment such as tents and generators and those are very costly. Some have said that the bill may run as high as \$25 billion. So we have tried to put all of that into perspective as we try to wrangle resourcing of this problem, which falls on both the AC and RC side.

Mr. MONTGOMERY. Would the gentleman yield?

Mr. SPRATT. Yes, sir.

Mr. MONTGOMERY. The figures that you are quoting and the ones that General Ensslin used and I have used them before the committee, they came from the Defense Department in the total force study that they made last year and I think they have verified that.

Mr. SPRATT. These are direct costs.

Mr. MONTGOMERY. About hidden costs—we cannot go around looking for hidden costs. We took what they sent down here and it said it is a big saving if you put these missions in the Guard and Reserve and those are the figures you are quoting.



General PEAY. I am saying those are operating costs and I am saying as you look at the full picture, there is a lot more than operating cost here.

Mr. SPRATT. Toward the end of your testimony, you said there is an additional modernization cost of \$9.6 billion for RC divisions proposed by others. I guess that is the four divisions on top of the six divisions, the ten-ten option. Both proposals add up to 20 divisions. You are talking about 12, six and two and I guess the two cadre divisions would be fully equipped if they were going to be—they would not be fully equipped?

General PEAY. Well, I do not think we have come to grips. The Congress asked us not to move out on the cadre division business this year. Sir, we have five options that we are looking at, they are sort of on the shelf. They run everything from a 250-man cadre division that comes out of our instructors to an A load down Guard division. We simply have not come to grips with the details of that.

Mr. SPRATT. Well, my point is that if you had 20 divisions in each equation, and if you assume they were going to be fully equipped, if they were true cadre divisions so that they could be rounded up and put into action within a reasonable period of time, then the modernization expense is the same for both equations, is it not?

General PEAY. No, I think again as you look at total cost, the hidden cost—

Mr. SPRATT. No, I am just talking about equipment. Modernization. You said there is a—

General PEAY. I think that is probably correct. I will have to look at the POMCUS that we have as part of the overall strategy and see how that integrates, but probably the equipment stuff—

Mr. SPRATT. Would be about the same. Assuming full equipment on both divisions.

General PEAY. Again, sir, may I say I think that depends on what the structure is. You see, our 12-division force has some light divisions in it. We have to see is it a heavy or light mix, what is the mixture we are talking when we go to ten. Then again, what is the return on that investment when you lay out that force.

Mr. SPRATT. I have to go but I just want to make one point myself.

As I read through your testimony, it seems to me that the problems that you outline—the IG and you yourself, General Peay, and the General Accounting Office can be fixed. Indeed, you are already talking about fixes to these problems. The question I have for you is after these problems are fixed, let us assume we diligently and earnestly go to work on correcting the problems that are perceived and found in the Guard. Does that make the Guard a more usable force or does it just bring them up to the base force late deployment mission that you are talking about?

If we can fix it, if we can deal with the pre-mobilization training, if we can modernize the equipment, if we can deal with the interface in the structural relationship between the Active and the Reserve component, then do we have a different candidate to consider for missions in the total force?

General PEAY. Yes, I think there is probably some room there for movement but we have to work this problem at over a number of

years. We have to grow some youngsters now through a different training system. We have to put them through some different experiences. What we need here is some help probably in some of our educational initiatives. I think we need to continue to work here with the committee on some of the AC support that we are talking about, a little different blend of that. Then I go back again that we think as you look at the strategy, to include the Reserve part of that thing, you get the best approach to that with a 12, six and two kind of a philosophy.

Mr. SPRATT. Let me just suggest to you that politically, legislatively, this is an excellent time to put through a reform package, a little Goldwater-Nickols for the Guard. If you want to come up with these structural changes, things are malleable right now. You can put them through and we can try this and see if these fixes work and come back to it at a later date.

It seems to me that this is a good time for the Guard to correct some deficiencies because you are going to be putting out an awful lot of highly qualified and skilled soldiers on the street who can fill in some of these deficient NCO positions and other MOS deficiencies that you noted here, General Griffith. All the way around it is a good time to act and see if we cannot get a better relationship and a better force mix.

General GRIFFITH. Yes, sir.

Mr. DAVIS. I would just like to add a thought if I could, because it gets to your question and it also gets to the question that Mr. Aspin and Mr. Bateman asked.

I think the answer really gets to what your expectations are. If you are talking about roundout brigades, and given that we can judge the future upon the situation today absent reforms, there is no evidence to suggest that you can get that ready in less than 90 days. Now, given the fact that if you change your expectations and maybe you have roundout battalions or companies, maybe you can do it in something less than 90 days.

If you also assume that because of whatever reforms we are talking about or the successes of programs like the Army has on Bold Shift or something, we can make improvements and overcome some of the difficulties that we have noted, then maybe we can chip away at that 90 days also.

But I think you are absolutely right. We believe that many of the problems that were noted in the roundout brigades are longstanding issues that can be dealt with and are fixable. Depending on the aggressiveness with which they are fixed, the commitment that is made and the improvement that is made in terms of means and skills, we can change it. But I think it gets back to what your expectation is in terms of what you are looking for at the end.

General ENSSLIN. I think one of the things we need to discuss is the potential in the Guard and Reserve units. We have achieved standards of readiness and capability that 20 years ago or 30 years ago no one would have believed could have been achieved in the Guard and Reserve. In my opinion, we have not hit the top of the graph yet. We have not maxed out what is capable and what is possible to achieve and attain the Reserve.

I think we should look at the very best Guard and Reserve units and look at what they are capable of. Because if it can be done in



other places—and that should set the standard rather than what we have seen in the past.

General EDWARDS. I also want to add a point if I might, Mr. Chairman. Several things have been said here that get back to a central thesis and it is what you and Mr. Bateman, I think, tried to address earlier. What is the threat and what are the scenarios and when are we going to need forces? Basically, in my opinion, that last phrase, when are we going to need forces, becomes very critical.

I still have major concerns about a three-division force that goes off with only 5,000 or 10,000 Reserve component soldiers called up and placed in combat to solve something in less than 30 days. Maybe it solves it in less than 30 days and maybe it gets the United States of America committed to a combat scenario and that is exactly how we, in my opinion, began to get into Vietnam. I am a Vietnam veteran, I will admit that I am shy on that subject, maybe I am psychologically damaged on it for all I know, but that concerns me enormously.

But the point is that if we do not need units in less than 90—let us even take their days, I do not agree with their days. I still think that the 48th Brigade clearly proved, despite all the detailed discussion about problems, and General Burba validated them as being combat ready in 59 days. I think that we need to fix on that, let us say 60 days.

If that is a record, then if we do not need units in 30 days and we do not have the bottoms to ship them in—and General Leland testified last week that it looked like 1999 before we were going to get the new shipping onboard to do that kind of thing—then I think you can begin to develop a strategy based on when you need units. That, to me, is strategizing.

You can look at Guard and Reserve units—combat units—on that basis. I think the 48th Brigade and a number of fighter units in the Air Force have proven that they can be available in that time at a lower cost, again, using the same figures that Representative Montgomery quoted out of the total force study.

We did not like the total force study but let us take their figures. Let us accept their figures as valid. We do not have any better figures. If you use those figures, they clearly prove that you can put combat units in the Guard at roughly 25 to 35 percent of the cost. If you do not need them in less than 30 days and within 60 days, and the 48th Brigade proved that you can do it, then there is probably a good saving for the taxpayers in this country in a reduced budget environment for a low cost national defense insurance plan.

The CHAIRMAN. You were going to add something, Mr. Davis.

Mr. DAVIS. Earlier there was a lot of discussion about the training and the type of training that occurred at the NTC with the roundout brigades. The Army was ask questions about training in the theater and so forth. I think it is important to emphasize the difference in what we are talking about in that training. I think it is critical.

The training that all the Army units that took place—the maneuver units, for example, that went to the theater—basically when they got in theater, they were honing their skills and they were reinforcing skills that they already had. That is different than what



we observed when we looked at the 155, 256, and the 48th. They were not honing skills, they were trying to develop skills. I think that is a critical point that should not be missed in this discussion.

The CHAIRMAN. Let me just say I think there are a lot of things here that we can work together and agree on. First, I think that the issue John Spratt raised—the issue of the reform—it is a good time for a reform package. I think you are going to see something that we are going to put together. I think then the question with respect to the reform package, is what does that do to the planning factors? You might be able to change the planning factors a little bit, shorten the time.

I personally believe we ought to make planning factors based upon conservative estimates. So I think we need to take a look at how much the reform efforts will change the planning factors; but I would certainly use conservative estimates.

I am a little worried, General Ensslin, about going with the best units and then planning that we can make everybody fit because some of those guys are awfully dedicated. That artillery unit, was that the 142d? That is a storybook case of people who were dedicated beyond the call of duty in terms of the time and effort that they put into that unit.

General ENSSLIN. Yes, sir, but they put a mark on the wall.

The CHAIRMAN. They sure put a mark on the wall. It is a pretty high mark on the wall.

General ENSSLIN. Right. Everybody else is shooting for that mark and that is how we make progress.

The CHAIRMAN. Well, I think it is a great idea to try and make sure that everybody tries to do that. But I think we have to plan on using essentially conservative planning factors. But once you do that, I do think that there is a better—getting back to the question you raised, Mr. Davis about what are your expectations here? I think there are some expectations that you can build on about what you can use the Guard for; even with the conservative planning factor that General Griffith and General Peay would agree to. I think roundout units is one; changing the size of the roundout maybe is an interesting proposition, but roundout is only one.

We also have this notion that I think is a rather interesting one about the roundout units. That is, where you bring Guard units in later into the process but replace units that maybe suffered casualties—using the Guard for a rotation process.

If you tell me, General Griffith, that the Guard units are not going to be available for a year, it seems to me that the next time we have a Desert Storm, the President and Congress may decide that we are going to actually wait a while for sanctions to work. Or the next circumstance could require a deployment, for longer than a year; then you will have to find some way to replace those units out there because you cannot just have the same people sitting in the desert forever. So you might want to call up the Guard units at the beginning, at the outset of the deployment. You are establishing a contingency force to rotate the Guard units out there as the second year of the deployment begins, just in case the deployment went into a second year.

The point I am making with you, and I guess it is a point to General Peay, is that I think you can make a lot more creative use

with the Guard even with the conservative planning factors that you want to use.

General PEAY. Yes, I think we agree with that. I think we are trying to move in that way to include—we have been unbalancing or whatever term you want to give it. In fiscal year 1990 we had 29 percent of the air defense in the Guard. When you look at fiscal year 1996, that number grows to 48 percent. So we are doing some unbalancing in areas we think we know what we have hold of.

I would just like to say, though that we have to look ahead and see how warfare is going to look in 1998. Warfare, as dynamic as it today, could be changed another dimension in 1999, 2000. I think we have to be conservative in terms of the way we structure this force to meet the particular strategy.

Finally, sir, I would like to say I know the gentleman to your right has been a long-time supporter. This is not a fun time for airing our laundry among people that are great supporters. But I would like to say that we have a volunteer Army today. These kids come from all across America. It is true it is not quite the same as in the small armory. But I would like to think that, God forbid, if we lose some of these youngsters, the impact will also be felt across America. Finally those CSS forces that go early, while they may not be combat forces, they are mid America and they go in large numbers in terms of American support.

The CHAIRMAN. General Ensslin.

General ENSSLIN. Mr. Chairman, I would like to comment—in response to some of Mr. Bateman's comments and some of the other comments—on our fratricide, as it were, or our not getting along or not agreeing. The Chief of Staff of the Army is very concerned about building a one-Army team of all the components. He is working very hard at that, as is the Vice Chief of Staff of the Army. They have a series of efforts and initiatives to bring the Army together, and I would certainly not want the members to be unaware of those efforts or the fact that we may have some professional disagreements, but that does not mean we are not friends.

The CHAIRMAN. General Glen Browder. General Browder.

Mr. BROWDER. I have no questions, Mr. Chairman. Thank you.

The CHAIRMAN. General Skelton.

[Laughter.]

Mr. SKELTON. Well, first, Mr. Chairman, you had better tell me whether I am member of the Guard or the Active Duty.

[Laughter.]

Mr. SKELTON. Mr. Chairman, if we had before us the two members of the Air Force and two members of the Air Guard testifying or if we had two members of the Marine Corps Active Duty and two members of the Marine Corps Reserve testifying, we would happily not have the situation we have today of an us or them attitude.

I hope, sooner rather than later, that gets behind us; I really do. What we are interested in—and you are all soldiers wearing the same uniform—is victory with as few casualties as possible. The Active Force in 1942 had a disaster known as Cassarine Pass. A National Guard division, the 36th division, had a disaster in Italy not too long thereafter. So no one can claim—and all as a result of the same thing, lack of training, lack of readiness. So let us do



our best to put this behind us. Really. The us or them attitude. Let us say goodbye to it because the only thing that amounts to a dime is victory with as few casualties as possible.

I might say, Mr. Chairman, the reform package has already begun. Last year, you will recall that this committee in conference with the Senate established a pattern similar to the Marine I&I inspector instructor system. We called them advisors. We start out at some 1,300, it will grow to some 2,000. I understand that is well on its way.

General ENSSLIN, are you and General Edwards fully acquainted with this yet? Have you received any type of briefings as to where that is yet insofar as its implementation?

General ENSSLIN. No. I received peripheral briefings; I have not sat in on one. I understand there is more than one model that is being put in place. So there is going to be an opportunity to look at more than one solution to the problem.

Perhaps General Edwards has got more specifics.

General EDWARDS. No, I basically have had the same exposure as General Ensslin. I understand second and third hand some information but I would much rather hear things firsthand, sir.

Mr. SKELTON. Well, hopefully that will be forthcoming in the near future. The Marines make it work. Their inspector instructor operation makes it work and that is our intent.

Our intent is not to fill high-level National Guard staff slots. Our intent, and please understand this, is for these advisors—I will call them inspector instructors, but these advisors—is to be at the brigade, battalion, hopefully company level giving instructions.

I might also ask this question since we are talking about reform. Unofficially I have been asking questions both of Guardsmen and Active Duty about restructuring the Guard. In light of the testimony that it takes roughly 90 days, I suppose we can add or subtract a few days, but if we go away from the National Guard division concept, unless you want to keep it for administrative purposes, and look at the units to be deployed, to be utilized in any contingency, be on a brigade level.

They, of course, can be made ready much more quickly, many would be ready on a moment's notice, hopefully. Size does make a difference because the Marines do not have anything higher than a battalion deployment and they train on a battalion level. If we—I do not want to say erase the divisions but have a brigadier general, a National Guard brigadier general who goes to war with them, heading up these combat brigades, as opposed to divisions.

I would appreciate your thoughts and advice on that.

General Edwards, we will just start with you.

General EDWARDS. Yes, sir. Our force structure addresses your very question, sir. Our force structure study uses the words ten division equivalents.

Mr. SKELTON. So—

General EDWARDS. The word equivalents is there—

Mr. SKELTON. It would not hurt your feelings to have just the divisions for administrative purposes and have the brigades either for roundup or roundout; it does not make any difference. But ready to go on a brigade level as opposed to waiting for the whole division to get ready.



General EDWARDS. We felt that it was—that your approach—is interesting. The conversation—was an approach that we should consider and there ought to be flexibility. To say rock hard, we want ten division flags out there and they are all going to deploy as divisions is a very inflexible position.

Somewhere within the 425,000, 450,000 soldiers that we are advocating could be the equivalent—in brigades and divisions—of ten divisions. Leave it up to the total Army team to come up with a concept as to how to do that rather than having us try to dictate to the people to my left as to how they ought to organize a whole total Army.

Mr. SKELTON. All right. General Ensslin.

General ENSSLIN. Well, I am a little bit more inflexible than General Edwards.

The Army's doctrine employs divisions. The division is the basic combat unit of the Army, it has been for a long period of time. Guard divisions have participated most recently in the Korean War but certainly in World War II and World War I. It is the division structure that is in place.

I was on a division staff early on as a young major and that division was done away with; it was replaced with brigades. The exercises that we went through at Leavenworth from then on either had us play the part of a division, or play the part of an internal brigade. This was so because they really had not developed exercises to exercise separate brigade staffs in the training set up in the Army doctrine. We feel—I feel—that for us to not participate with divisions in the mobilizations and combat of the future would be too bad.

Mr. SKELTON. General Griffith.

General GRIFFITH. Sir, I am going to certainly speak now with my personal view—

Mr. SKELTON. That is what we want.

General GRIFFITH. Certainly this does not represent my boss's views. But one of the things that I have felt, that I have felt for a long time, is that the U.S. Army does not have enough artillery. As pointed out here, the 142d was a very, very good artillery brigade. If there was one thing that U.S. division commanders fought over in the Gulf, it was over the availability of artillery. I personally would like to see more artillery brigades in the National Guard structure. These are not single function units but are non-divisional brigades that could be brought on, can fall in and have a lash up very similar to a roundout brigade where they would have an association with a division.

I personally feel that the ability to attack the enemy's artillery with counterfire, the ability to mass fire on the battlefield, the type of fire that you need to be decisive—right now, we do not have enough of it. I would certainly like to see something like that.

Mr. SKELTON. Non-divisional.

General GRIFFITH. Non-divisional brigades. Yes, sir. My personal view is that there is great utility in that.

I must add, as I am sure my friends here to the right know, converting maneuver to artillery is a major retraining effort. But if we are truly talking about reforms, I for one would say that we ought

to examine the possibility of putting more Reserve component artillery structure with possible affiliation with Active divisions.

Mr. SKELTON. Fine. Thank you.

General Peay.

General PEAY. Well, again, I think there are six roundout brigades today in the structure. So we have to consider those total numbers and we think roundout/roundup—those six have got great utility today. We are not walking away from the roundout/roundup process in the Army. We think it can work. We think it is a great part of the team.

I think some of this reform does get in the shifting of kinds of forces. The artillery, that General Griffith mentions, is superb from a non-divisional standpoint. That is not to replace the internal artillery within divisions because there is an air-land battle synergism in terms of the way it fights.

We think external to the division that can work. We think there are a number of other brigade size units that could be formed or battalion size units that give you greater utility as you look at the total force. Again, I am conservative and I think you have to let these reforms take place and then you have to balance that against the time.

But I can recall as a captain, when we first started out on this kind of business under the General Abrams model, we worked it and we trained around the clock, hour after hour. Yet, when you start to increase that training time, my experience in the Reserves is it can go so far and at that time the reenlistment rates go down. When the reenlistment rates go down, the readiness of the units go down.

So I am just suggesting you have to balance that because the last thing in the world we want to do is to wake up in 2005, or something, and have the total force not ready to fight.

General EDWARDS. I respectfully, Mr. Chairman, want to qualify that. I think that it is very clear that historically the intensity of training in the Guard and Reserves has been increasing over the years. I do not think there is any comparison between what goes on in the Guard and Reserve and what went on 25 years ago, even 15 years ago or even 10 years ago. We are having trouble getting down to the authorized strength numbers funded for last year.

I think we can improve the intensity, increase the intensity. I think there are some misunderstandings within the Army family about what goes on in Guard units and in Reserve units.

For instance, one year I asked my brigade commander to keep track of how many days he actually worked doing something; and this is a part-time soldier. He spent 257 days doing something in the operation of his brigade. A typical battalion commander, a company commander, will spend 150 days in the operation of his unit.

The 39 days that is so frequently cited really is a minimum number of days for a minimum rank person, and I really do think that we clearly have demonstrated, and you will see more of it, given the opportunity to be challenged, as General Ensslin pointed out, of people who will respond to intensive training. I do not think it has to mean, and I do not think it will mean, that we are going to lose people in the thousands.

The CHAIRMAN. My last comment is only this: I hope that the next time you or your successors appear before us you will appear before us as blood brothers.

General EDWARDS. I think we are blood brothers, if I might comment on that, but we have a little internal disagreement.

[Laughter.]

The CHAIRMAN. Admiral Hunter.

Mr. HUNTER. Just lieutenant here, Mr. Chairman. Army here.

This has been, Mr. Chairman, a very interesting hearing because we have had an opportunity to review with five winners. You have all been winners with respect to the force that you developed for the Persian Gulf, really kind of a historic exercise. This is the exercise in which we typically undertake when a war is over, in this case, the cold war.

Historically, unfortunately, we have been rather inept in the way we have drawn the force down. We have always been a little radical with respect to drawing the force down and we hope we can prevent that history from repeating itself with this Armed Services Committee and this Congress.

I think a couple of truths have emerged here. One is that the equipment differential between the Guard and the Active force has to be totally eliminated with whatever numbers—with these rather meager numbers—that we have in terms of bodies.

One truth is that they are going to have to be highly trained and highly equipped. Especially if you have one of these advanced, innovative integration programs that the Chairman spoke about with respect to roundout or roundup. Everybody is going to have to be using the same equipment; essentially, and the same quality of equipment.

Let me just ask all of you something real quickly. You have been through a long hearing and I have really appreciated what you said. Incidentally, we are interested in the war in California that the Guard has been, if not involved in, at least has been ready to become involved in; and that is the war in Los Angeles. I also happen to represent the Mexican boarder in California and the Guard has been extremely effective in building the roads and the Reserve has been building the steel fence, a 14-mile fence, that cuts off the smugglers' corridor between Mexico and the United States. This has resulted, incidentally, in an increased interdiction rate of cocaine of about 700 percent. I have seen the creativity and the motivation that the Guardsmen have on the border in doing that anti-drug work and we are very grateful for it.

But let me just ask all of you, I am looking at these numbers, the base force numbers, 12 Active divisions, six Guard divisions, the National Guard Association numbers of ten and ten, and the Chairman's Option C of nine and six.

Let me ask each of you, your personal opinion. Do you think we could win the Desert Storm again in the same manner that we did with any combination of these numbers? Do you think we could win that war effectively with the ten and ten division?

Start with Mr. Davis and go to his left.

Mr. DAVIS. I do not have a good answer for that.

We are currently looking at the basis for which the Army came up with the base force. We should be able to report on that shortly.



But it is worth noting, I think, that the base force that the Army came up with predates Operation Desert Storm and it predates the collapse of the Soviet Union. So they were coming up with a base force that would deal with an environment that is different than what we are seeing in the world today.

Mr. HUNTER. OK. General Edwards.

General EDWARDS. I am glad Mr. Davis made that point because I think it is important that the committee realize that. The base force proposal is a follow-on to the quicksilver proposal, which is a proposal that has been around for some time. The Chairman knows that I have reservations about Option C in terms of whether or not we could go and fight the Desert Storm war.

I guess if we mobilize the entire country, call all the divisions and send them all off—you look at the number of divisions, you have to make some assumptions about allies, are the same allies going to show up, et cetera, there are a lot of assumptions to be made.

Mr. HUNTER. On the same side, too.

General EDWARDS. That is exactly right. Are we going to be given all those many months to get ready?

I think that—and I admire the Chairman and I am not saying that because he is sitting here and I am testifying in front of him because he has exercised some innovative reform ideas, as he puts it.

I think nine and six is a bit slim. We clearly think that the ten and ten can do it. I would have reservations on the base force and the Adjutant Generals do have reservations on the base force.

General ENSSLIN. In terms of your question, I think all three mixes would win Desert Storm if Desert Storm came up. But I think we would be at great risk for anything beyond Desert Storm with that particular mix. I think a second contingency would be very difficult to cope with but one Desert Storm, if we put everything into it, we could handle.

General GRIFFITH. The question has to do with the base force, right, sir?

Mr. HUNTER. Yes, sir. You can take any one of these options and make a comment with respect to our ability to win the Desert Storm conflict.

General GRIFFITH. Sir, I think the base force would do it. I think we would be stressed. If you look at the forward deployments, if you look at—and Mr. Montgomery made a point that is valid, the divisions that deployed to Southwest Asia to fight that war were in fact reinforced from other Active units.

My division, when I deployed out of Southern Germany, I had one brigade that had not modernized. I had to pick up a brigade of the 3d Infantry Division to go as a part of that division.

So the answer to the question is I think that we could win it. Yes, sir, we could do that but I think it would be a much greater stress on the total force than our experience of a year ago.

Mr. HUNTER. Thank you.

General PEAY. Sir, I strongly feel that the base force is the right force. It is the versatile force as you look at all of them in terms of its mix. It is four light; eight heavy and then you have the five heavy.

When you look at the ten and ten, it is two light, eight heavy, nine heavy. I am sorry—I said should have six heavy in the base force. So you have a differential of versatility in the mix of the kinds of divisions that you would have to fight with.

I think the base force, though, keeps you from fighting. It gives you the best deterrence because it has some forward presence with it in the right numbers.

Finally, the Option C. Again, I also echo the remarks here about the great thinking that has been done in bringing the debate to the floor. But I think the Option C avoids the Pacific and I think as our country looks to the Pacific in later years, with its economic base and the great land armies associated in the Pacific arena, I do not think we can walk away from it.

I do not think you can win the short war or the medium war in Korea with straight air power. I think again it is a combined team that has to fight that particular war. It is an example of learning the wrong lesson out of the desert.

So I strongly feel that your base force is the right force. I would like to add a caution on the size, though. I tried to put that in my opening statement about the importance of the training institutions and the materiel commands.

We are going to get this thing down so small now we are not going to have the resiliency in the force to make it a healthy institution. So we need to have the combat forces of the divisions as an equal partner so that we correctly grow the leaders in leading all of those institutions.

Mr. HUNTER. OK. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you, gentlemen. Very excellent testimony.

The CHAIRMAN. Gentlemen, this has been a very, very helpful afternoon and it has been extraordinarily interesting. You have all been very kind and very patient and I think you have been really terrific. Thank you all for coming and thank you for being so informative.

[Whereupon, at 5:12 p.m., the panel was adjourned.]










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